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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis poses the research question of whether it would be desirable and feasible 
to articulate common ethical standards for counsel. It conducts original research into 
the issues arising from the nascent process of professionalisation of advocacy before 
international courts and tribunals. Its methodology includes: historical narration, 
comparison between national standards, detailed examination of the procedures and 
practices of international courts and analysis of international codes of conduct. Its 
research sources include: national and international rules and cases, published 
secondary sources, interviews with judges and advocates and unpublished archival 
materials.  
 
The thesis first sets out the theoretical and historical framework in which the research 
question is situated. It defines key conceptual terms such as 'advocacy', 
'professionalisation' and 'procedural integrity' in placing the problem of common 
ethical standards within the sociological context of the wider international judicial 
system. It describes the historical origins of advocacy, compares the ethics of major 
national jurisdictions and sets out the historical evolution of international advocacy. It 
then examines the procedural architectures and practical experiences of the 
International Court of Justice, European Court of Justice and International Criminal 
Court in a comparative study. In seeking to determine whether the articulation of 
common ethical standards would be desirable, it identifies areas of commonality and 
difference amongst three distinct international courts. Finally, it addresses the 
question of whether the professionalisation of advocacy through common ethical 
standards would be feasible. It considers the competence of international courts to 
prescribe and enforce such standards as well as early efforts to articulate common 
ethical standards. It analyses whether an international bar of centralised regulatory 
authority is feasible and the potential consequences of professionalisation. 
 
In answering its research question, the thesis argues that common ethical standards 
are both desirable and feasible. It suggests that the rationale for such standards is the 
protection of the integrity of judicial proceedings. It contends that such standards are 
feasible through a coordinated process that involves carefully articulated principles by 
senior counsel with the involvement of national bar authorities and judges. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
The practice of public international law has been evolving over the past thirty years.
1
 
International litigation, once a rarefied field confined to insiders at traditional 
institutions such as the ICJ, has expanded greatly. This has been prompted by two 
major forces, namely an increase in the number of international courts and tribunals
2
 
(„international courts‟) and the revitalisation of older courts. As parties have shown a 
greater propensity to litigate, older institutions like the PCA and ICJ have seen a 
resurgence of business and new courts have been created in growth areas like 
international criminal law and international investment law.  
Moreover, the subject-matter of international litigation has diversified. 
Whereas once largely confined to areas such as territorial disputes and the law of the 
sea, it now covers a wider range of politically sensitive areas such as the use of force, 
trade, investment and criminality. International law in general has consequently 
acquired a higher profile in the consciousness of societies throughout the world due to 
the expansion of the international judicial system into these new areas. Whether in a 
war crimes trial at the ICC, trade disputes at WTO dispute settlement panels or inter-
State disputes at the ICJ, outsiders to international litigation have a growing interest in 
its outcome.  
One of the consequences of this expansion for the international judicial system 
is the greater focuses on procedural matters. As parties resort to international 
litigation more often and in more sensitive areas and societies acquire a greater 
awareness of international courts, the expectations of all concerning the judicial 
process can be expected to rise accordingly. Not only are new procedural issues such 
                                                 
1
 E.g. – Buergenthal, „Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?‟, 14 LJIL 
(2001), 267-275; Guillaume, „Advantages and risks of proliferation: a blueprint for action‟, 2 JICJ 
(2004), 300-303; Pocar, „The proliferation of international criminal courts and tribunals: a necessity in 
the current international community‟ 2 JICJ (2004), 304-308.  
2
 For definition, see Chapter 2. 
 2 
as jurisdictional conflicts between international courts emerging but longstanding 
matters like the independence of the judiciary have renewed importance. 
Amidst these historical trends, this thesis examines the problem of common 
ethical standards for counsel appearing before international courts. As an emerging 
procedural issue, the regulation of advocacy in international litigation is increasingly 
important as the quantity and quality of litigation continues to grow and diversify. 
Traditionally considered to be a minor matter that was the exclusive prerogative of 
parties,
3
 the conduct of counsel in international litigation has become increasingly 
topical.
4
 In investment arbitration, there is debate concerning instances of 
questionable conduct threatening the integrity of the arbitral process and the 
feasibility of common ethical standards. Procedural objections concerning the conduct 
of counsel and applications for their disqualification have become more 
commonplace. The conduct of counsel appearing before other courts such as the ICJ 
and ITLOS have also been criticised. Prosecutors, defence counsel and judges at the 
international criminal tribunals have encountered a variety of problems in creating a 
common culture designed to protect procedural integrity.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Historically, „parties‟ were only States – see Chapter 4. Today, parties are far more diverse.  
4
 E.g. – Vagts, „The International Legal Profession: A Need for More Governance?‟ 90 AJIL (1996), 
250-261; Mendelson, „The International Lawyer in Domestic Law‟ in Wickremasinghe, The 
International Lawyer as Practitioner (2000), 163-184, 180-183; Cot, „Appearing “for” or “on behalf 
of” a State: The Role of Private Counsel Before International Tribunals‟ in Ando et al., Liber 
Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (2002), 835–847; Jennings, „The Work of the International Bar‟ in 
Vohrah et al., Man‟s Inhumanity to Man (2003), 443–466; Benson, „Can Professional Ethics Wait: The 
Need for Transparency in International Arbitration‟, 3 Dispute Resolution International (2009), 78; 
Mosk, „Attorney Ethics in International Arbitration‟, 5 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 
(2010), 32–37; Higgins, „Ethics and International Law‟(2010) 23(2) LJIL 277-289, 288-289; Rogers, 
„The Ethics of Advocacy in International Arbitration‟ in Bishop and Kehoe, The Art of Advocacy in 
International Arbitration (2010), 49–66; Crawford, „Advocacy Before the International Court of 
Justice and Other International Tribunals in State-to-State Cases‟ in Bishop and Kehoe, ibidem, 303-
330, 304. Confer the view that „no legal rule governs the profession of Counsel before the ICJ‟ – Pellet, 
„The Role of the International Lawyer in International Litigation‟ in Wickremasinghe, ibidem, 147-162, 
149.  
 3 
1.1 Overview of International Advocacy 
As the parties in international litigation have greatly diversified, so too has the profile 
of the counsel who represent them. Whilst the group of primarily European professors 
and practitioners who traditionally dominated the ICJ bar remains prominent before 
that forum, the volume and diversity of international litigation has nevertheless 
opened access to the international judicial system for counsel from other national and 
professional backgrounds. Those counsel bring with them a greater variety of cultural 
traditions, standards and preconceptions concerning the role of advocacy. The college 
of international lawyers has become increasingly aware of the propensity of those 
diverse cultures to conflict, creating important procedural problems in litigation.  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, there was a trend towards 
codification of ethical standards amongst national jurisdictions.
5
 Moreover, wider 
historical developments like the advent of the European Economic Community 
prompted efforts to identify common ethical standards amongst national jurisdictions 
for transnational purposes.
6
 These include the International Bar Association („IBA‟) 
International Code of Ethics 1956, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
(„CCBE‟) Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 1988, the UN Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers 1990 and the Union Internationale des Avocats Turin Principles 
of Professional Conduct for the Legal Profession in the Twenty-first Century 2002. In 
addition, codes of conduct were prescribed by the international criminal tribunals 
created at the turn of the twentieth century.
7
 However, these articulated standards 
were not intended to address the specific problems arising for counsel from diverse 
national jurisdictions appearing before all international courts.  
                                                 
5
 See Chapter 3. 
6
 For background, see Rogers, „The Ethics of Advocacy in International Arbitration‟ in Bishop and 
Kehoe, The Art of Advocacy in International Arbitration (2010), 49-68. 
7
 See Chapter 8. 
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As a reaction to the perceived need for common ethical standards for counsel 
focusing upon international litigation, certain senior members of the informal 
„college‟ of international lawyers have begun to address the problem. In 2001, the 
ILA created its „Study Group on International Courts and Tribunals‟ tasked with, inter 
alia, examining ethics at the international Bench and Bar. In 2004, the Study Group 
published its „Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International 
Judiciary‟. In 2010, this was followed by the „Hague Principles on Ethical Standards 
for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals‟. In 2010, the IBA 
created a „Task Force on Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration‟ to investigate 
whether the lack of international guidelines and conflicting norms in counsel ethics 
undermines the fundamental protections of fairness, equality and the integrity of 
international arbitration proceedings. Also in 2010, the CCBE also created a working 
group to examine much the same territory.  
Amidst the emerging debate concerning the need for professionalisation of 
advocacy before international courts, there is limited scholarship on the subject. 
Although there is a growing awareness amongst practitioners concerning the existence 
of divergent and conflicting ethical standards, the causes and consequences of such 
conflicts have not been explored. The existing literature has drawn attention to 
specific problems (e.g. – conflicts of interest) arising in practice in connection with 
particular courts but there is no work that comprehensively examines the subject from 
the perspective of the international judicial system as a whole. Moreover, though 
identifying particular problems (e.g. – „double deontology‟8) arising in the 
prescription of common ethical standards, the present scholarship does not 
comprehensively analyse the professionalisation of advocacy.   
                                                 
8
 For explanation, see Chapter 2. 
 5 
1.2 Objectives 
Against this background, this thesis poses the following research question: is the 
professionalisation of international advocacy through the articulation of common 
ethical standards for counsel desirable and/or feasible? In addressing this question, the 
thesis has three objectives aimed at filling the gap in the scholarship in order to 
inform the debate concerning the professionalisation of advocacy.  
The first objective is empirical, whereby it is intended to provide original 
research concerning hitherto little-known problems of international advocacy. As 
efforts to articulate common ethical standards and problems concerning counsel 
continue, the thesis is designed to provide judges, practitioners and academics 
involved in the subject with a comprehensive analysis. Thus, the debate can be 
assisted by the original research contained in the thesis.   
The second objective is practical, in that the thesis is aimed at providing 
judges and practitioners with a resource that can assist in the resolution of procedural 
problems arising from divergent ethical standards. Judges, arbitrators, registrars and 
counsel who need to address challenges to the participation of counsel or allegations 
of professional misconduct would be able to refer to this thesis as a resource. The 
thesis can also assist in explaining points of divergence between national standards.  
 The third objective is normative, whereby the thesis argues for the 
professionalisation of advocacy. In this respect, the thesis is aimed widely at all 
persons (specialists, lawyers or non-lawyers alike) who are interested in the conduct 
and integrity of the international judicial process. In seeking to convince its readership 
of the potential benefits of professionalisation, the thesis is intended to stimulate the 
process and thereby encourage the progressive development of international judicial 
procedure and the creation of an international judicial culture.  
 6 
1.3 Scope 
The thesis addresses divergences amongst ethical standards of counsel appearing 
before international courts. Accordingly, its scope is restricted to the practice of 
international advocacy connected with litigation. This necessarily excludes issues 
such as the advisory functions of legal advisers to governments, diplomatic functions 
exercised in international negotiations and non-litigious dispute settlement. Whilst the 
thesis engages in comparative analysis of national ethics, it is also not concerned with 
transnational advocacy involving counsel appearing before various national courts.  
 Whilst select reference is made to various international courts, the thesis 
focuses upon the practice of advocacy before the ICJ, the ECJ and the ICC. These 
courts were selected due to their different histories, jurisdictions and cultures.
9
 
Whereas the ICJ is a traditional inter-State court, the ECJ is a regional court with a 
review-based jurisdiction for States, EU organs and individuals and companies and 
the ICC is a criminal court hearing the Prosecutor (representing the States Parties and 
victims) and individual defendants. Thus, their commonalities (e.g. – all three are 
permanent courts) and differences (e.g. – different parties) provide a basis for 
comparison concerning the problems of advocacy in the international judicial system. 
 In considering the role of counsel, the thesis adopts a functional definition 
whereby it considers those who appear as counsel before international courts 
regardless of their professional or national backgrounds. This enables not only the 
identification of divergent standards in practice according to backgrounds but also the 
analysis of the efficacy of qualification requirements that already exist and additional 
requirements that could be imposed. Finally, it provides consideration of the functions 
of representatives (e.g. – agents and counsel) before courts without preconceptions.  
                                                 
9
 See further Chapters 5-7. 
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1.4 Methodology 
The material of the thesis comes from three categories of sources. The first is primary 
research on treaties, cases, rules of procedure, national legislation and codes of 
conduct, international codes of conduct and other instruments. The sources for this 
category comprise archival research, commentaries written by drafters and other 
actors as well as biographical research into the protagonists. Thus, the thesis seeks not 
only to describe the cases and instruments but also to contextualise and interpret them 
in light of the participants‟ national and professional backgrounds.  
 The second source entails secondary research, entailing commentaries 
concerning the practice and procedure of international litigation. In addition to the 
standard sources of published books and journal articles, the thesis draws upon 
electronic resources (particularly in constructing biographical information). The 
comparative analyses of national ethical standards rely upon national legislation, 
codes of conduct and secondary commentaries by legal scholars and anthropologists 
upon the historical development of the legal professions.  
 The third source comprises twenty-three interviews with judges, registrars and 
counsel from various international courts. These have been invaluable not only in 
informing the research and strengthening the analysis but also in illustrating the issues 
that are of greatest concern to practitioners. The interviews are cited where permission 
has been given by the interviewee pursuant to approved drafts on file with the author. 
Where remarks have been provided on condition of anonymity, no attribution has 
been made. Materials confidentially provided have similarly not been attributed but 
are merely noted as being on file with the author.    
 
 
 8 
1.5 Structure 
The thesis adopts a broadly historical structure which also accords with the division of 
the thesis into the two research questions of the desirability and feasibility of 
professionalisation. Chapter 2 identifies the conceptual issues engaged by the topic 
and the arguments for and against the professionalisation of advocacy. In particular, it 
focuses upon the role of advocacy within the international judicial system and its 
connection to the integrity of the international judicial process. It defines the key 
concepts and the breaks the research question into its component parts.  
Chapter 3 explores the historical origins of professional advocacy in key 
national jurisdictions and compares them in order to determine their commonalities 
and differences concerning the role and ethical standards of the professional advocate. 
In explaining the ethical standards and professional cultures that counsel bring with 
them to international courts, it provides the context in which international advocacy 
can be examined. Chapter 4 examines the historical development of international 
advocacy from nineteenth century until the PCIJ, focusing upon the functions of 
representation in international judicial procedure and the issues arising in historical 
cases. This historical narrative identifies the origins of the modern procedural system 
of representation and brings hitherto unknown historical examples of arbitral tribunals 
and the PCIJ considering the professional regulation of counsel.  
 Chapters 5 to 7 examine certain aspects of the practice of advocacy before the 
ICJ, ECJ and ICC. This continues the historical approach in moving from the oldest to 
the newest court. The structure of each chapter is broadly similar. First, it sets out the 
historical background to the creation of the court. Secondly, it analyses the relevant 
provisions concerning advocacy in its statute and rules of procedure. Thirdly, it 
examines the requirements laid down by the court for the admission of counsel to 
 9 
practise before it. Fourthly, it scrutinises the problems that have arisen in practice in 
connection with the professional conduct of counsel. Finally, it addresses the 
disciplinary regime available at each court to deal with allegations of professional 
misconduct. Thus, Parts I and II principally examine the case for the desirability of 
professionalisation, though they also address feasibility in particular sections.  
 Chapters 8 and 9 concern the current and future professionalisation of 
advocacy before international courts. Chapter 8 examines the legal and practical 
challenges to international courts exercising regulatory jurisdiction over counsel as 
well as the nascent efforts made by practitioners to articulate common ethical 
standards. As indicated in Chapter 2, this is because international courts are 
considered by practitioners to be the principal candidates to regulate counsel in the 
event of professionalisation in the absence of an international bar authority. Chapter 9 
considers the possibility of creating such an authority as a long-term project as well as 
the potential consequences of professionalisation for the international judicial system. 
Hence, the principal focus of Part III is upon the feasibility of professionalisation by 
identifying the legal and practical obstacles to its achievement. Finally, Chapter 10 
offers the overall conclusions of the thesis.   
 
1.6 Argument 
The central argument of this thesis is that the professionalisation of advocacy before 
international courts – the articulation of common, fundamental ethical standards 
regulating counsel appearing before international courts – is both desirable and 
feasible as a means of protecting the integrity of the international judicial process and 
thereby promoting the legitimacy of international courts. In arguing that 
professionalisation is desirable, the thesis refers not only to its practical necessity as a 
 10 
means of solving existing problems but also as a means of raising standards in order 
to enhance the image of the international judicial system. In arguing that 
professionalisation is feasible, the thesis refers both to the legal and practical 
challenges to its accomplishment. In particular, it addresses the jurisdictional issues 
concerning the regulatory powers of international courts as well as the resources 
necessary for that jurisdiction to be exercised fairly in harmony with national bars. 
 In the course of making its central argument, the thesis also offers arguments 
concerning the various sub-issues. A key argument concerning the articulation of 
common ethical standards is that conflicts amongst national standards should be 
resolved through selection where compromise or hybridisation is impossible. This 
selectivity should be generally be in favour of a stricter standard in the interest of 
procedural integrity. The thesis proposes a related argument that the ideological 
foundation of the international bar be based upon the professional values of justice, 
independence and the rule of law. Whilst these values are not shared by authoritarian 
judicial systems, they are nevertheless propounded as the core values of professional 
advocacy both by historical legacy and by morality.  
 This thesis is concerned with the creation of an „international judicial 
culture‟.10 This necessarily entails the articulation of uniform professional values and 
the inculcation of those values into the practice of international advocacy. Whilst this 
endeavour is much broader than the role of counsel, the professionalisation of 
advocacy is a part of that wider process. In considering the future practice of 
international litigation, its professionalisation is but one step in the continuous journey 
towards a fully mature and developed judicial system.  
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 Harhoff, „It is all in the process: reflections on the relation between international criminal tribunals 
and international humanitarian law‟, 78(4) NJIL (2009), 469-480.  
 11 
Chapter II: The Role of Counsel Ethics in International Litigation 
You are a Dutch professor retained as counsel in an ICJ case concerning a territorial 
dispute. Your government, without your prior scrutiny, annexes to its memorial 
„historical documents‟ previously unknown to historians and emanating from its own 
archives to substantiate its claim. The veracity of those documents is challenged by 
the opposing party, following which your client admits that they are false and 
withdraws them. Your government instructs you to invent a new argument in the 
counter-memorial.  
  You are an English barrister in an ICSID arbitration concerning lucrative 
mineral rights. During proceedings, your client informs you that four private meetings 
have recently taken place between its representatives and a senior member of the legal 
team for the opposing party. In those meetings, the latter disclosed confidential 
information concerning his client‟s legal strategy and proposed a corrupt bargain 
whereby that he would persuade his client to accept a settlement favourable to your 
client in exchange for a bribe. Your client insists that you keep your knowledge of 
them confidential.  
 You are a Gambian lawyer employed as an ICC prosecutor. During a trial 
concerning a charge of forcibly conscripting child soldiers, your first witness abruptly 
recants and accuses intermediaries you employed to gather evidence of bribing him to 
commit perjury. The Trial Chamber orders you to disclose the names of the 
intermediaries. The ICC Prosecutor instructs you to disregard the order on the ground 
that he has a higher duty to protect the safety of the intermediaries in a war zone.   
 These three scenarios are based upon real cases, for which all of the 
international courts concerned have not prescribed ethical standards. All three 
individuals differ by nationality and vocation: the Dutch professor is bound by no 
 12 
professional standard, the English barrister is bound by the „international practice 
rules‟ of the English Bar Code of Conduct and the Gambian lawyer has no code of 
conduct prescribed by the Gambian Bar Association. All three situations pose 
complex ethical problems upon which national standards diverge. All three problems 
threaten the integrity of judicial proceedings.  
This chapter explores the central question of this thesis, namely, whether the 
professionalisation of advocacy before international courts and tribunals through the 
articulation of common ethical standards for counsel is desirable and feasible. Whilst 
this question is highly practical, it also engages underlying questions of principle 
concerning the nature of international litigation and the role of counsel. These 
questions illustrate the complexity of professionalisation and the consequent need for 
a nuanced approach.  
 Section 1.1 of the chapter sets out the principal function of the international 
judicial system. Contextualisation of advocacy within the system is important because 
its professionalisation could greatly affect the dynamics of litigation. Section 1.2 
identifies the role of professional advocacy within international litigation. It analyses 
two distinct concepts, namely, professionalisation as the process of creating a 
profession and professionalism as the outcome.  
 Sections 1.3 and 1.4 consider the arguments for and against 
professionalisation. The issues that arise concerning professionalisation are based 
upon three central questions, namely: 1) its feasibility; 2) its desirability; and 3) its 
consequences. The arguments regarding these respective questions engage not only 
basic principles underpinning litigation but also tangible interests of the various actors 
involved, which define the emerging debate concerning professionalisation. Section 
1.5 summarises the main themes that emerge from the central research question.  
 13 
2.1 The Function of the International Judicial System 
To contextualise the role of representatives and professionalism within the 
international judicial system, it is necessary to first identify the function of that 
system. It is difficult to strictly assert the existence of a „system‟11 because of the 
absence of formal links between most international courts. However, such links may 
be informal (e.g. – academia, personnel overlap or doctrinal cross-fertilisation). 
According to Brown:  
„The emergence of a common law of international adjudication is significant for reasons other 
than its practical effects, for it might inform answers to broader questions concerning the 
systemic coherence of the international legal order…international courts are not created as 
part of a formal system. Several international tribunals have expressly stated that they 
consider themselves to be self-contained regimes without any links to other international 
courts. Yet the emergence of common standards in the procedure and remedies applied in 
international adjudication permits the suggestion to be made that despite the absence of formal 
institutional connections, international courts are beginning to operate as if they formed part 
of the same system.‟12 
 
Thus, in this thesis the term „international judicial system‟ is used loosely to describe 
a system with informal links amongst international courts.  
Having asserted the existence of an informal system, the next step is to define 
an international court or tribunal. Whilst the term has become standard in the 
jurisprudence, it has yet to be formally defined.
13
 A useful, minimal definition 
employed for the purposes of this thesis is a permanent court or temporary tribunal 
created by an international instrument and vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate or 
arbitrate disputes between parties of which at least one is a State or international 
organisation.
14
 Although this glosses over definitional problems, it is useful for this 
                                                 
11
 „I. An organized or connected group of objects. 1.a. A set or assemblage of things connected, 
associated or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly 
arrangement according to some scheme or plan‟ – „system n.‟, Oxford English Dictionary (1989), 
online: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/196665?redirectedFrom=system#eid [Accessed: 6 June 2011]. 
12
 Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (2007), 255. 
13
 Romano, „The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle‟, 31 NYUJILP 
(1998-1999), 709-752, 712. 
14
 Ibidem, 713-715. Confer ILA Hague Principles, Principle 1.2. 
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thesis because it encapsulates the issue of international adjudication with 
representatives from multiple national jurisdictions.     
If the international judicial system can be described as an informal one, the 
next question is to identify its purpose. There are considerable jurisdictional and 
cultural differences amongst the respective courts. Nonetheless, the common feature 
to all international courts is the resolution of international disputes through judicial or 
arbitral procedure. Investment arbitral tribunals and criminal tribunals are both 
concerned with the business of litigation despite serving different purposes. Thus, the 
unifying feature within the international judicial system is the conduct of litigation.  
Two main schools of thought exist concerning the functional purpose of 
international litigation.
15
 The first school asserts that international courts perform a 
private function in that they settle disputes between the parties and „do justice‟ to 
them. The second school argues that international litigation also has a public function 
beyond dispute settlement to develop the law and the wider legal system. The dividing 
line between these schools appears to be the degree of activism appropriate to the 
international judiciary in performing their duties.  
 If litigation
16
 is the principal function of the international judicial system, the 
next question is whether there exist core standards of fairness by which litigation is 
conducted. This question, upon which no comprehensive study has been done, is vital 
in order to identify the exact elements of fair trial that are fundamental to all 
international courts. Whilst the scope of this thesis precludes a comprehensive 
examination of this important question, tentative observations are made in order to 
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 Brown, supra note 12, 72-74. 
16
 „1. The taking of legal action by a litigant; 2. The field of law that is concerned with all contentious 
matters‟ – Oxford Dictionary of Law (2009), online: http://www.oxfordreference.com [Accessed: 9 
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illustrate the connection between the integrity of judicial proceedings („procedural 
integrity‟) and ethical standards for counsel. 
In this thesis, procedural integrity entails those fair trial principles connected 
to advocacy: 1) the equality of the parties; 2) the right to a fair hearing; 3) the right to 
counsel; and 4) an independent and impartial judiciary. Within these principles, there 
are a number of sub-issues such as equality of arms, adequate counsel and the 
submission of evidence. Although certain principles are more obviously affected by 
counsel conduct than others, professionalisation is directly linked to the interests of 
the parties and the court in preserving procedural integrity. Lower standards of 
integrity hazard the confidence of the parties and the international community. Since 
the legitimacy of the court stems from its integrity, there is a material interest for 
judges, registrars and practitioners alike to protect and strengthen it.    
Since the function of counsel is to represent parties before the court, the 
conduct of counsel not only concerns the parties‟ legal interests but also the 
international court‟s ability to effectively discharge its judicial duties. For example, 
admission standards for counsel clearly impact upon the right of parties to adequate 
representation. Counsel‟s treatment of evidence affects the parties‟ right to adduce 
evidence as well as the court‟s assessment. Relations between bench and bar bear 
upon party equality and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Thus, 
there is a direct connection between the conduct of counsel, procedural integrity and 
the legitimacy of the court. 
 There are three potential sources of law for procedural integrity within the 
entire international judicial system: 1) treaty law; 2) general principles of law; and 3) 
peremptory norms. Treaty law may be generally disregarded because there are few 
 16 
standards of procedural integrity common to statutes.
17
 The criminal courts have 
statutory provisions
18
 setting out extensive fair trial duties that include the principles 
of procedural integrity set out above. The principles of procedural integrity common 
to the civil courts appear to comprise party equality alongside judicial independence 
and impartiality.
19
 The right to counsel is prescribed in statutory instruments.
20
  
There appear to be two different standards of procedural integrity in criminal 
courts versus civil courts. The statutory duties imposed upon the criminal courts are 
more detailed and stringent whereas civil courts operate under more generic rules. 
This may be attributable to the criminal-civil dichotomy within fair trial principles in 
international human rights law, which is due to the exceptionally grave consequences 
of criminal proceedings for individual liberty. As explained below, aspects of fair trial 
that are connected to the prohibitions upon torture, inhumane treatment and 
extrajudicial executions are considered to be peremptory norms. Thus, if it is possible 
to identify principles of procedural integrity that are common to all international 
courts there clearly exist different standards for criminal and civil litigation.   
The second potential source of law for procedural integrity is as a „general 
principle of law recognised by civilized nations.‟21 This entails its recognition as a 
duty of national courts within municipal legal systems, translated to the international 
level. In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, it is axiomatic that courts must 
judge cases justly according to core standards of procedural integrity. These are often 
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 Whilst each court‟s statute is central to its own proceedings, it rarely impacts upon other courts. 
Whilst the human rights treaties may create a universal standard applicable in national jurisdictions, 
these are generally inapplicable to international courts. 
18
 E.g. – ICTY Statute, Art. 21; ICC Statute, Arts 64, 67. 
19
 E.g. – ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure 1957, Preamble, OP5; ICJ Statute, Arts 2, 20, 35(2); 
ITLOS Statute, Arts 2(1), 11, AU Court of Justice Protocol, Arts 4, 9, 13, 15, 18(2); ECHR, Art. 21(3); 
ECJ Statute, Arts 2, 4, 49; IACtHR Statute, Art. 11(1), 18(1)(c). See also Rosenne, The Law and 
Practice of the International Court 1920-2004 (2005), Vol. III, 1036-1039, 1048-1052. 
20
 This was not allowed in the WTO dispute settlement body until 1997 – Bananas, paras 4-12. 
21
 Brown, supra note 12, 53-55. 
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enshrined in national constitutions and international human rights treaties, as refined 
by the jurisprudence of constitutional and international human rights courts.
22
  
The third potential source of law for procedural integrity is the category of jus 
cogens or „peremptory norms‟. There is no consensus concerning their legal nature. 
One potential explanation is that they are natural law applied as international public 
policy
23
 through international judicial practice, codifying bodies such as the 
International Law Commission and academia. As Orakhelashvili explains: 
„…it may be suggested that jus cogens is based on an autonomous body of superior rules, 
independent of any source of international law. This suggestion is intended not to provoke a 
discussion on the relationship between natural and positive law, but to emphasize the special 
character of peremptory norms. Also, the affirmation that peremptory norms can be created 
through an autonomous source does not necessarily operate to the exclusion of the relevance 
of other sources in the same process. It is only meant to address the question of possible lack 
of relevance of the traditional sources of law in giving rise to peremptory norms, and suggest 
the viable alternatives of comprehending the international public order in the context of the 
process of international law-making.‟24 
 
The naturalist explanation for peremptory norms is historically accurate
25
 and 
explains their doctrinal inconsistency with the grundnorm of consent,
26
 both in their 
prescription and their superiority. One possibility is that they are subsumed as general 
principles of law recognised at the international level, not necessarily by States.
27
  
An alternative explanation is that peremptory norms are an enhanced form of 
custom.
28
 This, however, may be criticised as an attempt to artificially force a non-
consensual communal norm into the orthodoxy of consent.29 Doctrinally, empirically 
                                                 
22
 E.g. – Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (2009), 11.425. 
23
 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006), 36-38. E.g. – Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] ICJ Rep. 15, 23. See 
also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)(Provisional Measures), 13 September 1993,  Sep. 
Op. Judge Lauterpacht, 440 (para. 100).  
24
 Orakhelashvili, ibidem 109. 
25
 Whewell, Hugonis Grotii de jure belli et pacis libri tres (1853)(Vol. I), 9 (IX.2). 
26
 Byers, „Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules‟, 66 NJIL 
(1997), 211-239, 230-231; Orakhelashvili, supra note 23, 268-270, 518-527; Tams, Enforcing 
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), 139-157. 
27
 Orakhelashvili, supra note 23, 126. 
28
 E.g. – Byers, note 26, supra.  
29
 Orakhelashvili, supra note 23, 125. 
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and historically the explanation of custom is weak.
30
 Not only is jus cogens the 
historical successor to jus naturale but there is scant evidentiary support of States for 
specific peremptory norms
31
 alongside challenges to the existence of the category 
itself. Although there is no settled view concerning the creation of peremptory norms, 
the rationale of international public policy founded upon natural law through a 
combination of judicial and academic opinion seems the more persuasive. 
 Having set out the difficulty of identifying the creation of a peremptory norm, 
the next question is whether procedural integrity is such a norm. Whilst it has been 
suggested that non-derogable elements within fair trial (e.g. – judicial review of a 
criminal conviction) are peremptory norms,
32
 the point is contested.
33
 There is some 
judicial practice supporting that assertion but with scant reasoning.
34
 The most recent 
authority is Kadi,
35
 in which the EU General Court implicitly held that the right to be 
heard is a peremptory norm. However, the  Court did not expressly adopt the 
applicant‟s argument on peremptory status but rather asserted that all „fundamental 
human rights‟ are peremptory36 and indirectly reviewed a UNSC resolution on the 
basis of fair hearing.
37
     
Though dated, the most comprehensive study of fair trial remains the 
Chernichenko and Treat Report to the UN Commission on Human Rights of 1994.
 38
  
The Special Rapporteurs concluded that fair trial had not been recognised as non-
                                                 
30
 Ibidem, 126-127.  
31
 Ibidem, 114. 
32
 Ibidem, 60 (note 138). 
33
 Zappala, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (2003), 9, 154. 
34
 Tadić (Allegations of Contempt), p.3.  
35
 Kadi. See also the related Yusuf (General Court) case. Although the judgment was set aside on 
appeal, the ECJ did not address the CFI findings on jus cogens – Yusuf (ECJ), paras 327-330.  
36
 Kadi, paras 228-230. 
37
 Ibidem, paras 253-292. 
38
 UN Commission on Human Rights, „The right to a fair trial: Current recognition and measures 
necessary for its strengthening‟, UN Doc. E/CN.1/Sub.2/1991/21 (3 June 1991). 
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derogable in its entirety but only elements relating to criminal trials, including the 
right to counsel and to an independent and impartial tribunal.
39
 They wrote:  
„Therefore, while the right to a fair trial has not been recognized as a non-derogable right in 
article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [other treaties] indicate 
that aspects of the right to a fair trial have been accepted as non-derogable. Moreover, the 
broad framework of international standards related to fair trial which are not in the form of 
treaties, such as…the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary…the Basic 
Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, are intended 
to apply at all times...it is essential that the draft third optional protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights be adopted. This optional Protocol, if adopted, would 
make the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guaranteeing a 
fair trial and a remedy non-derogable in all situations.‟40 
 
No such Protocol has since been adopted, suggesting that the Special Rapporteurs‟ 
conclusions remain broadly applicable.    
Thus, though fair trial is a derogable human right, elements of it are 
peremptory.
41
 It may be suggested that there exists a „core, irreducible minimum‟42 of 
fairness that is absolutely fundamental to judicial procedure. The Chernichenko and 
Treat Report suggests that, in the national context, core standard has hitherto focused 
upon criminal trials. Similarly, the jurisprudence at the international level (with the 
exception of the Kadi cases) recognising peremptory elements of fair trial derives 
almost entirely from criminal tribunals. The explanation for this stricter standard lies 
in the gravity of criminal sanctions, especially the deprivation of personal liberty.
43
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 Ibidem, paras 127-140. 
40
 Ibidem, para. 140. 
41
 Orakhelashvili, supra note 23, 59. 
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 Per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Secretary of State for the Home Department vs. MB (FC) [2008] 1 
A.C. 440, 479 (para. 34), 482 (para. 43). 
43
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2.2  The Role of Professional Advocacy in International Litigation 
In considering the role of professional advocacy, the crucial question is whether 
professionalisation would assist the international judicial system in discharging its 
principal function of adjudication. Efficiency and integrity are the rationales for 
professionalism: in exchange for creating a privileged class of advocates through a bar 
of admission, the system would benefit from strict standards of integrity and 
competence through ethical standards backed by disciplinary sanctions. 
Societies throughout the world
44
 have followed Shakespeare‟s tongue-in-
cheek advice to revolutionaries to firstly „kill all the lawyers‟45 by creating judicial 
systems that specifically excluded professional counsel as a privileged and corrupt 
class. These historical examples suggest that the downfall of professionalism has been 
intimately linked with the legitimacy of the profession. As Lord Bingham wrote:  
„Few would choose to set foot in a court at any time in their lives if they could avoid it, 
perhaps echoing an Italian author‟s description of courtrooms as “gray hospitals of human 
corruption”. As for the judges, the public entertain a range of views, not all 
consistent…although often unfavourable. But belief in the rule of law does not import 
unqualified admiration of the law, or the legal profession, or the courts, or the judges….The 
hallmarks of a regime which flouts the rule of law are, alas, all too familiar: the midnight 
knock on the door, the sudden disappearance, the show trial,….The list is endless. Better to 
put up with some choleric judges and greedy lawyers.‟46 
 
Thus, professionalism is predicated upon its ability to dedicate counsel to the service 
of the rule of law and its price is reduced public accessibility to the courts.  Ironically, 
this requires counsel to represent deeply unpopular clients (e.g. – an alleged 
perpetrator of genocide or a „pariah State‟). Although international courts are more 
detached from the public eye, their public image is an important factor in their 
relevance to dockets.  
 
                                                 
44
 E.g. – ancient China and Japan, pre-Georgian England, Saudi Arabia, the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
as well as revolutionary France, Russia, Iran and the United States. See Chapter 2. 
45
 Henry the Sixth, Act IV, Scene II. 
46
 Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010), 9. 
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2.2.1  Professionalism 
If professional advocates have a class interest in the integrity and legitimacy of the 
judicial system upon which they depend for their existence, this begs the question of 
what public function this class serves by its existence.
47
 Since it is theoretically 
possible to construct judicial systems without professional counsel, as indeed is most 
of the international judicial system, then it must be shown why professionalism is 
better than the alternatives. The most convincing rationale is that professionalism, in 
requiring moral behaviour from counsel through collective ethics and discipline, is a 
better safeguard for the integrity and competence of the international judicial system 
than the alternatives of general self-representation or amateur representation. 
 Professional ethics are a collective set of moral rules governing the provision 
of a service. They are, of course, not the only potential motivation for professional 
conduct. Others include personal morality and pressures from other collective entities 
whether from clients, the wider State law, the legal services markets, family, 
community, religion and so on. What differentiates professional ethics from other 
sources of collective moral rules is their narrow application to select occupations as 
well as their endorsement by the State. This description of the status of professional 
ethics at the national level, however, does not explain why professionalism exists. The 
idea is of historically recent origin as a response to corruption by compelling 
advocates to behave morally. Architectural reforms in France, the UK and elsewhere 
to liberalise the legal professions and promote a „competitive ethos‟ have challenged 
this traditional professionalism.  
If the overarching rationale of professionalism is to promote the fundamental 
mission of procedural integrity within the international judicial system, the concept 
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 Do lawyers have a concordat with society to do „good works‟ as the price for their independence – 
Abel, „Revisioning Lawyers‟ in Abel and Lewis, Lawyers in Society: An Overview (1995), 1-38, 16.  
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has still to be defined to identify its features. Three distinct criteria are necessary for 
the existence of a professional system of representation: 1) qualification requirements 
for the admission of representatives to practice; 2) ethical rules governing 
representatives‟ professional conduct; and 3) a disciplinary regime that investigates 
and enforces alleged professional misconduct. The function of admission 
requirements is to ensure a minimal threshold of competence and training in the art of 
forensic advocacy, which in turn promotes the integrity of the judicial system. 
Professional ethics guide advocates by defining their duties, particularly in difficult 
situations. A disciplinary regime exists to investigate and sanction professional 
misconduct with expertise and procedural fairness. 
 Prescription is an important, perhaps even an indispensable, part of 
professional ethics. It provides corporealness and precision to ethereal custom and 
etiquette. This is particularly important in moving beyond ethereal principles to 
address specific, nuanced dilemma. Although ethical principles appeared in statutes 
from the Middle Ages, professional ethics primarily existed in custom through rulings 
by self-regulating professional bodies until the twentieth century. This may be 
responsible for the sub-conscious perception of ethics in some quarters as cultural 
rather than legal principles. Thus, codification of ethics is not only a matter of 
articulating common principles but also of enhancing their authority to compel 
advocates to respect those principles in practice. Crucial to their authoritativeness is 
the content of the principles themselves in striking the right balance between a 
disregard for the benefits of consensus amongst practitioners and a failure to address 
controversial issues that demand normativity.   
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2.2.2  Professionalisation 
Advocacy has primarily been a self-regulating profession within the European 
jurisdictions whence it originated. Gradually, the professions organised into bar 
associations to which individual advocates are professionally accountable. Two 
principal justifications may be offered for this approach: 1) professional 
independence, particularly to preserve freedom from client pressure; and 2) 
competence in forensic advocacy, in that non-professionals cannot presume to judge 
what they have not themselves done.  
However, self-regulation is not a requirement for the existence of a profession. 
It should not be assumed that self-regulation is necessarily the end-goal of 
professionalisation or that it is the ideal or only form which a profession can take. It is 
arguable that professionalism stems not from institutions but from culture. A 
profession formally regulated by the State may be substantively independent whilst 
one formally self-regulating may in reality be subservient. Moreover, it is arguable 
that expertise in the ethics of advocacy may be attained from study and not only from 
experience against the common wisdom that only those who have been practitioners 
can judge practitioners.  
 An additional objection to self-regulation is the existence of an incentive to 
promote collective interests as perceived by the profession. Paradoxically, institutions 
comprising professionals may not be the most trustworthy to uphold professionalism. 
A variety of motives may corrupt professional discipline and begin the process of de-
legitimisation and decay of the profession itself. Although the survival of professional 
advocacy is linked to its reputation amongst the wider public, professionalisation is 
arguably self-defeating by creating a corporate interest of professionals that replaces 
the altruistic interests of justice that they are intended to serve.  
 24 
 Professionalisation is used in this thesis to signify the transition from an 
unregulated system of advocacy to one regulated by professionalism.
48
 The two 
traditional sociological theories were the „trait‟ approach and „functionalist‟ 
approach.
49
 The former is concerned with identifying key attributes of 
professionalism and assessing whether a given occupation possesses them to qualify 
as a profession. The latter is a reaction to the former by contextualising the occupation 
within the wider society to which it belongs rather than accepting the image that 
professionals have of themselves. Although other theories have been offered, 
sociologists generally agree that professionals and professions act for a dual motive 
„to provide service and use their knowledge for economic gain.‟50 The struggle 
between the „grand old men‟ of commercial arbitration and the Anglo-American law 
firms concerning disclosure of conflicts of interest at the International Chamber of 
Commerce is emblematic of this mixing of principles and market competition.
51
    
 Assessment of the validity of these competing sociological theories for 
professionalism is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, since the thesis is 
concerned with the professionalisation of the international bar, it is worth considering 
both of the questions that they pose. The thesis attempts to identify the attributes 
which the international bar must attain in order to become a profession and to 
understand the historical causes for the nascent professionalisation being attempted by 
certain members of the international bar, for which the unique traits of the 
international bar are critical.  
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2.2.3  Fundamental Ethical Duties 
One of the primary functions of the advocate is to seek to persuade the court of the 
righteousness of his client‟s cause. This may be regarded as the „private‟ aspect of 
forensic advocacy. There is clearly a tension between the public interest in ensuring 
that justice is done and the private interest of the client in defending his interests. A 
key argument in this thesis is that all ethical problems of advocacy may be 
encapsulated within a basic dilemma, namely, conflicts between the duties owed by 
an advocate to justice, court and the client. In this context, justice is mainly 
procedural but may also be substantive or consequential. The court refers to the 
institution, comprising the judiciary and registry. The client encompasses the legal 
interests that the advocate defends.  
A common conception of professional ethics envisages competing duties to 
the court and the client. However, the court‟s interests may not always coincide with 
those of justice. Judges, arbitrators and registrars can misbehave and the political 
interests of the court may pressure counsel to disregard procedural integrity. For 
example, the selective justice of the ICTR in not prosecuting alleged war criminals 
from the Rwandan Patriotic Front resulted from obstruction by the Tutsi-run Rwandan 
government.
52
  Institutional interests require practical cooperation to function whereas 
justice demands the impartial exercise of the prosecutorial discretion. There may also 
be cases in which the court is unaware of a threat to justice. For example, the ICSID 
arbitrators in Foresti were ignorant of secret meetings between the claimants and an 
advocate for the respondent in which a corrupt bargain was discussed. The claimants 
eventually informed their counsel who, bound by confidentiality, advised disclosure. 
An overriding duty to justice requires the advocate to act even without judicial order. 
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2.3 Arguments for the Professionalisation of Advocacy  
Some of the arguments for and against the professionalisation of advocacy have 
already been foreshadowed, which revolve around the two basic issues of the 
desirability and feasibility of articulating common ethical standards as a means of 
protecting procedural integrity. The arguments in favour of professionalisation are: 1) 
professionalism is necessary to solve recurring problems in practice; 2) 
professionalism is desirable to enhance the image of the international judicial system; 
and 3) professionalisation is achievable through progressive stages. Since 
professionalisation is used both in a trait sense of attaining the concrete attributes of a 
professional bar identified above and in a functional sense of raising ethical standards 
to promote the legitimacy of the practice of international advocacy in wider society, 
these arguments address both end-goals.  
 
2.3.1 Solving Practical Problems 
The first, and most compelling, argument in favour of professionalisation is that 
professionalism is necessary to solve real problems that have repeatedly arisen and 
continue to arise in practice. They point to two basic problems, both of which can 
seriously threaten procedural integrity: 1) conflicting national standards of conduct 
amongst professionals on important procedural points; and 2) the presence of non-
professional advocates who are not bound by any ethical rules whatsoever. Amongst 
those practitioners who have participated in the nascent project of professionalisation 
or who are otherwise in favour of it, necessity is the most frequently raised argument. 
Consequently, one explanation for the professionalisation phenomenon is as a 
reaction to practical problems that are sufficiently frequent as to prompt remedial 
action.  
 27 
 However, it should not be assumed that their perception is necessarily accurate 
or that their personal experiences imply a wider systemic problem. It is arguable that 
professionalisation could be said to be an overreaction to isolated or relatively 
infrequent problems and that, taken as a whole, the existing regulatory setup has 
proved itself to be adequate to discharge the function of litigation. Thus, the crucial 
test for determining whether professionalisation is necessary is whether practice 
shows that ethical problems threatening procedural integrity occur sufficiently 
frequently to justify the change. Since the necessity argument is predicated upon facts, 
those facts must be clearly proved.      
  This is one of the most important forensic tasks of this thesis and entails three 
basis levels of research. The first stage is to examine whether national standards of 
conduct, in principle, diverge from one another. This is the purpose of the inquiry into 
national traditions of advocacy in Chapter 2. The second stage is to determine how 
and why international advocacy is currently practised as it is. This is done through a 
historical analysis of international advocacy in Chapter 3. The third stage is to assess 
the practice and procedures of international courts to determine whether divergent 
standards of conduct actually exist and, if so, whether they have caused significant 
problems. This is done in scrutinising the jurisprudence of the ICJ, ECJ and ICC in 
Chapters 4-7. An additional strand to this argument is that, even if certain problems 
have not yet occurred in practice or have arisen only infrequently, professionalisation 
is nevertheless necessary to prevent rather than cure by clarifying ambiguities and 
deterring misconduct.  
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2.3.2  Enhancing the Image of International Courts 
A second argument in favour of professionalisation is that a professional image would 
be beneficial to international courts in promoting their legitimacy amongst the public 
and thereby boost the confidence of their constituents. For example, the respect of 
national judges for their international counterparts (and, by extension, for the latter‟s 
decisions) would arguably increase along with a more meritocratic, transparent and 
professional system of judicial recruitment and regulation.
53
 Analogically, national 
respect for the quality of international adjudication would presumably increase as a 
result of a more meritocratic, transparent and professional system of advocacy. It may 
be surmised that that confidence would, in turn, be useful in attracting future business 
from potential litigants. Thus, this argument is essentially about using an image of 
procedural integrity and sophistication as a tool for marketing international courts for 
business.  
Whilst this argument clearly applies most readily to those international courts 
with consent-based jurisdictions like the ICJ and ITLOS, it may also be applied to 
those courts with compulsory jurisdictions such as the ECJ, ICC and ECtHR. For the 
ICC and ECtHR, there is continual pressure to sustain and enhance their external 
legitimacy. In the case of the ICC, this is in order to attract more States to accede to 
the Rome Statute. In the case of the ECtHR (and, to a lesser extent, the ECJ in the EU 
context) this is in order to keep the existing parties within the Council of Europe and, 
crucially, to persuade certain States to fully implement adverse judgments.  
Consequently, the image of those Courts is an important factor for their 
overall agenda for which professionalisation could be a helpful tool. It can also be 
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about enhancing the prestige of the Court amongst professional practitioners. In the 
words of one judge at the Strasbourg Court: 
„For me, having a code of conduct is as much a question of appearances to the outside world 
as it is a question of practice. It is difficult to explain to the outside world why we have ethics 
for judges, doctors, politicians and even for companies but we do not need them for counsel. 
Also, can we as a Court honestly say that we are so much better that we are not ourselves 
subject to temptations or to difficulties? For example, when we were considering the 
Resolution on Judicial Ethics, several drafts had to be prepared and put to the Plenary before 
an acceptable version was found. This process took between one and two years and I now 
think that it was a good thing that it took so much time because it really made us stop and 
think about these issues, particularly those judges who were sceptical at first about the whole 
idea. For example, on the propriety of accepting gifts or honours, can we say that accepting a 
small plate from a bar association leaves a judge open to accusations of bias? Clearly not. But 
then, can we say that accepting an all-expenses-paid holiday trip offered by a bar association 
or a government, for example a judge‟s home country, would leave that judge free from such 
suspicions of improper influence? Maybe not. It can often be difficult for judges, who realise 
that these people wish to be kind and honour them, to refuse such gifts as improper without 
telling a white lie to get out of it. With a Resolution that they can cite, that problem disappears 
completely. When you get into the details, you realise that things are more complex than they 
may at first appear.‟54 
 
The counter-argument to this assertion is that it cannot be proved that 
professionalisation would necessarily enhance the images of international courts. 
Furthermore, if the project is being done solely or principally for that purpose, it is 
arguably a weak rationale for investing effort into changing a working system if it 
cannot be proved that there is a real need in practice. Whilst it is impossible to predict 
the impact of professionalisation on the image of the international judicial system, in 
principle it is certainly arguable that it would have a certain positive effect.  
 
2.3.3  Stages of Professionalisation 
Moving from desirability to feasibility, an argument for professionalisation is that it is 
achievable through clearly identifiable stages. In this respect, a programme for the 
project can be constructed that would progressively lead to the normalisation of 
professionalism in the international judicial system. The following outline may be 
considered: 
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1) articulation of common ethical standards based upon the consensus of 
practitioners from a range of professional and national backgrounds; 
2) application of those articulated principles by individual international courts 
to solve problems arising in their proceedings; 
3) prescription of codes of conduct inspired by those principles into the 
procedural rules of individual courts; 
4) construction of a disciplinary jurisdiction harmonised across courts; 
5) harmonisation of international regulatory jurisdictions with national bars; 
and 
6) imposition of admission requirements in international courts. 
Although Chapter 8 examines the possibility of centralisation into a unified 
international bar, self-regulation is not a requirement for professionalism. As will be 
seen in Chapter 7, a decentralised model reflecting the fragmented nature of the 
international judicial system can not only achieve professionalism but is also more 
practicable than the centralisation of regulatory authority. Whilst there would clearly 
an element of cross-fertilisation amongst international courts in taking these steps, a 
centrifugal international judicial system necessarily precludes complete uniformity of 
professionalism. Rather, it is likelier that international courts will develop their own 
standards according to their particular needs and cultures whilst informally referring 
to each other‟s activity in doing so. 
Of course, it cannot be predicted exactly how professionalisation will take 
shape. In this very early stage of the process, the first stage has already begun with the 
articulation of the ILA Hague Principles. As will be considered in Chapter 7, those 
Principles are a response to the argument against professionalisation set out below 
that the articulation of universal standards is impossible. However, even if the 
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Principles can be accepted as an achievement of its goal, there are other practical 
difficulties that will need to be solved in order to complete professionalisation. Those 
obstacles include double deontology, procedural safeguards for professional discipline 
and the potential opposition of some States to the deprivation of traditional 
prerogatives. Thus, the crucial test for the feasibility of professionalisation is the 
ability to craft inventive solutions for these complex problems and to persuade 
practitioners and States that, far from a threat to their interests, professionalisation 
would in fact serve them.  
An important question is the potential consequences of professionalisation 
upon the international judicial system. The current system of largely unregulated 
advocacy creates three principal problems: 1) an unlevel playing field, whereby some 
advocates are bound by standards to which others are not; 2) conflicting national 
standards demanding harmonisation and uniformity; and 3) unaddressed misconduct 
for want of a clear regulatory framework. Since the rationale of professionalisation is 
to protect procedural integrity and these problems adversely affect that integrity, the 
test for its success is whether it solves those problems. The scale of the impact of the 
project upon the practice of advocacy depends upon the incisiveness of senior 
practitioners and the judiciary. Although it is unlikely that professionalisation would 
have no effect at all, moderate steps would produce only a moderate result.  
 
2.4  Arguments against the Professionalisation of Advocacy 
In the emerging debate amongst practitioners concerning professionalisation, cogent 
arguments have been made against it. Those arguments principally point towards the 
considerable difficulties of implementation but also, less persuasively, suggest that the 
end-goal of professionalism is in principle undesirable. Although the debate has 
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hitherto focused upon the merits of the project itself, an important undercurrent is the 
potential impact of professionalisation upon the legal services market. Thus, in 
addition to the need to demonstrate that professionalisation is both feasible and 
desirable, a subtle but crucial political dimension must be accounted for to enlist the 
support of international law practitioners by persuading sceptics that the project 
accords with their interests.  
 The arguments put forward concerning the feasibility of the project are 
broadly threefold: 1) common ethical principles are impossible to articulate; 2) 
enforcement of those principles is impracticable; and 3) professionalisation would 
infringe sovereignty of those parties that are States, by limiting the pool of available 
advocates and increasing the independence of their counsel from their control. 
Arguments advanced regarding desirability are: 1) codes of conduct would encourage 
abusive litigiousness amongst counsel; and 2) professionalisation is a conspiracy of 
common law practitioners to remove Romano-Germanic academics from litigation. 
Whilst it is suggested that, on close examination, the arguments concerning feasibility 
are stronger than those on desirability the objections are in all cases helpful to 
illustrate the complexities of changing the ethos of the international bar.  
  
2.4.1 Common Ethical Standards are Impossible  
The first argument relating to feasibility is that it is impossible to articulate common 
ethical principles. This assertion runs counter to the existence of texts drafted by 
professional organisations during the past half-century identifying universal ethical 
principles – notably the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers and the CCBE 
Code of Conduct. However, a more subtle variation of the argument is that such 
instruments reflect consensus on only the most straightforward issues and consist of 
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broad, vacuous principles that gloss over important national differences. Thus, it is 
arguable that the rationale of solving practical problems is defeated by the fact that 
lawyers from diverse jurisdictions are unable to agree on solutions.  
 At first sight, there is force in this argument. An examination of the texts that 
have hitherto been produced proposing universal ethical principles
55
 reveals that in 
committees differences on key issues are often resolved by adopting a consensual 
approach or by omitting the issue from the text.
56
 Both of these methods defeat the 
very purpose of the exercise, namely, to produce common ethical standards. There is 
also a case to be made that, on certain questions, national divergences are too great to 
achieve consensus. For example, witness proofing entailing pre-testimonial practice 
sessions between counsel and witness is unethical in England and Wales, a crime in 
France and professionally negligent if not done in the United States. With such major 
differences amongst even these three jurisdictions, it appears impossible to forge 
consensus on practically important questions. 
 However, on closer examination the argument is flawed. First, it assumes that 
consensus is the only method by which common ethical principles can be articulated. 
However, it is possible through comparison of various national approaches alongside 
analysis of the underlying policy arguments to select or synthesise from the 
competing alternatives. An example of this may be seen in the ICC Trial Chamber‟s 
decision to depart from the ad hoc criminal tribunals‟ practice of accepting witness 
proofing in the Lubanga trial.
57
 This does not imply that a selective or synthetic 
approach will necessarily be optimal but only that a lack of consensus on a particular 
issue is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle to a coherent principle. 
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 Secondly, it discounts the potential value of a minimalistic, anodyne text. This 
ignores the fact that the international bar is not a cohesive, organised body but rather a 
fragmented and mostly unregulated mass of individuals from a wide range of 
professional and national backgrounds. In particular, the lack of admission 
requirements at courts like the ICJ means that non-lawyers can and do represent 
parties who have no background in advocacy and are bound by no professional 
standards. Moreover, academic lawyers may be admitted who are similarly not bound 
by ethical standards and are unlikely to be experienced advocates. Hence, what may 
appear mundane to professional practitioners who are required to be conversant with 
professional ethics is not necessarily obvious to a great many of their counterparts.  
 Thirdly, the argument disregards the possibility of the gradual accretion of 
ethical norms through practice. It is arguably sensible for a universal set of ethical 
principles to be initially drafted in a relatively cautious and anodyne fashion to ensure 
sufficient consensus. The experience of the abortive CCBE Ethical Guidelines for 
Lawyers in Arbitration 2011, discussed in Chapter 8, is a case in point. On this 
approach, the priority at the beginning of professionalisation is to create a framework 
within which the entire topic of professional ethics can be considered in international 
litigation. As controversial issues are addressed through court decisions, seemingly 
intractable problems would gradually become amenable to compromise, synthesis or 
selection.  
 Fourthly, the argument is self-contradictory due to the critical importance of 
striking a balance between the need for consensus by avoiding risk and the 
importance of answering the practical demand for normativity. The authority of a text 
depends upon that balance by avoiding a document that is so cautious that it will 
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rarely be useful whilst also resisting the temptation too ambitious a text that lacks 
authority. As indicated earlier, this political aspect is essential to inspire confidence.  
 Fifthly, the argument ignores the potential utility of even a conservative, 
anodyne text to practitioners. There is potential scope for professional negligence 
actions against counsel whose conduct is criticised by international courts. Without 
common ethical standards or organised regulation before the court in question, the 
determination of such a claim is likely to be complex. The applicable standards will 
depend upon the professional circumstances of the counsel in question and the forum 
of the claim, which may not fully appreciate the difficulty of applying its own norms 
to the individual concerned for conduct before an international court with an ethical 
vacuum. The potential consequences, particularly for individuals lacking professional 
liability insurance, can be potentially ruinous.
58
     
 
2.4.2 Enforcement is Impracticable 
Another argument employed concerning the feasibility of professionalisation is that, 
even if common ethical standards can usefully be identified, enforcement of them is 
impracticable. This is an important point that can be usefully divided into two sub-
issues: 1) the competence of international courts as enforcers; and 2) conflicts of 
jurisdiction with national bars, known in professional ethics jargon as „double 
deontology‟. The argument is predicated upon the assumption that an unenforceable 
code is useless. Whilst a forensic study of the effects of an exhortative code as 
opposed to a binding one upon advocates‟ conduct in practice is beyond the scope of 
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this thesis, it is suggested that this assumption appears to be correct in principle as 
there is scant cause for practitioners or courts to pay attention to an unenforceable 
code except as a source of inspiration for the development of binding rules to be 
applied in the resolution of ethical problems. Thus, since common ethical standards 
ultimately emanate from a regulatory jurisdiction empowered to pronounce upon 
matters of principle, the goal of professionalisation is to development of ethical rules 
rather than exhortative principles. 
 The first sub-issue concerning the competence of international courts may 
itself be sub-divided into the question of jurisdiction to exercise regulatory powers 
over advocates („competence‟ as a matter of law) and the question of the expertise of 
the judges and registrars who would presumably be called upon to adjudicate ethical 
matters („competence‟ as a matter of fact). This issue is a dominant theme of Chapter 
7, which explores not only the potential legal bases for international courts as 
regulators in detail but also the difficulties that arise from the regulation of the 
international bar by the international bench. However, the key themes may be listed 
briefly here. 
 Concerning jurisdiction, the basic question is whether international courts are 
empowered to regulate counsel at all. The answer to this question clearly varies on a 
case by case basis and international courts have reached different conclusions for their 
own purposes. A critical question is whether the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction 
(also, perhaps erroneously, known as the doctrine of inherent powers) may be invoked 
by international courts in the absence of an express or implied statutory power as a 
legal source for such regulatory jurisdiction. The importance of this particular 
question is that, if the doctrine can be shown to apply, it would almost certainly apply 
 37 
universally to all international courts by its very nature unless it can be proved that the 
inherent jurisdiction is displaced by an express or implied statutory provision. 
 Regarding expertise, there are multiple layers to the question of whether 
international judges are practically capable of regulating the ethical conduct of 
counsel. One layer is that the qualification requirements for international judges do 
not require them to have practised themselves as counsel or to be conversant with the 
professional ethics of counsel, which is surely a basic requirement. Consequently, 
there are many judges and arbitrators with professional backgrounds in academia, 
diplomacy or government without any expertise in counsel ethics. This is not only 
important in principle but also carries the grave danger of a miscarriage of justice 
towards a counsel who may suffer serious professional consequences from an adverse 
finding by an incompetent judge – in many courts (e.g. – investment arbitral tribunals) 
without recourse of appeal. A second layer is the nascent professionalisation of the 
international judiciary, a process that has begun in parallel with that of counsel. A 
third layer is the importance of procedural safeguards during the disciplinary process 
that protects basic standards of fairness for the accused counsel. Without a carefully 
constructed disciplinary mechanism, the authority of the court can be damaged.  
 The second sub-issue of enforcement is the question of double deontology. 
Within regulatory jurisdiction, this has both a prescriptive and a disciplinary element. 
The prescriptive element entails a clash between national and international codes of 
conduct whereby an advocate bound by both is forced to choose between them. 
Alternatively, an advocate who is stridently opposed to a particular ethical rule in the 
international code may seek to invoke his national code in order to circumvent it. The 
disciplinary element involves an advocate being tried twice for the same conduct. 
This can be envisaged if, for instance, the advocate chooses (or is ordered by the 
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court) to follow the rule of the international code and subsequently faces disciplinary 
proceedings at his national bar for a violation of the national code. This has the 
potential to provoke a practically disruptive standoff between the international court 
and the national bar. This is not a far-fetched scenario in the case of, for example, a 
complaint by a disgruntled client or opposing party or counsel. Additionally, the 
national bar may be seized ex proprio motu. Several of these problems have already 
arisen in the practice of the international criminal tribunals, as explored in Chapter 6. 
However, despite the considerable obstacles in the enforcement problem, it is 
suggested that they are tricky but far from insurmountable.  
 
2.4.3 Professionalisation Would Infringe Sovereignty 
One of the principal objections to professionalisation is that it would infringe 
sovereignty. This argument is classified as pertaining to the desirability of 
professionalisation rather than feasibility because, as a matter of law, there is no basis 
for distinguishing between parties that are States and parties that are not in connection 
to the regulation of representation. This is subject to an important exception, namely, 
the imposition of admission requirements for agents. There, States have a statutory 
right to select whomever they wish as agents at courts like the ICJ and ECJ.  
The argument that international courts and tribunals lack the power to regulate 
States‟ representation, which is the latter‟s exclusive prerogative, engages the wider 
relationship between parties and the courts. One flaw is that it distinguishes between 
parties that are States despite the fundamental principle of party equality. A second 
flaw is that it ignores the existence of many powers of international courts to control 
the presentation by parties of their case, such as the admissibility of claims or 
evidence. Such powers are grounded in the need for courts to control proceedings 
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before them in order to ensure that adjudication proceeds in accordance with 
fundamental principles of procedural integrity. A third flaw in the argument is that it 
confuses the right of States to consent to the jurisdiction of international courts with 
their rights as parties once that consent.
59
 A fourth flaw is that the argument explains 
neither the origin nor the purpose of the State prerogative to control representation. 
Sovereignty etymologically derives from the Vulgar Latin term superanus 
(„chief‟) and the Old French term souveraineté („majesty‟).60 Although it is often 
misunderstood as denoting the absolute self-accountability characteristic of pre-
medieval despotism, this was not its original meaning when coined by Jean Bodin in 
1606.
61
 Rather, Bodin asserted the divine independence of kingship from Pope, 
Emperor, Estates or suzerain subject to natural law.
62
 Subjects, by consequence, were 
generally required to obey the commands of the sovereign (leges) unless they 
contravened the laws of God (jura) from which the supreme legislative authority 
(potestas legibus soluta) derived.
63
 Subsequently, the term was detached from its 
original meaning
64
 to denote „untrammelled authority and power and it is in such 
discourse that the term can be problematic‟.65 Such absolutism is diametrically 
opposed to the rule of law which, as the late Lord Bingham suggests, „is the nearest 
we are likely to approach to a universal secular religion.‟66 The rule of law as a 
grundnorm
67
 of political society was asserted by Aristotle.
68
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 In the modern era, the incompatibility of sovereignty with the rule of law is 
illustrated by the Lotus case cited for the proposition that States are free to do 
anything that international law does not specifically forbid (the so-called „Lotus 
presumption‟):  
„International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore 
be presumed.‟69 
 
Leaving aside the question of whether this statement was part of the Court‟s 
conclusive reasoning, the proposition is self-contradictory because it begins from the 
premise that „international law governs‟ relations between States. The subsequent 
assertion that „the rules of law…therefore emanate from their own free will‟ is 
illogical. Law cannot govern (régit) from consent (la volonté); rather, law can grant 
the right of consent. The only true „sovereign‟ in the absolute sense is outside of 
international law (i.e. – not a State).  
 Absolute sovereignty, therefore, is historically inaccurate and fundamentally 
incompatible with the rule of law, which should be recognised as a basic or 
„constitutional‟ norm of international law instead of the „anachronistic idea of the total 
independence and autonomy of the state‟.70 Therefore, it is suggested that the 
argument that professionalisation would infringe sovereignty is a political, not legal 
question. It is about potentially alienating States that cling to anachronistic privileges.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
This thesis will show that the cause of the nascent professionalisation of the 
international bar is a need in practice for normativity in the area of professional ethics. 
The test for the success or failure of the project is whether it can be proven that that 
need is justified by real problems and that it is possible to meet that need by 
articulating coherent ethical principles that can solve those problems. The authority of 
a code of conduct, therefore, depends upon its ability to satisfactorily meet practical 
problems with practical solutions that are sustained by careful reasoning and 
pragmatism rather than dogmatic nationalism. This depends upon two critical criteria, 
namely, an overarching commitment to the pursuit of justice and the broadmindedness 
to jettison a priori conceptions about how advocacy is practiced „at home‟ in favour 
of reasonable, though unfamiliar, solutions. 
Professionalisation is neither a common law conspiracy to imperialistically 
colonise international courts nor a practitioners‟ scheme to eject the civilian 
professors from international litigation. Rather, it is driven by a realistic 
acknowledgement by practitioners of international law from a range of backgrounds 
that the traditional, inclusive methods of glossing over divergent standards of conduct 
in the practice of advocacy no longer suffice. Amidst the explosion of litigation in the 
age of proliferation, gone are the days when teams of one or two agents would 
regularly practice before the PCIJ and ICJ. Now, legal teams can include dozens of 
persons from numerous national and professional backgrounds: diplomats, academics, 
practising advocates, scientists, civil servants, soldiers or even the man from the 
street. In these more complex times, professionalisation is not a matter of narrow 
dogma but a response to a real and mounting need for normativity concerning the 
acceptable conduct of international litigation.  
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 To be sure, there are tangible interests at stake lurking beneath the surface. 
Professionalisation is not a wholly benign process, for change is always aimed at 
something or someone. It is not only aimed at resolving honest differences amongst 
professionals in the highest sense of the term, amongst lawyers of great repute and 
integrity, but it is also aimed at eliminating the pettifoggers
71
 and the amateurs from 
the business of litigation. It is no longer acceptable that anyone at all, without the least 
professional training or qualification, can represent the interests of parties before the 
ICJ, ITLOS, ICSID tribunals or other courts that regularly hear cases of the most 
serious import. Moreover, it is not enough to impose only minimal requirements: it is 
in the interests of the parties, the courts and the true professionals to demand the 
highest standards for the practice of international law.  
 Neither should it be assumed that the process is fated to succeed, nor that the 
considerable obstacles in its path are insurmountable. The project is highly complex, 
littered with pitfalls and not yet universally supported. A minimal degree of consensus 
behind a prescribed code of conduct is an imperative to begin the process, providing 
judges with the confidence to apply it. With gradual acclimatisation to the new ethical 
dimension, bolder structural reforms such as the imposition of admission 
requirements cannot long await. The price for consensus, of course, is sacrificing a 
degree of completeness from the text to at least begin with a baseline. With growing 
awareness of the seriousness of the problems and the feasibility of solutions, 
professionalisation can develop a self-sustaining momentum. Although it is likely that 
early doubts will delay the initiation of the process, the continuing prevalence of 
ethical problems in practice suggests that it will eventually succeed.    
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Chapter III: The Historical Development of National Ethical Traditions 
In Chapter 1, one of the principal dangers identified to the integrity of international 
judicial proceedings within the current system of unregulated advocacy is the 
conflicts between ethical standards binding upon national practitioners. Within a 
single procedure, the absence of common rules regarding practical matters (e.g. – the 
handling of evidence or appropriate contacts with judges) can result in practitioners 
applying their own national standards to the common problems. However, the degree 
to which this theoretical problem is manifested in practice depends upon the premise 
that national standards actually diverge and conflict on such matters. The rationale of 
professionalisation to harmonise such conflicts also rests upon the existence of a 
sufficient degree of commonality amongst national cultures of advocacy. 
 Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: 1) to outline the 
historical development of professional advocacy in order to identify its rationales; and 
2) to compare the architectures, ethical standards and contemporary cultures of 
selected national jurisdictions. The chapter relies upon sociological studies of the 
historical origins of modern bars, original historical works by legal philosophers who 
were instrumental in the development of professional advocacy and laws, codes of 
conduct and commentaries concerning contemporary issues for the modern bars. 
Those bars have been selected according to three criteria: 1) their relevance to 
advocacy before international courts; 2) their historical impact upon the development 
of advocacy on a global scale; and 3) their geographical and jurisdictional diversity. 
By illustrating the origins, development and contemporary cultures of these bars, 
commonalities and divergences can be identified that shaped the practices of 
advocacy in the international judicial system. 
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The creation of an orderly narrative for a profession is somewhat artificial in 
tracing its historical development.
72
 Nevertheless, within those realistic limitations, 
analysis of national ethical traditions reveals a recognisably common profession of 
advocacy as a classical and medieval European institution exported to other regions 
through imperial colonisation. This, of course, was only a part of a wider historical 
phenomenon entailing the intensive diffusion of European laws and procedures 
(particularly in the commercial sphere) to Asia, Africa and the Americas during the 
Age of Empire and the Industrial Age. The standardisation of key architectural 
features of professional advocacy, such as the organisation of the members of the 
profession into a collective bar authority, throughout the world exemplifies this 
legacy. Despite the standardisation of most legal systems into the two broad families 
of legal systems (common law and civil law) considerable diversity exists not only 
within those two families but also between the socialist and Islamic families.   
Thus, the overview provided in this chapter seeks to identify certain dynamics 
amongst these complex cultures – each possessing their own histories that have also 
been affected by a universal historical phenomenon of convergence and hybridisation. 
Section 1.1 traces the historical genesis of professional advocacy and its ethics in 
classical and medieval Europe and examines the European bars of France (civil law) 
and England (common law). Section 1.2 addresses the North American bar of the 
United States (common/civil), section 1.3 the Asian bars of China (socialist/civil) and 
Japan (civil) and section 1.4 the Middle Eastern bars of Iran (Islamic/civil) and Saudi 
Arabia (Islamic). Key elements addressed are: 1) professional architecture; 2) ethical 
standards, especially concerning advocate‟s duties to client, court and colleagues; and 
3) ethical efficacy.  
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3.1 European Traditions 
3.1.1 Historical Background 
Following the Greek Dark Ages, city-states relied upon mediation and arbitration in 
order to strengthen social cohesion and achieve mutually acceptable settlements. 
Parties were self-represented and argumentation was oral and populist with emotive 
rhetoric and lax evidentiary rules.
73
 Litigation was peculiarly Athenian: Solon‟s 
reforms transferred judicial power from magistrates to an Athenian judicial assembly 
of five hundred plebeian citizens.
74
 No judge-jury distinction existed and all 
participants except for the literate clerks were amateur.
75
 Bribery and blackmail by 
„sycophants‟ often occurred. Evidence from the torture of slaves was admissible and 
orators appealed to personal knowledge and private animosities. Litigiousness 
increased due to poorly drafted laws, court anarchy and popular regard for litigation 
as entertainment.
76
 This prompted the orator, who was nominally prohibited from 
representation without a personal interest in the case. Certain „professional‟ 
rhetoricians would compose speeches for orators for a fee.
77
 Athenian justice was an 
ochlocracy of rhetoric, bias and bribery rather than proof.  
 In the early Roman Republic, a patronus would sponsor his client in the 
forum. The illegality of fees created an aristocratic class of amateur advocates for 
whom forensic advocacy was a rite of passage.
78
 Ignorance of the law was considered 
virtuous; the Roman trial judged character rather than truth.
79
 Patroni consequently 
appealed to the prejudices of magistrates (and plebeian spectators) rather than to 
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evidence.
80
 Politics pervaded the forum, as when Cicero defended Ligarious for 
treason before Julius Caesar for aiding the vanquished Pompey.
81
 Cicero was 
exceptional for his professionalism and articulation of the first ethical principles of 
advocacy.  He wrote that an advocate must provide his services to all – even 
defending his enemy against his friend – and that he should attain mastery of law, 
oratory and knowledge.
82
  
In the Empire, the patricians lost their monopoly with the end of the ban upon 
fees by Claudius.
83
 Seneca the Elder and Quintilian criticised the venality and 
incompetence of the infamous advocati.
84
 Widespread corruption prompted the first 
historical organisation, bureaucratisation and regulation of advocacy in the fourth 
century by the Byzantine Empire.
85
 Qualification requirements, separate legal 
professions and a centralised bar authority were created. In the former Western 
Empire,
86
 primitive advocacy existed during the Dark Ages as knight-advocates 
bound by chivalry.
87
 Trials by evidence
88
 and professional advocates
89
 became 
standard by the twelfth century in ecclesiastical courts. The Kingdom of Jerusalem 
chivalric code required advocates to advise clients for a prescribed fee, preserve 
confidentiality and plead honestly, fearlessly and competently.
90
 These Christian 
ideals laid the foundation for European professional advocacy. 
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3.1.2 France 
3.1.2.1 Historical Development 
The first professional system of advocacy in France, introduced under Charlemagne,
91
  
was that of the „State bar‟, whose defining feature was close regulation of advocacy 
by the monarchy. The monarchy vested its judicial powers in the travelling parlement, 
which became based at Paris under Philip the Fair.
92
 Regional parlements were also 
created,
93
 each exercising regulatory powers over the Order of avocats attached to it.
94
 
The Orders comprised ecclesiastical and lay members with qualification requirements 
(university degree, internship and examination) and sanctions for misconduct.
95
 The 
professions split from the fifteenth century with prosecutors (procureurs, later 
avoués)
96
 and defence advocates (avocats) discharging representational functions.  
In 1270, Saint Louis promulgated the first code requiring advocates to „present 
no cause to the court which was not just and loyal, and to practise courtesy and 
forbearance towards their opponents while refuting their arguments, without using 
words of contumely or abuse.‟97 However, Louis XII‟s practice of selling judgeships 
led to prolix written submissions, insulting rhetoric, illegal fees and other abuses 
amongst advocates.
98
 Although the State bar or noblesse de la robe became corrupt, it 
left a legacy of independence, professional monopoly and ethical codification.  
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 The „classical bar‟ emerged in the mid-seventeenth century when the Paris 
Order wrested regulatory powers from its parlement in a complete break with the 
State-regulated regime.
99
 The President of the Order (bâtonnier) eventually 
established his authority. The Order articulated core principles of probity, 
independence, fidelity, disinterestedness and collegiality. As ethical standards rose in 
practice, the popularity of the professions rose with them. Amidst widespread 
corruption, the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV saw high standards and a robust 
defence of civil liberties by advocates.
100
  
Public confidence decayed in the late eighteenth century amidst political 
splits, as at the trial of Louis XVI.
101
 The Revolution destroyed the Orders and 
parlements; most of the professionals shunned the revolutionary „peoples‟ 
tribunals‟.102 Napoleon revived the Orders and ancien régime principles of probity, 
disinterestedness and courtesy but abolished their independence to preserve State 
control.
103
 The classical bar was defined by political activism, independence and 
disinterestedness.
104
 The Orders won public respect, many members serving in 
government in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
105
 Incremental legislation 
between 1971 and 2011 merged the professions of avocat, avoué, agréé and conseil 
juridique to simplify legal services and strengthen market forces, causing deep rifts 
and public protest.
106
 The modern Orders have since been characterised by a tension 
between classical ideals and competitive capitalism.  
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3.1.2.2 Ethical Standards 
Under modern French law, there are two principal legal professions that exercise 
rights of hearing before national courts: 1) avocat; and 2) procureur. The professions 
are recruited and organised separately with discrete rights of hearing, though their 
functions interface in criminal proceedings. As noted above, avocats discharge 
advisory and representational functions; they have rights of hearing before the civil 
courts
107
 and the exclusive right to represent defendants in criminal proceedings.
108
 
They are professionally defined by their independence from the State. Procureurs, 
who have rights of hearing to prosecute in criminal proceedings, are civil servants 
who are recruited, trained and organised within the judicial profession. These legal 
professions are broadly representative of the Romano-Germanic tradition, which has 
historically placed a greater procedural emphasis upon judges rather than counsel. 
Save for ICC prosecutors, avocats (and jurisconsultes, discussed below) are the more 
relevant profession before international courts.  
French law on avocats is contained in the French Law 1971, the French 
Decree 1991 and the French Decree 2005. The 1971 Law concerns rights of audience 
and the reform of the legal professions.
109
 Article 11 stipulates, inter alia, the 
following qualification requirements: 1) examination; 2) no criminal conviction 
impugning honour, probity or good morals; and 3) no administrative sanction such as 
disbarment, bankruptcy or liquidation. Article 17 empowers the Orders to promulgate 
internal regulations
110
 and Article 22 vests each Order‟s disciplinary council with 
disciplinary jurisdiction, subject to the courts of appeal. Articles 26-27 provide for the 
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civil professional liability of advocates. The 1991 Decree prescribes more detailed 
provisions for the organisation and administration of the activities of the Orders, 
regional training centres and National Council.
111
 Chapter III restricts advocacy to 
named persons in the roll of an Order
112
 and regulates professional residence, 
administrative matters and fee recovery.
113
 Part IV addresses the sanctions, procedure 
and jurisdiction of the disciplinary councils.
114
  
The 2005 Decree articulates the ethical principles of the profession.
115
 Article 
1 declares that „fundamental principles‟ are to „guide the behaviour of advocates in all 
circumstances‟. Those principles are contained in Articles 2-5: 1) the freedom and 
independence of the profession; 2) the dignity, diligence, independence, honesty, 
humanity, loyalty, disinterestedness, collegiality, tactfulness, courtesy, competence 
and prudence of advocates in discharging their functions; and 3) strict duties of 
confidentiality to client and court, which may only be lifted in cases authorised by 
law. Article 6 commits the profession to promoting access to justice. Article 7 
generally prohibits acceptance of instructions where exists risk of: 1) conflict of 
interest between multiple clients; 2) breach of confidentiality; or 3) impaired 
independence. Articles 8-9 require advocates to act pursuant to client instructions and 
to abstain from illegalities or frauds in drafting legal instruments. Article 10 stipulates 
that fees, subject to contract, are determined by client means, case difficulty and 
advocate‟s prestige, efforts and costs. Article 15 permits self-promotion within 
fundamental professional principles. Article 16 prescribes respect for the demands of 
fair trial and the rights of the opposing party. 
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3.1.2.3 Ethical Efficacy 
The historical overview of the French professions and the professional regulation of 
avocats identify certain themes. First, the traditional ethos of disinterestedness, 
probity and independence has been challenged by the radical structural change 
introduced since 1971 aimed at enhancing commercial competition.
116
 Consequently, 
a greater competitiveness amongst avocats in practice may lead to the lowering of 
professional standards to attract clients. Second, the qualification requirements and 
ethical standards prescribed for the profession are fairly broad and lax.
117
 Whilst these 
lower standards reflect the lesser role of counsel in the inquisitorial tradition, they also 
provide a greater freedom of action before international courts.  
 An additional consequence of the generality of the ethical standards is that 
avocats have scant textual guidance concerning their professional responsibilities 
before international courts. For example, there is no equivalent of the „international 
practice rules‟ of the English Bar (see below) concerning extraterritorial applicability 
of home bar rules to advocacy before international courts. Whilst it is unlikely that the 
Orders would refrain from exercising disciplinary jurisdiction concerning alleged 
professional misconduct by members before international courts, the standards that 
they would apply in doing so would be opaque. Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether the Orders would necessarily be well-equipped to judge advocacy before 
international courts in which the functions of counsel (e.g. – in the handling of 
evidence) are considerably greater than in France. From the perspective of 
international courts, the reliance to be placed upon the title of avocat to ensure the 
observance of rigorous ethical standards may be limited. 
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 Another important category of legal practitioner to the international judicial 
system is that of jurisconsulte („legal adviser‟). In France, as in other Romano-
Germanic systems, the jurisconsulte is not a profession as such with its own 
governing body and distinctive function. It is a loose term to describe a holder with a 
licence en droit who may work with the law in any number of capacities, such as an 
employed adviser at a company, a civil servant or an academic. In the context of this 
thesis, the jurisconsulte refers to those civil servants employed to provide in-house 
legal advice and represent governments (principally as agents) before international 
courts. The important role played by the agent and the particular sensitivity 
concerning regulation of agents by international courts is a recurrent theme in Part II.  
Whereas in Germany „the legal adviser‟s office consists largely if not entirely 
of regular diplomats with a legal background or even professional legal training‟, in 
France „some members of the Quai‟s Direction des Affaires Juridiques are regular 
diplomats, for whom a period in the legal office is more or less like any other posting 
in Paris, and some are recruited specifically as legal advisers, for example, on 
secondment from the judiciary.‟118 Thus, though it is possible that a jurisconsulte will 
be a magistrat regulated by ethical standards (at least, when acting as such) it is more 
likely that he will be a diplomat bound by no such standards. Historically, 
jurisconsultes at the Quai d‟Orsay who have appeared before the PCIJ and ICJ (e.g. – 
Jules Basdevant, André Gros, Ronny Abraham, Alain Pellet) as agent for France have 
often been simultaneously professors of international law at the University of Paris. 
Thus, a jurisconsulte (essentially a diplomat, and perhaps also academic, by vocation) 
will be subject to no ethical standards at the national level in discharging the functions 
of advocacy before international courts.   
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3.1.3 England and Wales 
3.1.3.1 Historical Development  
Before the Conqueror, ad hoc representation by lords for vassals existed within the 
feudal system.
119
 Subsequently, literate cleric-advocates in ecclesiastical courts were 
pre-eminent as the lay-advocates of the royal courts became notorious for prolixity, 
dishonesty and venality. In 1275, statutory duties were introduced banning false 
causes, corruption, deceit, false delays and excessive fees.
120
 By the fifteenth century, 
the Inns of Court evolved from lodgings into societies.
121
 In 1590, the term „utter-
barrister‟ was first used for student-counsellors who were outside of the (meta)-
physical „bar‟. By the sixteenth century, the Inns became known as the „third 
university of England‟ for counsellors‟ training122 and in the seventeenth century 
excluded attorneys and solicitors.
123
 By the nineteenth century, the professions of 
barrister and solicitor emerged split by function, recruitment and regulation.
124
  
 Counsellors were infamous during the Tudor and Stuart dynasties for venality 
and incompetence
125
 and popularly stereotyped as amoral, manipulative „intellectual 
prostitutes‟.126 The traditional rule of honorarium whereby barristers served without 
right to fee was a direct response to popular indignation.
127
 They were prominent in 
the English Civil War, as when John Cook was hanged for high treason for 
prosecuting Charles I; his defence of acting professionally was rejected in law.
128
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In the Georgian era, the apparent illogicality of defence counsel being 
prohibited for treason and felony trials but not misdemeanours was supported by the 
Bar on the grounds of dishonour for barristers to defend those accused of heinous 
crimes and that professional duels would distort the truth. This changed with the 
Prisoner‟s Counsel Act 1836, which produced two infamous trials129 illustrating the 
moral-ethical conflict of duty to court versus client, truth versus victory. The lay press 
attacked barristers as deceitful men saving the guilty, whereas the professional press 
advocated an absolute right to counsel. In 1820, Henry Brougham had articulated a 
so-called „doctrine of all expedient means‟ whereby counsel owes an absolute duty to 
his client whereas others argued for a duty to undertake „just causes‟.130  
 The Victorian era was a formative period amidst widespread corruption.
131
 
Criticism focused upon inefficiency, aggressiveness and disgraced barristers 
appointed as judges,
132
 Discipline was for the judges and circuit messes rather than 
the Inns and a lax „aristocratic ideology‟ replaced medieval scholarship. In 1851, the 
Inns created the „Council of Legal Education‟133 and the first Consolidated 
Regulations for all four Inns in 1863.
134
 In 1895, the General Council of the Bar („Bar 
Council‟) was created which promulgated the first English Code in 1979.135 Since 
2006, the Bar Council represents the profession whilst the Bar Standards Board 
(„BSB‟) oversees education and discipline.136  
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3.1.3.2 Ethical Standards 
As noted above, the two principal, modern legal professionals in England and Wales 
are barristers and solicitors. Whilst the progressive erosion of barristers‟ traditional 
monopoly over rights of audience resulted in a degree of convergence in the late 
twentieth century,
137
 the professions remain split. Broadly, barristers perform 
specialist advisory and advocacy functions connected to litigation and have virtually 
exclusive rights of hearing before most courts whereas solicitors conduct drafting, 
advisory and other general client services. Whilst solicitors are not excluded and in 
fact appear as counsel before international courts, this thesis focuses upon barristers 
as the specialist profession for advocacy.
138
 Barristers are regulated by the BSB, 
applying the English Code, legal rules and the etiquette of the profession.
139
  
Whilst not intended to be totally comprehensive, the English Code is the 
principal textual source for the ethical standards of the Bar.
140
 Its general purpose is to 
inculcate common standards of conduct, independence in practice and a public duty to 
act for any client within a barrister‟s field of practice.141 A practising barrister has an 
„overriding duty to the Court to act with independence; he must assist the Court in the 
administration of justice and must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the 
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Court‟.142 He must defend a lay client‟s interests „fearlessly‟ without regard to his 
own or to another‟s interests.143 He must not compromise his independence or 
integrity by lowering his professional standards to please another.
144
  
A hallmark English principle is the „cab rank rule‟, which prohibits barristers 
from withholding advocacy services on the ground that the nature of the case, the 
client or the source of client‟s financial support is objectionable.145 A self-employed 
barrister must accept instructions commensurate to his expertise and seniority 
regardless of the case or personal belief concerning the „character, reputation, cause, 
conduct, guilt or innocence‟ of the client.146 However, the degree to which this 
principle is enforced in practice is questionable: whereas some are noted 
proponents,
147
  others are not.  
A barrister must refuse instructions if he were to be „professionally 
embarrassed‟ by: 1) insufficient experience or expertise; 2) inadequate preparation 
time; 3) fettering, unlawful or unethical instructions; 4) prejudice to justice or to an 
unrepresented party; 5) conflict-of-interest; or 6) breach of confidentiality.
148
 He may 
refuse instructions which: 1) require him to work outside of his ordinary working 
year; 2) offer an „improper‟ fee; 3) require a conditional fee agreement; 4) are directly 
from a lay client; or 5) come from a unified professional and lay client.
149
 Like other 
European jurisdictions, contingency fee agreements are generally illegal.
150
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A barrister must continuously assess whether the interests of justice and of the 
client permit him to represent.
151
 For example, he must withdraw where he is 
professionally embarrassed, there is risk of conflict-of-interest or the client refuses to 
authorise a court-ordered disclosure.
152
 He may withdraw where his professional 
conduct is being impugned, his advice has been ignored or there is „some other 
substantial reason‟ for doing so.153 However, he must not withdraw while failing to 
explain his reasons to his client beforehand, for a non-professional reason or where 
the client cannot obtain a replacement without sustaining prejudice.
154
 The Code also 
requires courtesy, diligence, efficiency, competence, confidentiality and loyalty.
155
 It 
proscribes improper arguments, unsustainable allegations of fraud, coaching 
witnesses, inarguable submissions, failure to inform the Court of law or procedural 
irregularity, factual invention, personal opinion concerning a case in which he is 
instructed and witness vilification.
156
  
A key section is the „International Practice Rules‟, which provides that for 
„matters or proceedings essentially arising…outside England and Wales and to be 
substantially performed outside England and Wales‟, barristers must comply with 
local law save where conflicting with [the fundamental principles] of the Code.
157
 
Whilst this applies to international courts, it entails a conflict-of-law approach that 
assumes the existence of „local law‟ that those courts generally lack. Moreover, as 
explored further in Part II, the reservation of ultimate supremacy concerning 
fundamental principles creates the potential for conflict between English standards 
and putative international standards („double deontology‟).  
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3.1.3.3 Ethical Efficacy 
This survey of the history and professional ethics of the English Bar indicates that 
more exacting and detailed standards apply than for French avocats. This may be 
explained by the greater role that parties play in adversarial procedure and the 
historical continuity of the Bar‟s traditions and etiquette. The applicability of the 
fundamental principles of the Bar to international litigation means that barristers are 
bound by stricter standards, creating a distorted playing field. Without equally 
rigorous international standards, it is unlikely that the English Bar would fully 
relinquish its jurisdiction to international courts.  
Despite barristers‟ historical independence, the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries have seen increasing interference from the State.
158
 The Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990 increased external regulation whilst stopping an attempt to end 
barristers‟ exclusive rights of audience.159 Contemporary issues include: reduced self-
regulation, oversupply of barristers, conditional fees and reduced adversarialism.
160
 
Critics suggest that the Code requires cautious interpretation,
161
 anecdotal evidence 
indicates widespread circumvention of the cab-rank rule
162
 and the BSB has published 
warnings concerning payments for briefs and client confidentiality.
163
 As in France, 
the Bar is challenged by structural changes aimed at promoting commercialism that 
threaten its traditional professionalism. 
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An important category of legal professional to be considered for the practice 
of the United Kingdom before international courts is that of the legal adviser to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office („FCO‟). In contrast to French jurisconsultes, 
British legal advisers to the FCO are invariably members of one of the two legal 
professions.
164
 Theoretically, there is a difference between a jurisconsulte at the Quai 
d‟Orsay who is bound by no professional ethics and discipline and a legal adviser at 
the FCO who faces the possibility of disciplinary sanctions by an external regulator 
for professional misconduct. However, there are real questions concerning „how 
effective [their national rules] are to control conduct before international courts‟165 – 
in particular due to the Bar‟s reluctance to investigate matters of Government.166 
However, it should be noted that FCO legal advisers operate as civil servants 
within a structure of formal subservience to their political masters. Whilst Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice postulated a duty of the government international lawyer to the law and 
Sir Franklin Berman asserted that it was for him to persuade his government to 
comply with the law,
167
 these ideals lacks a practical enforcement mechanism. Since 
the scrutiny of the bars is unlikely, it is arguable that as a government legal adviser 
the barrister‟s duty of independence is curtailed by the civil servant‟s duty to carry out 
policy decisions.   
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3.2 The American Tradition 
3.2.1 Historical Development  
The aboriginal nations had diverse legal systems
168
 but professional advocates did not 
exist amongst those of New England. Aboriginal justice sought not discovery of truth 
but rather the preservation of social harmony. The village sachem administered justice 
by example and persuasion and the village council of clans mediating disputes.
169
 
Apart from the support of a friend or elder, self-representation was the norm. The 
seventeenth century New England colonies consciously rejected the English common 
law and its legal professions as immoral.
170
 The Puritan settlers opted for religious 
texts and self-representation in closed trials judged by the literate clergy.
171
 Advocates 
were litigants‟ friends and kinsmen with laws severely restricting fees and pleadings.  
The lay legal profession‟s genesis was in Massachusetts, 172 where burgeoning 
commerce with England and the consequent need for litigation to regulate commercial 
transactions caused the gradual adoption of professional advocacy and the common 
law by the eighteenth century.
173
 The lack of English-trained professionals required 
adaptation; Massachusetts attorneys modelled their bar associations after the English 
attorneys‟ „Society of Gentleman Practitioners‟ founded in 1739.174  The 
professionals, seeking a monopoly to exclude the amateur „pettifoggers‟, overcame 
resistance from the clerical bench to introduce admission requirements into the 
superior courts and the rank of barrister was created (though without functional 
specialisation).  
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The professionals, by imposing educational requirements, provoked the clergy 
which argued that lawyers were an evil class feeding upon the sins of wayward 
people.
175
 The professionals retorted that the necessity for both moral and positive law 
to govern society demanded courts with competent professionals. However, country 
litigants generally preferred amateur family members due to the cost and scarcity of 
professionals. By 1774, a mixed legal profession of amateur and professional 
advocacy existed. As the War of Independence approached, the courts became 
political arenas as in John Adams‟ successful defence of British soldiers for the 
„Boston Massacre‟,176 Patrick Henry‟s attack upon the Privy Council‟s powers177 and 
Theodore Sedgwick‟s defence of loyalists.178  
After the war, the new state courts excluded loyalists but retained pre-war 
laws and customs except in Pennsylvania, where in 1776 a radical government created 
an elected judiciary – despite a bar boycott – to prosecute loyalists.179 Massachusetts 
attorneys were loathed for representing wealthy creditors against poor debtors.
180
 
Popular antagonism (including attacks upon courthouses and attorneys) against an 
„exploitative elite‟ became rife in the post-war period.181 Legislation destroyed the bar 
associations by removing admission requirements and introducing elected judgeships. 
De-professionalisation was caused by mistrust of professional advocacy, anti-British 
sentiment and class warfare. Law schools filled the gap created by the associations‟ 
demise, with universities operating them from the nineteenth century.
182
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The creation of the American Bar Association („ABA‟) in 1878 and 
contemporaneous rejuvenation of bar associations were prompted by low self-esteem 
amongst attorneys from rampant corruption due to virtually no regulation until after 
the Civil War.
183
 Ethics, without centralised authority, were likewise individually 
relative. Law schools introduced ethics into curricula in the twentieth century, 
becoming universally taught by 1980.
184
 The ABA, in its campaign to harmonise 
ethics, adopted the „Canons of Professional Ethics‟ in 1908 and created a „Standing 
Committee on Professional Ethics‟ in 1913 to monitor bar associations. By 1971, the 
Standing Committee was renamed the „Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility‟. In 1969, the „Model Code of Professional Responsibility‟ replaced 
the Canons and, in 1983, the „Model Rules of Professional Conduct‟ („Model Rules‟) 
replaced the Model Code. To date, California is the only state jurisdiction that has not 
adopted the Model Rules.
185
  
Consequently, the American legal professions are separated not by function 
but rather by the federal system. Although the ABA has sought to represent the 
professions at the national level and to promote national standards, the principal 
regulatory functions are discharged by the state bar associations. In addition, 
specialist bars exist for the federal courts as well as the US Supreme Court that 
generally require payment of a fee and the taking of oath for admission. Thus, the 
„fused profession‟ is something of a misnomer from the perspective of international 
litigation in that the Model Rules can be enforced by dozens of bar associations to 
regulate the conduct of attorneys before international courts.  
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3.2.2 Ethical Standards 
The Preamble of the Model Rules identifies a lawyer‟s three fundamental roles: 1) 
representative of clients; 2) officer of the legal system; and 3) public citizen having 
special responsibility for the quality of justice.
186
 Whilst the Preamble stipulates that 
the Model Rules address conflicts amongst these duties, there is no „overriding duty‟ 
provision.
187
 However, the Model Rules prioritise the client through: 1) textual 
prioritisation; 2) structural focus; and 3) textual language. A cultural preference for 
partisanship has been noted in commentary by American attorneys.
188
  
Concerning the „client-lawyer relationship‟,189 competence and due diligence 
are prescribed. Fees are subject to a broad „reasonableness‟ requirement and personal 
financial interest in cases are permitted. A duty of confidentiality is imposed, whereby 
an attorney „may‟ disclose privileged information only to prevent a crime believed to 
be „likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm‟ or to provide him with a legal 
defence and a strict conflict-of-interest rule restricts multiple client representation in 
the same case. Contingency fees are permitted and a detailed conflict-of-interest 
provision generally prohibits, inter alia: misuse of client information, instruments 
providing client gifts to the attorney and financial assistance towards litigation.
190
  
Refusal or termination of representation is compulsory, inter alia, upon ethical 
or legal violation and (unless ordered to continue) he may withdraw if without 
material adverse effect upon the client or if, inter alia: he reasonably believes that the 
client is perpetuating a crime or fraud involving his services, the client pursues an 
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objective that he considers „repugnant or imprudent‟ or other good cause exists.191 An 
attorney must not pursue „frivolous‟ arguments or knowingly mislead the court and 
may withhold evidence reasonably believed to be false.
192
 He must refrain from 
falsification, sabotage, obstruction, procedural abuse, improper influence and ex parte 
communication with the court.
193
 False or reckless public expression of doubt 
concerning the competence or integrity of a judge is prohibited.
194
  However, the 
dilemma of a client‟s perjury, investigating the veracity of evidence and media 
comments remain controversial.
195
 
A key provision is Model Rule 8.5, providing that an attorney admitted to 
practice „is subject to the disciplinary authority of [the] jurisdiction, regardless of 
where the [conduct] occurs.‟ He may be „subject to the disciplinary authority of both 
this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct‟. A complicated „choice 
of law‟ provision provides for the applicability of the standards of the jurisdiction in 
which the „predominant effect of the conduct‟ occurs. Although applicable to 
international practice,
196
 they were designed for transnational practice on a conflict-
of-law approach and have been criticised by US academics for producing „some 
highly problematic and ultimately unsatisfactory results when applied to international 
arbitration.‟197 For example, they can lead to the absurd conclusion that US attorneys 
are bound by Dutch standards before international courts situated in the Hague. Thus, 
Model Rule 8.5 is very broad and poorly designed to regulate conduct before 
international courts.  
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3.2.3 Ethical Efficacy 
Despite the advent of university degree requirements for law school admission in the 
twentieth century, the bar associations‟ failure to obtain admission control allowed the 
competition-minded law schools to form the professional culture. In 1952, an ABA 
investigation reported obsolete, deficient and unenforced standards.
198
 Judicial 
politicisation hampers its ability to discipline attorneys and divergent standards from 
state to state constrain ABA harmonisation efforts. Self-assessment has deprecated 
ethical efficacy, with the bars‟ efforts viewed as inadequate.199  Thus, the historical 
background of US attorneys has been characterised by de-professionalisation and a 
market ideology that prioritises client control over attorneys as „hired guns‟.  
 Consequently, it cannot be assumed that an American attorney will necessarily 
follow rigorous professional standards relative to Europe. Indeed, many of the 
standards that apply in the US (e.g. – media statements, witness proofing or 
contingency fees) are considerably laxer and the philosophy of the judicial system is 
considerably more party-centred and adversarial. Legal advisers in the State 
Department, as in the UK, are invariably qualified professionals.
200
 However, the 
independence of US government counsel from policy direction and ideological bias 
(e.g. – John Yoo201) is questionable.202 Internal disciplinary procedures may 
exacerbate this danger by displacing the external disciplinary scrutiny of state bars 
when acting as agents in international litigation.  
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3.3 Asian Traditions 
Relative to Europe, Africa and the Americas, the participation of the Asian continent 
in the international judicial system through counsel has been minor. For example, 
China has participated in no contentious cases before the ICJ and Japan has only 
participated in one (pending) case. Only seven Asian States (Cambodia, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand) have ever participated in 
contentious cases, excluding Oceania and the Middle East. China is not party to the 
Court‟s optional clause jurisdiction or the Rome Statute, though Japan is. Asian 
jurisdictions are not generally noted for producing lawyers who serve as counsel for 
States or other parties not of their own nationality before international courts.
203
 There 
exists no regional Asian court.  
 Why, then, examine Asian traditions (instead of, say, African)? First, the 
under participation of Asia in the international judicial system should be regarded as a 
potential growth area (e.g. – maritime and territorial disputes). Second, despite its lack 
of modern regional integration, there is arguably a stronger basis for generalisation of 
Asian standards than in the even more diverse and centrifugal African continent. 
Third, examination of China and Japan as two major Asian jurisdictions that share a 
considerable degree of common historical background (though with different modern 
systems) suggests the existence of distinctly Asian features of professional advocacy: 
restricted professional independence, small bars and a peripheral role for advocates 
relative to judges. It is suggested that these characteristics derive from a historical 
legacy of deference to the State and scepticism towards litigation with a cultural 
emphasis upon mediation and other non-confrontational dispute resolution techniques. 
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3.3.1 China 
3.3.1.1 Historical Development 
The Confucian foundation for imperial China emphasised a harmonious, hierarchical 
society promoting good morals and compromise (li). The competing school of 
legalism conceived of law as a tool for social order through deterrence and fear.
204
 
Mixing these two philosophies, imperial justice discouraged litigation through 
systematic bribery and confession by torture to compel litigants to compromise.
205
 
The „officers of the court‟ were Confucian-trained magistrates who were intentionally 
ignorant of laws and local customs.
206
 A shadow system of private justice promoted 
mediation by the educated elite.  
 During the nineteenth century, hapless governments failed to reform the 
corrupt bureaucracy. As external powers sapped the economy and imperial expansion 
stalled, economic power was concentrated in a gentry exploiting a growing peasantry. 
Following the 1911 Revolution that brought the Kuomintang to power, the Republic 
of China unsuccessfully attempted to reform the judiciary by importing European 
methods, imposing new admission requirements and discarding the Confucian 
examination system.
207
 The new bureaucracy and judiciary continued unchecked the 
courts‟ bribery and extortion and judicial reform stalled.208 Professional advocates 
(introduced in 1912) were of poor standard and insufficient numbers.
209
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In the People‟s Republic of China („PRC‟), the Maoist system of „mass line‟ 
revolutionary justice used revolutionary courts as instruments of class struggle.
210
 
Whilst corporeal punishment and judicial confession by torture were eliminated, 
mediation was co-opted to compel the peasantry. As the Maoists absorbed Soviet 
ideas, the courts gradually became more bureaucratic. In reaction, the Communists 
abolished professional advocacy in the Judicial Reforms of 1952-1953.
211
  
The „constitutionalist movement‟ campaigned for a „socialist rule of law‟ 
encompassing „rule by law, not by men‟. The Constitution and the „Organic Law of 
the People‟s Courts of the PRC‟ 1954 provided the right to defence counsel.212 In 
1956, advocates were revived as „legal advisers‟. Although originally bureaucratic 
„state workers‟ alongside the traditional procuracy, they later created bar associations. 
This stab for professional independence was reversed by Mao‟s return to populist 
justice during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.
213
 The Ministry of 
Justice and professional advocacy were abolished from 1966 until 1976.
214
  
After Mao, professional counsel and the Ministry of Justice were revived in 
1979. Law schools, law offices and local bar associations followed in 1980. An 
explosion in advocates‟ numbers created quality control problems, prompting 
admission requirements and the creation of the All China Lawyers Association 
(„ACLA‟) in 1986. Popular discontent at widespread violation of lax standards 
prompted the Ministry of Justice to enact the Chinese Lawyers Law in 1996 (amended 
in 2007). Whilst the ACLA promulgated its „Lawyers Code of Practice‟ 2004, this is 
not recognised by the Law and is presumably exhortatory in light of the ACLA‟s lack 
of disciplinary jurisdiction. 
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3.3.1.2 Ethical Standards 
Article 1 of the Law defines its purpose: „to improve the system of lawyers, regulate 
practice by lawyers, ensure that lawyers conduct their practice in accordance with the 
law and enable lawyers to fulfil their roles in the building of the socialist legal 
system.‟ Article 2 defines a „lawyer‟ as a practitioner providing legal services to a 
concerned party. This definition is a compromise between „state workers‟ and „free 
and independent professionals‟.215 A lawyer‟s basic duty is ambiguous: to „safeguard 
the lawful rights and interests of the concerned party, secure the correct 
implementation of the law and ensure social fairness and justice.‟ Article 3 further 
provides: „In his/her practice, a lawyer must abide by the Constitution and the law, 
and adhere to the ethics of the legal profession and practise discipline...take facts as 
the bases and the law as his/her standard...subject himself/herself to monitoring by the 
state, the public and the concerned party.‟216  
Competence and educational attainment are problems for the legal profession. 
Article 5 lays down the following requirements for a practicing licence: 1) upholding 
the PRC Constitution; 2) passage of a unified state judicial examination for judges, 
procurators and lawyers; 3) completion of a one-year apprenticeship in a law firm; 
and 4) being of good conduct.
217
 Articles 7 and 11 automatically disqualify criminals, 
those dismissed from State employment or disbarred and public servants. Article 42 
prescribes a two-year cooling-off period for judges or procurators to serve as lawyers.  
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 Law firms and lawyers must pay taxes pursuant and not compete for briefs 
through „improper means such as denigrating other lawyers or law firms, or paying 
introduction fees‟.218 Article 28 of the Law provides that a lawyer has discretion 
whether to accept authorisation to act for a client.  Under Article 32, once a lawyer 
has accepted an appointment he may only withdraw from it „legitimate reason‟ or „if 
the entrusted matter violates the law, the client uses the services provided by the 
lawyer to engage in illegal activities or the client deliberately conceals important facts 
relating to the case‟.  
In response to longstanding concerns about the ability of lawyers to meet with 
their clients in criminal proceedings, Article 33 provides for an appointed lawyer‟s 
„right to meet the suspect or defendant and be informed of matters pertaining to the 
case‟ without being subjected to monitoring. Article 38 requires a lawyer to keep 
state, trade and client secrets confidential unless pertaining to a specified ongoing or 
future criminal enterprise. Article 39 proscribes representation in a matter in which he 
or a close relative has a conflict of interest. Article 40 prohibits illicit acceptance of 
authorisation or fees, extortion, illegal meetings with judges or prosecutors or 
arbitrators, bribery, forgery, suppression of concealed evidence and obstruction.  
Article 46 vests the ACLA and bar associations with powers to represent 
collegial interests, conduct professional training and monitor compliance.
219
 However, 
the Ministry of Justice retains disciplinary and admission powers. Under Articles 47-
56, penalties for malpractice include warnings, fines, suspension and disbarment. 
There is no provision addressing the applicability of the Law to conduct before 
international courts, though applicability may be reasonably presumed in light of the 
generally tight control exerted by the State over the profession. 
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3.3.1.3 Ethical Efficacy 
The constitutionalist vision of professional advocacy based upon a socialist rule of 
law has in some areas been realised.
220
 The Lawyers Law was a step towards 
professional standards of independence, integrity and quality.
221
 However, the quality 
of lawyers is low, corruption rampant and collective self-regulation weak.
222
 The ills 
of the legal profession are emblematic of wider problems in the judicial system: low 
judicial independence, deficient educational standards, inadequate legislation and the 
power of the Party to hamper the independence of lawyers (particularly in criminal 
and administrative cases).
223
 The 2007 amendments to the Law have sought to address 
these issues, though compliance is haphazard and disciplinary proceedings rare. 
In these circumstances, the development of the Chinese legal profession is still 
nascent. In a culture with a deep-seated prejudice against litigation and professional 
advocacy and an authoritarian political system with a historical suspicion of 
professionals seeking to limit its powers by the rule of law, this is predictable and 
understandable. Despite the architectural similarities to inquisitorial systems, the 
reality of professional advocacy in the Chinese judicial system is representative of 
authoritarian jurisdictions in which the State severely curtails professional 
independence. Whilst there is no published information on the recruitment of Chinese 
legal advisers, as civil servants they are precluded from practice as lawyers and 
appear to be primarily diplomats by training.
224
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3.3.2 Japan 
3.3.2.1 Historical Development  
The judicial system of medieval Japan was inspired by tenets of Shintoism and 
Confucianism emphasising harmony through adherence to the hierarchical social 
order. As in Imperial China, judicial functions were vested in the executive, litigation 
discouraged, legal codes unpublished, confession by torture used, procedure judge-
centred and professional advocacy outlawed.
225
 During the Tokugawa Shogunate of 
1603-1867, only unpaid advocates could represent an incompetent litigant through 
kinship.
226
 Its feudal society delegated the administration of justice to the warrior 
class, which largely performed with sophisticated forensic scrutiny and without class 
bias. However, innkeepers near the courts (kujishi) who sold knowledge of legal 
procedures to litigants and bribed judges were despised but intermittently tolerated 
and suppressed.
227
  
The first formative period for the modern Japanese judicial system was the 
Meiji Era of 1868-1912. European legal systems (especially Prussia) were emulated in 
a radical departure from Tokugawa practices, including the publication of legal codes 
and abolition of judicial torture.
228
 However, judicial power remained firmly 
embedded in the executive. Legal reforms between 1872 and 1898 sought to raise the 
standards of judges and procurators (who were mostly Confucian-style bureaucrats) 
and created the first Japanese bar for civil advocacy.
229
 In 1976, the Ministry of 
Justice issued an „Ordinance Concerning Attorneys‟ in 1876 prescribing a bar 
examination and rules of honour.  
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However, a reputation for incompetence until educational and admission 
reforms enacted in the early twentieth century and traditional bias against private 
practice meant that the Japanese bar was considered incapable of self-regulation.
230
 
An oversupply of attorneys and widespread corruption in the 1920s convinced bar 
leaders to reduce numbers in order to raise standards. However, against the bar‟s 
wishes the Lawyer‟s Law 1933 preserved State regulation and did not exclude non-
attorneys from practice.
231
 After the Second World War, constitutional reforms 
charged professional advocacy with the defence of human rights.
232
 Self-regulation 
followed with the Practising Attorney Law 1949, which created the Japan Federation 
of Bar Associations (Nichibenren) and the Legal Training and Research Institute for 
combined training of judges, prosecutors and attorneys under the overall supervision 
of the Supreme Court.
233
  
 However, a professional crisis ensued in the 1960s concerning the conduct of 
advocates in criminal cases involving protests against the renewal of the Japan-US 
Mutual Security Treaty. Attorneys obstructed, defied court instructions and withdrew 
from cases to demonstrate contempt for a judicial process they considered biased 
towards the prosecution. The Ministry of Justice and popular media painted attorneys 
immature, insubordinate and dishonourable.
234
 A proposal to abolish attorneys in 
criminal proceedings was narrowly averted when the head of the Nichibenren publicly 
apologised and promised to work to prevent recurrence. The Code of Ethics 1990 
made cautious changes but restricted withdrawal from representation.
235
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3.3.2.2 Ethical Standards 
There sources for the professional ethics of Japanese attorneys: 1) the Practising 
Attorney Law; 2) the Nichibenren‟s articles of association and those of local bar 
associations; and 3) the Japanese Code of Conduct.
236
 Article 1 of the Law defines 
attorneys‟ mission as the protection of fundamental human rights, realisation of social 
justice, sincere performance of their duties whilst endeavouring to maintain social 
order and improve the legal system.
237
 Article 2 requires them to „strive to remain 
highly cultured, to build his fine character and be well acquainted with laws‟.  
 Article 4 requires attorneys to complete vocational training at the Legal 
Training and Research Institute for admission. A former Supreme Court judge is ipso 
facto qualified and certain convicts, the impeached, the disbarred, the incompetent 
and bankrupts are disqualified.
238
 The rights and obligations of a practising attorney 
include: secrecy, refusal of instructions amidst conflict-of-interest, abstention from 
corruption, exclusion of non-attorneys for legal representational matters, refraining 
from any interest in a dispute, giving notice of refusal of instructions and informing 
the bar association of any undertaking of profit-making business.
239
  
 Article 11 of the Articles of Association of the Nichibenren on the „ethics of 
the practising attorney‟ obliges attorneys to apply law justly and to strive to rectify 
any discovered illegality or injustice. By Article 12, they must continuously strive to 
build legal knowledge and character. Article 13 stipulates duties of politeness to 
judges, public prosecutors and colleagues. Article 15 declares that „a practising 
attorney shall be essentially free, and shall not be influenced by power or economic 
interests‟.  
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The Code of Conduct 2004 enacted by the Nichibenren lays down duties of 
professional independence, protection and development of the judicial system, 
fairness and integrity, personal honour, continuous professional training and 
participation in public-interest activities.
240
 Additional standards on business matters 
include: dignified self-advertisement, no client solicitation or undignified litigation 
purpose or manner, restrictions upon fee sharing, no compensation for client referral, 
no promotion of unlawful conduct, no participation in immoral or degrading business 
and no undignified business „from a preoccupation with the pursuit of profit‟.241  
General standards articulated in relation to the client include: independence, 
not undertaking „clearly illegitimate‟ cases, avoiding conflicts of interest, 
confidentiality where there is no „due reason‟ for disclosure and charging appropriate 
and reasonable fees.
242
  Direct communication with a represented opposing party and 
the provision or acceptance of any benefit to an opposing party is forbidden.
243
 
Mutual respect and honour, no entrapment, no intervention and amicable dispute 
settlement are required between attorneys.
244
 Attorneys must strive to respect fair 
trial, refrain from enticing perjury or submitting false evidence, desist from negligent 
or „illegitimate‟ delay and avoid using personal relations with any judge or public 
figure towards proceedings.
245
 Article 82 provides a wide discretion for individual 
attorneys: „in consideration of diversity and individuality of the duties of attorneys, 
these rules shall be interpreted and applies so as not to impair the freedom and 
independence of attorneys‟. There is no jurisdictional provision concerning conduct 
before an international court.    
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3.3.2.3 Ethical Efficacy 
Japanese advocates enjoy a mixed reputation for high competence but questionable 
ethical standards.
246
 The key debate in the professional media concerns the merits of 
increasing attorney numbers.
247
 From the 1920s, this remarkably small bar has put its 
faith in its smallness rather than in ethical prescription and enforcement to ensure 
quality. Despite the rarity of disciplinary proceedings,
248
 ethical scandals involving 
bribery, excessive fees and other problems have dogged the profession.
249
 In the early 
1990s, the Nichibenren reversed longstanding policy by publishing miscreants‟ 
misconduct in a bid to win public trust. Despite internal pressure to reform the Code 
of Conduct and strengthen the disciplinary process, reliance upon the size rationale 
continues. The Code is relatively ethereal and would benefit from more specificity 
and practicality.  
Whilst there is no published research on the backgrounds of Japanese 
jurisconsultes, both of its agents in the pending ICJ proceedings appear to be career 
diplomats.
250
 However, Judge Oda was an academic recruited as a part-time 
jurisconsulte and Judge Owada both a diplomat and academic.
251
 Thus, Japan appears 
closer to the French model rather than the British model of professional practitioners. 
On the rare occasions in which it participates in international litigation, it appears to 
rely upon diplomats as agents and eminent foreign international lawyers as counsel. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
This overview of the national ethical traditions of national jurisdictions has illustrated 
a number of themes. First, it shows that professional advocacy as understood today is 
a peculiarly European institution that was subsequently spread throughout the world 
during the Age of Empire. Consequently, there are certain architectural and functional 
commonalities that derive from this history. This provides a tenuous foundation for 
the articulation of common ethical standards for advocacy before international courts 
in that the concepts (e.g. – confidentiality or conflicts of interest) are shared.  
Secondly, it demonstrates the significant differences in the histories and 
professional standards of the respective bars. A crucial factor to consider is the legal 
system and cultural context in which the bar is situated. For example, for the bars 
operating within liberal democracies professional independence through self-
regulation is considered to be an imperative virtue as a bastion against State power. 
By contrast, for the bars operating in authoritarian systems and/or in legal cultures 
that are traditionally sceptical of professional advocacy the self-conception will be 
more likely to be service to the State or to God. However, noteworthy is that 
professional advocates in authoritarian systems worldwide almost invariably come to 
agitate for professional independence and the rule of law. Thus, despite cultural 
differences concerning the role of professional advocacy it is arguable that justice and 
the rule of law are universal principles.   
Thirdly, although historical and cultural context are important factors in 
determining the success of a bar the history also shows that bars have a degree of 
power to professionalise themselves by raising their own standards. The age and 
social status of the profession is a critical factor for the standards that it adheres to in 
its practice, through which virtuous and vicious cycles of integrity and corruption 
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emerge. At various points, bar leaders seized the initiative to stamp out corruption, 
exclude amateurs and impose higher standards on the profession. A successful 
outcome appears to create a virtuous circle of high standards and social prestige. 
These historical examples can guide the professionalisation of the international bar. 
Fourthly, it shows that there are significant differences in the professional 
backgrounds of jurisconsultes in foreign ministries. These are more often career 
diplomats and academics, perhaps combining the two, rather than professional 
practitioners of advocacy. Consequently, when they appear as agents for their 
governments before international courts they are unlikely to be bound by any ethical 
standards in doing so. On the contrary, as civil servants they are likely to be even 
more subservient to their governments than would be a British or American legal 
adviser who is also a member of self-regulating national bars with no history of 
disciplining their members who serve as government lawyers. Whilst this lack of 
independence is likely to endanger the integrity of international judicial proceedings 
where any State determined to win its case pressures counsel to engage in corrupt 
practices, it is even more likely to occur where the legal culture of the jurisdiction is 
authoritarian and sceptical of professional independence. 
 These are real challenges facing the professionalisation of international 
advocacy, which necessarily entails the creation of a professional autonomy for 
counsel bound by standards that require them to resist such pressures under threat of 
disciplinary sanction. Common ethical standards articulated in the absence of 
common ideology necessitate value judgements and a conscious, a priori articulation 
of the fundamental role of the advocate. Whilst it is right that justice and the 
international rule of law form the core values of a new profession, the realities of 
diverse legal cultures must be reckoned with. 
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Chapter IV: The Historical Development of International Advocacy until 1945 
Having examined select national traditions, this chapter considers the historical 
development of international advocacy preceding the Second World War. From 
classical ad hoc arbitral tradition through to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice („PCIJ‟), the ethics of advocacy was an almost completely ignored topic. As 
the above quotation suggests, scholars and statesmen who were engaged in the 
creation of the first international judicial institutions at the turn of the century, 
culminating with the PCIJ, were far more concerned with the impartiality of the 
international judiciary. In line with the diplomatic tradition from which international 
arbitration derived, procedural rules concerning the representation of parties were 
minimal. A laissez-faire culture prevailed in this era, by which arbitral tribunals and 
the PCIJ declined to regulate advocacy in deference to „State sovereignty‟.  
 However, this did not preclude ethical issues connected to counsel from 
arising before those early institutions. Such problems included the forgery of 
documents, conflicts of interest arising from arbitrators seeking to serve as counsel 
and the propriety of scientific experts appearing as counsel rather than witnesses. As 
will be seen in Part II below, such issues persist before modern international courts 
and tribunals. This not only indicates that they are long-term procedural problems but 
also that the laissez-faire policy adopted by the early courts and tribunals was 
unsuccessful. Whilst a degree of homogeneity was present before the PCIJ due to the 
emergence of a tiny de facto bar, with small legal teams of typically one or two 
counsel representing each party, this could not wholly preclude the regulation of 
counsel from international judicial procedure. Moreover, certain PCIJ judges 
supported the creation of an „international bar‟ attached to the Court in order to break 
the link between advocacy and nationality and ensure the quality of advocates.  
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Thus, this chapter serves two main purposes. First, by describing the historical 
development of advocacy before the early international courts, it explains the original 
reasons why modern advocacy has been hitherto unregulated. Second, it identifies 
early (and largely unknown) problems arising in this unregulated and quasi-
diplomatic culture that recur before modern courts. Through analysis of these two 
themes, the longevity and recurrence of ethical issues for counsel becomes evident. 
Despite (or because of) the laissez-faire culture before the early international 
tribunals, problems such as forgery, experts and qualification requirements for 
counsel repeatedly arose. Strikingly, these and others remain live issues before the ICJ 
and other modern tribunals that also lack common ethical standards for counsel.    
 An important theme that this chapter engages is the role of counsel as an 
autonomous intermediary between the parties and the court. It does so by examining 
the early models of representation before arbitral tribunals and the PCIJ, which 
eventually became standardised with the distinction between „agents‟ and „counsel 
and advocates‟ within Article 42 of the ICJ Statute. The attempts to delineate the 
respective functions of the two were connected to the control of parties over case 
presentation. Since agents were diplomatic representatives considered to be beyond 
the regulatory jurisdiction of the judiciary, abortive proposals to professionalise 
counsel and advocates were especially significant. After briefly examining classical 
and early modern arbitration, the narrative principally addresses the practices of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration („PCA‟) and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice („PCIJ‟). Section 2.1 concerns ancient and classical arbitration, section 2.2 
relates the early institutionalisation of the international legal system and section 2.3 
examines the creation and practice of the PCIJ and other courts and tribunals between 
the two World Wars.   
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4.1 Ancient and Classical Arbitration 
4.1 1  Antiquity 
The degree to which arbitration was employed by the independent polities of antiquity 
is debatable.
252
 However, scholars agree that the Greek city-states most frequently 
utilised „public‟ arbitration253 – defined as the submission by independent and legally 
equal polities of a dispute to an impartial arbiter.
254
 In the ancient world, the modern 
„fiction‟255 of juridical equality within a co-existential legal system did not generally 
exist. Whilst domination by conquest was the order of the day, expediency and 
morality prompted resort to some eighty-one recorded instances of inter-municipal 
arbitration in the Hellenes.
256
 In these arbitrations, natural justice principles of equal 
hearing and impartiality were observed.
257
 Arbitration was not conducted with non-
Greeks, probably due to hostility and arrogance.
258
 
The majority of known Greek arbitrations arose within alliance systems, either 
by clause compromissoire or by ad hoc agreement.
259
 Disputes were most often 
territorial but would also concern religious, proprietary or other matters.
260
 No unified 
code of procedural law governed arbitrations, which varied immensely in form and 
content; for example, whilst the usual number of arbitrators was three or five, the 
range was between one and six hundred.
261
 Arbitral procedure depended upon parties; 
often, it was agreed that a neutral third city or institutions like the Amphictyonic 
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Council and the Delphic Oracle be designated to constitute a tribunal.
262
 There were 
no qualification requirements for arbitrators (in one arbitration, they were chosen by 
lot
263
) but they were often required to swear an oath to the gods that they had not 
received a bribe and that they would judge impartially according to the truth.
264
 
Advocates were routinely employed to present arguments,
265
 yet no oath 
appears to have been required of them. Advocates and „trustworthy men‟ would be 
entrusted with the conduct of the case but had no right to amend the procedural rules 
of the compromis without instructions.
266
 Parties were entitled to equal numbers of 
advocates by arbitration agreements, which also often limited the number of 
advocates to two or four each.
267
 Advocates‟ speech time – as in Athenian law – was 
limited and procedures governed the production of documents.
268
 However, no 
personal duties appear to have been placed upon advocates who were also invariably 
citizens of their instructing city.  
Early Rome largely rejected participation as litigant in arbitration and when 
acting as arbiter frequently did so for self-benefit; its eventual domination over most 
of the known world precluded the utilisation of arbitration between independent 
polities but rarely.
269
 Advocates‟ ethics being unknown in archaic Greece and only 
really developed from the time of Cicero onwards, the exclusion of such ethics from 
international arbitration is readily understandable. The principal legacy of ancient 
arbitration was the principle of equality before and impartial decision by international 
arbitral tribunals and a precedent of unregulated advocacy.  
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4.1.2 Middle Ages 
The two most powerful authorities in Catholic Christendom during the Middle Ages 
were the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. The Papacy claimed to and often 
actually did dispense title and judgement amongst the princes of Europe. It did so, 
literally and figuratively, ex cathedra as God‟s vice-regent – his judgements were 
nigh-absolute rather than „judicial‟ in any restricted sense.270 Whilst this largely 
excluded law, the princes‟ methods of pleading before the Pope remain unexplained. 
The incremental surrender of papal authority as the summit of feudal Christendom to 
absolute monarchy
271
 produced several arbitrations involving the Pontiff as arbitrator 
as well as an arbitration submitted to the Paris parlement as party against the 
Emperor.
272
 Besides the Papacy, arbitrators included the Emperor, princes, cardinals 
and bishops, municipalities and even occasionally individuals of lesser rank.
273
  
 Little is described concerning the procedure of these arbitrations.
274
 Cases 
have been cited of the use of advocates and delegates in arbitrations.
275
 Whether they 
were employed to advocate the pleadings of princes who appeared before the Pope or 
arbitrator and whether the ethical duties of the ecclesiastical courts bound such 
advocates in doing so remains unknown. The principal legacy of feudal adjudication 
and medieval arbitration was twofold: an overtly pacifistic ideal to achieve universal 
pax inter christianos and, pursuant to that aim as well as expediency, the 
establishment of a fragile principle of co-existentialism within initially a feudal 
hierarchy beneath the Supreme Pontiff and later an anarchical Europe of sovereigns – 
each with an equal right to rule bestowed directly by God, not by Pope. 
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4.1.3 Early Modern Age 
Scholars generally date the beginning of the early modern age of international 
arbitration from the signing of the Jay Treaty between Great Britain and the USA in 
1794.
276
 Early modern arbitration can be said to span the nineteenth century until the 
creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration („PCA‟) by the first Hague Convention 
1899 as the first permanent arbitral institution. One reckoning of the number of 
arbitration treaties agreed between 1796 and 1900 shows 177 in total, with 134 of 
them occurring after 1860.
277
 The great majority of these arbitrations involved 
European and American parties in which arbitrators were vested with remarkably 
broad procedural powers, as compromis were often silent or terse on procedure.
278
 
Whilst it has been observed that the incremental increase of arbitrations brought 
greater procedural homogenisation, their general flexibility have also been noted.
279
 
Arbitrators were stated to have been permitted to draw upon general rules for the 
administration of justice to safeguard their decisions.
280
 Agents and advocates appear 
to have invariably been expressly or impliedly permitted in the arbitrations to which 
the United States was party during this period, mostly claims commissions.
281
  
Periodically, arbitrators would have to address procedural issues concerning 
advocacy in an ad hoc fashion. Whilst diplomats were likelier to appear for parties 
than professional advocates, there was considerable diversity. In the Behring Fur Seal 
arbitration of 1892, the arbitrators directed that they would recognise the agent‟s 
standing to present a motion but not to argue it because argumentation was held to be 
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the function of counsel.
282
 The Chilean Claims Commission directed that certain 
offensive briefs submitted by private counsel be withdrawn and that in future no 
briefs be submitted without prior authorisation by agents. The Spanish-American 
Commission and Venezuelan Protocols directed that it would only receive petitions 
and arguments from individual claimants through State-appointed advocates and 
agents, arbitrators in a US-Russian whaling arbitration directed that Russia must 
communicate with the USA through its appointed agent and the Spanish Commission 
held that a former secretary in its offices – having had access to its documents – 
would not be permitted to act as counsel before it.
283
 An oath to faithfully perform 
their duties was administered by an arbitrator to the agents appearing for the USA and 
Great Britain (the US agent was a Massachusetts attorney) in the St Croix River 
Arbitration of 1814.
284
 
Whilst these cases are exceptional, the matters upon which arbitrators ruled – 
conflicts of interest, oaths, offensive pleadings and the functions of agents – would 
today be covered by professional ethics. This not only demonstrates that such issues 
were arising within historical arbitrations but also that arbitral tribunals were ready in 
certain instances to assert an authority to regulate advocacy when necessary. 
Consequently, though the prevailing diplomatic culture resulted in minimalistic 
procedural rules, this did not preclude arbitral tribunals from issuing ad hoc directions 
and otherwise controlling advocacy in the interest of the proceedings. This indicates 
that, in even the most unregulated era of modern international litigation, international 
tribunals could and did exercise regulatory authority over counsel. 
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4.2 The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
The Institut de Droit International was created in 1873 with the aim of contributing to 
the development of international law independent of governmental influence. Its third 
resolution was the Code of Arbitral Procedure 1875,
285
 which was the first attempt to 
codify arbitral rules of procedure. In 1927, the Institute considered that certain Code 
provisions had attained the status of positive law.
286
  The Code, with only twenty-
seven articles, left many matters to individual tribunals. Article 12 of the Code 
provided that a tribunal must conform to its statutory procedure but was free to create 
rules conforming to governing principles. Article 13 (adopted without debate) 
ambiguously stipulated that each party may appoint „a‟ representative.287 Article 15 
prescribed that tribunals should have the power to, inter alia, create procedural rules 
and control evidence.
288
 The Code‟s provisions have been stated to represent 
contemporary „best practice‟ and were a model for ad hoc arbitration and the PCA.289 
The PCA is the oldest currently operating international arbitral institution. Its 
statute is contained within the Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes 1899 and 1907. Its provisions were intended to be „fundamental‟ rules rather 
than comprehensive with broad discretion for individual arbitral tribunals.
290
 The 
travaux préparatoires reveals that the two issues causing most debate were the 
compulsion of arbitral dispute settlement and the composition of tribunals.
291
 
Representation was barely discussed.
292
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Article 37 of the 1899 Convention couched the right of parties to appoint 
agents and „counsel and advocates‟ in absolute terms. There was no limitation upon 
the number of counsel; in the Pious Fund arbitration, as many counsel as desired were 
permitted to plead on behalf of each party.
293
 However, adverse criticism was 
provoked when members of the PCA appeared as counsel in the Pious Fund and 
Venezuelan Preferential Question arbitrations.
294
 A proposal was made at the 1907 
Conference to exclude „Members of the Court‟ from representing parties whilst in 
office on grounds of judicial impartiality but was opposed because the pool of high-
quality arbitrators and counsel would be reduced.
295
 Article 62 of the 1907 
Convention adopted a compromise proposal whereby „the Members of the Permanent 
Court may not act as agents, counsel, or advocates except on behalf of the Power 
which appointed them Members of the Court‟. An attempt to remove the exception296 
was defeated due to the „freedom of the parties to be represented by those of their 
nationals whom they desire‟.297 
 Article 45 of the 1899 Convention (Article 70 of the 1907 Convention) 
provides absolute discretion for agents and advocates submitting oral arguments 
„which they make think expedient to the defence of their case‟. However, the original 
draft was narrower in authorising them to present „all the explanations or proofs 
which will aid the defense of the cause‟.298 No explanation for this change is revealed 
by the drafting committee minutes.
299
 Article 46 (Article 72 of 1907) prescribes a 
right for agents and counsel to „raise objections and points‟ to the tribunal, whose 
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decisions concerning those points are „final‟. Article 47 (Article 71 of 1907) creates a 
converse right for the tribunal to „put questions to the agents and counsel of the 
parties, and to demand explanations from them on doubtful points‟. Article 44 (Article 
69 of 1907) provides that the tribunal may „take note of refusal‟.   
 Despite the prescription of a detailed procedure for the hearing of witnesses 
and expert for international commissions of inquiry, the PCA‟s provisions for 
arbitration were virtually silent concerning them. Article 50 (77 of 1907) provides that 
„when the agents and counsel of the parties have submitted all the explanations and 
evidence in support of their case the President shall declare the discussion closed‟ and 
Article 90 of 1907 (concerning summary arbitral procedure) provided for a right for 
the parties and the Tribunal to call witnesses and experts. Article 90 originated from a 
French proposal of amendments to arbitral procedure, yet the Committee incorporated 
it into summary procedure (Article 90) only.
300
  
 A treaty signed at the 1907 Hague Conference, but subsequently not ratified, 
was the International Prize Court Convention 1907 to hear appeals from national 
jurisdictions.
301
 The Court was to have been given power to compose its own 
procedural rules, to have been undertaken within a year of ratification.
302
 Article 17 
forbade members of the Court from hearing cases who has been participated in the 
judgments of the national courts involved or as counsel to one of the parties and from 
appearing as agent or advocate before the Court or „act[ing] in any capacity 
whatever‟.303 Article 27 provided for calling witnesses and experts and Article 25 for 
the right to be represented by agents and counsel.
304
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Article 26, by contrast, made representation by advocate compulsory for 
private persons appearing before the Court; moreover, qualification requirements 
were imposed that the „attorney...must be either an advocate qualified to plead before 
a court of appeal or a high court of one of the signatory States, or a lawyer practicing 
before a similar court, or lastly, a professor of law at one of the higher teaching 
centers of those countries‟.305 This provision appears to have been the first attempt in 
the history of the modern international legal system to impose a formal „bar‟ upon 
rights of hearing for advocacy. The travaux préparatoires reveals that these 
provisions – drafted by representatives from Germany, the USA, France and Great 
Britain – were adopted without debate.306 The contrast between Articles 25 and 26 is 
also unexplained by the materials, though it plausibly stems from the traditional 
deference to State control over arbitral proceedings as opposed to the weaker power 
of the individual. Whether it was assumed that national ethics would apply to 
advocates appearing for States remains likewise unknown. 
The International Prize Court, however, never came into being due to the 
failure of the signatories to agree to an applicable law for the Court as well as a 
procedure for the appointment of judges. The failure of the Convention to come into 
effect, or else the adoption of a generally more conservative view of international 
litigation, may have been why Article 26 did not catalyse later initiatives to create 
qualification requirements for advocates.
307
 The Court was an early example of the 
bifurcation between qualification requirements for State and non-State parties, 
whereby the former were not subject to such requirements whereas the latter were. As 
seen below in Part II, this distinction continues to be made before modern courts. 
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Moreover, it is likely that the character of the Prize Court as a „court‟ rather than an 
arbitral tribunal was a factor in the reduced State control over advocacy.  
An early regional court was the Central American Court of Justice („CACJ‟) 
was created by a 1907 treaty inspired by the Hague Conferences and ideas for a 
Central American federation.
308
 Article 26 empowered the Court to formulate its 
procedural rules, contained within its 1911 Regulations and 1912 Procedural 
Ordinance.
309
 Article 25(2) provided a ground of challenge to a judge‟s competence 
„to have been counsel or attorney for any party in the pending suit or to have been 
such before a national court or a court of arbitration or international commission of 
inquiry in the controversy which gave rise to the suit‟.  Representation was implied by 
Article 53 of the Ordinance requiring that all pleas be filed by the party or „his 
attorney or legal representative‟.310 Articles 35 and 37 of the Regulations prohibited 
judges from practising as lawyers and from intervening „as counsel or advisers for any 
of the parties in the cases before the court for its decision‟.311  
The CACJ heard ten cases over the course of its ten years of existence, of 
which three were initiated ex proprio motu and only two came for judgment on the 
merits.
312
 The closure of the CACJ following ten years of existence has been 
attributed to its lack of practical independence, extraordinarily broad jurisdiction and 
unsatisfactory procedure.
313
 Whilst advocates pleaded before the Court,
314
 its 
incomplete procedural rules, light docket and short existence precluded its operation 
from impacting on the development of agents and counsel in international courts. 
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4.3 The Permanent Court of International Justice 
4.3.1 Creation of the PCIJ 
The late nineteenth-century movement advocating international institutionalisation 
and the creation of a permanent international court largely derived from pacifism.
315
 
Progressive jurists regarded ad hoc arbitration and other mechanisms as valuable but 
insufficient to prevent war. Proposals at the Second Hague Peace Conference for a 
„Court of Arbitral Justice‟ were never realised.316 When the PCIJ was being created, 
the drafting of its Statute was entrusted to an „Advisory Committee of Jurists‟ 
comprising ten members from the judicial, diplomatic, academic and political fields 
(five nationals of the „Great Powers‟ and five of „smaller Powers‟) which met 
between 16 June – 24 July 1920.317  Following the conclusion of the Committee‟s 
work, its draft was amended by the League Council as well as the Third Committee of 
the First Assembly of the League and again in 1929.
318
 
The Rapporteur in his initial Report to the League outlined the recent history 
of the creation of arbitral and judicial institutions and noted that the most sensitive 
points concerned the appointment of judges and compulsory jurisdiction.
319
 The 
official language of the Court was the only procedural matter discussed. Except as 
affecting the judiciary, the provisions of the Statute pertaining to the representation 
were drafted with little scrutiny at each stage. Preoccupied with the two major 
diplomatic issues, the Committee considered representation a minor matter that was 
addressed by resorting to arbitral practice which left it almost entirely to parties. 
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4.3.2 Statute 
In the Committee of Jurists, arguments similar to those at the Hague Conferences 
were made for and against the restriction of judges‟ extra-judicial activities.320 The 
Committee opted for stronger controls than those at the PCA. Article 17 of the PCIJ 
Statute forbade them from acting as agent or counsel in any case of an international 
nature or from sitting on any case in which he had previously acted as such.
321
 The 
Committee declared that „once the judge has taken up his duties, he may no longer act 
as representative, counsel or advocate in any case of an international nature, even on 
behalf of his own country. This incompatibility, though not recognised by the Court 
of Arbitration, must be taken into account by a Court of Justice‟.322   
The provisions of the Statute most relevant to agents and advocates were 
Articles 42, 51 and 54. Article 42 provided that „The parties shall be represented by 
agents. They may have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court‟. 
Although this provision differed from the Hague Conventions in not defining their 
respective roles, it was barely discussed in the Committee. However, the Committee 
reported that only agents could represent parties but that agents might also act as 
counsel.
323
 Whilst this is consistent with the PCA functional distinction that agents 
„represent‟ parties whereas counsel only „defend‟ them, it is contrary to the Behring 
Fur Seals precedent. In addition, it is illogical that agents might also act as counsel if 
the latter have no defined role. Article 51 provided for the Court‟s power to put 
questions to the agents and advocates
324
 and  Article 54 for the presentation of cases 
by the representatives „under the control of the Court‟.325  
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4.3.3 Rules of Procedure and Practice 
The terseness of the Statute‟s provisions concerning advocacy is explicable by the 
Advisory Committee‟s intention that the PCIJ should have wide discretion to create 
rules of procedure governing its proceedings.
326
 The Court proceeded to adopt the 
first Rules in 1922 with amendments in 1926 and 1931. In 1936, the Court prescribed 
a new set of Rules of Procedure („PCIJ Rules‟) in response to the amendments to the 
Statute instituted by the Revision Protocol of 1929.
327
 The PCIJ Rules 1922 
mentioned representatives only secondarily within Part III („Oral Procedure‟) 
concerning matters such as order of speaking. The 1936 Rules, although substantially 
based upon the previous versions, differed in structure and content.
328
 The 1926 and 
1931 amendments did not contain changes concerning the conduct of 
representatives.
329
  
 
4.3.3.1 Qualifications 
In creating the 1925 Rules, the Court relied upon drafts submitted by Judges Loder 
and Altamira as well as the Secretariat.
330
 Article 38 of the Secretariat‟s draft331 
required that „advocates‟ be: 1) „persons admitted to practise as advocates before the 
highest Court of their own country‟; 2) „University professors of International Law‟; 
or 3) „members of the great international academies of International Law‟. It further 
stipulated:  
„In each particular case the Court shall fix the number of counsel which each party may 
employ in the conduct of the case. The counsel of the different parties shall be called upon to 
speak in the order laid down for the presentation by the parties of the written proceedings. 
Agents shall always speak after counsel.‟  
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Article 40 of the draft provided that „the representatives of the parties may be heard as 
witnesses‟ and that the Court may grant a request by a party to administer an oath to 
the other party of the truth of its assertions.
332
 Judge Altamira‟s draft was to have 
excluded an agent from addressing the Court in oral proceedings where an advocate 
conducted a case as in Behring Fur Seals.
333
  
All of these proposals were ultimately not adopted. The judges rejected any 
limitation of rights of pleading before the Court.
334
 Lord Finlay articulated the 
rationale for restricted pleading in national courts as preventing abuse of procedure 
but asserted that that rationale did not apply „when the persons pleading represented 
States; moreover, the difficulty in laying down rules in such a matter was almost 
insurmountable‟. The Court decided that „no rule limiting the right of pleading before 
the Court should be introduced into the Rules of Procedure. Any person appointed by 
the Court to represent it should be admitted by the Court‟. In practice, advocates were 
commonly university professors or national practitioners fluent in the Court‟s official 
languages.
335
 Judge Hudson speculated that a qualification requirement would be ill-
received by States in light of the „quasi-political functions of agents‟ and, if imposed, 
may have resulted in the non-appointment of advocates in favour of agents.
336
  
In practice, agents were far more significant than advocates. Whilst agents 
were almost invariably appointed in contentious proceedings, advocates were not. 
Advocates were introduced into advisory proceedings after agents were.
337
 Agents 
could entirely conduct proceedings without advocates whilst advocates lacked agents‟ 
power to commit their parties, did not engage in case correspondence and were not 
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usually questioned by the Court in oral proceedings.
338
 Whilst the language of Article 
42 of the Statute required the appointment of agents, Judge Hudson described it as 
exhortatory due to the Court‟s inability to enforce.339 Regardless of the legal issue of 
compulsoriness, it would seem that the utilisation of agents in contentious 
proceedings was invariable in practice.
340
 Agents were likewise utilised in advisory 
proceedings by States and organisations, though initially termed „representatives‟.341 
As with advocates, the Court did not regulate the quality of agents.
342
  
The Court similarly permitted parties to employ however many advocates and 
agents they wished. Proposals to restrict numbers in the 1922 and 1936 Rules 
failed.
343
 However, on 15 June 1923 the Court „held that, in order to avoid useless 
repetition, the maximum number of speeches or oral statements made in the same 
interest should not as a general rule exceed two. It was however understood that, if 
necessary, several persons might share the task of stating a case‟.344 In Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland: „...the President pointed out that, according to the practice of the 
Court, there was no objection to several persons dividing between them the main 
speech on behalf of each Party, providing however that the various speakers dealt 
with different points or with different aspects of the subject, which was moreover 
strictly limited‟.345 Despite the absence of a prescribed rule, the Court controlled the 
number of representatives. This suggests that its general laissez-faire approach 
towards representation was tempered in practice. 
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4.3.3.2 Experts 
The impact of the Court‟s decision to allow States absolute discretion concerning the 
quality of its representatives was profound. The overlap with the role of witness 
(despite the relative rarity of witnesses) was a very important one whereby in practice 
expert witnesses (and, theoretically, lay witnesses) could give evidence as advocates, 
thus avoiding the „solemn declaration‟ and cross-examination without right of reply. 
Under the 1922 Rules, no discrete category of „expert witness‟ existed; only a 
„witness‟ category was prescribed under Articles 48, 50 and 51.  
 Nevertheless, „experts‟ were considered in the Personal Work of Employers 
Case (1926) (Advisory Opinion No 13):  
„the Court decided...[that] the International Federation of Trades Unions should be allowed to 
produce experts. It was further decided that: 1) the experts should not to be treated as 
witnesses and 2) they should be invited to reply to questions put by the representatives of 
international organisations and, if necessary, by the Court. It was also agreed that the 
representatives of organisations might reply orally to the arguments advanced at the first 
hearings (Cf. Rules, Article 46). Ultimately, these experts were not heard, as the organisation 
concerned considered that their evidence was not required and the right of reply was not 
used.‟346  
 
Although these „experts‟ were apparently to have been treated as representatives 
rather than witnesses, it was crucially the Court which decided the matter rather than 
the party. Thus, there was no absolute right to call experts under the PCIJ regime. 
There was only one case where „expert witnesses‟ („témoin-expert‟) so called 
were employed.
347
 In Upper Silesia, Germany called four expert witnesses and Poland 
one – the Court had made an order inviting the parties to furnish „by any means they 
think fit, further information regarding the points reserved by the Court for this 
purpose‟.348 The witnesses gave evidence and were cross-examined by the opposing 
party‟s agent and then by the judges. All of the witnesses were treated according to 
the procedure then prescribed by Article 50 of the Rules, whereby they made a 
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„solemn declaration‟ to „speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth‟.349 
Here, by contrast, it was not the Court but the parties which decided how the „experts‟ 
were to appear according to the wide discretion given by the Court in its order.  
 The 1936 PCIJ Rules introduced an „expert‟ category into Article 53 with a 
separate procedure.
350
 This was prompted by a desire to harmonise the positions of 
experts called by parties with those called by the Court under Article 57.
351
 However, 
in only one post-1936 case was an „expert‟ ever utilised. In Diversion of Water from 
the Meuse, the Belgian agent requested that M. le professeur Delmer – „secrétaire 
général du ministère des Travaux publics de Belgique, est la père du projet du canal 
Albert‟ – be permitted to present a statement to the Court, which the President 
approved.
352
 Designated „conseil technique du gouvernement belge‟, M. Delmer 
proceeded to address the Court on two scientific issues. He neither made a „solemn 
declaration‟ nor was he examined by the opposing agent. Notwithstanding the Court‟s 
right to question advocates under Article 52(1) of the Rules, he was not questioned.  
 Belgium did not assert a procedural right to designate M. Delmer as „technical 
counsel‟ rather than as „expert witness‟ but applied to the Court. Thus, it was the 
Court which permitted him to appear as advocate rather than the party. This implies 
that it was the Court which governed the admission of advocates and evidence rather 
than litigants, an approach consistent with the fact that it was the Court which decided 
not to impose qualification requirements in the 1922 Rules. The amendments to the 
Rules and their re-drafting in 1936 further show that the Court retained the power to 
change its position concerning advocates‟ qualifications – as when it invented the 
„expert witness‟ in 1936.  
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4.3.3.3 Functions 
Article 51 of the 1922 Rules came closest to defining representational functions: 
„witnesses shall be examined by the representatives of the parties under the control of 
the President‟. The Rules seemingly envisaged representatives‟ functions to be 
oratorical since they are only mentioned for oral proceedings. However, in practice 
the agent acted for his party in all matters including diplomatic and political functions 
alongside legal ones.
353
 In the drafting of Article 35 of the 1936 Rules, it was decided 
that only agents could represent parties on procedural matters and the agent‟s superior 
role was emphasised.
354
 An amendment to Article 32
355
 governing the Court‟s general 
procedural power was proposed but not discussed.
356
  
Whilst the Court declared in the Prince von Pless Administration case that 
„according to the doctrine of the Court, statements by Agents of the 
governments...engaged the responsibility of those governments, whereas observations 
offered by Counsel or Advocates only engaged the responsibility of the latter‟, the 
following day it narrowly adopted a contravening amendment to Article 51 of the 
Rules changing „representatives‟ (which had been applied as „agents‟) to „agents, 
counsel or advocates‟ having the right to question witnesses‟.357 In any event, the 
Court‟s former position did not explain an advocate‟s „responsibility‟ in practical 
terms; given the Court‟s general laissez-faire approach, it is unlikely that it envisaged 
an ethical dimension.  
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4.3.3.4 Documentary Evidence 
A crucial link exists between counsel, witnesses and evidence. Article 68 of Judge 
Nyholm‟s re-draft of the 1922 Rules358 had empowered the Court to „on [its] own 
initiative, or at the request of one of the parties, order the production of any evidence 
which [it] consider[s] necessary…for instance, order the appearance or the 
interrogation of the representatives‟. Despite the use of „representatives‟, the 
following Articles 69-71 referred exclusively to „agents‟ in the administration of an 
oath („serment décisoire ou supplétoire‟) and interrogatory examination. Article 77 
had stipulated that „the agents of the parties and persons whose individual 
responsibility might be involved by their replies shall not be heard as witnesses‟.359 
However, these provisions were ultimately not adopted. 
 The 1926 Revision of the 1922 Rules amended Article 35 („institution of 
proceedings‟) to require „whenever possible‟ agents to be resident at the Hague.360 
The Court debated
361
 the following amendment proposed by President Huber: 
„Article 33 bis: States...which are Parties to a dispute or which furnish information to the 
Court in the course of advisory procedure, shall be held solely responsible for the production 
of any particular document and for any statement made on their behalf during the 
proceedings...The Court, when deciding upon [a] request that the proceedings shall be secret, 
shall at the same time decide whether the evidence in question is admissible‟.  
 
President Huber explained the reasoning for his proposal:  
„Again it might happen that a representative of a Party made statements or proposals which, in 
the opinion of the other Party, were of an invidious nature. Cases of this kind had actually 
occurred. Now, it was a very regrettable matter when one of the representatives made a protest 
to the Court. Of course, the President could always break off the hearing in order that the 
Court might withdraw to decide the point, but nevertheless it would be well for the Court to 
establish once and for all the principle of the exclusive responsibility of Parties. Parties 
appearing before the Court were invariably sovereign States, but the corollary of such 
sovereignty was the absolute responsibility of the representatives of such States. That 
principle having been established, the President should simply say: “under the Rules of the 
Court all responsibility rests on States appearing before it and on their representatives”...The 
President also observed that the principle of responsibility also covered that of secrecy‟.  
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The ensuing debate focused exclusively upon the principal aim of President Huber‟s 
proposal, namely, to establish exclusive responsibility of Parties „in order to relieve 
the Court of responsibility‟.362 Judge Weiss proposed to amend the provision to refute 
the Court‟s responsibility on the ground that the Court lacked the power to enforce 
any sanction which it may prescribe for party responsibility.
363
  The President 
ultimately withdrew his proposal.
364
 
Whilst the principal focus of the debate concerned the role of the Court in 
regulating evidence, President Huber‟s proposal placed responsibility not only upon 
parties but also upon their representatives. Whilst this aspect was not debated, the 
proposal engaged an important theme pervading the procedure of international dispute 
settlement, namely, the tension between the power of international courts and 
tribunals to regulate their own procedures on the one hand and the State control over 
case presentation on the other. for Concerning the practical question of approval by 
agents, advocates or witnesses of court records of their statements, a distinction was 
drawn between „the position of agents, advocates and counsel, on the one hand, and 
witnesses on the other; there could be no question as to the integrity of persons 
representing a government, and the Court could not dictate to them what the record of 
their speeches was to be‟.365 President Huber‟s proposal could potentially have 
created personal responsibility for agents and counsel who, for example, colluded to 
suppress documentary evidence on false grounds of secrecy.
366
 
An interesting historical example of forged documents occurred in the Behring 
Fur Seals arbitration. An American counsel, studying Russian documents in his 
leisure hours, discovered obvious discrepancies in the translations from Russian to 
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English which, on investigation, were found to have been forgeries by the translator 
employed by the American legal team.
367
 This raises two ethical questions, namely, 
whether counsel should be obliged to take reasonable steps to scrutinise documentary 
evidence that they intend to adduce and whether they should be required to notify the 
tribunal and the opposing party of reasonable suspicions concerning the veracity of 
evidence. There is some evidence to suggest that the British legal team had previously 
discovered the discrepancies and, seemingly to prejudice the American case by 
ambushing them at oral hearings, deliberately decided to keep silent.
368
  
During the Lighthouses case, one of the agents referred to a document which 
he intended to file but whose authenticity he could not verify. The agent, upon being 
questioned by the President, stated that since he attached little importance to the 
document it would not be worthwhile to authenticate so that he „consented‟ to 
withdraw it.
369
 This Court control exercised concerning the veracity of evidence 
would appear to have gone further than the laissez-faire admissibility approach in the 
Rules. The debates concerning President Huber‟s proposal in the framing of the rules 
of procedure, coupled with Behring Fur Seals and Lighthouses, illustrates two 
important dynamics concerning responsibility for the veracity of documents. The first 
is the link between parties‟ control over counsel and case presentation and the danger 
of false evidence. Since parties‟ principal motivation is to win cases, there is a 
considerable risk that absolute control over case presentation entices some parties to 
attempt to mislead the court. The second is the personal responsibility of counsel as 
an intermediary between court and client to ensure the veracity of documentary 
evidence as an important safeguard for the integrity of the judicial process. 
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4.3.4 Calls for an International Bar 
In a lecture and debate of the Grotius Society in 1931 concerning the future of the 
PCIJ, Judges Caloyanni and Hurst expressed qualified support for the concept of an 
„international bar‟ as part of the Court.370 For Judge Caloyanni, the crucial motivation 
was ensuring that men of the highest standard appear before the Court:  
„At this moment anybody, without restriction...with regard to qualifications, may plead before 
the Permanent Court...[t]he States responsible for sending representatives have sent men who 
were up to their task, but with the number of cases increasing, I should say in the interests of 
the Court a Bar should be formed...a great deal...of the Judges‟ education is owed to...the high 
standard of the men who compose the Bar – I do not mean morally, I mean scientifically...The 
men who plead before the Permanent Court are either practitioners or men who have never 
had the slightest practice at the Bar – professors – and, in countries where professors are not 
allowed to practise at the Bar, sometimes men who have only known the Bar because they are 
eminent political men. If there were formed a body with strict rules not only with regard to the 
conduct of cases but also to the organisation of the Bar, we should have there a great 
opportunity with regard to the choice of Judges when the day comes, if it ever comes, when it 
will not be left entirely in the hands of the National Group to submit the names of the Judges 
to the League of Nations.‟371 
 
Thus, for Judge Caloyanni the rationale for the professionalisation of advocacy before 
the Court was twofold: 1) to raise the standards of its practitioners (particularly 
professors and politicians) by requiring them to be experienced advocates; and 2) to 
raise the standards of the judiciary by providing recruits from the bar.  
For Judge Hurst, there were two reasons for the existence of a Bar, namely, „to 
ensure that those who are responsible for the preparation of the case shall see to it that 
the individuals they are representing – whether it is a State or a private person – shall 
have their case put before the Court in a proper way, and, above all, to ensure that all 
the material essential to a proper decision by the Court is laid before the Court for its 
consideration‟.372 He also dwelt upon the official languages excluding more able 
advocates in favour of less able „professors‟.373  
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Dr Bisschop advocated the creation of a „School of International Law‟ 
alongside a professional bar attached to the Court in order to increase independence of 
advocates from States.
374
 Dr Idelson expressed scepticism, in that he favoured a „law 
of natural selection‟ that would solve such practical problems due to the difficulty of 
creating such a bar.
375
 Mr Bewes supported the idea of replacing the national group 
system as it produced „too many professors‟:  
„It seems to me that the first thing...is to get the very best men. If you have a wide rule...the 
little fish will no doubt come through because the net is so wide, and you cannot keep them 
out. It may be that all these Courts suffer from “professors”, sometimes on the Bench and 
sometimes at the Bar...after all a Court must protect itself, if and when troublesome or 
wearisome advocates come before it. It must have the courage, even if the advocate is an 
advocate for a Government, to shut him up if he ought to be shut up. The difficulty...is very 
much greater if the Government is going to go off the deep end and say: “how can anyone 
representing us be otherwise than perfect?” But in the end it can be done...It may be, as [Judge 
Hurst] pointed out, that for disciplinary reasons the creation of a Bar may be necessary which 
the man who wishes to plead can join as of right and by joining would submit himself to the 
discipline of the Court.‟ 
 
Judge Caloyanni replied that „a Court is responsible for its Bar because the Bar is 
responsible to the Court‟. He declared:  
„...when a Government appoints a member of the bar, the first is that the Government will take 
care he is a man of their own political views. That is a danger. The Government, knowing that 
there are two languages there, will choose from amongst the most eminent men...It might 
mean that, in that way we should have a very good selection of barristers. That number should 
be fixed, but not by the Permanent Court...When you have had those men chosen, they will 
form a Bar. The Bar, directly it is appointed, will be denationalised...and that body will grow 
and in time create an atmosphere in which they will even stand up against their own 
Governments...they will also be in a panel of barristers put up by the Bar Council itself, who 
will say: “These men are qualified to go and plead.” Then the Governments must [support 
them]...His qualifications would have to be studied by...a private Committee appointed by the 
League of Nations itself, and he would have to submit something to the League of Nations by 
way of qualifications.‟376 
 
These Grotius Society proceedings, unknown to us today, paint a remarkable picture 
of the practice of advocacy before the PCIJ. Despite the modern tendency to regard 
the PCIJ as, in some respects, more successful than the ICJ there was general criticism 
offered in the debate concerning the quality of its judges and practitioners.  
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 First, there was a general dissatisfaction with the academics who regularly 
appeared before the Court. Although no specific cases or individuals were cited, there 
was a collective perception that „the professors‟ were verbose, tiresome or otherwise 
incompetent advocates and that qualification requirements were needed to weed the 
„little fish‟ out. Judge Caloyanni‟s statement that there was a need to attract advocates 
and judges of higher quality suggests that, contrary to the modern perception of the 
Court, it did not generally meet that standard. In particular, he criticised the political 
motivations for States‟ recruitment of counsel and the restrictions imposed by the 
official languages. Second, contrary to Lord Finlay‟s assertion in 1922 that the 
rationale of qualification requirements before national courts to prevent procedural 
abuses did not apply to States, there was a clear recognition that States‟ 
representatives could misbehave.  
The debate reveals the great tension between Court and States with a clear 
desire to increasing the independence of advocates in order to improve the quality of 
argumentation and restrict the ability of States to control evidence. Interestingly, 
despite the general laissez-faire culture of the Court, at no time during the debate 
were concerns raised about the power of the Court to exercise such regulation. Judge 
Caloyanni, in a paper presented later that year, amplified his views by proposing a 
constitution for an international bar with a senior-junior division and 
„denationalisation‟ scheme which would break the tradition of national election which 
he ascribed to the principle of State equality.
377
 That these issues were being 
discussed in 1931 reveals that, despite the tradition of State control over international 
litigation, those arrangements were considered problematic by some insiders. 
  
                                                 
377
 Caloyanni, supra note 370, 770-775. 
 105 
4.4 Conclusions 
This narrative of the historical development of international advocacy has identified 
several important themes. The first is the tension between party control (especially 
States) and tribunal control over the case presentation, which stems from the origin of 
the international legal system in inter-state arbitration where State control is 
imperative. The second, related theme is the role of professional counsel as 
autonomous intermediaries between parties and tribunals. The history of international 
arbitration leading to the PCIJ illustrates that desire of States to retain control over 
their representatives and the belief of some judges, like Lord Finlay, that the integrity 
of States could not be questioned created an unregulated space within which States at 
times misbehaved. The propensity of such procedural abuses and the criticisms made 
by insiders like Judges Hurst and Caloyanni suggest that the standards being observed 
by agents and counsel in practice were problematic.   
 A third theme is the readiness of international tribunals to regulate counsel. 
The research indicates that two opposing dynamics were occurring. On the one hand, 
the historical era was strongly characterised by a laissez-faire mentality by which the 
judiciary formally allowed parties a virtually absolute discretion concerning the 
appointment and control of their representation. For example, the PCIJ considered but 
rejected proposals to impose qualification requirements for counsel in its rules of 
procedure. However, when procedural problems arose within this unregulated space 
international tribunals demonstrated a remarkable willingness to regulate in an ad hoc 
fashion. Orders made by the Behring Fur Seal arbitration concerning the function of 
agents and by the PCIJ regarding the use of experts as counsel fall within this 
category. At no time were the powers of the arbitral tribunals and the PCIJ to make 
such orders questioned. Regulating counsel was as a matter of policy rather than law. 
 106 
Consequently, modern concerns about the powers of international courts 
(particularly for inter-State courts like the ICJ and ITLOS) to regulate counsel on the 
ground that they lack the power to do so are historically unfounded. First, 
representation was not considered in any detail by State delegates at the Hague Peace 
Conferences or by the Advisory Committee and other organs involved in the drafting 
of the PCIJ Statute. Those delegates, being preoccupied by the great issues of 
compulsory jurisdiction and the judiciary, left procedural matters (including 
representation) entirely to the courts. The broad statutory power of the PCIJ (identical 
to that of the ICJ) to frame rules of procedure was intentional. The subsequent 
consideration by the PCIJ in drafting its first rules to impose qualification 
requirements for counsel was rejected not because the Court considered that it lacked 
the power to do so but on policy grounds. This suggests that the ICJ has the implied 
power to regulate counsel under its statutory power to frame rules of procedure.
378
  
 The final theme illustrated by this chapter is the link between professional 
advocacy and procedural integrity. This is demonstrated not only by specific cases 
such as Behring Fur Seals and Pious Fund but also by more general considerations 
such as the competence and efficiency of counsel. The criticisms voiced of the quality 
of counsel in the Grotius Society debates of 1931 are revealing and have 
circumstantial support in attempts in the 1920s to impose time limits and make agents 
personally responsible for the production of documents. These early problems 
concerning the integrity and efficiency of proceedings appear to have been more 
serious than is understood today and to have foreshadowed virtually identical 
problems that would arise before the ICJ. They are longstanding issues dating from 
the beginnings of international adjudication that are today beginning to be addressed.  
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Chapter V: The International Court of Justice 
Having set out the historical background of international advocacy, this chapter 
begins examination of the ethical standards for counsel before three modern courts 
that differ considerably from one another. As explained in Chapter 1, the key question 
that Part II addresses is whether the professionalisation of advocacy through the 
articulation of common ethical standards for counsel would be desirable. Following 
historically from the PCIJ analysis in Chapter 3, it analyses the procedural rules 
concerning representation before the ICJ as well as the ethical issues that have arisen 
in practice. Parties are allowed absolute discretion concerning whom they appoint as 
their agents and counsel so that anyone regardless of training, vocation or character 
can represent a party before the Court. Agents and counsel are subject to no common 
standards and are accountable only to their clients and to their national bars.  
 Despite (or because of) this laissez-faire diplomatic tradition of nineteenth-
century advocacy explored in Chapter 3, the role of representatives before the Court 
has been attracting greater attention from prominent judges
379
 and practitioners
380
 in 
recent years. These commentators have expressed two broadly opposed views. The 
progressive view is that that there ought to be a professional bar at the Court because 
this would be theoretically desirable or practically necessary. The conservative view 
argues for the status quo because there is no practical need, the project would be 
prohibitively onerous or States would resist professionalisation in order to defend 
their „sovereignty‟ with detrimental consequences for the Court‟s docket.381  
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 In examining the practice of the Court, two questions are posed. The first is 
whether problems concerning the conduct of party representatives have arisen and, if 
so, to what causes are such problems attributable. This may be termed the corrective 
aspect of professionalisation in that it seeks to rectify existing problems by providing 
a regulatory framework within which they can be better handled by the Court. The 
second is whether, in the absence of common ethical standards, there are potential 
problems that would threaten the integrity of the Court‟s proceedings in the wrong 
circumstances. This may be called the preventative aspect of professionalisation 
whereby it serves to preclude potential problems through prescription. Through 
analysis of the cases in which ethical questions have arisen, it is suggested that 
common ethical standards for counsel are desirable for both corrective and 
preventative purposes.  
 This chapter also serves a second purpose, namely, to identify the main issues 
concerning professionalisation within the specific cultural context of the Court. As 
explained in Chapter 1, each international court has its own historical, procedural and 
jurisdictional identity that delineates its ability to undertake professionalisation. The 
historical legacy of the Court, for example, makes clear that the laissez-faire culture 
of the PCIJ towards representation deriving from the nineteenth-century diplomatic 
tradition explored in Chapter 3 derived not from statute but rather from a decision of 
the judiciary when it was framing its 1922 Rules of Procedure. This decision indicates 
an implied power for the Court under Article 30(1) of the Statute to regulate 
representation within its rules of procedure. However, it is clear that 
professionalisation would encounter a degree of resistance from a culture that remains 
considerably deferential toward governmental officials. Thus, the debate is likely to 
largely focus upon the attitude of those officials towards professional representation.  
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5.1 Historical Background 
Procedural matters received scant attention from the various organs that drafted the 
ICJ Statute.
382
 The PCIJ Statute provisions concerning representation, judicial 
disqualification and case presentation under Articles 17, 30, 42-43, 51 and 54 were 
retained virtually intact and little discussion in the ICJ Statute at the San Francisco 
Conference.
383
 In adopting its Rules of Procedure 1946, the Court retained the laissez-
faire provisions in the 1936 PCIJ Rules concerning representation.
384
 However, 
amidst a „crisis of unemployment‟ following the unpopular South West Africa and 
Barcelona Traction judgments, several States complained that the Court‟s procedure 
was costly and cumbersome.
385
 In 1972, the Court responded to these complaints by 
amending the Rules to improve its efficiency by exercising greater control over 
proceedings and compelling parties to plead more succinctly.
386
  
This greater judicial oversight over parties‟ pleadings was welcomed by 
States,
387
  indicating that government officials were willing to exchange a measure of 
their control over case presentation for improved procedural efficiency. These 
amendments on case presentation remain in force to this day.
388
  Similarly, the 
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Court‟s Practice Directions389 introduced in 2001 to augment the Rules and improve 
courtroom discipline have been generally welcomed by States. As explored below, 
though Practice Directions are not legally binding they are in practice treated as such 
by parties. Not only have greater judicial oversight into party representation in 
Practice Directions VII and VIII do not appear to have had any negative impact upon 
the Court‟s docket but, on the contrary, have arguably improved the attractiveness of 
the Court to potential litigants as an efficient and rigorous judicial institution.     
This background suggests two points concerning the regulation of party 
representation: 1) that procedural inefficacy arising from a party-controlled litigious 
process can undermine the Court‟s legitimacy and docket; and 2) that at least some 
States welcome tighter judicial control in the interest of procedural efficiency and 
rigour. Whilst this thesis has not undertaken research into the attitudes of States 
towards the professionalisation of advocacy and the corresponding reduction of their 
control over their representatives, this historical background concerning increases in 
the Court‟s regulation of advocacy suggests that the tighter procedural integrity that 
would accompany the advent of professionalism would be welcomed by States as 
another progressive step in the continuous improvement of the Court‟s procedure. 
Since States regularly conform to compulsory professional representation before their 
own national courts, it is illogical to suppose that the conformity of the ICJ to that 
national standard would be met with hostility by those same government officials. On 
the contrary, it is arguable that professionalisation would enhance the Court‟s 
attractiveness to States by providing even stronger assurances of procedural integrity, 
fairness and efficiency in settling their disputes by judicial means.   
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5.2  Admission Requirements 
Article 42 of the Statute
390
 is identical to the PCIJ Statute. From the Corfu Channel 
case onwards, the ICJ has followed PCIJ in imposing no admission requirements for 
representatives. Whilst Professor Rosenne opines that representation „is a matter for 
each litigating State to settle for itself with due regard for the status of the Court, on a 
level with its own Supreme Court‟,391 litigants‟ powers to appoint representatives 
under the current Rules are limited only by the Court‟s power under Article 58(2) to 
restrict the number of advocates (a 1972 amendment).  
Concerning the question of whether the Court has the power to regulate the 
appointment of parties‟ representation, judges are broadly divided into two camps: 
„Subject to the Statute, the Court does have the authority [to prescribe admission 
requirements]. Concerning the Court‟s consent-based jurisdiction, there is one camp within 
the Court that gives priority to „State sovereignty‟ and there is another camp that says „this is a 
courtroom!‟ This is not a regional dividing line. I have always taken the view that sovereignty 
stops at jurisdiction and that litigants are subject to courtroom discipline.‟392 
 
An interesting innovation in Bosnia Genocide was a „code of conduct‟ for journalists 
backed by exclusion from proceedings for the good administration of justice.
393
 Other 
judges believe that since only „sovereign States‟ can appear before the Court, 
sovereignty „does not stop at the jurisdictional door‟.394 Another view is that „it is at 
the risk and peril of the party concerned to [appoint] non-lawyers as counsel and they 
are the ones who stand to lose by it.‟395 Four admission issues arise from practice: 1) 
the appointment and functions of agents; 2) expertise in international law; 3) expertise 
in advocacy skills; and 4) the appointment of experts as counsel rather than witnesses.  
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5.2.1 Agents
396
 
As explored in Chapter 3, the agent is the most procedurally powerful representative 
of the party and (for logistical, political and other reasons) is usually a diplomat or 
other government official in practice. Objection has been made to Practice Direction 
VIII on the ground that the Court lacks the power to regulate the appointment of 
diplomats.
397
 However, Judge Oda was critical in DRC v. Uganda of a private lawyer 
as agent because of a recent history of „abusive‟ unilateral applications brought 
without the prior exhaustion of diplomatic channels for the private interest of the 
lawyers rather than the interest of the party.
398
 A similar problem arose before the 
ITLOS in the Grand Prince case, where a Spanish abogado appeared as agent for 
Belize.
399
 In that case, there were not only practical difficulties for the agent in 
obtaining instructions from his principal but „one of the difficulties the Tribunal had 
to face was that of an eventual conflict of interest between the lawyer acting as an 
agent for Belize and as counsel for the ship-owner.‟400 The comments of Judges Oda 
and Cot suggest an unhealthy degree of control being exerted by private counsel over 
vulnerable States in certain cases.
 401
  
This problem of conflicts of interest also begs the question of defining the 
fundamental role of the agent before the Court. Historically, the agent derives from 
the „diplomatic tradition‟ of nineteenth-century arbitration. The agent also has 
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exclusive authority under the Rules to perform procedural acts.
402
 The agent also 
fulfils an important, practical role as the legal team‟s chief administrator and 
intermediary with the instructing government.
403
 Thus, it is sensible for practical and 
political reasons that the party have a diplomat within its legal team.  
However, the ability of agents to perform representational functions is 
problematic because such persons (unless members of national bars) are not bound by 
ethical standards of conduct or required to have expertise in international law or 
advocacy. There are two ways to address this: 1) to exclude agents from advocacy by 
restricting their rights of hearing to political statements and performing procedural 
acts required of them under the Statute;
404
 or 2) to require agents to comply with 
admission requirements and ethical rules for advocacy. The effect of the former 
option would be to require parties to appoint professional „counsel and advocates‟, 
which goes against the current voluntary phrasing of Article 42 of the Statute. 
However, the second option would be compatible with Article 42 because it would 
not interfere with a party‟s right to not appoint counsel and advocates if it so elects. 
The practical effect would still be to require parties to retain professional counsel. 
Whilst this in itself would not deal with the conflict of interest problems that arose in 
DRC v. Uganda, Grand Prince and elsewhere, those conflicts could be dealt with 
conjunctly by prescribing ethical standards forbidding agents and counsel from 
serving interests other than those of the client in their representation of them.
405
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5.2.2  Membership of a National Bar 
The only admission requirement common to the ECJ, ECtHR and ICC is membership 
of a national bar.
406
 There are three advantages to this requirement. Firstly, advocates 
would be subject to the admission requirements of national bars – theoretically 
ensuring that they have received some advocacy training. Secondly, national bars 
have disciplinary sanctions (e.g. – suspension and disbarment) that international 
courts lack.
407
 Thirdly, national bars can provide practical assistance to international 
courts‟ disciplinary systems.408   
 It is arguable that a top practitioner with no specialist background in 
international law is nevertheless capable of advocating effectively before the Court.
409
 
However, not all non-specialist practitioners would be competent. For example, 
Maître Jacques Vergès
410
 was reportedly discharged by the DRC for poor 
performance in Arrest Warrant.
411
 According to one judge: 
„I would favour robust standards of admission – e.g. „great expertise in international law‟. For 
example, in two African cases a French counsel representing the Applicants clearly did not 
know what he was doing and knew nothing of the Court‟s procedures. It was a vexing 
experience and people were surprised to see this individual appear again before the Court as 
counsel.‟412 
 
Since membership of a national bar does not necessarily ensure competence before 
the ICJ, a requirement of „expertise in international law‟ would be appropriate.  
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5.2.3  Academic Lawyers 
Advocacy work before the Court is dominated by an elite „mafia‟413 of professors. 
The professionalisation of advocacy before the Court is a sensitive proposal in part 
because of academics‟ fear that it would result in the end of their domination. 
However, precedent exists for the admission of academics before international courts. 
Exceptions for academic lawyers from the general admission requirement of 
membership of a national bar are prescribed by both the ECJ
414
  and ICC.
415
 Thus, it 
does not necessarily follow that a generic admission requirement of membership of a 
national bar results in the exclusion of academics.  
There are cogent arguments for the admission of specialist academics. Firstly, 
by definition they have the international law expertise that practitioners from other 
specialisations lack. Whilst the very best practitioners may be able to plead effectively 
before the Court without an academic background in the discipline, it is a strong 
argument that the majority of practitioners without such a background would struggle 
to do so. Secondly, the prescription of common ethical standards would arguably deal 
with academics‟ lack of advocacy expertise by obliging them to abide by those 
standards.
416
 Thirdly, it may be suggested that academics have greater practical 
independence from their clients than diplomats or government lawyers.  
 There are also powerful arguments for the restriction of academics‟ admission. 
Firstly, in the absence of common ethical standards, academics have an unfair 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis practitioners who are bound by their own national 
standards. Secondly, there is an argument for requiring academics to complete 
advocacy training because university lecturing requires different rhetorical skills: 
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„…the written pleadings should not be excessively argumentative, nor should they be 
academic or pedantic in their presentation. It is not the function of advocates (including those 
also known as professors) to give lectures to tribunals; it is not the function of written 
pleadings to substitute for textbooks. Cases can usually be presented clearly and eloquently 
without over-elaborate disquisition on legal issues.‟417 
 
Thirdly, academics arguably lack the forensic skills required to be a complete 
advocate.
418
 For example, an oft-repeated criticism is that professors have poor 
witness examination technique:  
„This common law art of questioning in examination and cross-examination of a witness is 
one of those skills which can only be learned by doing it. It is, one may say with conviction, 
not one that the academics and professors of international law who so often plead in the ICJ 
would be well advised to attempt. The few times it has been attempted have not shown the 
professors at their best. Good cross-examination has indeed happened in the ICJ but that has 
only been when a party has been wise enough to include in its team some experienced and 
proven practising counsel, often not an international lawyer at all, but who is used to dealing 
with witnesses and with the art of examination and of cross-examination.‟419 
 
It may be suggested that the cause of this particular weakness is not professional but 
procedural in that academics typically come from inquisitorial jurisdictions. However, 
there may also be a difference between avocats and academics insofar as the former 
have greater experience in interrogating witnesses after the judge. 
A nuanced approach would reflect the dual need both for international law 
expertise and competent advocacy. One way to reflect these priorities would be to 
exempt sufficiently qualified academic international lawyers from a putative 
admission requirement of membership of a national bar. However, academics should 
be required to adhere to common ethical standards to provide parity with practitioners 
who are already subjected to national ethical standards. Such standards would also 
oblige academics to refrain from performing those advocacy functions for which they 
lack due expertise; for example, a due diligence rule would be infringed by an 
academic who attempts witness examination to his client‟s detriment.420  
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5.2.4 Experts 
Despite the experts witness procedure in the Rules, litigants are able to designate their 
experts as „counsel‟ instead of witnesses. The tactical advantages to be gained from 
this method of adducing „evidence‟ is that counsel are, unlike witnesses, not subject to 
cross-examination and the substance of that material can be presented in a more 
controlled and favourable manner to the Court. The central issue concerns the 
independence of these experts from their clients and, from that, the integrity of their 
statements. Examination of the Court‟s practice reveals that the anomalous privilege 
of parties to present expert evidence in the form of pleadings by counsel not only 
impinges upon the Court‟s ability to accurately weigh the evidence but also provides a 
dangerous loophole through which it can be corrupted.  
In Corfu Channel, Albania sought permission for its „experts‟ to interrogate 
witnesses. The President directed Albania to clarify whether they were appearing as 
„expert counsel‟ or „expert witnesses‟.421 Upon being reminded that, if appearing as 
the latter, they would not have the right to interrogate witnesses Albania ultimately 
decided to designate the experts as witnesses rather than counsel.
422423
 In the South 
West Africa cases, the President declared that the evidence of a governmental official 
called as an „expert‟ was admissible but his status as a governmental official „may 
bear upon the weight to be given to his evidence‟.424 Following statements of personal 
opinion by an „expert‟ in Burkina Fasoe v. Mali, the presiding judge declared that his 
statements would be treated as those of a representative.
425
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This liberal policy proved to be problematic in the Pulp Mills case,
426
 in which 
scientific evidence was pivotal. Argentina and Uruguay appointed „scientific experts‟ 
as part of their legal teams. In its pleadings, Argentina characterised some of these 
persons as „independent experts‟. Uruguay argued that Argentina, by „cloaking them 
in the garb of advocates‟ and thereby insulating the experts from cross-examination, 
had forfeited their independence. Argentina argued that independence depends upon 
the experts‟ relationships to the instructing party and case issues, by which definition 
some of its experts were independent. The Court held:  
„Regarding those experts who appeared before it as counsel at the hearings, the Court would 
have found it more useful had they been presented by the Parties as expert witnesses…instead 
of being included as counsel in their respective delegations. The Court indeed considers that 
those persons who provide evidence before the Court based on their scientific or technical 
knowledge and on their personal experience should testify before the Court as experts, 
witnesses or in some cases in both capacities, rather than counsel, so that they may be 
submitted to questioning by the other party as well as by the Court.‟427  
 
Pulp Mills illustrates the danger of permitting litigants to conflate the roles of witness 
and advocate; as Sir Arthur Watts put it, it becomes a matter of „forensic tactics‟.428 A 
potential benefit is that the inclusion of expert counsel in legal teams improves the 
quality of argument.
429
 However, the exposure of the experts to the parties‟ case 
strategies – compounded by lack of cross-examination – inevitably dilutes the 
integrity of their statements. Though experts will by definition be better-placed to 
address the Court on specialist matters,
430
 there is no compelling reason for this to be 
done as an advocate rather than a witness.  
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5.2.5 Legal Aid 
An important facet of equality of arms entails parties‟ ability to retain competent 
counsel. In forming a legal team, „the real objective…would seem to be that a State, 
presenting its case, should use the best counsel and advocates available, no matter 
what their nationality‟.431 Judge Owada wrote in 1971:  
„[T]here is a vast difference between…a country which can employ her own legal experts in 
the service of the government and…a country which has to hire illustrious names from abroad. 
A possible solution to this might be found in the establishment of a panel of lawyers from 
whose list the parties may choose their own counsel before the Court and the establishment of 
a system under which the cost incurred will be borne, in toto or in part, by the United 
Nations.‟432 
 
The creation by the Court of a list system comprising expert counsel would be a 
useful and feasible project. A legal aid mechanism  would help to ensure that all 
parties can retain good counsel. Currently, the UN Secretary-General‟s Trust Fund 
provides only financial assistance and is somewhat cumbersome.
433
  
An apposite case is Corfu Channel, which was litigated in the tense 
atmosphere of the nascent Cold War between a relatively wealthy and experienced 
Applicant (the United Kingdom) and a poor and novice Respondent (Albania) then 
ruled by a Communist government. Judge Jean-Pierre Cot‟s sketch of the two parties‟ 
legal teams reveals a significant imbalance,
434
 though he notes that the degree of 
inequality was „a situation quite unimaginable today in the Hague Court‟.435 However, 
according to a confidential source there have been cases in which the Registrar has 
had to bend his strict neutrality by informally assist parties to retain competent 
counsel. A legal aid mechanism would bring structure to this de facto practice.  
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5.3 Ethical Standards 
In the absence of common ethical rules for counsel, it might be asked whether the 
standards of counsel who regularly appear before the Court are nevertheless 
harmonious. However, the question is not entirely to the point because, although it is 
true that the group of regular counsel is relatively homogenous,
436
 there are also 
counsel who appear before the Court in only one or two cases.
437
 Whilst the standards 
of the counsel who regularly appear before the Court (the so-called de facto bar) 
clearly have the most scope to shape its culture of advocacy, the lack of admission 
requirements for counsel common ethical standards are necessary not only to 
harmonise divergent standards amongst senior ICJ counsel (e.g. – Professors James 
Crawford SC or Alain Pellet) but also amongst junior counsel. 
 The Practice Directions provide a precedent for compromise between the 
progressive and conservative schools of thought concerning the jurisdiction of the 
Court to regulate counsel. Were the Court unwilling to prescribe a binding code as 
part of its Rules, it could partially base such a code upon the consent of counsel by 
issuing a Practice Direction containing a voluntary code of conduct and inviting 
counsel to sign and deposit a copy of the code with the Registrar at the 
commencement of new proceedings. Non-mandatory provisions of the code could 
potentially be amended by the common consent of the counsel in a particular case: 
„Although I for one believe that the Court ought to adopt its own Code of Conduct for 
counsel, I believe that the Court might find such an idea interesting. I do not personally see a 
problem with it, if that is part of the agreement of the States Parties.‟438 
 
A quasi-compulsory set of ethical standards would not only be useful in addressing 
practical issues but also circumvent the debate concerning the Court‟s powers. 
                                                 
436
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5.3.1 Duties to the Client 
In considering counsel‟s duties to his client, the role of counsel as intermediary 
between Court and client is crucial. Counsel not only articulates his client‟s cause to 
the Court but also explains the Court‟s procedure and its wishes to his client. The 
paradox that emerges is that clients that consider the pursuit of a course of action that 
they perceive to be in their best interests – defined narrowly as „winning the case‟ – 
can sometimes act contrary to their best legal interests. The perceived dichotomy 
between, on the one hand, the client‟s interests and, on the other hand, the interests of 
justice is fallacious. Counsel must be persuasive in dissuading his client from 
pursuing a course of conduct that, in endangering the integrity of proceedings, 
concordantly carries the grave risk that his client‟s cause will be prejudiced. Thus, by 
serving the supreme interests of justice and those of the Court counsel is also serving 
his client‟s legal interests.  
 An important factor to consider in examining this counsel-client dynamic is 
that not only do client profiles and attitudes differ but so too do those of counsel. 
Although the pool of senior counsel at the Court is relatively concentrated, there is a 
wider range of junior counsel. They, too, will encounter ethical problems in advising 
and representing their clients. It is conceivable that, in doing so, they may be 
compelled to act without the benefit of advice and supervision from senior counsel. 
The dynamics of the counsel-client relationship clearly change, in that the authority 
accrued by senior advocates will necessarily be nascent for juniors. Even eminent 
counsel may not always be successful in persuading (or dissuading) their clients. A 
code of conduct serves not only as a shield to empower counsel to resist client 
pressure but also as a sword to pressure clients to „do the right thing‟.  
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5.3.1.1 Acceptance of Instructions 
There exists a variety of national practices concerning the circumstances in which 
advocates may enter into a representation agreement.
439
 The problem that arises from 
these differences is that, without a uniform rule based upon a clear philosophical 
approach, parties may well face difficulties in retaining objective and disinterested 
representation. Two issues in practice have been incompetent counsel representing 
inexperienced parties and counsel being pressured to not represent „pariah States‟.  
A relatively uncontroversial, universal principle is that counsel should be 
required to only accept briefs for which they are „competent‟ in expertise and 
resources.
440
 The problem of counsel subjectively selecting clients or being pressured 
to reject clients by third parties is more difficult.
441
 It is arguable that the Corfu 
Channel experience of a „pariah State‟ unable to retain senior counsel from the 
(primarily Western European) de facto bar is unlikely to recur: 
„This is not such a problem because the international marketplace is very open. States will 
always be able to find someone to defend them, which is a case where ethical flexibility is 
actually good because someone will always be available.‟442 
 
By contrast, the late Sir Ian Brownlie was a famous proponent of the English „cab 
rank rule‟ in his representation of States hostile to the UK as a manifestation of the 
rule of law.
443
 Whilst his ideal that counsel should be independent and apolitically 
loyal to the rule of law,
444
 agreement amongst counsel may be difficult to achieve due 
to divergences in national standards.   
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5.3.1.2 Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest are a particularly sensitive area,
445
 including where counsel: 1) is 
a former judge or registrar of the Court; 2) has professional or personal links with the 
Bench or the opposing party; and 3) is likely to be called as a witness. Opinions 
diverge on whether appropriate remedies are disclosure, withdrawal or waiver. In 
examining these conflicts, it is suggested that client waiver would be unsatisfactory 
because parties may not be well-placed to judge their own legal interests and such 
conflicts also affect the Court. Thus, a stricter standard of disclosure or withdrawal 
would better protect the integrity of proceedings. 
 
(a) Former Judges and Court Officials 
The Court has sought to sharpen the boundary between judges and representatives.
446
 
In February 2002, the Court issued Practice Direction VII directing parties not to 
appoint as ad hoc judge one who has acted as agent or advocate within the previous 
three years.
447
 Practice Direction VIII directs parties not to appoint as agent or 
advocate one who has been a judge, ad hoc judge or official within the previous three 
years. Whilst there was no single incident that prompted these Directions, there was 
disquiet at a growing trend of ad hoc judges contemporaneously acting as counsel. As 
the President at the time relates: 
„Speaking generally, I would say that I believe the pre-PD practice of an ad hoc judge 
addressing the Court as counsel in another case was professionally not right and needed 
changing. On a more personal level, it can make one feel quite uncomfortable when counsel in 
an ongoing case is sitting with you in Judges‟ quarters as a judge ad hoc in another case. It 
had to change.‟448  
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 Hague Principles, Principle 4. 
446
 Rosenne, supra note 389, 238; Watts, supra note 389, 254. Article 17 of the Statute for judges has 
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Whilst the Directions have been welcomed as „a demonstration of the Court‟s 
growing judicial self-confidence and maturity‟,449 doubts have also been raised 
concerning their propriety, compulsoriness and enforceability.  
The interaction between the Statute and Rules on the one hand and the 
Practice Directions on the other has been described as „unclear‟.450  Although it may 
be suggested that the requirement in Practice Direction VII has a defensible rationale 
on the ground that the neutrality of ad hoc judges who have recently acted as counsel 
for the appointing party may be challenged, the Directions are clearly exhortatory. As 
former President Higgins explains: 
‘All Practice Directions have the same legal character. The Bench was fully aware that 
Directions are not binding and their language reflects that. That said, sensible counsel are well 
aware that there is no point in antagonising or irritating the Bench and so the Directions have 
been treated in practice as if they were obligatory.‟ 451 
 
Whilst Practice Directions VII and VIII have largely been respected by parties and 
counsel, there has been at least one case of non-compliance. In Bosnia Genocide, 
Judge ad hoc Sir Elihu Lauterpacht QC resigned on 22 February 2002.
452
 On 21 
January 2003, Sir Elihu addressed the Court as counsel for the Respondent in 
Avena.
453
 According to a confidential source, the Applicant in that case was aware of 
the issue but, to avoid antagonising the Court or embarrassing an eminent advocate, it 
made no formal objection but informed the Registrar. Whilst it is arguable that the 
Court should have nevertheless examined ex proprio motu whether to exclude him 
due to appearance of bias, it is conceivable that the Court decided that the „damage‟ 
had already been done by the speech.  
The question remains whether, where a party appoints an ad hoc judge or 
advocate contrary to these directions, an ethical duty ought to exist for that person. 
                                                 
449
 Watts, supra note 389, 247. 
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 Avena, Verbatim Record (21 January 2003), pp. 4, 34.  
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Acceptance of both appointments risks a „conflict of interest‟ between judicial 
impartiality and client fidelity. A judgment appearing to have been influenced by the 
presence of a former judge or registrar on a legal team endangers „not just the 
reputation and interests of the personalities in this field…but [also] the fair 
administration of international justice.‟454 International justice serving elite interests 
risks undermining confidence in the Court, which is detrimental for the „invisible bar‟ 
because history has shown confidence to be necessary for the Court‟s docket. 
 
(b) Professional and Personal Links  
In the small world of the Court in which counsel and judges are often close colleagues 
and personal friends, caution is necessary to prevent the appearance of bias or 
corruption.
455
 The merest suggestion
456
 that an advocate or judge could have been 
biased would damage the Court‟s reputation. This applies emphatically to contacts 
between judges, ad hoc judges and representatives of the same nationality.
457
 This 
does not mean, however, that withdrawal is necessarily the appropriate remedy in all 
cases. Disclosure would in most cases satisfy integrity through transparency. 
However, withdrawal may be more appropriate in cases of exceptional proximity such 
as spouses serving on opposite legal teams. Nuanced cases include barristers from the 
same set of chambers or solicitors from the same firm appearing on opposite sides or 
joining proceedings after a judge who is a former member of the same chambers or 
firm.
458
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(c) Witnesses of Fact  
There have been several cases in which representatives have made reference to 
personal knowledge concerning the facts of the case in the course of pleadings, 
including ELSI, DRC v. Uganda and Costa Rica v. Nicaragua. In ELSI, Mr Guiseppe 
Bisconti (an Italian avvocato) was instructed as an „adviser‟ to the United States. 
However, in addressing the Court as counsel: 
„[H]e had occasion to refer to matters of fact within his knowledge as a lawyer acting for 
Raython Company, the President of the Chamber acceded to a request by the Agent of Italy 
that Mr. Bisconti be treated pro tanto as a witness. Mr. Bisconti, who informed the Chamber 
that both Raytheon Company and Mr. Bisconti himself waived any relevant privilege, was 
cross-examined by [counsel for Italy].‟459  
 
In DRC v. Uganda, the President interrupted the speech of the Defence Minister for 
Uganda acting as counsel when he referred to personal knowledge to remind him that 
he was speaking for Uganda rather than as a witness.
460
 A similar slip by Mr Paul 
Reichler (an experienced international law practitioner) occurred in Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua, in which he referred to his personal familiarity with a river in 
contradistinction to the unfamiliarity of opposing counsel
 461
  
Whilst these were ultimately not serious slips, they were nevertheless 
inappropriate
462
 because they conflated the role of counsel as an interpreter of the 
facts with the role of a witness as a narrator of those facts. The effect is to impinge 
upon counsel‟s professional objectivity and create the appearance of distortion of the 
facts. This conflict unnecessarily complicates the Court‟s task to test evidence with 
the objective assistance of counsel. Ethical standards requiring counsel to segregate 
the roles of advocate and witness would preclude this.
463
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5.3.1.3 Withdrawal 
As already discussed, withdrawal may well be the appropriate remedy for ethical 
problems that emerge during the course of representation (as opposed to those that 
appear prior to acceptance, for which the technical equivalent is refusal of 
instructions). These may include conflicts of interest, such as an unforeseen factual 
issue upon which counsel has personal knowledge such as renders him „reasonably 
likely‟ to be called as a witness. This test of reasonable likelihood is suggested as 
appropriate, in that it does not impose an excessively strict standard of automatic 
withdrawal where it is merely possible that the counsel will be called as a witness. 
Counsel would be required to take steps to ascertain whether his knowledge would be 
required by the Court and, if so, to disclose its existence. 
 There are, however, situations in which withdrawal is the only reasonable 
course. For example, a client may insist upon giving an instruction to make manifestly 
abusive arguments lack a legal and/or factual basis. As one senior counsel explains  
„But it is not the function of a written pleading to present purely argumentative or rhetorical 
material. Unfortunately it is not uncommon for written pleadings to be presented in an 
overwritten – indeed at times even hysterical – style. No doubt there can be legitimate 
differences in forensic taste, but in my opinion the written pleadings are better and more 
effective if they are relatively understated. They need to express the party‟s case, and to do so 
clearly, convincingly and without equivocation. But they do not need to pour abuse on the 
other side or to use language which is overblown or unsustainable.‟464 
 
Such pleadings are likely to be made by parties that enjoy a generally hostile 
relationship or are engaged in a particularly charged dispute. Whilst senior counsel 
may have the personal authority to dissuade clients from such pleadings, junior 
counsel will likely struggle to do this. They are not only bad advocacy but can cross 
an ethical threshold of professional embarrassment if they are vexatious, insulting or 
manifestly unsustainable in fact or law.
465
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5.3.1.4 Diligence  
Criticism has been made in debates on the Court‟s procedural efficiency of advocates‟ 
volubility in their pleadings
466
 alongside common law practitioners‟ and civil law 
academics‟ tendency to respectively indulge in „procedural chicaneries‟ and 
unnecessary „intellectual jousting‟.467 Here, there is a fine line between indifferent 
advocacy and professional misconduct due to inefficiency or lack of diligence.
468
 Like 
a „game of ping-pong‟,469 bench and bar have blamed one another for inefficient 
advocacy. Counsel are said to indulge in irrelevant debate and insufficiently focus 
their pleadings whilst judges are said to insufficiently direct the parties to enable 
advocates to sharpen their pleadings.
470
 Clients sometimes insist upon legally weak 
but politically important arguments
471
 and pressure counsel to „keep all issues open‟ 
and resist any concessions, however sensible.
472
 As Professor Crawford has written: 
„Evidently it is the function of the advocate to comply with the instructions of the government 
or other party, and to present the case in as forceful and vigorous a way as possible. At the 
same time it is not the function of the advocate simply to say things for money; nor 
unquestioningly to present the client‟s case in the way the client would have it, without regard 
to any of the actual difficulties. Rather it is the function of the advocate to seek to persuade the 
tribunal in such a way as to preserve the essentials of the client‟s case. This is a delicate 
matter, requiring trust between the client (through the Agent) and the advocate. In the search 
for a proper outcome, the advocate is not merely a mouthpiece but rather an active 
intermediary.‟473 
 
Ethical standards of efficiency and diligence can oblige and empower counsel to resist 
such pressures in the interest of justice and of the client by retaining „the 
independence of approach which is characteristic of the professional lawyer. 
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Confidential advice to the client must involve frankness and objectivity, otherwise it 
is worthless, and probably harmful.‟474  
A related problem is the bringing of manifestly unfounded unilateral 
applications to the Court.
475
 According to one former Registrar: 
„There were a few times when, as Registrar, I would receive applications that were so clearly 
improper that I would on my own authority have to indicate to the applicant the defects in 
their application so that, if possible, they could re-submit it properly. There is a distinction 
between the roles of counsel and Registrar. The Registrar cannot address the merits of a case. 
Perhaps admission requirements for counsel are inevitable in this respect.‟ 476 
 
In 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo („DRC‟) brought two applications 
against Burundi and Rwanda. Both of them were subsequently withdrawn whilst 
„reserv[ing] the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the 
Court‟, implying that the DRC belatedly understood that its applications were ill-
founded.
477
 Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, an ITLOS judge and ICJ ad hoc judge in four 
pending cases, explains: 
„Burundi did not waste much of the Court‟s time but rather the parties‟ time as it was 
withdrawn fairly quickly. Inter-state tribunals are constrained by sovereignty of States. 
Consequently, they are very cautious with them in their procedures. For example, in 
Nicaragua v. Colombia there will be a full week of pleadings from Costa Rica and Honduras 
which could be done in two days. There will be a great deal of repetition and waste for which 
the Court will pay. The same happened in Black Sea with matters unnecessarily protracted. 
The Court basically lacks the authority to control this. The Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
Courts have much stronger mandates.‟478 
 
Thus, although frivolous applications may not have a great deal of adverse effect upon 
the Court‟s docket there is a more fundamental problem concerning the seeming 
inability or unwillingness of certain counsel to plead succinctly. However, there 
arguably have been manifestly ill-founded applications
479
  that the Court should have 
dismissed in limine litis.  
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5.3.1.5 Confidentiality 
The principle of professional secrecy or confidentiality is sensitive. For obvious 
reasons, it is central to the counsel-client relationship because trust with one‟s client is 
considered to be impossible without discretion.
480
 Exceptions to the principle may be 
commonly found in national codes for evidence of future crimes or frauds or in the 
advocate‟s own defence.481 However, there have been cases where its strictness may 
arguably be detrimental to the interests of justice by preventing advocates who know 
of abusive misconduct by parties from informing the Court.    
 For example, in Qatar v. Bahrain (discussed in greater detail below) Qatar 
adduced 82 false documents as „evidence‟ at the written stage of pleadings for which 
its official explanation concerning their provenance is weak. In particular, there is no 
record of these documents‟ existence prior to their sudden appearance at those 
archives during the case.
482
 In the absence of a convincing alternative explanation, lex 
parsimoniae
483
 suggests that those documents were forged by someone within Qatar‟s 
archives. In such circumstances, if counsel „knows‟ that a client is endangering the 
integrity of proceedings by intentionally submitting documents of dubious veracity 
and that client disregards counsel‟s professional advice to confirm their authenticity, 
then counsel should to withdraw from representation and inform the Court. A 
disclosure exception to the confidentiality principle
484
 would empower counsel to 
dissuade clients from misconduct.  
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5.3.1.6 Fees 
The Court, by Article 64 of the Statute, has the power to make costs orders. However, 
like the PCIJ, it has never elected to depart from the general rule that each side should 
bear its own costs.
485
 Apart from general statements that costs orders are exceptional 
and require express reasoning, the Court has yet to elaborate the principles upon 
which it would base a putative decision to impose costs orders.
486
 Commentators have 
surmised that costs orders may be made for „manifest abuse of legal process or in 
cases of prima facie unfounded claims‟ or „vexatious or abusive tactics…employed or 
the proceedings conducted in an improper manner‟.487  
Two ethical issues arise for advocates: personal liability and proportionality of 
fees. If a party were to blame its advocate for procedural impropriety, the question 
arises whether the Court could make a „personal costs order‟ directed at that advocate 
– a potentially useful tool for enforcement purposes. Further, the scale of an 
advocate‟s fees would eventually become relevant should the Court ever utilise its 
dormant power. Professor Pellet has provided estimates of $250,000 to $8 million to 
conduct litigation before the Court,
488
 sums which may be burdensome for poor 
States.
489
 This may require that advocates‟ fees be subject to a „proportionality test‟ in 
order to ensure that all litigants can obtain access to good counsel at affordable 
cost.
490
 Additionally, as considered above in the context of a putative legal aid system, 
a requirement that „list counsel‟ undertake to a certain percentage of cases pro bono 
would be a useful and feasible requirement in promoting access to top counsel for 
poor States. 
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5.3.2 Duties to the Court 
General principles of ethics that one may identify in an advocate‟s interaction with an 
international court or tribunal include loyalty, candour and courtesy.
491
 Counsel 
should not disobey, disrespect or lie to the bench. Whilst these principles may appear 
at first sight to be relatively straightforward, practice has shown them to be more 
complex owing to diverging national standards of appropriate professional conduct. In 
particular, the exact standard of honesty expected in counsel‟s pleadings is a tricky 
and delicate problem. The resolution of such problems depends upon the hierarchical 
supremacy of duties to court over counsel‟s duty of loyalty to the client, which entails 
a conceptualisation of the role of the advocate as an independent intermediary 
between Court and client and a servant of justice. This notion runs counter to the 
current laissez-faire culture of the Court, in which counsel are not empowered by 
ethical standards and procedural rules in their relations with their clients.  
 Additional problems have arisen in the Court‟s practice concerning ex parte 
contacts between counsel and judges as well as the handling of documentary and 
testimonial evidence. Witnesses, in particular, have historically been a difficult 
procedural area in which normativity is greatly lacking. Since these are areas in which 
the integrity of proceedings has the potential to be seriously undermined – and with it 
the legitimacy of the Court‟s judgments to the public – the lack of appropriate 
safeguards is a major procedural lacuna. Here, ethical standards can be particularly 
useful in providing counsel and judges with practical guidance in difficult and 
awkward situations. Moreover, an ethical rubric would enable the Court to handle 
such problems as may arise without recourse to ex post facto law. Finally, ethical 
standards would provide an even stronger appearance of institutional maturity.    
                                                 
491
 Hague Principles, Principles 5.1, 5.3, 6.1. 
 133 
5.3.2.1 Loyalty and Courtesy 
A duty of loyalty to the court is an uncomfortable term for many counsel.
492
 Loyalty 
entails a general duty to diligently implement the rules and orders of the Court. In 
Corfu Channel, the President took the very unusual step of publicly admonishing 
counsel for both sides for lack of discipline in breaching an order of the Court.
493
 
Obedience of the procedural rules and orders of the Court is vital to preserve its 
control over proceedings.  However, it is suggested that there may be rare occasions 
in which the Court itself seriously breaches procedural integrity or fair trial standards. 
Judges, however eminent, are only human and can therefore be corrupted. Thus, 
counsel‟s duty of loyalty to the Court as an institution should take precedence over 
whether a judge whom counsel reasonably suspects of having breached judicial 
standards is expected to vote favourably to his party‟s case. Moreover, the desire to 
spare the Court, or the judge himself, embarrassment should not outweigh the 
overriding need that justice be clearly seen by the outside world to have been done.  
A duty of courtesy is largely self-explanatory in that counsel should always 
address a court or tribunal, including registrars and officials, with respect and 
decorum. Insulting or abusive language or behaviour should be strictly forbidden. 
Vitriolic, intemperate or otherwise disrespectful language should be avoided at all 
times. Whilst seriously disruptive incidents are relatively rare in oral proceedings 
before the Court,
494
 disrespectful language has been known to be employed in written 
pleadings.
495
 Not only do these not serve the best interests of the client but 
disrespectful language towards either the Court or one‟s colleagues in oral 
proceedings may disrupt the smooth functioning of the Court.  
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5.3.2.2 Ex Parte Communication 
In practice, the danger of apparent or actual bias
496
 from ex parte communications 
between counsel and judges has been illustrated in two cases: 1) allegations of judicial 
leaks;
497
 and 2) informal meetings between a judge and a member of the de facto bar. 
In Nuclear Tests, a statement by the Australian Prime Minister was published 
speculating that the Court would rule in favour of Australia by eight votes to six. The 
Registrar (Mr Stanislas Aquarone) was an Australian national. Australia‟s agent 
denied that the statement was based upon a leak
498
 and the Court unsuccessfully 
investigated. The case demonstrates the danger of the appearance of bias: 
„I think that in general counsel and judges are sensible about their social arrangements. For 
example, if I were to invite my friend to a social function who happens to be counsel in a 
pending case I would also invite opposing counsel to ensure that there is no appearance of 
bias. Certainly ex parte communications are a real issue, we have had leaks in the past. Of that 
there is no doubt. Some judges are too familiar with their national embassies and certainly 
there is an issue with ad hoc judges‟ links with appointing States.‟499 
 
Professor Pellet also relates an informal encounter with a judge in a pending case:  
„In [Nauru] I was acting for Australia and the written pleadings had been drafted in 
cooperation with Counsel, but by the Australians themselves…sometime before the oral 
hearings I met one of the “civil law” Judges, who said to me, “Well Alain, I have read all of 
this material, but to be honest, I am not sure I have understood all of the reasoning”. I 
answered “Well Judge, I am not sure I have understood it myself”. There was a pause before 
he asked “Who is going to plead that part at the hearings?” When I answered “I think I should 
do it”, I had the feeling he was somewhat relieved. Then, after the oral hearings we met again 
and he told me “I think I have understood now”. However he voted against Australia and I am 
not sure it would not have been better from our point of view if he had not understood that 
part of the argument.‟500 
 
Although there is no indication that Professor Pellet was „pleading‟, it is arguably 
improper for pleadings to be discussed one-on-one with a judge in a pending case. 
The exchange illustrates the proximity of the bench and bar created by a small and 
tight-knit legal community. 
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5.3.2.3 Candour 
The principle of candour in an advocate‟s pleadings to the Court is misleading in its 
seeming simplicity in that the precise standard of honesty that is difficult. Should 
counsel be ethically obliged to disclose adverse facts to their own case, even if the 
Court does not ask him directly? What steps should counsel be required to take to 
„reasonably‟501 satisfy himself of the veracity of his evidence? As noted above, this 
scenario of closing one‟s eyes to suspicion of dishonesty has a potential conflict with 
the duty of client confidentiality. For example, in false documents case like Qatar or 
Behring Fur Seals counsel may be bound by their domestic ethical rules
502
 to not 
disclose the fact that a grave breach of integrity of proceedings had occurred until 
their clients gave their permission. Counsel may be obliged, even where they have 
reasonable suspicions of falsehood, to remain silent as the Court is misled.  
 The counter-argument to this is that, since counsel were ignorant of the entire 
affair until their clients informed them, they would have likely been unable to 
persuade their clients to reveal the attempted bribery because the latter would have 
been unwilling to reveal such sensitive information knowing that their counsel would 
be free to disclose it. The relationship of trust empowers counsel to persuade the 
clients to ultimately „do the right thing‟ so that removing confidentiality would 
threaten that trust. Nevertheless, on balance the need for some person to disclose such 
matters outweighs that risk. The possibility that judgments can be jeopardised by such 
serious misconduct and that counsel should be ethically bound to silence cannot be 
the best solution. Where counsel satisfies his duty to take reasonable steps to confirm 
the veracity of evidence, the ethical recourse in the event of client refusal to not 
adduce false evidence should not only be withdrawal but also disclosure. 
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5.3.2.4 Documentary Evidence 
Written pleadings are a crucial facet of the Court‟s procedure,503 which 
correspondingly increases the importance of the veracity of documentary evidence. 
Following naturally from the general duty of candour, the role of counsel in 
undertaking a professional assessment of documentary evidence before the Court is 
critical. For example, an American counsel in Behring Fur Seals discovered forged 
translations with only a rudimentary knowledge of the Russian alphabet.
504
 Thus, as 
intermediary between Court and client, counsel is well-placed to protect evidentiary 
integrity. Two problems in practice have been the suppression of adverse documents 
on false grounds and the submission of false documents. 
Governments may attempt to abusively invoke „executive privilege‟ to conceal 
documents adverse to their case.
505
 In Corfu Channel, the „XCU‟ Admiralty orders 
that arguably disproved the British argument of innocent passage were suppressed by 
the British legal team to the point of refusing to produce them on the ground of naval 
secrecy.
506
 Professor Carty‟s study suggests that the documents had no information 
justifying secrecy and that the British advocates were principally motivated not from 
any genuine belief in the documents‟ military sensitivity but rather to suppress 
adverse documents in order to win the case.
507
 A memorandum dated just days before 
the oral hearings from the Attorney General and leader of the British legal team (Sir 
Hartley Shawcross QC) to the Prime Minister (Clement Attlee, also a barrister) is 
telling: 
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„It is a fundamental principle of the practice of the Courts of our country and of the conduct of 
our legal profession that parties to litigation are not entitled to use merely those documents 
which they think will assist their case and to suppress others which are inimical to it.  I must 
make it clear that neither the Solicitor General, nor myself, nor, I am sure, any of the other 
members of the Bar who are assisting us in this matter, would for a moment contemplate 
being parties to the course of conduct now forced upon us by the Admiralty‟s failure to 
procure and produce these documents earlier had our country‟s international position not been 
so gravely involved.  As it is, we retain great misgiving about the propriety of what is being 
done, which we can only justify on the principle „my country […] right or wrong, my 
country‟.  We all feel that we must insist that circumstances such as these are not allowed to 
recur […].‟508 
 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the eminent counsel were knowing parties to 
misleading the Court, both concerning the reason for the refusal to disclose and the 
suppression of evidence. National ethics and discipline appear to have been 
completely ineffective.
509
 
As mentioned above, issues concerning the authenticity of documents arose in 
Qatar v. Bahrain where Qatar adduced eighty-one „historical documents‟ to its 
written pleadings in support of its claim to the Hawar Islands.
510
 Expert analysis 
commissioned by Bahrain indicated that documents adduced by Qatar from its own 
archives were forged.
511
 Qatar declined to elaborate upon the provenance of the 
documents, asserting only that they had been obtained through „academic and private 
channels‟ and submitted in good faith.512 Qatar‟s subsequent analysis also cast doubt 
on the documents‟ authenticity, following which it withdrew them.513  Although the 
Court only made passing reference to the issue in its judgment, Judge Fortier 
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(seemingly adopting the words of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht QC, counsel for Bahrain
514
) 
in a separate opinion characterised Qatar‟s case as „polluted‟ and „infected‟ by the 
documents.
515
  
Counsel for Qatar, numerous and from diverse national jurisdictions, have 
been described as „seasoned, experienced, respectable…and very embarrassed‟.516 
From the ethical perspective, the incident is troubling in two respects. The first is that 
documents of doubtful authenticity were adduced to the Court. The government of 
Qatar's unsubstantiated and vague explanation that it had acquired the documents 
from „a number of sources…through official, academic and private channels… all 
over the world‟517 is circumstantially weak.518 That these documents, which contained 
several obvious anomalies,
519
 were submitted without detecting by Qatar‟s external 
counsel
520
 appears not to be collusion but rather a failure to verify.
521
 In ethical 
question is the standard of „reasonable knowledge‟522 expected of counsel in a duty 
not to mislead the court. This would accord with the standard of diligence owed to 
clients to require counsel to take reasonable steps to confirm the authenticity of 
documents. Whilst counsel for Qatar may not have had access to the documents prior 
to submission,
523
 had ethical standards existed the resulting prejudice sustained by the 
client would likely have raised questions about negligence.  
 
                                                 
514
 Supra note 510, 12 (para. 8), 14 (para. 14). 
515
 Ibidem, 452 (para. 4). 
516
 Cot, supra note 379, 837. 
517
 Ibidem, „Interim Report Submitted by the State of Qatar‟ (30 September 1998), para. 14. 
518
 Al-Arayed, supra note 511, 356. 
519
 E.g. – references to „Her Majesty‟s Government‟ at a time when the British monarch was King 
George VI and a letter purportedly written by a ten-year-old official – ibidem, 358.  
520
 For a list of counsel, see Qatar v. Bahrain, 41-42.  
521
 Mendelson, „The Curious Case of Qatar v. Bahrain in the International Court of Justice‟, 72 BYIL 
(2001) 183-212, 211 (para. 4). See, however, the author‟s disclaimers at 183 (note **) and 211 (note 
70).  
522
 Hague Principles, Principle 6.1. 
523
 Pleadings are signed not by counsel but by agents – Bowett, supra note 403, 1-20, 12, 14, 17-18. 
 139 
5.3.2.5 Testimonial Evidence 
Testimonial evidence has been relatively rare
524
 but a difficult area for several 
reasons. First, the Court‟s procedural rules525 concerning testimonial evidence are 
silent on important issues on the role of counsel like witness preparation, examination 
technique and extra-testimonial contact. Second, national standards diverge on these 
matters.
526
 Third, parties can appoint counsel inexpert in handling witnesses. 
Memory
527
 is especially vulnerable to contamination so that robust procedural 
safeguards are necessary to protect evidentiary integrity. Problems arising from 
conflicting national standards on witness statements, contacts with witnesses and 
examination procedure were particularly acute in Corfu Channel but have also arisen 
in subsequent cases.
528
 In recent cases (particularly Bosnia Genocide) the earlier 
problems have been somewhat ameliorated by the Court‟s adoption of common law 
procedures and parties‟ use of common lawyers to interrogate witnesses. 
Nevertheless, the lack of common ethical standards leaves scope for contamination of 
evidence through inappropriate procedures.  
In Corfu Channel, the UK legal team were all members of the English Bar.
529
 
The first English Code of Conduct was not enacted until 1979, which expressly 
permitted barristers to accept „foreign work‟ subject to local law and the Code.530 In 
1946, the Bar Council had not made a general ruling on barristers being 
extraterritorially bound by home ethics.
531
 However, the ruling of the Bar Council in 
1946 prohibiting a barrister from representing an accused before the Nuremberg 
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Tribunal implies the general applicability of the „cab rank rule‟ and other ethical 
standards. Albania was represented by two diplomats, a French professor and three 
avocats of the Paris Order.
532
 In 1948, the French Orders were in disarray following 
the political splits of the 1930s and the Vichy era.
533
 Although in Vichy France the 
Orders‟ personal jurisdiction over advocates was essentially retained,534 the Orders‟ 
oversight may have been practically curtailed.  
During the case, there was a clear conflict between French and English civil 
procedure and counsel ethics. In France, the interrogation of witnesses is principally a 
matter for the judge at a hearing (enquête).
535
 Pre-testimonial contact with witnesses 
by advocates is forbidden and can even be a crime.
536
 However, advocates may ask 
supplementary questions in the enquête to witnesses with relatively few 
technicalities.
537
 This is attributable to the dominant role of the judge in the process of 
gathering evidence. By contrast, evidence-gathering within common law systems is 
formally
538
 weighted towards the parties.
539
 There are detailed legal and ethical rules 
concerning preparation of testimony
540
 and myriad technicalities regarding 
interrogation technique.
541
 Using Corfu Channel as the principal case study, six 
problems have arisen in practice from diverging national standards: 1) witness 
statements; 2) showing documents to witnesses; 3) impugning a witness‟ credibility; 
4) limits to questioning; 5) communication with a witness; and 6) leading questions. 
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(a)  Witness Statements 
In Corfu Channel, Sir Hartley Shawcross objected to a witness on the ground that 
Albania had failed to provide a „proof of evidence‟ and the witness might modify his 
testimony after hearing the opposing party‟s opening statement.542 President José 
Gustavo Guerrero of El Salvador enquired whether Albania was able to supply „un 
résumé de la deposition…ainsi que le prévoit le Règlement.‟543 However, Professor 
Pierre Cot for Albania argued that Article 48 of the Rules required „l‟indication en 
termes généraux du ou des points sur lesquels doit porter la déposition‟ and that, 
„[c]onformément à nos habitudes françaises, nous sommes incapables de dire en quell 
sens ils déposeront.‟544 Following argument, the President ruled that Article 49 
required only an enumeration of topics rather than a summary of testimony.
545
   
There was clearly a conflict between diverging national standards. English 
civil procedure demands early disclosure of the substance of testimony to preclude 
witnesses from manipulating their evidence to suit a party‟s case. French civil 
procedure requires advocates to refrain from preparing testimony to preclude 
manipulation by counsel.
546
 The procedure under Article 48 (now Article 57) of the 
Rules was too vague to resolve this conflict. Witness statements were in general use 
in Bosnia Genocide,
547
 which is logical in light of the Court‟s general dependence 
upon parties to adduce evidence due to remoteness and lack of coercive powers.
548
 
However, the danger that counsel may influence testimony is a real one and should be 
addressed by ethical standards governing the preparation of witness statements.  
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(b) Showing Documents to Witnesses 
In Corfu Channel, the President‟s initial direction explained the order of questioning 
with a „very liberal‟ procedure and no limit to questioning.549 This direction was 
consistent with the laissez-faire PCIJ procedure and the President‟s background as a 
career diplomat and academic from a civil law jurisdiction who was the last PCIJ 
President.
550
 However, it soon proved inadequate to deal with a variety of procedural 
issues. The use of documents was an especially protracted and difficult problem. As 
noted above, compounding this was the disparity between the legal teams. 
 In Professor Cot‟s cross-examination of Commander Kovavic, he presented a 
photostatic copy to the witness. Sir Frank Soskice objected on the ground that, under 
English procedure, „one cannot produce a copy of a document unless one can account 
for the fact that the original is not being produced.‟551 Following debate, the Court 
directed the parties to adduce only original documents.
552
 However, the documents 
issue was revisited several times with British objections
553
 and Professor Cot 
apologising for his unfamiliarity with the procedure.
554
 The need for rigour to ensure 
the veracity of testimony was underlined by a challenged copy used by Albania in 
cross-examination.
555
 Counsel argued the issues from their own national 
perspectives.
556
 The President had to reprimand counsel for „breach of discipline‟.557  
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(c)  Impugning the Credibility of a Witness 
During cross-examination, Professor Cot commented that „I thought I heard the 
witness state on a former occasion that he understood French and English, but I see 
that he understand both languages only for the examination and not for the cross-
examination.‟558 Sir Frank objected: 
„Mr. President, while that document is being fetched – of course I will not attempt to copy M. 
Pierre Cot in making that kind of observation about the witness, which we, at any rate, in our 
Courts, and I hope that you in this Court would regard as offensive and unnecessary, but that 
is entirely of course a matter for his judgment and for his taste.‟559 
 
This exchange
560
 illustrates another conflict between diverging standards whereby 
English barristers must refrain from gratuitously insulting a witness or from 
impugning his credibility without reasonable grounds
561
 whereas French avocats are 
not so bound. In this instance, the former standard
562
 would appear to be more 
appropriate for decorum and the burden of proof.   
 
(d) Communication with a Witness under Solemn Declaration 
Sir Frank, in applying to recall a witness, made the following declaration: 
„Now I want to be perfectly frank with the Court and say that after Commander Kovavic 
finished his evidence yesterday I personally spoke to him. Ordinarily, of course, one does not 
speak to a witness under examination. The Court may say that in those circumstances they 
will not allow him to be recalled any further, but I should like the Court to know that I spoke 
to him about that…[n]eedless to say, I have not told him what I want him to say; that goes 
without saying Ordinarily, of course, I would not have spoken to him when under 
examination., but yesterday his evidence was concluded. However, on speaking to him I find 
there is a little further evidence on that point which I would be very grateful to be allowed to 
place before the Court.‟563 
 
Although neither Professor Cot nor the Court made objection to the application to 
recall the witness,
564
 the statement is noteworthy for two reasons. First, Sir Frank 
impliedly felt himself to be obliged by English standards which generally prohibit a 
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barrister from communicating with a witness until his evidence has been concluded.
565
 
Second, it illustrates the danger that may arise in an ethical vacuum wherein a non-
professional advocate may influence or appear to influence a witness‟ evidence. For 
example, during a lunch break an advocate may ask a witness one-on-one whether he 
enjoyed his meal which, from afar, could appear to be a conversation about the 
testimony. This danger accordingly demands ethical rules prohibiting such contacts 
unless authorised by the Court or in the presence of opposing counsel. 
 
(e) Leading Questions 
Sir Frank objected to certain questions put by Professor Cot as „leading‟:566 
„…it is of little assistance to the Court if the advocate examining him tells him in the form of 
his question almost exactly that which he wants him to say. I quite accept that it is not always 
practicable to avoid doing so. One has, to a certain extent, to indicate the type of answer 
which one is endeavouring to elicit, and I have not raised any complaint against Professor Cot 
doing so. I do, however, respectfully submit that there is a limit beyond which Professor Cot 
should not go…I simply make the comment because I do respectfully submit that either he 
should not do it, or, if he does, it should be recognized that the answer he elicits, it being such 
a very leading question, really can be of very little value as evidence, because in effect it is 
Professor Cot giving the evidence and not the witness.‟567 
 
After Professor Cot apologised and re-phrased,
568
 the President declared: „the Court, 
in assessing the evidence given by witnesses, will bear in mind the method employed, 
and therefore the Agents need have no fear that any method employed will prejudice 
the Court one way or the other in reaching its decision.”569 This disregarded the 
prejudice of leading questions whereby counsel can influence testimony.   
 In Preah Vihear,
570
 the President was Judge Winiarski of Poland and the legal 
teams had a mixture of French academics and Belgian, Thai, American and English 
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practitioners. During examination-in-chief of the former governor of Kompong 
Thom
571
 (a Cambodian province) Professor Roger Pinto of the University of Paris 
asked the witness: „[l]e temple de Préah Vihéar est-il situé dans la province de 
Kompong Thom?‟572 Sir Frank objected for leading. Professor Pinto re-phrased: 
„[s]avez vous, M. le gourverneur, dans quelle circonscription administrative du 
Cambodge est situé le temple de Préah Vihéar?‟ The ensuing exchange is revealing:  
„[T]he whole issue in the case…is whether or not Preah Vihear is in Cambodia. The question 
was whether the witness knew in what district of Cambodia Preah Vihear was. He therefore 
puts to the witness the whole issue in the case. I say it was not in Cambodia at all. I 
respectfully submit that there is a plain case of a leading question and ask that it should be 
withdrawn.  
 
Le Président: Je crois que la règle que sir Frank Soskice vient de formuler comme une règle 
anglo-saxonne ou anglaise n‟est pas particulière au Royaume-Uni, aux pays anglo-saxons, 
c‟est une règle générale, mais d‟autre part, il est difficile de voir ici une question qui suggère 
qoi que ce soit au témoin… 
 
Sir Frank Soskice: Mr. President…to ask the witness in what province of Cambodia Preah 
Vihear is, in my submission, clearly offends against the rule. If Professor Pinto cannot put his 
question in a different form which does not offend against the rule, I would respectfully ask 
that the Court should say he must not ask the question at all. 
 
M. Roger Pinto: Monsieur le Président, je vais essayer, malgré le manqué d‟habitude des 
jurisdictions anglo-saxonnes, mais avec l‟aide de la delegation thailandaise, de formuler la 
question d‟une façon qui puisse paraître satisfaisante à mon eminent confrere. Et, Monsieur le 
Gouverneur, je vous demanderai simplement ceci: dans quelle province du Cambodge croyez-
vous que se trouve situé le temple de Préah Vihear? 
 
Le Président: Voulez-vous répondre à cette question? 
 
M. Suon Bonn: Je ne crois pas, mais il est incontestable que Préah Vihéar se trouve dans le 
district de Cheom Ksan qui est du resort de la province de Kompong Thom.‟573 
 
The witness‟ answer demonstrates the wisdom of the rule against leading because the 
witness, having heard two leading questions by counsel for Cambodia, knew the 
answer that counsel wished to elicit and gave a highly biased answer to a third 
formulation that was still leading.  
 Leading was also problematic in South West Africa with frequent objections 
by counsel.
574
 One exchange is revealing: 
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„Mr. Gross: May I be permitted to be heard? Mr. President, it will be apparent that in this 
Court rules of procedure and of evidence are not as easy to come by as in municipal courts; 
the line that is sought to be drawn between cross-examination, objection and comment will 
therefore present serious difficulties which may be prejudicial to the Applicants… 
 
The President: Mr. Gross, the procedure before this Court is not greatly different from any 
other court. The counsel will direct questions to the witness; either their question is a leading 
question, in which event objection can be taken to the question, or the answer of the witness is 
not responsive to the question which is put, in which event again objection can be taken to 
it‟.575 
 
Although the President was Australian and both parties‟ legal teams were South 
African and American practitioners,
576
 the terseness and opaqueness of the Rules on 
nuanced procedural matters caused confusion. National standards on issues like 
combativeness towards witnesses diverged. Despite the President‟s activism, he was 
ultimately unwilling to forbid questions.
577
   
 The need for common ethical standards to protect the integrity of testimonial 
evidence and clarify procedure is evident. Although the Court was unwilling to 
prescribe uniform rules for counsel from mixed cultures it was unable to avoid the 
resulting delay, confusion and even acrimony. Perhaps due to those experiences, 
testimonial evidence has remained rare even though common law procedures have 
been used from Preah Vihear onwards.
578
 In Bosnia Genocide, the Court heard nine 
witnesses over six days under a more rigorous regime than in Corfu Channel (where 
one of the witnesses needed three days). President Higgins adopted common law 
procedures
579
 with rules on timing, referencing, witness statements and leading.
580
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– Vol. V, 93-98. 
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 Bosnia Genocide, Verbatim Record (17 March 2006), 10-11. 
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5.4  Disciplinary Jurisdiction 
There exist no prescribed disciplinary powers for the Court. As discussed in Chapter 
7, the two potential bases are an implied power under Article 30(1) of the Statute or 
an inherent jurisdiction. Since exclusion from proceedings is a severe form of 
sanction, it may be posited that more moderate sanctions such as public 
admonishment, fines, suspension from proceedings and reporting to national bar 
authorities would also be available to the Court. Clearly, the authority of common 
ethical standards depends upon their being backed by a disciplinary jurisdiction. 
However, a fair and carefully constructed framework incorporating natural justice 
principles is required to ensure that such powers are exercised wisely. Counsel should 
have a right to a fair hearing before the Court with, inter alia, a right to be heard, to be 
represented by counsel and to appeal. Sanctions should be proportionate and the 
disciplinary judge(s) should have expertise in professional ethics.
581
 
There is no reason why such a framework cannot be created with a 
disciplinary chamber to investigate complaints against counsel. Although ex post 
facto application of ethical rules can be safely done with flagrant examples of 
dishonesty or incompetence, this would be controversial regarding nuanced issues. As 
previously suggested, a way for the Court to achieve compromise between 
conservative and progressive schools of thought would be to require counsel to sign 
and deposit a copy of a code of conduct at the commencement of proceedings. By 
putting counsel on notice of the standards of conduct expected of them, this would not 
only act as a deterrent upon flagrant misconduct and a clarification of the nicer issues 
but would also provide tribunals with a textual basis for the imposition of sanctions. 
Counsel would not be in a position to complain of lack of notice. 
                                                 
581
 See Chapter 7. 
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5.5  Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that problems caused by divergent ethical standards have 
occurred on several occasions in practice. The laissez-faire PCIJ culture has proved 
increasingly inadequate to meet these challenges. The history of the 1972 Rules 
amendments and the Practice Directions suggests that States, far from opposing 
greater regulation of their case presentation, have welcomed it in the interests of 
efficiency and rigour. Under President Higgins, the Court had a greater confidence in 
issuing directions to counsel (e.g. – Bosnia Genocide). There exists momentum for 
the prescription of admission requirements, common ethical standards and 
disciplinary jurisdiction as another step to promote that efficiency and rigour.  
 Complaints regarding the succinctness of pleadings continue due to parties‟ 
control over pleadings, the Court‟s unwillingness to direct them with greater firmness 
and certain advocates‟ loquacity. Parties‟ ability to manipulate the use of experts by 
appointing them as „technical counsel‟ detracts from the Court‟s ability to assess 
evidence. The absence of admission requirements – allowing agents, government 
officials, experts or anyone else to conduct forensic advocacy – restricts counsel‟s 
independence and creates unnecessary and dangerous conflicts of interest. Certain 
cases seemingly saw abuses such as manifestly inarguable applications or claims, the 
suppression of evidence, the submission of false evidence and ex parte 
communications with judges. More commonly, cases have seen questionable practices 
like leading, inappropriate contacts with witnesses and references to counsel‟s 
personal knowledge that did not result in serious incidents but could have done so in 
different circumstances. In any event, such practices are both detrimental to the 
Court‟s procedural integrity and image as well as avoidable through the 
professionalisation of advocacy. 
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The beginnings of a movement towards a professional bar at the Court in order 
to address such issues can be seen. Although warnings about the resistance of States 
towards encroachment upon their traditional prerogatives in ICJ litigation are still 
made, the progressive view that the Court is politically and institutionally prepared to 
advance to a higher level of procedural maturity appears to be increasingly 
persuasive. If government officials were prepared during the Court‟s post-South West 
Africa nadir to sacrifice traditional prerogatives to redress inefficient practices which 
those privileges had caused, it would seem unlikely that they would resist reforms 
during the busiest period in the Court‟s history. The case for the professionalisation of 
advocacy is persuasive from the practical and the political perspectives. 
If one accepts that reforms for advocates and case presentation are desirable, 
how then should they be implemented? One possibility is for the Court to do so, as it 
is well-placed to regulate advocates due to its broad power to prescribe procedural 
rules compatible with its Statute.
582
 As explained above, the Court cannot exclude 
agents from forensic advocacy without amendment of Article 42 of the Statute. In 
opposition, it is argued that the Court ought not to potentially antagonise litigants by 
constraining their ability to control their advocates. Treating States who have 
submitted their dispute to the Court for resolution as „litigants‟ rather than as 
„sovereigns‟ is compelling. Practically, the Court would appear to be best-placed to 
create a professional bar through admission and ethical requirements. However, 
should the Court decline to do so, advocates could themselves seek through the aura 
of professionalism to establish its authority over advocacy.
583
  
 
                                                 
582
 Zimmerman et al., supra note 380, 481-493. 
583
 This was how the English and Massachusetts bars came into existence – see Chapter 1. 
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Chapter VI: The European Court of Justice  
If the ethical framework of the ICJ concerning advocates exemplifies a „diplomatic 
tradition‟ of laissez-faire regulation, that of European Court of Justice („ECJ‟) appears 
at first sight to be considerably more stringent. Unlike the ICJ, it has prescribed 
admission requirements for representatives of individual litigants as well as 
disciplinary powers for professional misconduct. The requirement that advocates be 
members of national bars seemingly ensures that they be subject to professional ethics 
and discipline for their conduct before the European Courts. These requirements and 
powers are rare amongst „civil‟ international courts and tribunals. 
However, on closer inspection, the Courts‟ regulation of advocates is 
superficial. The lack of admission requirements, common ethical standards and 
disciplinary powers in ICJ proceedings is replicated before the European Courts. The 
requirement that advocates be „members of national bars‟ applies only to individual 
litigants‟ representatives; States and EU organs, by contrast, continue to be privileged 
in their right to be represented by agents who are insulated from the Courts‟ oversight. 
Thus, a two sets of representation requirements result. The EU Courts have yet to 
exercise their disciplinary powers, at least in part due to the lack of common ethical 
standards against which to judge advocates‟ professional conduct.  
Nevertheless, such ethical problems as have arisen in practice have been rare 
and largely isolated. This lack of practice is attributable to the narrow, review-based 
jurisdiction of the ECJ in which matters of fact and evidence are largely absent so that 
the role of counsel and scope for professional misconduct is accordingly diminished. 
For historical reasons, there is also a greater degree of procedural homogeneity before 
the Court due to the influence of the „original Six‟ founding members of the European 
Coal and Steel Community („ECSC‟). The smallness of the de facto bar of regular 
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practitioners also ensures a degree of uniformity of standards. Although expansion to 
twenty-seven member states may challenge this homogeneity, hitherto there have 
been no serious cases reported in which professional misconduct has featured heavily.  
However, this is not to suggest that ethics have no practical relevance before 
the Court. This relaxed regulation of counsel creates certain dangers, several of which 
have emerged (albeit rarely) in practice. First, the lack of common ethical standards 
creates the potential for conflicting national and personal standards concerning 
fundamental principles of professional conduct. Secondly, a weak regulatory regime 
creates gaps into which unscrupulous advocates may indulge in abusive conduct and 
thereby threaten the integrity of judicial proceedings with potentially serious 
implications for fair trial and equality of arms. Indeed, it is possible that such 
misconduct has gone undetected in the past fifty years of practice. Thirdly, the 
bifurcation of regulation of States as opposed to that of individuals creates the 
potential for agents to behave abusively without the threat of sanction by the Courts. 
Fourthly, although the Courts both have prescribed disciplinary powers to sanction 
misconduct the lack of prescribed codes of conduct containing clear and stringent 
ethical rules deprives all concerned of prior notice of the precise standards of conduct 
expected of counsel. If and when ethical problems do arise in proceedings, the EU 
Courts would be able to address them within a prescribed framework. For these 
reasons, it is recommended that the ECJ prescribe a code of conduct for counsel in 
order to fill a procedural lacuna.    
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6.1   Historical Background
584
 
The ECJ was created in 1952 by the ECSC Protocol as the judicial institution of the 
European Coal and Steel Community („ECSC‟) annexed to the Treaty of Paris 
1951.
585
 In 1958, the current ECJ Statute was annexed to the Treaty of Rome 1957 
and is the Court‟s current statute. The ECSC Rules586 were „inspired by‟ the ICJ Rules 
and national administrative and civil codes.
587
 Unfortunately, the travaux 
préparatoires to both the Statute and Rules remain unavailable for research.
588
 
The admission requirements imposed by Article 20 of the ECSC Protocol 
were historic, in that they marked the first time that litigants‟ discretion to appoint 
counsel was fettered before an international court. Contemporary works by treaty 
protagonists,
589
 judges, advocates-general and registrars
590
 as well as other 
commentators
591
 do not explain why the drafters opted to depart from the settled 
policy of the ICJ permitting litigants absolute control over their representation. 
However, since Professor André Gros, jurisconsult of the French delegation,
592
 almost 
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 Delvaux, La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l‟Acier (1956), 251-
313. 
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 Ibidem, 45-46. See also Riese „Die Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl‟, 6 NJW  (1953), 521-525, 521. 
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Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l‟Acier‟, 70 RDP (1954), 417-435, 433; Lagrange, „La 
Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes: du Plan Schuman à l‟union Européenne‟ RTDE 
(1978), 2-17.  
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 Antoine, „La Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour internationale de Justice‟, 57(3) RGDIP 
(1953) 210-261, 221, 252-253; Jeantet, „Les intérêts privés devant la Cour de Justice de la 
Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l‟Acier‟, 70 RDP (1954), 684-713, 709; Valentine, The 
Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community (1955), 149-151; Robertson, „Legal 
Problems of European Integration‟, 91(I) RdC (1957) 105-211, 149-153; Van Reepinghen and Orianne, 
La procedure devant la Cour de justice des communautés européennes (1961), 26-27. 
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certainly was involved in drafting the Protocol and was also a delegate to the London 
Conference that created the Nuremberg Charter – the first „international‟ tribunal to 
impose admission requirements for counsel – it may be speculated that an indirect 
link existed.
593
  
Moreover, Article 6 of the ECSC „Supplementary Rules of Procedure 
Concerning the Rights and Obligations of Agents and Advocates, etc.‟ prescribed the 
first-ever disciplinary power of an international court to exclude agents and advocates 
from proceedings for „behaviour incompatible with the dignity of the Court‟.594  
Publications by the Court protagonists of the day merely describe the existence of the 
powers without explaining the reasons for their creation.
595
 Without the travaux to the 
Supplementary Rules or other explanatory material, one might tentatively speculate 
that they were prescribed to generally strengthen the Court‟s control over its 
procedural integrity and thereby promote its image as a sophisticated judicial 
institution. Article 6 of the Supplementary Rules is retained as Article 35(1) of the 
current ECJ Rules of Procedure.  
In 1957, when the Court became the shared judicial institution of the three 
Communities, its Statute was substantively renegotiated. Whilst the ECSC Court of 
Justice was vested with the power to frame its own rules of procedure,
596
 the EEC 
Treaty required the ECJ to obtain the approval of the EU Council.
597
 Uniquely 
amongst the courts and tribunals examined by this work, the Court still lacks 
exclusive control over its own Rules.
598
 This arrangement is understandably 
                                                 
593
 Circumstantial support for this hypothesis may be found in a textual comparison between the French 
versions of Article 23 of the Nuremberg Charter („Les fonctions de défenseur peuvent être 
remplies…par tout avocat régulièrement qualifié pour plaider dans son propre pays…‟) and Art. 20 
ECSC Protocol („assistées par un avocat inscrit à un barreau de l'un des États membres‟).  
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  ECSC Protocol, Art. 20; Delvaux, supra note 586, 310. 
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unpopular with the Court.
599
 Although the Court has the right to request amendment 
of its Statute or be consulted, its consent is not required.
600
 In considering the Court‟s 
procedure, it is consequently important to recall that its control is limited due to the 
Council‟s oversight.  
Several works in French and English discussing the Court‟s procedure or 
advocacy before the Court only briefly describe the admission requirements, 
privileges, immunities and disciplinary powers concerning advocates and do not 
discuss the subject of professional ethics.
601
 Brown and Kennedy state: 
„Rules governing lawyers‟ professional ethics…vary widely between Member States. 
Moreover, apart from the notes for the guidance of counsel for the parties at the hearing, 
which are intended to ensure the efficient management of court business, there are no common 
rules governing the conduct of lawyers before the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance and it would be invidious for the Court of Justice to attempt such a labour of 
Sisyphus.‟602  
 
Similarly, Anderson writes: 
„…there is no code of conduct for lawyers practising before the European Court, whether in 
preliminary reference cases or direct actions. The construction of such a code might have 
advantages but it would be a formidable task, bearing in mind the very different traditions 
from which European advocates, procurators and legal advisers have evolved.‟603 
 
Whilst seems surprising that the subject should not have been comprehensively 
discussed in more than half a century of practice, this may be partially explained by 
the fact that the Court has never formally invoked its disciplinary powers for 
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600
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603
 Anderson and Demetriou, References to the European Court (2002), 252-253 (9-051). 
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professional misconduct.
604
 The absence of practice is also attributable to the rarity of 
serious misbehaviour.
605
 
In considering the ECJ, it is important to bear a number of considerations in 
mind. The first is language. Uniquely amongst the courts that this work examines, the 
ECJ is not confined to one or two official languages. The only authentic language of 
the ECSC Protocol and Rules of Procedure was the French,
606
 though the four 
languages of „the original Six‟ founding members (French, German, Dutch and 
Italian) were adopted as the official languages of the Court.
607
 However, these were 
adopted as the authentic languages of the ECJ Statute in 1957.
608
 The English versions 
of the Statute and Rules are translations done upon the accessions of the UK and 
Ireland in 1973.  
In examining the evolution of the Court‟s Statute and Rules, it is consequently 
necessary to do so in French – as the sole continuously authentic tongue – and to 
recall that the English version, as a translation, necessarily cannot always provide a 
perfect reflection of the originally intended meaning. The same precaution should be 
extended to the jurisprudence of the Court, as the official language of a given case 
may in principle be any one of the (currently twenty-three) official EU languages.
609
 
In interpreting the Court‟s jurisprudence concerning the relevant provisions, it is 
important to compare the official language of the case with the translation into one of 
the original languages.  
 The second factor is the functional and structural differences of the various 
legal professions of the national systems. For example, the functional purpose of an 
                                                 
604
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605
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„avocat‟ within Article 19 of the Statute takes concrete form once the original, 
national role of avocats is considered to contextualise the meaning of the term. Thus, 
the purely linguistic differences should be overlaid with the architectural distinctions 
between legal systems – particularly those between the common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. In this way, potential causes of confusion arising from the evolution of 
the texts may be dispelled.  
 The third factor is the Court‟s intricate jurisdiction, which has great 
ramifications for its procedure – in particular, it is directly responsible for the 
comparative rarity of factual issues – and, thus, evidence – in its proceedings. There 
are two main categories of proceedings: 1) direct actions; and 2) preliminary 
references concerning points of EU law from national jurisdictions.
610
 Direct actions 
are subdivided into two categories: 1) actions brought between „privileged parties‟; 
and 2) actions brought by individuals against institutions. A particular point to note is 
that the Statute only prescribes procedure for the former category; the Rules, 
supplementing the Statute, address for the latter.
611
 Since „staff cases‟ are now 
delegated to the EU Civil Service Tribunal
612
 factual issues are now rare in judicial 
review actions brought by individual against institutions because the Court relies upon 
national courts in preliminary reference cases for factual assessment.
613
 This restricts 
the role of counsel before the Court and thus the scope for professional misconduct. 
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However, re-assessment of factual matters is possible – Interview with President Eric Jaeger, Judge 
Nicholas Forwood and Registrar Emmanuel Coulon (14 October 2010), cited with permission. 
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6.2 Admission Requirements 
Representation of litigants before the Court is governed by Article 19 of the Statute, 
supplemented by Article 104(2) of the Rules. In order to fully explain the admission 
requirements, it is necessary to compare the various linguistic versions. Article 20 of 
the ECSC Statute originally provided: 
„Les États ainsi que les institutions de la Communauté sont représentés devant la Cour par des 
agents nommés pour chaque affaire; l'agent peut être assisté d'un avocat inscrit à un barreau de 
l'un des États membres. 
Les entreprises et toutes autres personnes physiques ou morales doivent être assistées par un 
avocat inscrit à un barreau de l'un des États membres. 
[…] 
La Cour jouit à l'égard des avocats qui se présentent devant elle des pouvoirs normalement 
reconnus en la matière aux cours et tribunaux, dans des conditions qui seront déterminées par 
le même règlement. 
Les professeurs ressortissants des Etats membres dont la législation leur reconnaît un droit de 
plaider jouissent devant la Cour des droits reconnus aux avocats par le présent article.‟ 
 
Article 17 of the ECJ Statute 1957was formulated in almost identical terms. Although 
mostly the same, Article 19 of the current Statute differs in two parts:  
„Les États membres ainsi que les institutions de l‟Union sont représentés devant la Cour de 
justice par un agent nommé pour chaque affaire; l‟agent peut être assisté d‟un conseil ou d‟un 
avocat. […] 
Les autres parties doivent être représentées par un avocat. 
Seul un avocat habilité à exercer devant une jurisdiction d‟un État membre ou d‟un autre État 
partie à l‟accord sur l‟Espace économique européen peut représenter ou assister une partie 
devant la Cour.‟ 
 
The English version states: 
„The Member States and the institutions of the Union shall be represented before the Court of 
justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a 
lawyer. 
[…] 
Other parties must be represented by a lawyer. 
Only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State…may represent or 
assist a party before the Court. 
[…] 
As regards such advisers and lawyers who appear before it, the Court shall have the powers 
normally accorded to courts of law, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure. 
 
University teachers being nationals of a Member State whose law accords them a right of 
audience shall have the same rights before the Court as are accorded by this Article to 
lawyers.‟ 
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6.2.1  Agents  
The first observation is that there exists a bifurcation of representational requirements 
for States and EU organs („privileged litigants‟) on the one hand and for individuals 
and companies („unprivileged litigants‟) on the other hand. Although all litigants‟ 
advocates are subject to the same admission requirements, States and institutions are 
permitted to appoint agents who are not subject to such requirements. The language of 
the provision, coupled with the fact that the ECSC Court‟s procedure was largely 
„inspired‟ by the ICJ,614 renders it likely that the rule on State representation derives 
from the ICJ Statute.
615
  
The reason for this dichotomy stems from the functional role of the avocat in 
civil law systems as an agent empowered to perform acts of procedure in civil 
proceedings. Privileged litigants are required to be „represented‟ (répresenté) by 
agents whereas „counsel or advocates‟ merely „assist‟ (assisté). As before the ICJ, 
counsel consequently do not bear personal responsibility for the procedural actions of 
the privileged litigants whom they „assist‟.616 The requirement that unprivileged 
litigants be „represented‟ by an avocat derives from ban upon self-represented 
litigants within certain civil law jurisdictions. An avocat, by virtue of that title, is 
empowered under French law (to take one example) to perform administrative acts of 
procedure for his client.
617
 Thus, the requirement that unprivileged litigants be 
represented by an avocat was occasioned by the need to create a counterpart to the 
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 Antoine, supra note 591, 252; de Richemont, Communauté européenne du charbon et de l‟acier: La 
cour de justice, code annoté guide pratique, (1954), 103: An alternative hypothesis is that it mirrors 
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616
 FTA, Order (24 February 2000), para. 25.  
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 French CPC 2010, Art. 411. The German text of Article 17 was even more explicit on this point, 
under which the term bevollmächtigte or „duly authorised agent to perform certain administrative or 
procedural acts‟ is used for both privileged and unprivileged litigants. 
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procedural role of the agent as well as the prohibition upon self-representation within 
certain national jurisdictions.  
 Although agents are in principle not required to have any legal expertise, in 
practice they are usually employed government lawyers.
618
 As before the ICJ, 
sometimes „experts‟ are appointed.619 Whilst there does not appear to generally be any 
great harm in practice from the use of agency,
620
 it is suggested that the ideal 
procedure would require all parties to the litigation to be represented by professional 
counsel who are subject to common admission requirements, ethical standards and 
disciplinary rules. However, this would be extremely unlikely to be approved by the 
Parliament and especially the Council which, as privileged litigants, benefit from the 
status quo. In this respect, the author is aware on a confidential basis that when the 
new Civil Service Tribunal wrote its Rules of Procedure, it wanted to include agents 
within the scope of [its disciplinary powers].
621
 It was required as part of the process 
to send its proposed Rules to the ECJ for positive advice before submitting them for 
approval to the Council.
622
 However, the proposal was ultimately not included in the 
Rules. Thus, it appears that there has been greater concern on the part of some 
members of the EU judiciary concerning agents than meets the eye.  
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6.2.2  Lawyers 
The second issue is the meaning of the term „lawyer‟ within the English text.623 As 
seen in the three French versions, there has been consistent use of avocat to describe 
the representative of unprivileged litigants. This naturally accords with the 
requirements of civil law jurisdictions, in which the title of avocat provides the right 
to perform procedural acts on behalf of a party in civil litigation. However, upon the 
accession of the anglophone, common law jurisdictions of the UK
624
 and Ireland in 
1973 this provision needed to be translated into English legal language. The drafters 
of the English version of the Statute were attempting to find the equivalent in English 
legal terminology for the representational function of an avocat. Instead of inserting 
the terms „advocate, barrister or solicitor‟ into the provision, they opted for „lawyer‟ 
as the „least cumbersome‟ term.625 However, since „lawyer‟ is not a legal term of art 
in either jurisdiction its use may cause confusion. Nevertheless, it is evident that the 
drafters of the English version of Article 19 intended to designate barristers, 
advocates and solicitors as „lawyers‟.626 Concerning the requirement that a „lawyer‟ 
be „authorised to practise before the court of a Member State‟, this was an attempt to 
distinguish between practising and non-practising lawyers.
627
 
 Thus, upon the accession of the UK and Ireland there was a discrepancy 
between the requirements of Article 19 in the English version and those of the other 
versions. This led to a third problem, namely, the change in the admission 
requirements for an avocat. Under Article 20 of the ECSC Statute, retained in the 
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original Article 17 of the ECJ Statute, an avocat was defined as inscrit à un barreau 
or „admitted to a bar‟ of a Member State. In the original French, this is a clear 
requirement because the title of avocat derives from membership of one of the 
regional Orders. The EEA Treaty provided for amendment of the Statute to ensure 
that EFTA lawyers could appear before the Court. Accordingly, all of the linguistic 
versions of the Statute were amended by the EU Council to provide literal linguistic 
harmony with the English version.
628
 Thus, although the various versions of Article 
19 are now linguistically consistent with one another, the redaction of inscrit à un 
barreau has left no textual definition of an avocat and its equivalents. The use of the 
English version of Article 19 as the template rather than the French version has 
introduced ambiguity.  
 Despite this omission, it appears that the old definition has been implicitly 
retained in the Courts‟ application of Article 19. In Comunidad Autónoma de 
Valencia, the CFI refused admission to an employed lawyer of a Spanish local 
governmental authority (who had rights of audience before Spanish courts) because 
he was not a member of the Spanish Bar. The CFI, citing a key passage from the 
competition case of A.M. & S. Europe,
629
 seemingly applied Article 19 in its original 
meaning in French
630
 whereby only a person inscribed to the College of Advocates 
would be considered to be an abogado. 631 However, the Court did not cite the original 
text but rather confusingly relied upon the principle of „independence‟ from A.M. & S. 
Europe.  
Since the harmonisation of the various linguistic versions of Article 19, the 
Courts has interpreted it to stipulate two separate requirements: 1) that a person be a 
                                                 
628
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„lawyer‟; and 2) that he be „authorised to practise before the Court of a Member 
State‟. As the Comunidad Autónoma case demonstrates, the original French definition 
of „lawyer‟ is implicitly retained. This has become a contentious area for „patent 
agents‟ or „patent litigators‟ who have unsuccessfully sought admission in their own 
right to representation before the Courts for intellectual property cases.  
In Alto de Casablanca, the claimant wished to be represented by a „patent 
attorney‟ who was entitled to „represent clients before the courts and tribunals of the 
United Kingdom in litigation concerning intellectual property.‟632 However, the CFI 
(again citing A.M. & S. Europe
633
) rejected this argument because the person in 
question was „neither a solicitor nor a barrister…[so] it remains the case that he is not 
a lawyer.‟634 The Court cited the specific exception within Article 19 for university 
teachers as illustrating the strictness of the general rule.
635
 Thus, the original intention 
of „lawyer‟ as meaning „solicitor, barrister or advocate‟ was applied to exclude a 
patent agent.  
In the Wilfer case, a patentanwalt or „patent attorney‟ applied for right of 
hearing before the Court. In Germany, patentanwälte are entitled to represent parties 
only before patent courts.
636
 The CFI, citing Alto de Casablanca, held that the 
patentanwalt could only address the Court in the presence and under the supervision 
of a rechstanwalt.
637
 This pragmatic compromise to an immediate problem reinforces 
the rule that only rechstanwälte may represent or assist parties. 
Finally, in the Imperial Chemicals case the applicant sought to distinguish Alto 
de Casablanca on the ground that „patent attorney litigators‟ differ from „patent 
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attorneys‟ in that they are „governed by special rules of professional discipline and 
special rules of conduct‟ and are defined as „lawyers‟ under UK law.638 The CFI 
rejected these arguments and defined the term „lawyer‟ narrowly because the 
Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys „cannot be assimilated to an authorised 
institution for the purposes of the case-law‟ and (citing Comunidad Autónoma) the 
need for an „independent and uniform interpretation [of „lawyer‟] throughout the 
Community‟ overrode the position of patent attorney litigators under UK law.639 
However, the CFI also cited EU transnational legal services directives.
640
 Although it 
acknowledged that their purpose is not „representation of a party by a lawyer before 
the Community judicature‟, it concluded that „the concept of lawyer must be given a 
uniform interpretation‟ in order to „avoid the paradox of permitting a person to 
represent a party before the Community judicature when he would not be authorised 
to represent that party before the national courts and tribunals of the Member States 
other than his State of origin‟.641  
Although the issue of patent attorneys recently arose again in the Enercon 
case, there is no reference to it in the judgment and it appears that the matter was 
disposed of summarily.
642
 Whilst the Courts‟ consistent rejection of patent attorneys 
has been explained as motivated by judicial scepticism of their professional 
competence,
643
 the more convincing explanation is that patent attorneys were not 
designated as „lawyers‟ within Article 19. Whilst there may be an argument for 
amendment of Article 19 to allow one or more versions of patent attorneys to be 
admitted in their own right as „lawyers‟ before the Courts for trademark cases, the 
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jurisprudence is consistent with Article 19 restricting representation to solicitors, 
barristers, advocates and anwälte. 
Hitherto, the discussion has focused upon the admission rules for direct 
actions. There is a somewhat looser rule for preliminary reference cases, for which 
Article 104(2) of the ECJ Rules of Procedure provides: 
„As regards the representation and attendance of the parties to the main proceedings in the 
preliminary ruling procedure the Court shall take account of the rules of procedure of the 
national court or tribunal which made the reference.‟ 
 
It is somewhat ambiguous whether this provision obliges the Court merely to consider 
national procedures or to apply them.
644
 Nevertheless, in practice the Court has been 
flexible in such cases in preliminary reference cases where parties were self-
represented in the national courts.
645
 Although the Court has never given a reasoned 
decision, it is suggested that the phrase „take account of‟ is not obligatory in scope.  
Throughout the jurisprudence concerning patent litigators, there is frequent 
reference in the decisions of the General Court to the need for representatives of 
unprivileged parties to be subject to professional ethics and discipline. In that context, 
the Court has cited a key passage from A.M.&S. Europe: 
„…the requirement as to the position and status as an independent lawyer…is based on a 
conception of the lawyer‟s role as collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts 
and as being required to provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interests of that 
cause, such legal assistance as the client needs. The counterpart of that protection lies in the 
rules of professional ethics and discipline which are laid down and enforced in the general 
interest by institutions endowed with the requisite powers for that purpose. Such a conception 
reflects the legal traditions common to the member states and is also to be found in the legal 
order of the Community, as demonstrated by article 17 of the Protocols on the Statutes of the 
Court of the E.E.C. and the E.A.E.C., and also by article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the E.C.S.C…[s]uch protection may not be extended beyond those 
limits, which are determined by the scope of the common rules on the exercise of the legal 
profession as laid down in Council Directive of March 22, 1977…which is based in its turn on 
the mutual recognition by all the member states of the national legal concepts of each of them 
on this subject‟.646 
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As discussed below,
647
 A.M. & S. Europe concerned a specific issue, namely, the 
existence and scope of the legal principle of professional secrecy in EU law. 
Specifically, this passage concerned the ruling that the principle does not extend to 
employed or „in-house‟ lawyers. Thus, notwithstanding the Court‟s citation of the 
Statute, A.M. & S. Europe did not concern the issue of admission requirements for 
counsel before the Court.  
Nevertheless, the consistent citation by the General Court of this passage in 
the admission cases suggests that „professional ethics and discipline‟ guaranteeing 
„independence‟ is an underlying rationale for the restriction of admission to the 
traditional legal professions. The greater European reliance upon a more 
„paternalistic‟648 relationship between counsel and client than is usual in the United 
States is predicated upon the assurance that, in exchange for such authority, counsel 
will be bound by professional ethics to ensure client confidence.
649
 The authority to 
perform procedural acts (often, if not almost always, irrevocable) on behalf of clients 
is, in many ways, one of the greatest manifestations of this trust. Although the ECJ is 
bound to apply its Statute according to its original meaning, should amendment of 
Article 19 be considered to extend rights of hearing to non-traditional „lawyers‟ the 
value of independent counsel bound by professional ethics and discipline should be 
central. concept.   
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6.2.3  Employed Lawyers 
Although questions concerning confidentiality have not yet arisen in proceedings 
before the Court, the A.M. & S. Europe case established that the principle exists in 
Union law. The Court‟s citation of its Statute in its key holding arguably excludes 
employed counsel by implication from representing or assisting parties before the 
Court.
650
 However, although the Court decided that the confidentiality does not yet 
extend to employed lawyers, its judgment did not directly engage with the underlying 
issue of the practical independence required of counsel. Although the case principally 
addresses the legal dimension of the confidentiality principle, its converse ethical 
dimension was pivotal because professional ethics (backed by professional discipline) 
provide a vital safeguard against lawyers concealing client misconduct behind the veil 
of confidentiality.  
The underlying question is: who is to be trusted to not be subverted in this 
way? One of the two Advocates-General in A.M. & S. Europe, Sir Gordon Slynn (as 
he was then), opined that employed lawyers should be treated in the same way as 
lawyers in private practice because the latter is no more „independent‟ than the former 
but the Court based its decision to exclude employed lawyers from the confidentiality 
principle on the „common legal principles‟ of EU national systems.651 Since those 
legal systems diverge on employed lawyers, the Court‟s prioritisation of consensus 
resulted in the extension of the confidentiality privilege to communications with self-
employed lawyers only – requiring that the definition of a lawyer be unanimous 
amongst the (now twenty-seven) EU Members‟ legal systems rather than based upon 
the underlying question of principle.
652
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The arguments for the inclusion of employed lawyers, as advanced by 
Advocate-General Slynn, are that professional ethics and discipline constitute 
sufficient safeguards in themselves against subversion of an employed lawyer‟s 
independence and that there is little practical difference between a self-employed 
lawyer dependant upon a single client for his practice and a lawyer employed by his 
client. There is also the suspicion that the exclusion of employed lawyers is motivated 
not so much by ethical considerations as by protectionism. The arguments for the 
exclusion of employed lawyers are that there is a difference between a lawyer whose 
entire living is dependant upon his employer and one who, by virtue of his self-
employment, is capable of financial independence by acting for multiple clients.  
 The A.M. & S. decision was subsequently applied by the General Court in 
Akzo Nobel, in which the Court found, inter alia, that A.M. & S. defined the role of 
´lawyer´ in negative terms to exclude employed counsel and that a re-examination of 
the laws of the EU Member States revealed that ´even though it is the case…that 
specific recognition of the role of in-house lawyers and the protection of 
communications with such lawyers under LPP is relatively more common today than 
when the judgment in AM & S was handed down, it is not possible, nevertheless, to 
identify tendencies which are uniform or have clear majority support in that regard in 
the laws of the Member States.´
653
 Before the ECJ, the appellants´ grounds of appeal 
were rejected by the Grand Chamber, which held that the General Court had correctly 
interpreted A.M. & S. and that there was no ´predominant trend´ amongst the Member 
States to justify an extension of legal confidentiality to communications with 
employed lawyers under EU law.
654
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On the first point, the Grand Chamber was more explicit than in A.M. & S. in 
setting out the rationale for the exclusion of employed lawyers from confidentiality: 
„Notwithstanding the professional regime applicable in the present case in accordance with the 
specific provisions of Dutch law, an in-house lawyer cannot, whatever guarantees he has in the 
exercise of his profession, be treated in the same way as an external lawyer, because he occupies 
the position of an employee which, by its very nature, does not allow him to ignore the 
commercial strategies pursued by his employer, and thereby affects his ability to exercise 
professional independence. 
It must be added that, under the terms of his contract of employment, an in-house lawyer may be 
required to carry out other tasks…which may have an effect on the commercial policy of the 
undertaking. Such functions cannot but reinforce the close ties between the lawyer and his 
employer. 
It follows, both from the in-house lawyer‟s economic dependence and the close ties with his 
employer, that he does not enjoy a level of professional independence comparable to that of an 
external lawyer.‟655 
 
Despite the overlap in the analysis with the debate concerning the attitudes of national 
jurisdictions concerning employed counsel, the Akzo Nobel judgment is clearer in 
articulating a principled basis for the exclusion of employed lawyers.  
Despite the express reference by the ECJ to Article 19 of its Statute in Akzo 
Nobel,
656
 it is nebulous whether the Courts would exclude employed counsel from 
their proceedings. According to the Registrar of the General Court:  
¨It would be interesting to examine whether the Akzo Nobel Chemicals decision has 
consequences for employed counsel appointed by parties before the Court. It is interesting and 
an open matter. Of course, although the confidentiality cases have analogies they do not 
necessarily raise identical issues concerning Article 19. It is to be noted that is not always 
possible to detect in-house lawyers by knowing that a member of a national bar is also 
employed. For example, the practising certificates of barristers and solicitors do not indicate 
whether they are self-employed or employed. Nor does a certificate of admission to the 
English Bar or Law Society state whether the individual is a practising or non-practising 
member, which is why the General Court requires that counsel produce their practising 
certificates.¨
657
 
 
It is „almost certain‟ that employed counsel has appeared before the EU Courts 
without their knowledge since the Courts have no means of detection.
658
 However, the 
judiciary‟s discomfort with the employment relationship suggests that they would be 
excluded. 
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6.2.4  Experts 
As before the ICJ, the possibility exists for parties to present expert evidence through 
the medium of representation. One commentator suggests that „there are certain 
practical advantages for a member state or Community institution to be assisted by an 
adviser who, while having no legal training, is an expert in any technical matters 
relevant to the case.‟659 Insofar as those advantages encompass effective 
argumentation through embellishment with expert knowledge, there seems to be no 
reason why that knowledge should not be tested by cross-examination. This apparent 
procedural inequality between privileged and unprivileged litigants does not appear to 
be regarded as a major problem.
660
  
 From the perspective of the judiciary, the current practice is to permit experts 
and other non-lawyers to address the Court under the supervision of a lawyer: 
„Judge Forwood: This must also be seen in the context of the practice of allowing unqualified 
persons to address the Court under the supervision of qualified counsel. For example, case 
handlers on the Respondent‟s side and also in-house counsel on the Applicant‟s side. See also 
big, complex cases such as Microsoft in which non-lawyers were giving submissions under 
supervision. This facility is very generally used to cover even non-lawyers addressing the 
Court. 
 
President Jaeger: There is a practical element to this practice, in that it saves time for counsel 
having to continuously ask the Court for time to consult the non-lawyer experts on technical 
matters and then repeating exactly what they were told, possibly mishearing as well. It is 
simpler to have them address the Court directly. Case-law and practice are well-established, 
covering especially economists but other technical experts as well. This practice of 
supervision is intended to ensure both that the Court‟s procedure complies with the Statute 
and Rules and the presence of an ethical element concerning counsel. We expect the lawyer to 
interrupt the non-lawyer if there have been misstatements and that control exerted by the 
lawyer is linked to the deontological responsibility of an avocat. It is important, in this 
respect, to have a bar association as interlocutor to assimilate these matters. Lawyers have 
tried sometimes to explain that their national rules are all the same, when they are not.‟661 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the absence of major problems in practice concerning the 
limited facility for non-lawyers to directly address the Court, it is clear that the 
supervision of a lawyer is regarded as necessary to ensure the presence of professional 
responsibility.  
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6.3  Ethical Standards 
As previously indicated, there is little practice to draw upon concerning ethical 
problems before the ECJ. The Court‟s Statute, Rules of Procedure and „Notes for the 
Guidance of Counsel‟ (originally created for oral hearings only662) address legal and 
practical matters, not professional ethics. Whilst some authors cite the Council of Bars 
and Law Societies of Europe („CCBE‟) Code of Conduct 1988 as a source,663 the 
Code is inapplicable to ECJ proceedings because it was expressly designed for 
transnational practice
664
 rather than for proceedings before international courts.  
The Court has never invoked its disciplinary powers towards advocates and 
generally ignores such problems as arise on rare occasions. The lack of practice must 
also in part be attributable to the comparative rarity of evidence before the Court 
which, as explained above, derives from its largely review-based jurisdiction. 
Additionally, there have been other problems that have been dealt with summarily and 
consequently cannot be discovered in the public domain. In the words of two judges 
of the General Court: 
„Judge Forwood: The General Court tends to deal with such matters on an ad hoc basis. Only 
if real problems arise, would a real incentive be provided to justify the intellectual effort and 
energy required to draft a comprehensive code of conduct. That said, [there are] some 
particular issues which are problems that, if they have not already arisen, may do so in the 
future. Confidentiality issues particularly come to mind in the context of counsel passing on to 
their client confidential material made available to him by to the Court on a restrictive basis. 
This could be particularly relevant for business secret material in competition cases, for 
example. One future area where this potentially could be important is in terrorist asset cases, 
though it has not yet arisen. For example, cases could arise concerning the „special advocate‟ 
procedures or the equivalent, in which lawyers are required  to keeping information secret 
from their client; even where it is central to the substance of the case. 
 
President Jaeger: Although I can anticipate that many national bars would not be in favour of 
a „European bar‟, I can see intellectual arguments in favour of such an idea. We have some 
700,000 lawyers who now may plead before the Court, from 27 Member States all with their 
own deontological rules, so there are strong arguments for the Court to only deal with one bar 
and one set of rules. 
 
Judge Forwood: There are trends now towards the liberalisation of rights of hearing in 
national jurisdictions, e.g. – the expansion of solicitors‟ rights in England and Wales. There is 
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an argument for a list of counsel to be maintained by the Court with a specialist EU Bar like 
the US Supreme Court. However, because of the requirement before the ECJ to take account 
of national rules in preliminary reference cases, this idea would only work for the General 
Court. We could have a common code of conduct without having to refer to 27 sets of 
codes.‟665 
 
Thus, irrespective of the rarity of real problems before the EU Courts, there is interest 
in the prescription of common ethical standards for counsel for its theoretical 
usefulness. 
 The question may be posed: why have ethical issues not arisen more often 
before the Court? It may be hypothesised that there are multiple causes: 1) the 
generally narrow, law-based jurisdiction of the Court excluding evidentiary matters; 
2) the concentrated number of specialist practitioners who regularly appear before the 
Court, helping to instil collegiality and similar etiquette; and 3) the relative procedural 
homogeneity of the „original Six‟ jurisdictions, narrowing certain differences in 
national standards. At first sight, since there are few problems in practice ethical 
conduct is not problematic because the existing admission requirements and 
disciplinary powers have proved adequate.  
 However, it is suggested that this is not the case. Firstly, although the Court‟s 
homogenous procedure would appear to be enduring despite membership expansions, 
the diversity of counsel qualifying for admission has considerably expanded. Ethical 
standards are consequently far more diversified and jurisdictions with formerly 
authoritarian political systems and limited experience of independent, self-regulating 
bars may not be able to adequately regulate their memberships. Moreover, national 
regulation is alone inadequate to ensure observance of rigorous and common 
standards because national standards diverge. The dormancy of the Court‟s 
disciplinary powers may be partially attributable to the absence prior notice for 
counsel through prescribed standards.  
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 It is arguable, however, that the best-placed organisation to undertake the task 
of drafting such a code would be the CCBE. In the words of one judge:  
„If the CCBE were to adopt a code of conduct for cases before international courts, such as the 
CJEU, the judges of both the EU Courts would necessarily be consulted as part of that process 
for our views. That would likely be the way in which such a project could be achieved. 
Having previously served as the CCBE Representative to the ECJ as part of its Permanent 
Delegation, I can imagine that there would be interest within the CCBE to undertake such a 
project.‟666 
 
The participation of national bars through the CCBE would ensure that the resulting 
text would be integrated at the national level. This would not only ameliorate the 
double deontology problem but also strengthen the legitimacy of the code amongst 
counsel by constituting a shared text. However, the principal danger of this approach 
is to prescribe a low standard as the price for consensus amongst dozens of 
jurisdictions by avoiding the difficult issues. This would endanger its efficacy by 
perpetuating conflicts between national rules rather than setting a common standard – 
thereby defeating its very purpose. 
 In the absence of agreement by the EU Council to such a code, it is arguable 
that the Court could nevertheless prescribe one by invoking an inherent jurisdiction: 
„If there were a serious enough case, for my part I would be willing to do so by relying upon 
the Court‟s mission to judge cases justly. In this respect, it is important to take into account 
the position of agents, who are not covered by Article 41. I can see a distinction in this sense 
between States and institutions, in that States would presumably be more jealous over their 
control over agents than would institutions.‟667 
 
Thus, it seems plausible that States would seek to block a code applicable to agents 
through their representation on the EU Council. However, it is suggested that a 
sufficiently serious case of dishonesty or other misconduct by an agent
668
 would 
justify the unilateral prescription of ethical rules to protect the integrity of its 
proceedings. 
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6.3.1  Duties to the Client 
There are neither procedural rules nor precedents prescribing the circumstances in 
which an advocate may (or must) accept a brief or withdraw from one such as 
competence, conflict of interest or professional embarrassment. Whilst this suggests 
that such issues have not yet come to the Court‟s attention, this does not necessarily 
mean that they have not surreptitiously occurred in practice. Moreover, the 
controversial A.M. & S. Europe and Akso Nobel confidentiality issues demonstrate 
that divergence of national standards and cultures results in deeply opposed views 
concerning shared problems. Within the common proceedings before the Courts, this 
divergence could lead to serious differences in advocates‟ handling of such sensitive 
issues.   
 
6.3.1.1 Conflicts of Interest  
Before other international courts, conflicts of interest are an increasingly important 
issue. The ECJ has also addressed the issue within Article 6(2) of the ECJ Code of 
Conduct 2007 for judges, which prohibits them after holding office from, inter alia, 
acting as representatives of parties for a three-year period. This is a practical problem: 
„[The three-year freezing period] is the Court of Justice's considered response to a potential 
problem. Several former Advocates-General, judges and even a President of the General Court 
have subsequently returned to practice and appeared as counsel. This is, moreover, a practical 
issue because EU judges are appointed for only six years or even shorter, rather than as a 
lifetime career, and (particularly if they have been appointed early) it would be severe to 
require them to sacrifice rights of audience permanently in the future, upon becoming 
judges.‟669   
 
Moreover, it is also interesting that the freezing period is the same as that of the ICJ – 
suggesting cross-fertilisation between international courts. This indicates that the 
adoption of a code of conduct for counsel by one court would provide an example for 
others to do likewise. 
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6.3.1.2 Confidentiality 
The principle of confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client, 
documents belonging to a litigant and communications between litigants intended to 
be treated as confidential has both legal and ethical dimensions. The legal protection 
of the principle ensures that third parties may not generally view such confidential or 
privileged communications without client consent. The ethical principle of 
confidentiality exists in order to encourage trust between lawyer and client.  
However, the legal protection of such communications from the eyes of others 
creates a danger that it may be abused. Legal and ethical safeguards are accordingly 
needed, wherein the former allows for limited circumstances for a court to view 
confidential communications and the latter requires counsel to disclose such material 
in abusive circumstances. Although the procedural rules of the Court provide for the 
former, its powers have never been invoked. Article 32(2)(a) of the Rules
670
  
provides: 
„[p]apers and documents relating to the proceedings shall be exempt from both search and 
seizure; in the event of a dispute the customs officials or police may seal those papers and 
documents; they shall then be immediately forwarded to the Court for inspection in the 
presence of the Registrar and of the person concerned;‟ 
 
De Richemont, commenting upon the rule, wrote: 
„Le principe du secret professionel auquel tout défenseur est astreint s‟impose aux tiers, 
autorités publiques ou privées. Le cabinet d‟avocat est inviolable…[c]e privilege s‟étend aux 
dossiers de l‟avocat, soit à son cabinet, soit au cours de leur transport… 
Par papiers et documents, il faut entendre non seulement les actes de procedure…mais encore 
la correspondence échangée entre le défenseur et son client…sous la reserve suivante : 
Il est nécessaire que la correspondence et les documents aient trait à l‟affaire soumise à la 
Cour et que les seconds ne constituent pas le corps d‟un délit qui aurait été commis dans 
l‟affaire en cause ou dans un connexe.  
La justice peut s‟emparer, partout où elle la trouve, d‟une pièce constituent le corps meme du 
délit – une pièce arguée de faux par exemple – sous condition qu‟elle soit representée en 
original ; une copie ou un photostat ne pourraient être saisis‟.671 
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Thus, the robust protection afforded to the confidentiality principle under French legal 
ethics is here invoked to interpret the Court‟s procedural rules. An advocate‟s duty to 
preserve secrecy extends even to confessions or admissions of wrongdoing, so that a 
client admitting, for example, that his case or a particular argument is a sham
672
 would 
be able to do so to his advocate without fear that that advocate would disclose that 
fact to the Court. Although de Richemont was commenting upon the Court‟s powers 
as a legal principle, it cannot be defined without also addressing its ethical 
counterpart.  
 The legal protection of confidential or privileged material is qualified. In 
writing that justice may demand material comprising a legal wrong, such as forgery, 
de Richemont probably intended that it would be for the Court alone to order 
disclosure. Article 24 of the Statute is expressed in very wide language: „[t]he Court 
of Justice may require the parties to produce all documents and to supply all 
information which the Court considers desirable‟ (emphases added).673 This is 
reinforced by Article 34 of the ECJ Rules (originally Article 3(1)(2) of the ECSC 
Supplementary Rules):  
„The privileges…specified in Article 32 of these Rules are granted exclusively in the interests 
of the proper conduct of proceedings. The Court may waive the immunity where it considers 
that the proper conduct of proceedings will not be hindered thereby.‟  
 
Commenting upon the provision, de Richemont wrote: 
„La défense doit être libre ; les défenseurs doivent jouir d‟une independance totale et absolue 
tant au point de vue moral que materiel…Assurer ces conditions, c‟est également garantir le 
fonctionnement harmonieux de la procedure et par suite preserver et garantir l‟intérêt de 
l‟instance…Le cas pourrait se presenter, si le défenseur s‟était rendu coupable à l‟égard des 
parties ou des tiers d‟imputations diffamatoires ou injurieuses, graves ou renouvelées.  
La Cour decide souverainement‟ (emphases added).674 
 
                                                 
672
 Namely, a case or argument unfounded in fact or law or otherwise made for abusive, vexatious or 
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673
 See also ECJ Rules, Art. 57; ECSC Rules, Art. 48(1). 
674
 De Richemont, supra note 614, 105-8. 
 176 
Thus, protection of confidential material is a privilege, not a right. The Court may 
order disclosure of such material if it considers it to be in the interests of procedural 
justice.  
The question may be posed: why would an international court ever order 
disclosure of confidential material? The answer is that serious alleged misconduct 
threatens the integrity of the judicial process. This is not only hypothetical, but 
practical in light of certain questionable cases before international courts and tribunals 
concerning bribery, forgery and other forms of serious misconduct.
675
 Since the 
advocate is the only person besides the client (who has a vested interest to keep secret 
his own wrongdoing) privy to the information that would prove that the judicial 
process is endangered, it follows that a safeguard is required in order to alert the 
Court. An advocate ought not to be suborned into protecting a client who bribes, 
deceives, coerces, spies or otherwise seeks to corrupt proceedings. Thus, it is 
suggested that an ethical duty of confidentiality would prescribe a duty to disclose 
confidential material where there is reasonable suspicion of such serious misconduct. 
As previously explored, A.M.&S. Europe and Akso Nobel exclude employed 
counsel from the scope of legal confidentiality. The „independence‟ of the lawyer 
from the client, particularly in the context of client misconduct, was crucial to that 
determination. Whilst this author respectfully agrees with the justification offered in 
Akso Nobel for that finding, the cases illustrate by analogy the problem of divergent 
ethical standards within the context of potential client misconduct being shielded by 
the confidentiality principle. The need for a general, rather than absolute, ethical duty 
of confidentiality would accordingly be appropriate in striking the correct balance 
between lawyer-client trust and protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings. 
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6.3.2 Duties to the Court  
Within the procedural rules of the Court, there are no general principles articulated 
concerning the ethical duties of advocates towards it. The umbrella terms „dignity of 
the Court‟ and „proper administration of justice‟ underpinning the Court‟s disciplinary 
powers within Article 35(1) RoP are the only such duties in the rules. „Dignity of the 
Court‟ may be interpreted, sensu stricto, as a requirement to address the Court with 
civility and decorum. However, the phrase „proper administration of justice‟ is too 
broadly drafted to extrapolate much concrete meaning. Particularly important but 
unaddressed matters include ex parte communications with the Court and the 
handling of evidence so as to preclude its contamination or fabrication by counsel or 
the parties. 
 
6.3.2.1 Candour 
A basic principle to be considered upon which there are differing standards in practice 
is that of honesty to the Court. At least two cases have occurred, discussed within 
„documentary evidence‟ below, in which this has been an issue. It was commented 
above that there ought to be an ethical duty upon counsel to disclose otherwise 
confidential information to the Court, as when a client is insisting upon bringing a 
„sham case‟ – that is, a case or argument unfounded in fact or law or otherwise 
brought for vexatious or frivolous purposes.  It should be noted that the risk of such 
„sham‟ cases being brought before the Court is generally slight. As a former judge has 
commented: 
„I suppose this could arise in a cartel case where a client says „of course we were part of an 
illegal cartel but the Commission‟s evidence is insufficient to prove it‟. However, in thirty 
years of practice before going to the Court I never experienced this kind of outright 
confession. One should distinguish between an out-and-out admission of a false case (which, 
if happening at all, will be very rare) and the more common situation of: „We‟ve been fined 
EUR 50 million…what can you do for us?‟ Decent counsel will say: “We can certainly argue 
that the Commission‟s evidence is insufficient but this may not hold water in court.” I 
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remember as a judge, and I have said it in lectures then and afterwards, that „you can tell an 
illegal cartel when you smell it.‟ Some counsel more than others will attempt to run every 
conceivable argument, which is not really a question of ethics but simply bad advocacy.‟676 
 
Apart from the issue of misleading the Court by putting forward argumentation that 
counsel „knows‟ to be false, it may be suggested that „bad advocacy‟ of sufficient 
seriousness could infringe an ethical standard of due diligence or competence. If 
counsel is running every conceivable argument without regard to merit in the forlorn 
hope that one of them sticks, this would be not only a waste of the time and money of 
his client but also that of the Court.  
The importance of candour appears in the List D case: 
„The Hellenic Republic admits that the provisions of Community law referred to by the 
Commission prohibit the introduction by Member States of quantitative restrictions with 
regard to matches from Bulgaria and Sweden. It claims, however, that "List D" was abolished 
in 1980 by Decision E6/8196/2600 in order to adapt Greek rules with a view to the accession 
of Greece to the Communities… 
It is therefore common ground that the Hellenic Republic, before accession, applied a system 
of import authorization referred to as "List D" or "Procedure D", the purpose and effect of 
which was to restrict imports of certain products. The Hellenic Republic has not produced any 
instrument providing for the abolition of that system. Contrary to the Hellenic Republic' s 
claim, Decision E6/8196/2600 does not expressly abolish "Procedure D"; paragraph 2 of that 
decision merely rescinds the distinction between Procedures "Delta" and "Epsilon" for the 
granting of an authorization to import.  
…the Commission has produced to the Court photocopies of the two import application 
forms… [o]n each form the refusal of the application is hand-written, accompanied by the 
Greek letter "D", also hand-written. The refusal of an import application bears no relation to a 
purely statistical procedure. On the contrary, the fact that the refusal of the application was 
accompanied by the letter "D" proves the continued existence of a so-called "List D" or 
"Procedure D" system designed to restrict imports, which did in fact have the precise effect of 
preventing the imports concerned.  
In the absence of any other convincing explanation from the Government of the Hellenic 
Republic it must therefore be concluded that there was in existence in that State a "Procedure 
D", the effect of which was to prevent the importation of the products appearing on a "List D", 
and in particular matches from non-member countries.‟677  
 
Here, there was certainly a failure to sufficiently scrutinise the Commission‟s 
documentary evidence. Had the agent for Greece scrutinised that evidence thoroughly, 
she would have noticed the handwritten „delta‟ symbols undermining her assertion 
that the „List D‟ procedure had been abolished. This may be attributed to an attempt to 
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mislead the Court by an assertion that the agent „knew‟ to be unfounded (namely, that 
the „List D‟ system had been abolished when the agent knew that it had not) and/or to 
a failure to exercise due diligence in scrutinising the evidence of the other side.   
 Although one could argue that the client in such cases bears the consequences 
for engaging bad counsel or insisting upon bringing a bad case, it does not account for 
the impact upon the Court. It also does not acknowledge the injustice of a client 
bearing the consequences of bad advocacy by counsel. If counsel vexes the Court with 
prolix or mendacious argumentation, then in principle it should be for counsel to reap 
what he has sown. To the argument that counsel may simply be advancing a case or 
argument which his client is insisting upon regardless of its merits, there is the answer 
that „independent‟ counsel must not compromise his professional standards to please 
his client. An example of this is the Koelman case,
678
 concerning which the author is 
aware on a confidential basis that the applicant was nominally represented by a 
Luxembourgois counsel who, in order to comply with the deadline for filing, signed 
pleadings that the applicant had himself drafted – presumably to assist the client in 
circumventing the Court‟s general prohibition upon self-representation. Subsequently, 
the advocate refused to answer questions put by the Court at the oral hearing – 
apparently because he was insufficiently unfamiliar with the applicant‟s case.679  
 
6.3.2.2 Documentary Evidence 
It is important to recall the preliminary caveat that the Court‟s jurisdiction generally 
precludes fact and evidence. However, when it does arise the Court‟s procedure is 
weighted towards written pleadings to which supporting documentary evidence is 
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attached.
680
 Where there is an issue of fact, the integrity of the judgment accordingly 
relies greatly upon the credibility of such evidence due to the comparative rarity of 
other evidence to refute it. Under the ECSC Rules, Article 33(7) provided that, in the 
event of the authenticity of a document being contested, the Court may ex proprio 
motu or on the application of the Advocate-General or one of the parties order 
verification measures to be taken.
681
 This provision is omitted from the current Rules. 
Lacking the travaux préparatoires to the Rules, it is unknown why or when the rule 
was redacted.  
 Notwithstanding the procedural safeguards by which the Court may scrutinise 
the authenticity of written evidence, in most national ethical traditions an advocate is 
obliged to refrain from misleading the court. The enduring and universal nature of this 
problem is demonstrated by the forged documents incident in the Qatar v. Bahrain 
case before the ICJ.
682
 Although it clearly behoves the Court that advocates be placed 
under a professional duty to refrain from misleading it by false evidence, Qatar v. 
Bahrain further shows the necessity for advocates to actively control evidence. Thus, 
it is argued that procedural justice demands that advocates not only be obliged to 
refrain from misleading the Court but also to shield it from false evidence. 
Documentary evidence problems have arisen in at least one case. In Società 
Italiana Vetro, the General Court noted: 
„It emerges from the inquiry carried out by the Court that when the Commission prepared the 
documentary evidence…certain relevant passages were deliberately deleted or omitted, even 
though they did not relate to business secrets. In particular, nine words were deleted without 
trace in a handwritten note from SIV of 20 January 1985 (374)… 
The Court considers that is self-evident and indisputable that the tenor of the note is changed 
completely by the omission of those nine words. With those nine words the note could be 
taken as clear evidence of a competitive struggle between SIV and FP on the one hand and VP 
on the other. At the hearing, the Commission tried in vain to supply an objectively justifiable 
reason for the deletion of those words. 
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The Court must record that that is not the only example of such a proceeding, other examples 
of which will be commented upon below… 
Accordingly, the Court considers that it is incumbent on it, in assessing the applicants‟ second 
general plea, to check meticulously the nature and import of the evidence taken into 
consideration by the Commission in the decision.‟683 
 
The redaction of those nine words from a document, for which there was no 
„objectively justifiable reason‟, can be attributed either to dishonesty or to a failure to 
sufficiently scrutinise the document and provide an explanation for the redacted 
words. The Commission was „represented‟ by two members of its Legal Service as 
agents who were „assisted‟ by an Italian avvocato and a French avocat. Since only 
agents can perform procedural acts that bind their principals before the Court, the 
ultimate responsibility for the documentary evidence is theirs. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that although the Court was critical of this redaction in its judgment it 
lacks disciplinary powers concerning agents. Thus, even if the Court had been minded 
to discipline the agents in that case on grounds of candour or diligence it would not 
have had the ability to do so.  A similar problem of failing to sufficiently scrutinise 
documentary evidence arose in the BP Chemicals case, in which certain documents 
submitted in support of the Commission´s position were seemingly reconstructed 
from memory by the legal team or case team.
684
 This, however, did not appear to have 
been an attempt at deceit but rather a failure on the part of the legal team to 
sufficiently scrutinise the documents prepared by the case team. 
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6.3.2.3 Testimonial Evidence 
It has been noted that, due to the review-based jurisdiction of the Court, testimonial 
evidence by witnesses and experts is very rare.
685
 The broadly drafted procedural 
rules of the Court are virtually identical to those of the ICJ, giving scant guidance to 
advocates.
686
 Although the Court‟s original policy was to permit advocates to question 
witnesses only indirectly through the President of the Court, the Rules were amended 
in 1974 to allow direct interrogation.
687
 There is no rule that regulate witness 
statements,
688
 which are a requirement in England and a taboo in France. Surprisingly, 
witness examination before the Court is not addressed by much of the English 
literature.
689
 However, Usher writes:  
„Since all witnesses are ultimately called by the Court on matters decided by the Court, 
distinctions known to common lawyers between witnesses called by one side or the other are 
not recognised. In particular…there is no real distinction between examination-in-chief and 
cross-examination, and no prohibition upon leading witnesses.‟690 
 
Although the distinction between witnesses called by the parties as opposed to those 
called by the Court may be technically accurate, it is suggested that it is an 
unsatisfactory one. Like all international courts and tribunals, the Court is almost 
always far removed from the vicinity of the disputed facts. Whilst the Court is vested 
with inquisitorial powers to collect evidence, in reality parties will have much greater 
access to potential witnesses. The conditions for the relaxed rules governing witness 
examination at the national level do not exist for international courts.  
Brown and Kennedy also observe: 
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„The taking of evidence from a witness conforms, for the most part, with the normal practice 
of continental courts – practice which common lawyers generally regard as much inferior to 
their own for the establishment of facts where this depends on the credibility of a 
witness…[t]he witness is heard by the Court in the presence of the parties or their 
representatives. After the witness has given his or her evidence, questions may be put to the 
witness by the presiding judge, the other judges or the advocate general. Until the revision of 
the Rules of Procedure in 1974, the parties‟ lawyers could only put questions through the 
medium of the presiding judge, but now they may be permitted to put their questions directly, 
as in cross-examination – although the different context of the Luxembourg questioning 
makes it no more than a pale shadow of the English original.‟691 
 
To illustrate this perceived cultural difference, they cite a case in which „[t]he parties 
were each represented by distinguished leading counsel from the English bar who 
were repeatedly admonished by the presiding judge for attempting to turn the 
inquisitorial hearing of witnesses into an adversarial trial.‟692  According to one of the 
barristers in the case, the incident was actually quite minor in that counsel for both 
sides had wished to cross-examine witnesses but were instructed by the President that, 
as those witnesses were „the Court‟s witnesses‟, they must be examined through the 
Court.
693
 In the event, the interrogations „came off in a similar way to a normal cross-
examination, in that the same progress was made but in a less confrontational 
manner.‟694 This procedure, wherein the judges‟ questions precede those of counsel, is 
more representative of a civil law jurisdiction than a common law one.
695
 The role of 
counsel is correspondingly diminished, though of course not eliminated.  
 Instead of the technicality of calling witnesses, the more compelling 
explanation for the Court‟s relaxed rules of witness examination is historical in that 
there was not a single common law jurisdiction within the „original Six‟ members of 
the ECSC. Naturally, the protagonists drew upon their own national experiences and 
practices, as well as the laissez-faire regime of ICJ, in shaping the procedure of the 
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Court. However, in light of the practical reality of the Court as a distant court of 
reference from national jurisdictions (apart from direct actions) there is a need for 
strict ethical standards binding upon advocates from common law and civil law 
jurisdictions alike concerning contact with witnesses and treatment of testimonial 
evidence – including witness examination – in order to preclude contamination of 
evidence. Although certain common law rules concerning evidence, such as those 
governing „hearsay evidence‟, are unsuitable for the Court due to the absence of a jury 
the stricter common law rules concerning „leading‟ witnesses and particularly upon 
appropriate communication between counsel and witnesses may be appropriate due to 
the relatively greater access of parties to evidence.  
  The Court‟s procedural rules concerning experts are generally similar to those 
for witnesses.
696
 Thus, the foregoing analysis concerning testimonial evidence by 
witnesses of fact applies to expert witnesses with one important difference discussed 
above, namely, that the „experts‟ utilised by privileged litigants may, as before the 
ICJ, be insulated from cross-examination by opposing counsel (though not from 
questioning by the Court
697
) by designating them as agents rather than as expert 
witnesses. By contrast, unprivileged litigants must submit their expert evidence in the 
normal way.  
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6.3.3 Duties to Colleagues  
Apart from the broad provision under Article 35(1) of the Rules concerning the 
„dignity of the Court‟, there are no formal rules concerning collegiality or courtesy 
between advocates. Whilst counsel generally observe similar standards of decorum 
and courtesy,
698
 there is still some scope for divergent standards of conduct in 
practice. According to one senior English practitioner, in one case a minor incident 
occurred in which a German lawyer had effectively accused him in pleadings of 
attempting to mislead the Court.
699
 Although the judges from civil law jurisdictions 
did not take notice of it, the British judge (Lord Slynn of Hadley) „gave the lawyer 
hell‟ for it. When the lawyer, upon being questioned by Lord Slynn as to whether he 
had any evidence to sustain the allegation, replied that he had none to offer he was 
told to withdraw it.  
This minor incident demonstrates the scope for divergent standards of conduct 
between counsel. At the English Bar, an allegation against the integrity of another 
advocate is considered to be very serious. However, it was seemingly considered to be 
trivial by the accusing lawyer and the civil law judges. An incident that could result in 
disciplinary sanctions for a barrister could pass off without notice for a German  
rechtsanwalt. It is conceivable that differences of national ethical standards could 
disrupt proceedings, whether from simple misunderstanding or reckless accusations.  
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6.4 Disciplinary Jurisdiction 
Whilst the ECJ has not yet legislated common ethical rules for advocates, it has 
prescribed disciplinary powers. Article 19 of the Statute provides: „[a]s regards such 
advisers and lawyers who appear before it, the Court shall have the powers normally 
accorded to courts of law, under conditions laid down in the Rules of Procedure.‟ 
Article 35(1) of the current Rules states: 
„If the Court considers that the conduct of an adviser or lawyer towards the Court, a Judge, an 
Advocate General or the Registrar is incompatible with the dignity of the Court or with the 
requirements of the proper administration of justice, or that such adviser or lawyer is using his 
rights for purposes other than those for which they were granted, it shall inform the person 
concerned. If the Court informs the competent authorities to whom the person concerned is 
answerable, a copy of the letter sent to those authorities shall be forwarded to the person 
concerned.  
On the same grounds, the Court may at any time, having heard the person concerned and the 
Advocate General, exclude the person concerned from the proceedings by order. That order 
shall have immediate effect.‟700  
 
The Court was vested with positive disciplinary powers grounded in the inherent 
powers of courts and tribunals, including national courts. Moreover, the omission of 
agents from the exercise of these powers continues the bifurcation of representation 
whereby privileged litigants‟ representatives are subject neither to admission 
requirements nor disciplinary sanctions. As seen in the List D and Società Italiana 
Vetro cases above, agents are not immune from questionable conduct. However, 
amendment of Rule 35(1) (and, ideally, Article 19 of the Statute as well) to include 
agents would require the approval of the Council, an unlikely prospect. 
An interesting point is whether the Court could financially sanction a lawyer 
personally, as opposed to the party he represents, for wasteful or abusive pleading. 
Whilst there have been cases in which the Court has sanctioned parties through costs 
orders for such pleading,
701
 it is arguable that counsel should bear personal costs for 
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their own inefficiency or misconduct. However, it is contestable whether the Court 
would have the power and need to do so: 
„There is no scope for personal costs orders because it is unlikely that they would be within 
the Court‟s powers and in any event this would usually concern only respondents‟ costs, 
which in this respect are not excessive and in any event form a tiny fraction of the institution's 
budget.‟702  
 
However, assuming the Court did have such a power, it is likely that the mere 
existence of personal costs orders would help to deter lawyers from engaging in such 
pleadings. 
The Court has yet to invoke its disciplinary powers. Although this reflects a 
general lack of serious professional misconduct by counsel, as seen above this does 
not necessarily mean that no ethical problems have arisen during the Court‟s entire 
history:  
„Registrar Coulon: On the Court having „never invoked its disciplinary powers‟, this is 
formally correct. However, in only one case (Goldstein v. Commission) the President 
explained to a lawyer that if he intended to proceed with the 25
th
 or 26
th
 proceeding by one 
litigant concerning the same subject-matter before the Court then the Court‟s disciplinary 
powers under Article 41 would be invoked.  
 
Judge Forwood: I was the reporting judge in that case. It was also clear that the lawyer in 
question had not drafted the party‟s applications himself but had merely signed them. This 
clearly concerns not just the multiplicity of actions by the same party but also issues like the 
duty of the lawyer to present tenable arguments, the independence of the lawyers and the duty 
of the lawyer to assume personal responsibility for the content of pleadings. However, the 
isolated nature of this case demonstrates that this sort of occurrence is not a general 
problem.‟703 
 
Such difficulties appear have been handled in an informal way on the rare occasions 
that they have arisen through admonishment by the President or indirect criticism in 
the judgment.
704
 According to a former judge: 
„In general, the tendency is to not to make an issue of such things because it will probably not 
make a difference to the outcome of the case…Certainly, some counsel make extravagant 
claims or „over-egg the pudding‟ in presenting their case.  I have certainly pressed counsel to 
face up to difficulties; once counsel replied „I do not want to answer that question‟! However, 
I do not remember any extreme incidents. 
I suppose that with expanding EU membership there may be some new jurisdictions where the 
Bar take a different view of their role, particularly where the State has been seen as an enemy. 
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It may be that as the Union enlarges, different ethical values will lead to conflicts of 
behaviour. Ethical problems are in practice more likely to arise in :1) competition cases; or 2) 
staff cases.‟705 
 
In the absence of practice or a prescribed code of conduct, the question remains as to 
what misconduct would be regarded as „incompatible with the dignity of the Court or 
with the requirements of the proper administration of justice‟. This applies a fortiori 
with respect to difficult issues with divergent „good faith‟ views amongst national 
ethical traditions, such as conflicts of interest or confidentiality. In a nice case of 
alleged professional misconduct, the absence of prescribed ethical rules would 
undermine the legitimacy of the Court‟s ex post facto disciplinary sanction by 
depriving advocates of prior notice of the exact standard.   
 Due to the comparatively rare nature of disciplinary problems before the 
Court, the problem of „double deontology‟ entailing regulatory conflicts of 
jurisdiction between international courts and national bars has not yet arisen. In 
discussing double deontology, one judge has surmised: 
„On that problem, it is likely that the EU Courts would be in a stronger position than the 
international criminal tribunals towards national bars because they can invoke the Article 10 
duty of cooperation of the Member States, which is broad, to compel national bars to respect 
the jurisdiction of the Courts.‟706  
 
Thus, one may hypothesise that the principal problem concerning the prescription of 
common ethical standards for counsel before the Court is the articulation of principles 
acceptable to national bars rather than compelling the bars to respect the Court‟s 
regulatory jurisdiction after such principles have been prescribed.  
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6.5  Conclusions 
To recapitulate, the regulation of advocacy before the ECJ and ECtHR is currently in 
a state of partial development. Whilst both Courts have prescribed admission 
requirements and disciplinary powers concerning advocates, their policies in practice 
have been to delegate the regulation of advocates to national bars. This explains the 
otherwise surprising fact that neither Court has yet prescribed common ethical 
standards for advocates in over fifty years of existence.  
Thus, the procedural rules of the Courts concerning advocates are, like those 
of the ICJ, relatively lax. Although they have prescribed admission requirements and 
disciplinary powers for advocates, in practice the Courts have adopted a similarly 
passive posture. On the rare occasions in which it has been compelled to consider 
ethical problems with divergent national views, such as the confidentiality principle 
and the status of employed lawyers in A.M. & S. Europe and Akso Nobel. Where 
cultural conflicts have occurred, they have largely been dealt with by the ECJ in an 
informal way. However, more serious problems have not been avoided entirely. 
 One might argue that there is no pressing need for common ethical standards 
or for active regulation by the Courts because of the lack of serious problems. 
However, this ignores not only that theory is merely practice waiting to happen but 
also the occurrence of dubious professional conduct before the ECtHR and other 
„civil‟ international courts and tribunals. Furthermore, even if one discounts flagrant 
professional misconduct there nevertheless remains the important problem of good 
faith differences amongst divergent national and personal ethical standards. The 
Courts‟ principal admission requirement – that advocates be subject to national 
professional ethics and discipline – arguably creates problems arising from conflicts 
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between divergent standards of professional conduct. However, this is not merely a 
fact of life to be accepted, but a problem to be solved. 
 Admission standards, ethical rules and discipline are interlinked. The 
continuing diplomatic tradition of privileged litigants insulates their representatives 
from the Courts‟ regulation. Not only is this dichotomy between litigants intrinsically 
prejudicial to equality of arms by creating a double standard of acceptable 
professional conduct, but the underlying rationale of different standards for fair trail 
for different litigants – by which States are not considered to need professional 
representation whereas individuals do – is disproved by practice. Thus, the case for 
the abolition of privileged representation to ensure uniform regulation for all litigants 
and thereby promote fair trial is compelling. 
Although the ECJ has emphasised that professional ethics and discipline lie at 
the heart of its admission requirements, it has nevertheless declined to engage with 
underlying ethical issues in its jurisprudence. This must at least partially explain the 
otherwise extraordinary fact that the Court has yet to exercise its disciplinary powers 
in its entire history. Prescribed ethical rules that fail to resolve the critical issue of 
prioritisation of conflicting, fundamental duties are of limited value. In order to give 
the concept of „independence‟ substance, advocates must be both empowered and 
obliged to behave independently in every facet of international litigation according to 
a uniform and robust standard. The rule of justice demands that advocates – as 
professionals – should be held not to the lowest common denominator but to the 
highest moral standards so that the procedural efficacy of international courts may be 
held in the highest regard.     
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Chapter VII: The International Criminal Court 
This chapter considers ethical standards for counsel before the International Criminal 
Court („ICC‟). A distinguishing feature of the international criminal tribunals from 
civil tribunals is that they are expressly obliged through their statutes to ensure fair 
trial standards in their proceedings. Another important difference is that the criminal 
tribunals have more comprehensive regulatory systems for representation, particularly 
for defence counsel. The criminal context, in particular the stricter fair trial standards 
in international human rights law, is an important reason for this. This is amplified by 
the Court‟s subject-matter jurisdiction, in that it was constructed to try „the most 
serious crimes of international concern‟.707 This seriousness requires the highest 
standards of fairness and integrity for the legitimacy of international criminal justice.    
 At first sight, the ethical issues that arise for counsel before international 
criminal tribunals differ considerably from those before „civil‟ tribunals due to the 
distinctive nature of criminal procedure. For example, the prosecutorial discretion to 
indict and the disclosure of exculpatory evidence are issues that do not feature in civil 
procedure. An additional difference is that the ICC regulatory architecture for counsel 
is considerably more complex than before the ICJ and ECJ. However, the research 
presented in this chapter suggests that, despite these architectural and procedural 
differences, the essential principles (e.g. – integrity, competence and fair trial) that 
underpin the ethical issues are common to civil and criminal courts. The existence of 
universal principles of professional ethics, in turn, indicates that cross-fertilisation 
between the various courts on these shared values would be appropriate, mutatis 
mutandis, in analogical cases. 
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The principal theme that has emerged in the early practice of the Court, 
particularly in its first trial, has seen a battle of wills between the Prosecutor and the 
judiciary. From the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence to the disclosure of 
intermediaries‟ identities to extrajudicial media statements, the Prosecutor has 
asserted his belief that, as a separate organ of the Court under the Rome Statute, he is 
a judicial officer of an equal status with the Chambers judges. By contrast, the Trial 
Chamber in Lubanga has treated the Prosecutor as an advocate who owes a duty of 
obedience to it. Additionally, precise scope of the role of ICC Prosecutor is as yet ill-
defined.
708
  
This chapter principally examines the ICC because it was created to be the 
sole permanent court for international criminal law and makes supplementary 
reference to the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal („Nuremberg IMT‟),709 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia („ICTY‟), International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda („ICTR‟) and Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(„SCSL‟).710 Section 6.1 provides historical background concerning ethical standards 
for counsel before the Nuremberg IMT and the ICTY. Section 6.2 addresses the 
admission requirements, ethical standards and disciplinary regimes applicable to 
prosecutors. In analysing the ethical problems that have arisen concerning ICC 
prosecutors, this chapter suggests that the extension of the Court‟s regulatory 
superstructure for defence counsel to prosecutors would be a useful step to better 
handle ethical issues and raise standards. 
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7.1 Historical Background 
The Nuremberg IMT and the ICTY that preceded the ICC provide three major 
historical themes concerning representation. The first is the regulatory dichotomy 
between prosecutors and defence counsel, whereby the former are internally self-
regulating whereas the latter are externally regulated by the Tribunal. The second is 
the absence of common ethical standards for counsel caused by vague, terse or absent 
ethical rules. The third is a culture of weak professional independence, whereby 
prosecutors and defence counsel during contentious procedural issues identified their 
first duty as to their clients. These themes have had a considerable impact upon the 
ICC infrastructure.  
 
7.1.1 Nuremberg711 
At the Nuremberg IMT, the regulatory architecture concerning representation was 
skeletal. As the first modern international criminal tribunal with representatives, 
judges and tribunal officials from five jurisdictions there were considerable 
difficulties with conflicting national cultures and ethical standards. The Tribunal also 
disregarded several instances of questionable conduct on the part of individual 
counsel. They may have done so due to the absence of common standards and in the 
interest of preserving appearances.     
For prosecutors, regulation by the Tribunal was non-existent. The Allied 
Powers had absolute discretion to appoint prosecutors, who were accountable to 
them.
712
 There were no admission requirements, no ethical rules and no disciplinary 
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powers in the London Charter or the Rules of Procedure. For defence counsel, the 
admission requirement of professional qualification to appear before a national court 
was inserted into the London Charter without debate „to make the statute complete‟ 
by defining „rights of the defense and the prosecution‟.713 The historical theme of 
regulatory dichotomy between prosecutors and defence counsel was thus created, 
though there were no prescribed ethical rules or disciplinary powers concerning 
defence counsel. 
 In this lax regulatory context, the second historical theme of lack of common 
ethical standards for counsel emerged with the result of conflicting national standards 
and questionable professional conduct. Prosecutors doubled as delegates the London 
Conference that created the rules of the trial that they were to participate in, giving 
rise to a potential conflict of interest.
714
 Applicants to serve as defence counsel offered 
to secure the conviction of their putative clients.
715
 Prosecutors failed to disclose pre-
trial contacts with witnesses
716
 and documents that they considered to be highly 
exculpatory to the defence.
717
 For example, after his widely-regarded humiliation in 
failing to effectively cross-examine Hermann Goering, Jackson:  
„…arranged a private meeting with Parker and Biddle and, in a “wild” and “uncontrolled 
mood,” he poured our all his complaints about the Court and its members. He accused 
Lawrence of always ruling against the Americans, blamed Biddle for undermining the morale 
of the prosecution, and in the end threatened to resign.‟718 
 
Clearly, such actions had the potential to seriously compromise the integrity of the 
judicial process and thus detract from the legitimacy of the Tribunal. 
The third theme of weak professional independence also emerged at the trial. 
For example, political pressure was brought to influence the prosecutorial discretion 
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to indict, such as the Soviet attempt to falsely convict the accused for the Katyn Forest 
massacre that is now known to have been perpetrated by the Soviet Union
719
 or 
British Admiralty pressure to remove Admiral Doenitz as a defendant to preclude 
examination of its own wartime practices.
720
 Defence counsel also faced prejudicial 
instructions such as the exposition of irrelevant anti-Jewish propaganda
721
 or the 
intimidation of witnesses.
722
 This close proximity between counsel and client, 
particularly for prosecutors, exposed the trial to the dangers of politicisation and 
abuses carried out by counsel on client instructions.   
 
7.1.2 ICTY 
The ICTY was, after Nuremberg, the second influential forerunner to the ICC. As the 
first ad hoc international criminal tribunal, it provided a template for the ICTR and 
other tribunals that have since been created. It has also had occasion to address many 
of the most high-profile and sensitive procedural issues in its trials that engage 
counsel ethics. For procedural purposes, its practice provides an important 
background for the ICC.  
 The ICTY architecture concerning defence counsel is considerably more 
developed than at Nuremberg, largely attributable not only to the cautionary lessons 
of the Nuremberg precedent but also to the post-Nuremberg advent of the 
international human right to counsel for defendants in criminal trials.
723
 The 
prescribed admission requirements, overseen by the Registry, go beyond the 
Nuremberg benchmark in demanding expertise in criminal law.
724
 Defence counsel 
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are bound by an ethical code of conduct and subject to a purpose-built disciplinary 
regime with procedural safeguards.
725
 Thus, the Tribunal is considerably more active 
in regulating defence counsel and its Code of Conduct marks the first prescription of 
common ethical standards for counsel by an international criminal tribunal.  
 However, the three major themes concerning counsel identified in the 
Nuremberg trial have also emerged before the ICTY. The bifurcation of regulation 
between prosecutors and defence counsel has existed since the creation of the 
Tribunal. Apart from the Tribunal‟ contempt jurisdiction (which applies not only to 
counsel but to all participants in the trial process) and those national bars that exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, prosecutors are professionally self-regulating. In two 
unreasoned decisions, Trial Chambers have decided that they lack jurisdiction to order 
a prosecutorial code of conduct or mete out disciplinary sanctions to prosecutors for 
professional misconduct.
726
 
 In the Furundžija trial, the Trial Chamber issued a decision in which it 
declared that, with reference to the Prosecution‟s handling of disclosure, it was 
„appalled by what it considers to be conduct close to negligence in the Prosecution‟s 
preparation of this case.‟727 The Chamber then took the novel step of issuing a „formal 
complaint‟, for which no express procedure existed in the Statute or the Rules, to the 
Chief Prosecutor in which it complained of „a consistent pattern of non-compliance 
with the orders of the Trial Chamber, failure to comply with obligations imposed by 
the Rules…late and/or last minute filing of substantial motions and failure to provide 
the Trial Chamber with satisfactory reasons for such conduct‟ threatening „equal 
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rights for all parties…and…the rights of the accused‟.728 The Chamber declared that it 
had made „findings of misconduct on the part of the Prosecution‟ for which it issued 
its Formal Complaint.
729
 It observed „all Trial Chambers have the right to expect the 
highest standards of professionalism from counsel who appear before them‟ and that, 
whilst defence counsel were bound by their Code of Conduct, there exists no 
equivalent instrument for prosecutors.
730
  
Whilst the Chamber considered the conduct of the counsel concerned was 
unprofessional, it considered that it did not arise to the level of contempt, reserved for 
„the most extreme of cases where there has been interference with the course and 
administration of justice‟. 731 Following an internal report, the Chief Prosecutor 
referred the Formal Complaint to the Lord Advocate and the Crown Agent of 
Scotland for external assessment who found that there had been „an error of judgment 
in not disclosing, but no professional misconduct‟.732  Clearly, the OTP was sensitive 
to the potential conflict of interest arising from the Chief Prosecutor investigating her 
own deputies‟ professional conduct.733 No disciplinary sanction was imposed by the 
Chief Prosecutor who, in defence of her deputies, considered that although they had 
been „wrong‟ they had not been „unprofessional‟ and criticised the Formal Complaint 
for having been „made without notice to the lawyers involved…with no opportunity to 
respond to the allegations and no right of appeal against them.‟734  
 Although there is force in the latter criticism because the Formal Complaint, 
as a public reprimand, may itself be regarded as a disciplinary sanction. A public 
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admonishment would have had potential consequences for the professional 
reputations of the counsel concerned. Natural justice would require that counsel have 
an opportunity to defend themselves with adequate notice and a right of appeal 
(presumably to the Appeals Chamber). Paradoxically, the Formal Complaint supports 
the hypothesis that the ICTY has an inherent power to sanction prosecutors for 
professional misconduct.
735
 M
me
 Arbour‟s call for the procedure to be prescribed or 
disapproved was not acted upon.
736
 
 However, it is suggested that M
me
 Arbour‟s thesis that professionalism entails 
a standard of honesty is wrong because it does not account for due diligence.
737
 In her 
Response to the Formal Complaint, she wrote: 
„I do not accept, however, that any aspect of the conduct of counsel for the prosecution 
constituted misconduct amounting to the wilful disobedience of court orders or deliberate and 
improper withholding of relevant evidence from the trial process. My review of the way the 
prosecution was handled confirms that there were failings on the part of the prosecution team, 
that errors of judgement were made. I have found no suggestion of bad faith on the part of any 
member of staff involved in the case.‟738 
 
The omission of due diligence may be found in her observation that: 
„There is no dishonour in being wrong, assuming that one is otherwise diligent. I believe that 
we can safely promote integrity, honesty and candour as universal trademarks of advocacy. I 
would suggest that the willingness to recognize errors and to correct them is the ultimate 
guarantee of justice. It should not be the hardest thing for a true professional to do, but it often 
is.‟739 
 
The Trial Chamber‟s Formal Complaint was directed not at the integrity of the 
counsel concerned but rather at „inaction, inefficiency, shoddiness and 
incompetence‟.740 The Chamber was complaining about diligence, not honesty. 
 The Furundžija formal complaint also demonstrates the second Nuremberg 
theme, namely, a lack of common ethical standards amongst counsel from divergent 
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national cultures. M
me
 Arbour, understandably, relied heavily upon the jurisprudence 
of her home jurisdiction of Canada in her analysis of the ethical issues.
741
 The two 
prosecutors concerned were English and American lawyers, each with its own 
national standards, to say nothing of the judges and defence counsel. In judicial 
proceedings with counsel from an even wider variety of national ethical cultures than 
the five present at Nuremberg, there is clearly difficulty in finding an „international 
judicial culture‟742 with basic ethical standards concerning matters like honesty, 
courtesy and diligence – to say nothing of even more contentious issues, such as 
conflicts of interest or client confession.  
 The ICTY has also engaged the third Nuremberg theme, namely, the principle 
of professional independence. For example, the decision by Chief Prosecutor Arbour 
to preliminarily investigate the alleged war crimes in the NATO bombing campaign 
of 1999 and her subsequent departure from her position gave rise to the question of 
political interference by UNSC Members in the activities of the OTP.
743
 A sensitive 
problem for defence counsel has been withdrawal of assigned counsel from 
representation of unwilling defendants.
744
 Such issues of professionalism formed a 
historical context in which the ICC was created. 
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7.2 ICC Prosecutors745 
Within that historical context, several of these issues have been addressed within the 
ICC framework to continue the progressive work of the ad hoc tribunals. Although 
the professional dichotomy between prosecutors and defence counsel has not yet been 
criticised, the role of the Prosecutor has been a topic of extensive debate since before 
the Rome Conference. This issue has been described as comprising two competing 
priorities: independence and accountability.
746
 On the one hand, there should be 
safeguards to ensure the Prosecutor‟s freedom from undue influence. On the other 
hand, there should be checks to preclude abuse of prosecutorial powers. The problem 
is how to strike the right balance between those two needs. 
 However, the regulatory dichotomy has been narrowed under the Rome 
Statute. As before the ICTY, defence counsel are subject to admission requirements, a 
code of conduct and disciplinary regime. However, unlike at the ICTY the Prosecutor 
and Deputy Prosecutor subject not only to admission requirements but are also 
professionally accountable to the Assembly of States Parties („ASP‟). Trial 
prosecutors are, subject to the Rome Statute, appointed, regulated and disciplined by 
the Prosecutor. Thus, the bifurcation between prosecutors and defence counsel 
remains, in that: 1) prosecutors are professionally self-regulating, subject to the 
Prosecutor‟s professional accountability to a political organ; and 2) whereas defence 
counsel are subject to prescribed ethical rules, prosecutors are not. Thus, it is evident 
that the second historical problem of divergent ethical standards also persists. 
Although the third problem of professional independence has not yet been evident in 
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practice, the ICC framework leaves open the possibility of future problems similar to 
those that have arisen before the ad hoc tribunals.  
 The principal theme that has emerged during the term of the first Prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina, has been the status of the Prosecutor and his 
hierarchical status vis-à-vis the judiciary. The Prosecutor has been criticised for 
overstepping his mandate as the OTP has clashed with Trial Chambers in Lubanga 
and other early trials and investigations. On the one hand, the judges with whom the 
OTP has collided as well as the Office‟s critics believe that the Prosecutor and his 
subordinates are counsel and, as „officers of the Court‟, are subordinate to the 
judiciary. On the other hand, the Prosecutor and others believe that the OTP, as an 
independent organ of the Court, is equal to the judges and consequently subordinate 
only to the ASP.  
 These diametrically opposed conceptions of the Prosecutor‟s fundamental role 
may be described as a tension between the competing interests of independence and 
accountability.
747
 In this context, the difficult problems encountered in Lubanga and 
other cases have illustrated the lack of prescribed ethical rules for prosecutors in their 
trial conduct. This regulatory void not only creates the problem of diverging ethical 
standards between prosecutors and defence counsel but also the danger of 
prosecutorial misconduct owing to a culture of self-accountability that prioritises 
convictions over fair trial.      
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7.2.1 Admission Requirements 
The Rome Statute does not expressly define the Prosecutor and his subordinates as 
„counsel‟.748 Compounding this textual vagueness are two complications: 1) the 
hybrid nature of the role in combining diverging common law and civil law functions; 
and 2) the accountability of the Prosecutor to the ASP, which in practice is largely 
nominal. The Court‟s early activity – in particular, the Lubanga trial – has witnessed a 
power struggle between the judiciary and the OTP for control over the trial process. 
Thus, professional standards for prosecutors are not only important for the underlying 
philosophy of the Court but have also repeatedly arisen in practice. 
 As the Court evolves, greater clarity concerning the fundamental role and 
professional duties of the Prosecutor and his deputies would considerably assist in 
preventing future conflicts. Is the Prosecutor a magistrate in the civil law tradition, an 
advocate in the common law tradition or some hybrid of the two? Since magistrates 
and advocates are subject to professional ethics and discipline under both systems, the 
question is not so much whether the Prosecutor ought to be subject to professional 
rules of conduct but rather how those rules should define his duties in light of his role 
in the ICC system. A supplementary question is whether the current disciplinary 
structure, in which the Prosecutor is accountable to the ASP and his deputies to him, 
is adequate. The early days of the Court suggest that these issues will continue to be 
highly topical and may well be considered for future reform.   
The admission requirements for the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors are 
prescribed in Article 42(3) of the Rome Statute: 
„The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons of high moral character, be 
highly competent in and have extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of 
criminal cases. They shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the 
working languages of the Court.‟ 
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Despite being legal „requirements‟, in practice they are exhortatory because the ASP 
could ignore them without the possibility of judicial review.
749
  Since the Prosecutor 
bears wider political and administrative responsibilities than trial counsel, his 
appointment by the ASP seems appropriate. However, it remains the case that the 
Prosecutor is not only the head of the OTP but is also vested with the power to 
perform procedural acts for the Prosecution
750
 and may also himself appear as trial 
counsel before the Court. To ensure that the requirements stipulated in Article 42(3) 
are observed, a useful reform has been the creation in 2011 of an ASP search 
committee for the nomination of the next Prosecutor.
751
 However, the composition of 
the committee (three diplomats and two government lawyers) is not independent and 
there is no judicial review mechanism for future elections as a check upon the election 
of an unqualified candidate by the ASP.
752
  
The requirement of „high moral character‟ is vague, though it has been 
described as „international law boilerplate for positions in judicial institutions‟.753 One 
possibility is that a candidate must have no record of dishonest or violent criminal 
offences. However, were a candidate to have committed a crime peculiar to one 
national jurisdiction, it would seem invidious to be thus disqualified. It is also 
questionable whether a candidate subject to ongoing criminal proceedings or alleged 
to have committed some lesser form of misconduct should be disqualified.  
The requirement that the Prosecutor be „highly competent in and have 
extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases‟ is also 
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vague, particularly in that it does not account for the managerial and political aspects 
of the role. The ICTY experience suggests that a variety of professional skills are 
required in the ideal candidate. Whilst the minimal requirement of ten years‟ 
experience in criminal trial work for defence counsel discussed below would be a 
rough starting-point, an additional requirement of experience as the head of a major 
prosecution office with political and media relations aspects would seem appropriate.  
Below the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor are trial prosecutors within the 
„Prosecutions Division‟ of the OTP.754 Article 42 of the Rome Statute provides: „The 
Prosecutor shall have full authority over the management and administration of the 
Office, including the staff facilities and other resources thereof.‟ This administrative 
autonomy was „a considerable departure from previous practice at both the ICTY and 
ICTR, where the Registry has sometimes been alleged to have slowed down the 
recruitment and staffing process.‟755 Article 44 requires the Prosecutor to appoint 
„such qualified staff as may be required‟ whilst ensuring „the highest standards of 
efficiency, competency and integrity‟ and having regard, mutatis mutandis, to 
„representation of the principal legal systems of the world‟, „equitable geographical 
representation‟, and „a fair representation of female and male [sexes]‟. The Prosecutor 
has paid particular attention to geography and gender in selecting his senior staff.
756
 
Whilst the Prosecutor has been described as having „a very wide margin of 
discretion‟ in his organisation of the OTP, this „is not totally unlimited since he has to 
respect the financial regulations and the staff regulations, which have been adopted by 
the Assembly of States Parties and…also provides for management oversight to the 
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Prosecutor.‟757 Although „management oversight‟ is prescribed by the Rome Statute 
and seems to envisage that the ASP may use „budgetary tools‟758 to check 
Prosecutorial appointments that is dislikes, this is not specifically aimed at providing 
quality control to staff. The OTP has not published a document that sets out the 
criteria by which the Prosecutor recruits trial prosecutors but the „selection criteria for 
prosecutorial counsel (especially at the higher levels) includes various levels of 
experience (ascending with the seniority of the post)‟ and some prosecutors are not 
members of national bars.
759
  
A significant omission from the current arrangement is detailed requirements 
for the appointment of trial prosecutors as opposed to investigators or other staff 
members. It is arguable that the current setup may be improved by prescribing 
external requirements as already exist for defence counsel (e.g. – membership of a 
national bar and criminal law expertise). However, it is conceivable that current 
prosecutors at the Office would resist the imposition of such requirements on the 
ground that a „legitimate expectation‟ has been created for them to be able to plead 
before the Court. This could be addressed by prescribing transitional arrangements 
and applying new standards to future intakes.    
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7.2.2 Ethical Standards 
The bifurcation between prosecutorial and defence counsel is evident in that there 
exists a code of conduct for the latter but not the former. A draft „Code of 
Professional Conduct for Prosecutors of the International Criminal Court‟760  was 
submitted in the early days of the Court but was never adopted. There is also a belief 
that as „international civil servants‟761 prosecutors are different from defence counsel: 
“The common sentiment in the Office is that, unlike the duties of defence counsel, prosecutors 
have duties of confidentiality imposed upon them upon joining the Office. The Prosecutor has 
adopted a middle road of imposing certain duties through the [OTP] Regulations in order to 
emphasise predictability, consistency and transparency as priorities.”762 
 
From the administrative perspective, prosecutors clearly differ from defence counsel 
in that they are more integrally a part of the Court.
763
 However, from the litigious 
perspective the Prosecution and Defence are strictly equal – requiring equal 
regulation.
764
  
In the absence of a code of conduct, prosecutors are bound only by the broad 
provisions of the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, which provides:  
„By accepting appointment, staff members pledge themselves to discharge their functions and 
regulate their conduct with the interest of the Court only in view. Loyalty to the aims, 
principles and purposes of the Court, as set forth in the Rome Statute, is a fundamental 
obligation of all staff members by virtue of their status as international civil servants.‟765 
  
However, this provision does not provide clarity concerning potential conflicts that 
may arise between the interests of the Court, ASP, victims, witnesses and procedural 
justice. This vagueness may be explained by a duality in the role of the Prosecutor 
whereby he may be considered a judge or a counsel. According to one commentator:  
„[M]ore or less the same standards are required of judges and prosecutors alike throughout the 
Rome Statute. This would seem to imply that the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors are 
considered to be judicial officers, possessing the same qualities and conduct as that of judges. 
In England and Wales, this would fit in with the notion of the prosecution counsel as an 
officer of the court whose task is to present the facts of the case, not to do his utmost to secure 
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a conviction and of whom independence and impartiality may be required. In other 
jurisdiction – for example the United States – the prosecutor, or district attorney, fulfils a more 
partisan role, however, and the notion that he must be impartial might be regarded as 
bizarre.‟766  
 
In a departure from the ad hoc tribunals, the Prosecutor is required to be neutral in the 
civil law tradition.
767
 During pre-trial investigations his duties resemble those of a 
juge d‟instruction who impartially investigates both incriminatory and exculpatory 
evidence.
768
 Adding to this confusion is the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber, which was 
originally created to be „the reasoned gatekeeper‟ for a „zealous‟ Prosecutor.769   
Whilst it may consequently appear logical to treat the Prosecutor as a judicial 
magistrate, a key difference is that he is not bound by the ICC Code of Judicial Ethics 
whereas, in France, prosecutors and juges d‟instruction are bound by judicial 
ethics.
770
 Additionally, early practice has followed the common law model of the 
Prosecution as partisan against of the accused.
771
 It is arguable that the conception of 
the Prosecutor as a neutral judge rather than a partial advocate during litigation is not 
realistic in that, having decided to indict, he is committed to seeking a conviction with 
no duty of continual review.
772
 Although an advocate may be required to be objective, 
a judge cannot be required to be partial.  
 
7.2.2.1 Discretion to Investigate and to Indict 
The discretion to investigate and to indict is one of the Prosecutor‟s most important 
powers. Criticism of the Prosecutor bringing a charge of genocide against President 
Omar al-Bashir of the Sudan demonstrates that the criteria in the exercise of this 
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discretion are sensitive and topical.
773
 The policy factors driving the exercise of the 
discretion and the process by which the decision is made are crucial in defining the 
fundamental philosophy of the Office. Concordantly, the absence of an ethical code 
defining precise limits is suggested to be a weakness in the Court‟s procedure.774  
Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute provides that „the Prosecutor shall…initiate 
an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed under this Statute‟. The Prosecutor must consider whether there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed within the Court‟s 
jurisdiction, the case would be admissible and „taking into account the gravity of the 
crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe 
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice‟. The same test applies for 
the discretion to prosecute under Article 53(2). Not only does the negative phrasing of 
Article 53 create a presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution by requiring 
the Prosecutor to justify any negative decision, but Article 53(3)(b) empowers a Pre-
Trial Chamber to review a negative decision if taken according to the „interests of 
justice‟ criterion.  
Although much of Article 53 is progressive, particularly the advent of judicial 
review of negative decisions, ambiguity remains.
775
 From the ethical perspective, the 
crucial issue is the decision-making process. There is a case for an ethical duty to 
consider only such apolitical factors as the sufficiency of the evidence and the law to 
support an investigation or indictment coupled with the concept of „gravity‟ to focus 
the necessarily limited resources of the Office upon the serious crimes that it was 
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created to pursue.
776
 Experience at Nuremberg and the modern ad hoc tribunals not 
only shows the need for prosecutorial independence from external pressure but the 
Prosecutor and his deputies could also face individual pressures to prioritise 
extraneous considerations over the merits (e.g. – re-election or re-appointment).  
The nature of international criminal prosecution necessarily engages a political 
dimension to refrain from pursuing suspects on the ground that it would derail 
reconciliation processes („the interests of peace‟). The Prosecutor, subject to judicial 
review, could decide not to investigate or prosecute in the „interests of justice‟. It is 
suggested that „justice‟ should take the meaning of procedural justice, namely, to 
promote the integrity of judicial proceedings and fair trial. The integrity of judicial 
proceedings necessarily entails the blindness of justice to political considerations. 
Equality before the law, as a component of the rule of law, demands that no one be 
exempted from investigation or prosecution. This commitment to consistent and 
impartial justice, the antithesis of political prosecutions or non-prosecutions, should 
be expressed not only as a legal duty but also as an ethical one.  
 
7.2.2.2 Documentary Evidence 
As before the ad hoc tribunals, both the scope and implementation of prosecutorial 
disclosure duties is a major issue before the Court. In the Lubanga trial, the first 
before the Court, the disclosure of confidential exculpatory evidence opposed the 
Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber to one another. The resulting standoff provoked 
criticism of the Prosecutor and general support for the Trial Chamber.
777
 Whilst the 
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lack of clearly-prescribed ethical duties for prosecutorial counsel have precluded 
discussion of the ethical duties of prosecutorial counsel, the language employed by 
the Trial Chamber in its criticism of the Prosecution supports the need for a 
prosecutorial code of conduct.  
In Lubanga, the accused was surrendered by the DRC government on 17 
March 2006 and made his first appearance before the Pre-Trial Chamber on 20 March 
2006. His trial commenced on 26 January 2009 – a span of 1,046 days in pre-trial 
detention. Even by the relatively slow standard of international criminal tribunals, 
such an extensive period of pre-trial detention arguably infringes the right of an 
accused to an expeditious trial „without undue delay‟.778 Whilst allowing for the fact 
that Lubanga is the Court‟s first trial, the disclosure dispute engaged not only equality 
of arms but also expeditious trial issues. The Prosecutor is required to „as soon as 
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in [his] possession or control which 
he…believes‟ to be exculpatory.779 This disclosure duty is subject to an exception by 
which the Prosecutor may enter into agreements not to disclose „documents or 
information that [he] obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information 
consents‟.780 The Trial Chamber is empowered to decide procedural matters during 
trial, such as ordering additional documentary disclosure.
781
  
 The principal cause for the delay to the Lubanga trial was the refusal by the 
Prosecution to disclose exculpatory documents because Article 54(3)(e) 
confidentiality agreements had been concluded with the UN and other organisations 
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in order to „protect staff members‟ working on the ground.782 On 10 June 2008, the 
Prosecution informed the Trial Chamber that 207 documents provided under such 
agreements had not been disclosed due to provider refusal.
783
 Although the 
Prosecution considered that certain documents could „in principle‟ materially impact 
upon the proceedings, it argued that there was „no doubt‟ that „in fact‟ they would 
not.
784
  
 Despite a judicial confidentiality undertaking, the providers refused to permit 
their disclosure to the Chamber to evaluate their exculpatory nature. The Prosecution 
proposed that, for 33 of the documents, it would evaluate their exculpatory effect 
following which „elements of information‟ would be disclosed without the actual 
documents.
785
 The Chamber rejected this proposal, noting that its effect would be to 
render it dependant upon the Prosecution‟s evaluation.786 Staying the trial, the 
Chamber held that the Prosecution‟s interpretation of Article 54(3)(e) was „broad and 
incorrect‟ because it had been used to gather „evidence “for use at trial” contrary to 
the provision‟s intended meaning of permitting confidentiality to gather “information 
or documents which are not for use at trial‟” and characterised it as „a wholesale 
and serious abuse‟ resulting in „the trial process [being] ruptured to such a degree that 
it is now impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial‟.787 
Following appellate confirmation of the stay, the Prosecution disclosed the documents 
and the stay was lifted.
788
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 The principal ethical issue concerns the handling of evidence in a manner that 
respects procedural justice. The need to protect informants is immaterial in that 
Article 54(3)(e) requires confidential documents to be used „solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence‟. Rather, the problem arose from a culture by which it was 
considered acceptable to use such agreements routinely to selectively adduce 
confidential documents as evidence whilst refusing to allow the Court to evaluate 
them.
789
 The need for judicial scrutiny is amplified by the fact that many documents 
were collated at second-hand by unprofessional persons,
790
 increasing the risk of 
mishandling. Another issue is the prosecutors‟ decision to resist the Chamber‟s 
disclosure orders and statutory role.
791
  
 
7.2.2.3 Testimonial Evidence 
Concerning the ethics of testimonial evidence, the problem of „witness proofing‟ has 
also arisen during the Lubanga trial.
792
 Despite the fact that this is an issue of 
procedural importance upon which there exist diverging national rules, it is absent 
from the ICC texts.
793
 Whilst the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers in Lubanga diverged 
from the practice of the ad hoc tribunals by prohibiting witness proofing as 
unacceptably hazardous to evidential integrity, the lack of precise rules governing 
counsel‟s contacts with witnesses remains a lacuna in the Court‟s procedure.  
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 In Lubanga, the Prosecution applied for leave to conduct „witness proofing‟ 
which it defined according to ICTY jurisprudence as the „practice whereby a meeting 
is held between a party to the proceedings and a witness, before the witness is due to 
testify in Court, the purpose of which is to re-examine the witness‟s evidence to 
enable more accurate, complete and efficient testimony.‟794 The Prosecution cited 
jurisprudence from major common law jurisdictions as well as that of the ad hoc 
tribunals. However, as the Trial Chamber noted, not only is there definitional 
variation amongst common law jurisdictions concerning witness proofing but no civil 
law jurisdiction was cited – thus precluding the existence of a „general principle based 
on established practice of national legal systems‟.795 Whilst the Chamber accepted 
that witness proofing as defined by the Prosecution was a generally accepted practice 
before the ad hoc tribunals, it did not consider itself bound by Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute to apply those precedents.
796
 
 The decision consequently turned upon policy arguments. The Prosecution 
submitted that witness proofing assists in the discovery of the truth by „furnishing all 
involved with a complete picture of the case‟ and enabling „a more accurate and 
efficient presentation of evidence.‟797 However, the Trial Chamber rejected the 
Prosecution‟s proposal to meet with the witness prior to testimony in order to discuss 
the topics to be dealt with in court and to show the witness exhibits for comments on 
the grounds that it would created an unavoidable danger of „rehearsal of in-court 
testimony‟ and „may diminish what would otherwise be helpful spontaneity during the 
giving of evidence by a witness‟ that „can be of paramount importance to the Court‟s 
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ability to find the truth‟.798 Thus, whilst allowing the practice of „witness 
familiarisation‟ the Trial Chamber prohibited the practice of „witness proofing‟ as 
defined by the Prosecution.
799
 
 The Lubanga decisions, by expressly rejecting the permissive policy of the ad 
hoc tribunals, have prompted a re-evaluation of the merits of pre-testimonial 
communication between counsel and witness in which the substance of the witness‟ 
testimony is reviewed. The ensuing debate has addressed not only the desirability of 
such contacts for the integrity of the judicial process but has only briefly examined the 
corresponding ethical issues.
800
 Leaving to one side the interpretation of the Rome 
Statute, on the policy arguments Karemaker and others on the one hand assert that the 
advantage of witness proofing (namely, ensuring completeness of testimonial 
evidence) outweighs the risk of improper influencing of evidence by counsel that may 
be mitigated by cross-examination, the judiciary and ethical rules prohibiting 
manipulation of evidence.
801
 Ambos, on the other hand, argues that the serious risks 
of manipulation involved in the witness proofing process outweigh the supposed 
benefits in that a distinction between „familiarisation‟ and „coaching‟ does not work in 
practice and mitigation of the risks is doubtful.
802
  
 The invocation by one side or the other of the ethical duties of counsel
803
 
prompts closer examination of those duties. The ICC instruments are silent on the 
issue, in addition to the ethical handling of witness statements, pre-testimonial 
communication, witness examination or extra-testimonial communication with a 
witness under oath. The Trial Chamber‟s decision in Lubanga was beneficial not only 
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in clarifying the terminology but also in emphasising the danger of a witness‟ 
evidence being improperly influenced by counsel and the need to preserve the 
spontaneity of witness interrogation in order to assess credibility. A „proofed‟ witness 
insulated from this and (intentionally or not) alerted to evidentiary weaknesses by 
counsel necessarily removes that possibility.
804
 Based upon this assumption, ethical 
rules should prohibit counsel from conducting pre-hearing rehearsal of testimony with 
a witness and any communication with a witness under oath. The common law rules 
upon leading, designed to preserve testimonial integrity, should be adopted. A general 
rule prohibiting counsel who has drafted the witness statement from later 
interrogating that witness may also be a useful safeguard. 
 
7.2.2.4 Loyalty 
In the Lubanga trial, on 28 January 2009 the first prosecution witness dramatically 
recanted upon his original statement by alleging that an intermediary for the 
Prosecution had coached his statement.
805
 However, when the witness resumed his 
testimony two weeks later following a break requested by the Prosecution, he 
affirmed his original statement and withdrew the allegations. At this stage, the 
principal issue appears to have been whether intermediary 321 had unduly influenced 
the witness‟ evidence. An ancillary ethical issue, assuming that the witness remained 
under oath during the two-week break, is what contacts prosecutors had with the 
witness in question. Although this was not an issue in Lubanga, in future cases it is 
potentially sensitive to allegations of counsel influencing a witness under oath 
(particularly where a witness dramatically changes his evidence) and is a matter upon 
which the ICC texts are silent. Whilst Laurel Baig of the ICTY Office of the 
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Prosecutor suggests that „the first witness in the first ICC trial…experienced a number 
of problems that might have been ameliorated if he had been better prepared by the 
prosecution‟,806 it may also be argued that the dangerous revelations of the first 
witness and others may never have been discovered if prosecutors had been allowed 
to coach him – thus vindicating the earlier decision on proofing.    
 Subsequently, another prosecution witness recanted upon his original 
statement and alleged that the OTP‟s intermediary coached him to change his 
testimony in order to „get rich‟.807 On 27 January 2010, the Defence in its opening 
statement declared that it would prove that the Prosecution‟s witnesses were 
manipulated into lying and were in fact never child soldiers.
808
 On 2 February, 
Defence witness Joseph Maki Dhera then testified that intermediary 321 had coached 
him to falsely claim that he was a child soldier in order to get money.
809
 The 
following day, the Trial Chamber instructed the Prosecution by email to provide it 
with „comprehensive information on all the intermediaries‟.810  
 Subsequently, a Defence witness and a recalled prosecution witness both 
alleged that intermediaries had sought to coach them to falsely claim that they were 
child soldiers by offering money and other incentives.
811
 On 15 March 2010, the Trial 
Chamber ordered disclosure of the names of the intermediaries to the Defence.
812
 
However, the Prosecution argued, inter alia, that that it had a duty of care toward its 
intermediaries and witnesses, that the risk of harm to the intermediaries and witnesses 
is high and that their identities should accordingly not be disclosed to the Defence 
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„unless there is the most pressing reason‟.813 It submitted that „any action by the Court 
that chills the ability of the Prosecution to protect their identities and securities will 
chill the Prosecution‟s ability to obtain assistance by other intermediaries in future 
cases.‟814 In response, the Defence emphasised the importance of the intermediaries‟ 
role to the defence case
815
 and submitted that disclosure of their identities would be 
unlikely to endanger the safety of those involved or impair the work of the OTP.
816
 
The Defence „contend[ed] that there is an issue as regards the intermediaries‟ 
commitment to the integrity of the judicial process and there needs to be a thorough 
investigation of their identities, any links with external authorities and their approach 
towards witnesses.‟817  
  The Trial Chamber, acknowledging that the intermediaries‟ issue had become 
important in the trial, held that there was a „real basis for concern as to the system 
employed by the prosecution for identifying potential witnesses‟ and that „there was 
extensive opportunity for the intermediaries, if they wished, to influence the witnesses 
as regards the statements they provided for the prosecution‟ so that „it would be unfair 
to deny the defence the opportunity to research this possibility with all the 
intermediaries used by the prosecution for the relevant witnesses in this trial, where 
the evidence justifies that course.‟818 The Chamber ordered the Prosecution to, inter 
alia, disclose the identity of intermediary 143 and call intermediaries 316 and 321.
819
 
 On 3 June 2010, the Trial Chamber was informed that the VWU was confident 
that it would be able to implement protective measures for intermediary 143 
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preparatory to identity disclosure.
820
 However, the intermediary subsequently changed 
his mind about the adequacy of the security arrangements.
821
 Following submissions, 
on 6 July 2010 the Trial Chamber ruled that disclosure be confidentially made to the 
Defence. The Prosecution „unsurprisingly immediately indicated that the Chamber‟s 
order was understood and would be implemented.‟822 On 7 July, the Chamber again 
ordered disclosure to be effected that day.
823
 The Prosecution did not comply with that 
order but instead applied to the Chamber to reconsider it on the basis that the 
Chamber‟s order would have placed intermediary 143 at risk of being killed.824 The 
Chamber rejected this application and re-ordered disclosure.  
The Prosecution, again not complying with the Order, filed an urgent 
application to delay the time-limit for disclosure or alternatively stay the proceedings 
in which it argued that it the OTP had an autonomous duty under the Rome Statute to 
protect witnesses and that „the Prosecution considers it indispensable that prior to any 
disclosure being effected, the Prosecution be satisfied that it is acting in compliance 
with it specific duties under the Statute and the Rules.‟825 The Prosecutor declared: 
„The Prosecution is sensitive to its obligation to comply with the Chamber‟s instructions. 
However, it also has an independent statutory obligation to protect persons put at risk on 
account of the Prosecutor‟s actions. It should not comply, or be asked to comply, with an 
Order that may require it to violate its separate statutory obligation by subjecting the person to 
foreseeable risk. The Prosecutor accordingly has made a determination that the Prosecution 
would rather face adverse consequences in its litigation than expose a person to risk on 
account of prior interaction with this Office. This is not a challenge to the authority of the 
Chamber, it is instead a reflection of the Prosecution‟s own legal duty under the Statute.‟826 
 
The Prosecutor suggested that his Office was „torn between competing obligations‟ 
and that it was endeavouring to resolve the dilemma by obtaining an expeditious 
response from the VWU „to make sure that measures are in place that will protect all 
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interests in the proceedings‟.827 On 8 July, the VWU informed the Trial Chamber that 
the disclosure of intermediary 143‟s identity did not threaten his safety.828 
 The Trial Chamber considered that the Prosecution believed that it had an 
autonomous power to comply with or disregard Chamber orders depending upon its 
own interpretation of its duties under the Rome Statute.
829
 The Chamber found that 
Article 68 of the Rome Statute obliged the Prosecutor to take protective measures 
whilst investigating and prosecuting crimes but that „those responsibilities do not give 
him licence, or discretion, or autonomy to disregard judicial orders because he 
considers the Chamber‟s decision is inconsistent with his interpretation of his 
obligations.‟830 It held: 
„No criminal court can operate on the basis that whenever it makes an order in a particular 
area, it is for the Prosecutor to elect whether or not to implement it, depending on his 
interpretation of his obligations. The judges, not the Prosecutor, decide on protective measures 
during the trial, once the Chamber is seized of the relevant issue…These are issues for the 
Court, and the Court alone, to determine, having heard submissions and having considered all 
the information the judges consider necessary and relevant. The Prosecutor now claims a 
separate authority which can defeat the orders of the Court, and which thereby involves a 
profound, unacceptable and unjustified intrusion into the role of the judiciary.   
 
[…] 
 
Therefore, the Prosecutor has elected to act unilaterally in the present circumstances, and he 
declines to be “checked” by the Chamber, In these overall circumstances, it is necessary to 
stay these proceedings as an abuse of the process of the Court because of the material non-
compliance with the Chamber‟s orders of 7 July 2010, and more generally, because of the 
Prosecutor‟s clearly evinced intention not to implement the Chamber‟s orders…Whilst these 
circumstances endure, the fair trial of the accused is no longer possible, and justice cannot be 
done, not least because the judges will have lost control of a significant aspect of the trial 
proceedings as provided under the Rome Statute framework.‟831  
 
On 9 July, the Trial Chamber issued the following warning: 
„Under Rule 171 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, we hereby give the Prosecutor and 
the Deputy Prosecutor an oral warning of sanctions in the event of any continuing breach of 
our orders; the Deputy Prosecutor on 8 July 2010 having identified those members of the Bar 
as the individuals responsible for the refusal to comply with the Chamber's orders.‟832 
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The reference to „members of the Bar‟ is intriguing, since it identifies the Prosecutor 
and Deputy Prosecutor as counsel before the Trial Chamber. On 15 July, the Chamber 
ordered the unconditional release of the accused, finding that the uncertainty over trial 
resumption and the length of custody made it unfair to continue to hold him.
833
  
On 8 October 2010, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber‟s 
decisions to stay the proceedings and release the accused. In his appeal against that 
decision, the Prosecutor argued, inter alia, that „he did not refuse to comply with the 
orders of the Court but instead exercised rights available to him as a party‟834 and that 
the Trial Chamber „erred by concluding that it has a monopoly of protective 
functions.‟835 The Appeals Chamber observed: 
„The Prosecutor‟s non-compliance was deliberate. The Appeals Chamber finds that such 
wilful non-compliance constituted a clear refusal to implement the orders of the Chamber. To 
characterise such wilful non-compliance as anything other than refusal, as the Prosecutor does 
in his Document in Support of the Appeal, is, at best, disingenuous. At worst, it is an 
expression of what the Trial Chamber correctly described as “a more profound and enduring 
concern”, namely that the Prosecutor may decide whether or not to implement the Trial 
Chamber‟s orders depending on his interpretation of his obligations under the Statute.‟836 
 
However, the Appeals Chamber found that the imposition of a stay was an unjustified 
remedy in that the Trial Chamber should have first used sanctions under Article 71 of 
the Statute, the purpose of which „is not merely, as the Prosecutor suggests, to punish 
the offending party, but also to bring about compliance.‟837  
 On the same day, the OTP „by courtesy‟ disclosed the identity of intermediary 
143 to the Defence.
838
 It also, in its view, effected full disclosure compatible with the 
Trial Chamber‟s 12 May decision though this was disputed by the Defence.839 
Presiding Judge Fulford invited the parties to resolve the disclosure issues amongst 
themselves in the first instance and specifically invited the Prosecution to consider 
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meeting the Defence requests on a courtesy basis.
840
 He also declared that, following 
the Appeals Chamber judgment, „nothing more [would] be said or done about‟ the 
Rule 171 warning.
841
  
On 7 March 2011, the Trial Chamber rejected a Defence application for a 
permanent stay of the proceedings and immediate release of the accused due to 
prosecutorial abuse of process arising from its use of the intermediaries was rejected 
by the Trial Chamber.
842
 It found that the Defence accusations even „taken at their 
highest‟ were insufficient to meet the legal test that it would be „repugnant‟ or 
„odious‟ to continue the trial.843 However, it specifically reserved its definitive 
findings concerning the allegations that the Prosecution „failed in its duty to ensure 
that it was submitting reliable evidence‟ for the end of the proceedings.844 
 In assessing this aspect of the Lubanga trial, two distinct ethical issues arise: 
1) obeying the orders of the Trial Chamber; and 2) protecting the integrity of 
evidence. The alleged failures by prosecutors to protect the integrity of their 
testimonial evidence through the use of intermediaries are difficult to ethically assess 
due to the lack of a prescribed standard. The battle of wills between the Trial 
Chamber and the Prosecutor and the Prosecutor‟s assertion of an „autonomous duty‟ 
overriding his duty to implement judicial orders is a manifestation of the Prosecutor‟s 
ambiguous role. However, the Trial Chamber‟s appellation of the Prosecutor as 
counsel is the more convincing because the Prosecutor‟s approach would endanger 
the neutrality of the trial process by undermining the authority of the judges.  
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7.2.2.5 Media Statements 
Another issue that has arisen has been the propriety of public statements made by 
prosecutors to the press concerning pending proceedings. This is a topic that is not 
specifically addressed in any of the ICC instruments (apart from confidentiality 
provisions
845
). It is also one upon which national approaches significantly diverge. 
For example, rule 3.6(a) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 2005 provides:   
„A lawyer who is participating in or has participated in a criminal or civil matter shall not 
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be 
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.‟ 
 
Additionally, rule 3.8(f) of the Model Rules states: 
„[E]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the 
prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making 
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation 
of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement 
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal 
case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from 
making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.‟ 
 
Thus, the ABA Model Rules clearly provide a stricter standard for prosecutors than 
for defence counsel. This is likely due to a perceived need to restrain prosecutors from 
conducting „media trials‟846 of an accused.   
The English Bar Code of Conduct, more broadly, provides: „A barrister must 
not in relation to any anticipated or current proceedings or mediation in which he is 
briefed or expects to appear or has appeared as an advocate express a personal opinion 
to the press or other media or in any other public statement upon the facts or issues 
arising in the proceedings.‟847 Neither the CCBE Code of Conduct nor the French 
Code de procedure pénale nor the Règlement Intérieur du Barreau de Paris address 
the issue. However, the Brussels Order has frowned upon interviews given by avocats 
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concerning their cases and, in a specific resolution, prescribed strict circumstances in 
which avocats may communicate with the press on public acts of procedure.
848
 
 Thus, the position of statements to the media about ongoing proceedings in 
national ethical codes seemingly ranges from the silent (in France) to the very detailed 
(in the USA). There is consequently a lack of uniformity amongst national 
jurisdictions about the permissibility of media statements so that an international 
judicial standard needs to be found. In the criminal context, this is particularly 
relevant because of the gravity of the alleged crimes and the potential consequences to 
human rights. In the Lubanga trial, the Trial Chamber has disapproved of media 
statements made by prosecutors. Early in the trial, Presiding Judge Fulford „gave a 
very firm indication that the Judges did not expect to see satellite litigation in the 
press with the issues which we are considering being the subject of some kind of 
debate, with commentators on one or both sides seeking to litigate the issues in this 
trial in a different forum‟ and indicated „that this is an inappropriate activity, 
particularly for the Prosecutor to undertake‟.849  
However, on 17 March 2010 the Trial Chamber had occasion to address an 
interview given by Ms Béatrice Le Fraper Du Hellen (then head of the Jurisdiction, 
Complementarity and Cooperation Division of the OTP).
850
 A central theme of that 
interview, with reference to the emerging issue of the intermediaries, was „that the 
intermediaries are very committed persons who are very supportive of international 
justice.‟851 The Trial Chamber took issue with several specific comments.852 For 
example, concerning the intermediaries, she remarked that „they are fantastic and 
committed people…I do not think that we should try to affect the reputation of those 
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intermediaries.‟853 Addressing the possibility (later eventuated) of a defence abuse-of-
process application, she said:  
„There was absolutely no abuse of process. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo is a very accurate and 
fair prosecutor…So this is just talk…I understand the defence entirely…it‟s their last chance 
but nothing is going to happen. Mr Lubanga is going away for a long time.‟854 
 
Concerning the child witnesses heard in closed session, she commented: 
„But Lubanga knows who they are, and frankly I am amazed at the courage of the children. 
They actually were in the courtroom with Lubanga and you know, Mr Lubanga, he is making 
signs to the audience, he is smiling, he is doing a lot of body language – it is very terrifying 
for the children to testify in front of him. So they have been very courageous but we definitely 
cannot show their identities to the public.‟ 
 
The Trial Chamber, declaring itself to be “extremely disturbed” by the interview, 
directed the Prosecution to serve all evidence upon which “those very clear and 
unequivocal indications” of the intermediaries‟ characters were based, comment upon 
the propriety of her comment that „Mr Lubanga is going away for a long time‟ in light 
of the Trial Chamber‟s role in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused and 
the sentence (if any) that he should receive and adduce evidence to sustain her 
extrajudicial allegation that the accused had been behaving in a way „terrifying for 
children‟ in the courtroom – reflecting, in the Trial Chamber‟s view, upon its own 
handling of the trial.
855
 
 The Prosecution denied that it had a fresh disclosure obligation arising out of 
the interview remarks on the intermediaries and that „the Rome Statute does not 
prevent either party from making the kind of comments in issue.‟856 In particular, it 
„argued that the Bench, unlike a jury, is unlikely to be influenced by remarks of the 
kind that were made.‟857 On the matter of the accused‟s courtroom conduct, the 
Prosecution averred that „Ms Le Fraper du Hellen did not suggest that the accused had 
deliberately taken steps to terrify the witnesses, but instead she merely observed that 
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they had been courageous notwithstanding having to testify in his presence‟ and 
accepted that the accused had not behaved in a way that called for judicial censure.
858
 
It asserted that it would be unacceptable to „hamper the Office of the Prosecutor‟s 
ability to affirm publicly its moral authority to perform its role‟, „there are no legal 
reason to require silence by the Prosecution in the face of public attacks against its 
repute‟ and that „when [its] integrity is publicly attacked‟ by an abuse of process 
application it is entitled to publicly respond.
859
 
On 12 May 2010, the Trial Chamber issued a written decision on the 
interview. It observed that „none of the provisions of the Rome Statue framework 
address the relationship between the parties and the press, and public statements 
outside the courtroom are in this sense unregulated.‟860 After describing the general 
principle of public trials, which for security reasons had been displaced to a „very 
considerable‟ extent in the Lubanga trial, the Trial Chamber observed: 
„Most particularly in these circumstances, the public needs to be able to trust the published 
statements of those involved in the case, as reflecting, in a suitably balanced way, the 
evidence that has been heard and the decisions that have been made. It is important that in 
media statements there is a clear and accurate description as to whether issues that are 
reported have been decided or are still unresolved. Most importantly, and as a matter of 
professional ethics, a party to proceedings is expected not to misrepresent the evidence, to 
misdescribe the functions of the parties or the Chamber, or to suggest or imply without proper 
foundation that anyone in the case, including the accused, has misbehaved.‟861 
 
After finding that „in essence, the prosecution has accepted that it should abide by 
these principles‟, the Chamber declared that „respecting the Chamber, the judicial 
process and the other participants involves speaking publicly about the proceedings in 
a fair and accurate way, and avoiding any comment about issues that are for the 
Chamber to determine.‟862 The Chamber found that Ms Le Fraper du Hellen‟s 
remarks during the press interview „breached these restrictions in a manner that is 
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prejudicial to the ongoing proceedings (in the sense that they tend to prejudice the 
public‟s understanding of the trial), which tends to bring the Court into disrepute.‟863 
Finally, the Chamber declared: 
„The Chamber is wholly uninfluenced by these misleading and inaccurate remarks, but it 
deprecates the prosecution‟s use of a public interview, first, to misrepresent the evidence and 
to comment on its merits and weight, and including by way of remarks on the credibility of its 
own witnesses in the context of a trial where much of the evidence has been heard in closed 
session with the public excluded; second, to express views on matters that are awaiting 
resolution by the Chamber, thereby intruding into the latter‟s role; third, to criticise the 
accused without foundation; and, finally, to purport to announce how the Chamber will 
resolve the submissions on the abuse of process application, and, moreover, that the accused 
will be convicted in due course and sentenced to lengthy imprisonment at the end of the case. 
 
Although on this occasion the Chamber does not intend to take any action beyond expressing 
its strongest disapproval of the content of this interview, if objectionable public statements of 
this kind are repeated the Chamber will not hesitate to take appropriate action against the party 
responsible.‟ 
 
Ms Le Fraper du Hellen left her position within three weeks of these comments.
864
  
However, the matter of public statements arose again in the Lubanga trial. The 
Defence complained that a novel published by Mr Gil Courtemanche (a consultant for 
the OTP from April 2008 to November 2009) called Un lizard au Congo which 
allegedly „call[ed] into question the rights of the accused and the entire judicial 
process, including the Judges of the Chamber.‟865 The Defence asserted that the fact 
that the author was an OTP consultant and „worked very closely with Mr Ocampo, for 
whom he drafted numerous speeches, and that in addition this book talks not about Mr 
Lubanga but about Mr Kabanga and that this individual is the first accused before the 
ICC and that the charges levelled against him are exactly the same as those levelled 
against the Accused‟ breached the Prosecution‟s duty of impartiality.866 In response, 
the Prosecution contended that the complaint, against „a work of fiction‟ written in a 
private capacity, was „frivolous‟ and „a catastrophic waste of Court time.‟867 Whilst 
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the Trial Chamber found that the publication of the novel did not meet the test of 
„odious‟ or „repugnant‟ to justice for a permanent stay of proceedings, it did not at 
that time make any merits findings.
868
 
 Other media statements by OTP members have been criticised for breaching 
the Prosecutor‟s duty of impartiality by prejudging facts or guilt in pending 
investigations or encroaching upon Trial Chambers‟ function to determine the guilt or 
innocence of an accused.  For example, comments at the outset of investigations have 
definitively referred to „the crimes committed‟ rather than „alleged crimes‟.869 The 
Prosecutor has also been criticised for media statements concerning the Kenya 
situation, such as his remark that “in the next year and a half, there are 15 elections in 
Africa…Kenya will send a signal to all these elections: if you commit crimes, you go 
to The Hague”.870 The Kenyan government reportedly wrote to the UNSC to request a 
deferral to the trials on the ground that the Prosecutor had stigmatised the so-called 
„Ocampo Six‟ by naming them publicly before the pre-trial confirmation hearing.871 
As the Pre-Trial Chamber observed: 
„The Chamber is cognizant of the concerns of the Applicant with respect to the prejudice 
suffered due to the public disclosure of his name made by the Prosecutor. However, the 
Chamber is not of the view that such publicity caused could ground a construction of the 
proceedings of article 58 of the Statute in adversarial terms, contrary to the legal instruments 
of the Court. While it is not the Chamber‟s role to comment and advise the Prosecutor on his 
interaction with the press and media, the Chamber nevertheless is concerned if his actions 
have the potential to affect the administration of justice and the integrity of the present 
proceedings before the Chamber. In this respect, the Chamber expresses its deprecation 
regarding the Prosecutor‟s course of action in the present case, as it has unduly exposed the 
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Applicant to prejudicial publicity before a determination of the Chamber pursuant to article 58 
of the Statute has even been made.‟872 
 
An article
873
 published in the British newspaper The Guardian on 15 July 2010 (three 
days after the Pre-Trial Chamber‟s „Second Decision on the Prosecution‟s Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest‟) about the Darfur situation has formed the basis for legal 
challenges to the indictments against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. In that 
article, the Prosecutor wrote: 
„The genocide is not over. Bashir's forces continue to use different weapons to commit 
genocide…the court found that Bashir's forces have raped on a mass scale in Darfur. They 
raped thousands of women and used these rapes to degrade family and community members. 
Parents were forced to watch as their daughters were raped. 
 
The court also found that Bashir is deliberately inflicting on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
ethnic groups living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction… He has 
officially denied the genocide, the rapes, the camp conditions and his responsibility for 
them… He is also laying the groundwork for new crimes against Darfuris and against the 
south of Sudan. Bashir used Ahmad Harun, as minister of state for the interior, to co-ordinate 
genocidal attacks on villages; he later used Harun, as minister of state for humanitarian affairs, 
to control genocidal conditions in the camps. Harun's current role as governor of South 
Kordofan could indicate an intention to continue using him as a future crimes co-ordinator.‟ 
The ad hoc defence counsel assigned by the Court for the accused applied to the Pre-
Trial Chamber for an order condemning the Prosecutor‟s statements and „taking 
appropriate measures concerning the Prosecutor‟ on the ground that the Prosecutor 
had irreparably prejudiced a fair trial of the accused by declaring that the accused was 
already guilty of the alleged crimes before he had been tried for them, thus, inter alia, 
violating his duty of impartiality towards the accused and undermining the legitimacy 
and credibility of the Court.
874
 This application was declared inadmissible by a single 
judge for falling outside the scope of the functions of the ad hoc defence counsel.
875
 
Another application by the „Office of Public Counsel for the Defence‟ also failed.876 
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These criticisms demonstrate the potential for unregulated matters of 
professional ethics to seriously affect the integrity of judicial proceedings. The 
propriety of extra-judicial public statements by counsel is an issue upon which the 
ICC instruments are silent and yet have arisen repeatedly and in a serious way. The 
challenges raised by defence counsel and the criticisms made by judges and 
commentators of the Prosecutor‟s recourse to media statements illustrates the dangers 
of such comments – particularly for the Prosecutor because of his judicial duty of 
impartiality during the investigative phase. It may be argued that there is a need for 
clear ethical rules and a strict standard concerning media comments (particularly in 
light of national differences).  
 
7.2.3 Disciplinary Jurisdiction 
The disciplinary regime for prosecutors is complex and reflects several competing 
priorities. First and foremost, there is a sensitivity concerning the mutual 
independence of each of the organs of the Court. Secondly, there is an acknowledged 
need for public confidence in the disciplinary process to preclude allegations of 
conflict of interest or bias. Thirdly, a distinction is drawn between the Prosecutor and 
Deputy Prosecutor – as elected officials – and trial counsel, as appointed staff, in their 
accountability. Following the creation by the ASP of the „independent oversight 
mechanism‟ („IOP‟) in 2010, investigative jurisdiction for misconduct by elected 
officials and appointed staff is vested in a single organ. However, disciplinary 
jurisdiction remains split whereby the Prosecutor is accountable to the ASP whilst 
trial prosecutors are accountable to him.   
 Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, there exists an external disciplinary system for the 
Prosecutor which makes him professionally accountable to the ASP. However, this 
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accountability has been, in practice, largely nominal.
877
  Whilst the role of the ASP in 
the appointment and removal of the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor has a clear 
rationale in that both offices are politically important and also have considerably 
wider responsibilities attached to them than those of trial counsel, its power to impose 
disciplinary sanctions for professional misconduct arising from their functions as 
counsel is problematic because the ASP is not a professional but a political body.  
Three sanctions may be applied to the Prosecutor on an absolute majority of 
the ASP on any combination according to seriousness: 1) reprimand; 2) fine; and 3) 
removal from office.
878
 There are also detailed procedural rights for the Prosecutor, 
though no right of appeal.
879
 Whilst Articles 24 and 25 of the Rules provide examples 
of „less serious‟880 and „serious‟881 misconduct, the language is broad. The legitimacy 
of disciplinary sanctions is potentially diluted because there is no prior notice of the 
precise ethical standards to be applied. For example, the application of disciplinary 
sanctions to the Prosecutor or his subordinates for extrajudicial media statements 
prejudicing the integrity of the judicial process would be open to the criticism of 
arbitrariness because there are no rules prescribing precise professional standards 
regulating such statements.  
 The second disciplinary system concerns trial counsel within the Prosecution 
Division, who are accountable to the Prosecutor.
882
 This system of internal discipline, 
as illustrated by the Furundžija case discussed above,883 creates potential problems of 
conflict of interest, transparency and fairness. The outsourcing of the investigation in 
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that case reflects the sensitivity of the head of the Office disciplining her subordinates, 
which is arguably a latent conflict of interest. 
An investigation of the Prosecutor for sexual misconduct and the Prosecutor‟s 
summary dismissal of the whistleblower revealed problems within the disciplinary 
system. On 20 October 2006, Mr Christian Palme (then an OTP Media Relations 
Officer) filed an internal complaint against the Prosecutor in which he alleged with 
corroborating evidence that he had committed rape and requested his removal from 
office.
884
 The Presidency appointed a panel to determine whether the complaint was 
„manifestly unfounded‟. The panel considered the complaint in camera and 
interviewed the alleged victim and the Prosecutor – who both „firmly denied the 
allegations‟885 – and produced a confidential report.886 On 8 December 2006, the 
Presidency accepted the panel‟s recommendation that the internal complaint be set 
aside as manifestly unfounded and ordered the surrender for destruction all the 
corroborating evidence.
887
  
On 13 April 2007, the Prosecutor summarily dismissed the complainant for 
serious misconduct in having „falsely alleged, with obvious malicious intent, to 
damage the professional and personal reputation of the Prosecutor‟.888 A Disciplinary 
Advisory Board recommended reversal of the dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that 
it was procedurally flawed due to the Prosecutor‟s participation. However, the 
Prosecutor confirmed his decision to summarily dismiss because „the fact that the 
“serious misconduct concerned [him] personally [was] not enough to call into 
question his impartiality” and that there was „an obvious malicious intent‟ to damage 
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the Prosecutor‟s reputation.889 On 9 July 2008, an ILO Administrative Tribunal found 
that the complainant had not acted maliciously and that the Prosecutor had violated „a 
fundamental aspect of due process that a person should not take a decision in a matter 
in which he or she has a personal interest.‟890 It set aside the decision and awarded 
compensation and „moral damages‟ of 25,000 euros plus costs.891  
This case demonstrated the need for external investigation and judgement of 
alleged misconduct in order to ensure the observance of fundamental fair trial 
principles. On 4 December 2008, the Bureau of the ASP appointed a facilitator to 
report upon the issue of establishing an „independent oversight mechanism‟ for the 
staff members of the Court.
892
 With the assistance of a Working Group, the facilitator 
reported: 
„There was agreement on the merit of establishing an enhanced professional  investigative 
capacity situated within the Court‟s existing internal disciplinary structures, since 
investigations conducted by staff members not professionally trained for this function could 
compromise the legitimacy of the process, especially given that their recommendations  could 
lead to summary dismissals.‟893 
 
On 26 November 2009, the ASP adopted a resolution to create an „independent 
oversight mechanism‟ („IOM‟) based upon Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute with a 
„professional investigative unit‟ to operate „in support of the existing disciplinary 
structures of the Court to conduct investigations on allegations of misconduct and to 
ensuring effective and meaningful oversight thereof.‟894 On 10 December 2010, the 
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ASP adopted a resolution on the IOM setting out its framework to investigate reports 
of misconduct by elected officials, staff and contractors.895   
 The aim of the IOM is to promote the legitimacy of the disciplinary process by 
transferring investigative powers to an independent body created for the purpose. 
Given the criticisms which may be made about the disciplinary proceedings 
concerning the Prosecutor and Mr Palme, this effort would appear to be justified. 
However, the reforms have not been wholly welcomed by the Prosecutor, who has 
perceived the IOM as an interference with his authority over the Office: 
„I welcome the possibility to have a tool to investigate misconduct of the Office‟s staff. 
However, the IOM mandate proposed includes the possibility to replace the authority of the 
Prosecutor to start investigations and provides it for the IOM, a subsidiary body of the ASP. 
This proposal creates the risk of undue interference with the judicial activities of the Office. 
As explained in our legal memoranda, the Statute establishes that the Prosecutor is 
accountable before the Assembly, and to protect their independent work, the Office staff is 
under the full authority of the Prosecutor. …As a matter of policy, the Office never received 
an explanation as to why the Prosecutor could be trusted to investigate Heads of State, but not 
to investigate the staff of the Office.‟896 
 
In light of the experiences in Furundžija and Palme, it is arguable that the external 
enforcement of a prescribed prosecutorial code of conduct (or, better still, the 
extension of the existing Code of Conduct to prosecutorial counsel, as at the SCSL) 
instead of the status quo of self-regulation. Additionally, the generality of the 
confidentiality rule on disciplinary proceedings is problematic in that there is a public 
interest, as well as those of concerned parties, in knowing the details of such 
investigations. The general rule should be one of transparency with discretion to 
preserve confidentiality in exceptional cases and to the minimum necessary.  
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7.2.4  Double Deontology 
The problem of double deontology, or conflicts between the prescriptive and 
disciplinary jurisdictions of national bars and international courts, does not at first 
sight appear to arise concerning the conduct of prosecutorial counsel owing to their 
status as „international civil servants‟. However, it is conceivable that members of the 
Prosecution Division who are also members of national bars may face double 
deontology were they to be subjected to a complaint at their home bar concerning 
their conduct at the Court. There is no mechanism available to solve such problems, 
whether for conflicts between prescriptive or disciplinary jurisdictions.  
By contrast, some attempt has been made to address the issue for defence 
counsel. For prescriptive conflicts, the Code provides that it prevails „in respect of the 
practice and professional ethics of counsel when practising before the Court.‟897 
However, this does not ensure that national bars that have reserved extraterritorial 
applicability of their own ethical rules
898
 respect this provision. As seen in the Taylor 
and Milošević trials, for example, English barristers have on multiple occasions 
ignored supremacy clauses in international codes of conduct by invoking national 
rules to justify their conduct. On the other hand, the Code does not follow the ICTY 
approach in providing mitigation for counsel acting pursuant to their national rules 
who infringe the ICTY Code.
899
  
Concerning conflicts of disciplinary jurisdiction, the Code states that its 
disciplinary regime „…is without prejudice to the disciplinary powers of any other 
disciplinary authority that may apply to counsel subject to this Code.‟900 Whilst one 
may think it obvious that the ICC can do nothing to prevent national bars from 
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asserting a parallel jurisdiction, it is conceivable that the Court could invoke parties‟ 
general duty of cooperate by making a request that national governments take 
measures to abolish that jurisdiction.
901
 A useful provision is that the ad hoc members 
of ICC Disciplinary Boards serve as contact points with the relevant national bars for 
communication and consultation.
902
  The Code provides that Disciplinary Boards shall 
suspend their own proceedings pending the completion of ongoing national 
proceedings unless: 1) the national bar does not respond to communications with the 
ad hoc member within a „reasonable time‟; 2) the Disciplinary Board considers that 
the information received is not satisfactory; or 3) the Disciplinary Board considers 
that, in light of the information received, the national bar is unable or unwilling to 
conclude the disciplinary procedure.
903
  
Thus, in attempting to resolve the problem of conflicting national and 
international disciplinary jurisdictions, the Code seemingly gives first pass to national 
bars to apply their own disciplinary procedure whilst reserving its own. This is 
problematic because the ICC is better-placed both geographically and technically to 
speedily and effectively conduct disciplinary hearings. It will in most cases have 
better access to the requisite evidence and be able to better contextualise the 
allegations owing to greater familiarity with its own procedures. Moreover, the 
provisions preserve the conflict of jurisdiction because the Board‟s acceptance of the 
national bars‟ decisions is subject to its own evaluation. This preserves the possibility 
of counsel being subject to conflicting disciplinary jurisdictions, judging according to 
diverging standards. This is clearly a systemic weakness that promotes uncertainty 
and vagueness.  
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902
 ICC Code, Art. 38(2). 
903
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One concrete example of the double deontology problem in practice arose at 
the ICTY when the Serbian Bar Association („SBA‟) ordered all of its members, 
including those appearing before the Tribunal, to strike over a taxation dispute with 
the Serbian government.
904
 Serbian defence counsel were understandably reluctant to 
appear before the ICTY due to the threat of disciplinary proceedings, which would 
paradoxically affect their continued good standing before the ICTY itself.
905
 
Consequently, the two counsel concerned failed to appear before the Trial Chamber. 
Although the temporarily assigned counsel proposed that the Tribunal remind Serbia 
of its duty of cooperation under Article 29 of the ICTY Statute as well as the 
supremacy of the ICTY Code of Conduct and order the defence counsel to appear,
906
 
the Chamber decided to temporarily allow counsel to withdraw until the strike 
elapsed.
907
 As one of the judges relates: 
„I recall that in the Stanisić and Zupljanin cases in November 2009, the Serbian counsel 
applied to withdraw because their home bar had instructed them that they were going on strike 
due to a dispute about legal pay with the Serbian Government. Any lawyer who did not go on 
strike was threatened with disbarment. The Chamber told counsel that this was unacceptable 
because a private body does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction to impose such an order. 
Counsel telephoned Belgrade requesting permission to continue but were ordered to strike or 
be disbarred. The Tribunal decided to accept their temporary resignation for one or two days 
and appointed standby counsel, Mr Karim Khan, for the interim period. However, the Tribunal 
expressly refused to allow its trials to be stopped just because of a Serbian strike. Not only did 
the Tribunal not accept the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Serbian bar, but it also 
considered that the right of the accused to counsel could not be disturbed by reasons foreign to 
the appearance of the particular counsel before the Tribunal. Conduct considered to be 
unethical under the Serbian Code would engage the jurisdiction of the Serbian Bar 
Association but only insofar as conduct is concerned – any other matter would not be 
acceptable to the Tribunal.‟908  
 
Although the Chamber doubted it could take practical action against a private entity 
such as the SBA, it is possible that it could have invoked its contempt powers.
909
 
Regardless, the case illustrates the difficulty of the double deontology problem not 
only for the international tribunal concerned but for the counsel caught in the middle.  
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 Zupljanin, Transcript (10 November 2009), p.2846. 
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 Ibidem, p. 2842, 2845-2846. 
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 Ibidem, pp. 2842-2843. 
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 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 77(A)(v). 
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7.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated some of the principal themes concerning counsel ethics 
before international criminal tribunals, particularly the ICC. In certain respects, the 
ICC regulatory system concerning counsel is considerably more developed than was 
the case at Nuremberg. However, there remain a bifurcation between prosecutors and 
defence counsel, lack of common ethical standards and independence issues.  
 Most of the early ethical issues that have arisen thus far have concerned 
prosecutors. Imprecise definition of the fundamental role of the Prosecutor, whether 
as investigating magistrate or as advocate or a hybrid of the two, has caused 
considerable difficulties in the Lubanga trial and elsewhere. On the one hand, the 
Prosecutor considers himself to be a judge of equal standing with the members of the 
Chambers. On the other hand, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga has treated him as a 
counsel of equal standing with defence counsel. It is suggested that the battle of wills 
that has arisen in the early days of the ICC between the two may be attributed to the 
lack of precision concerning the Prosecutor and, in particular, to the lack of clear 
ethical rules governing his conduct.  
 The bifurcation between prosecutors and defence counsel is also connected to 
the divergent ethical standards between them. Although the Code of Conduct for 
defence counsel is an incomplete and imprecise document, there are no externally-
prescribed ethical rules for prosecutorial counsel at the ICC level that deal with the 
nuanced issues of forensic advocacy. Moreover, certain ethical issues (such as media 
statements or contacts with witnesses) are not addressed for either prosecutors or 
defence counsel and have created procedural problems. As the ICC prepares to elect 
the next Prosecutor and progress to a new phase, useful work could be done to solve 
these problems. 
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Chapter VIII: Counsel Ethics and International Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century 
 
In Chapter 1, the two basic questions identified in the debate regarding 
professionalisation were whether it is desirable and feasible and, if so, what would be 
the consequences of the endeavour. Following examination of the practice of the 
courts in Part II to determine its desirability, Part III considers its feasibility and 
consequences.  Chapter 7 analyses the adoption and enforcement of common ethical 
standards by international courts. Chapter 8 examines self-regulation by the 
international bar through the centralisation of regulatory authority.  
In this chapter, the principal issues are the articulation of ethical principles for 
advocacy by non-governmental organisations of practitioners and the application of 
those texts by international courts. That application can be in the form of prescription 
as codes of conduct integrated into the courts‟ procedural rules or in that of ad hoc 
application for courts to resolve ethical problems. Part II having suggested that there 
is a real need for normativity in the area of professional ethics for counsel, the 
question arises whether it is possible to articulate common ethical standards for 
counsel despite considerable differences amongst national jurisdictions.   
Through examination of this nascent process, two preliminary propositions are 
advanced. The first is that it is possible to identify universal or nigh-universal ethical 
principles that are both common to all of the major legal traditions of forensic 
advocacy and of general application to international courts and tribunals. The second 
is that the search for uniformity in professional ethics is of limited effectiveness 
because of major philosophical divisions amongst national ethical traditions. 
Consequently, in cases of divergent national views a selective approach on a given 
ethical issue (e.g. – witness proofing) is necessary in order to provide prescriptive 
clarity.  
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This chapter is divided into two halves. In the first half, the chapter addresses 
the question of the feasibility of the articulation of common ethical standards. In the 
second half, the chapter examines the question of the practicability of enforcement of 
such standards by international courts. Sections 7.1-7.3 consider the nascent efforts to 
articulate common standards by professional organisations. In particular, they 
consider the challenges concerning the key issues of balancing textual integrity with 
consent in articulating authoritative texts. Section 7.1 analyses the new principles 
proposed by the International Law Association („ILA‟), section 7.2 explores the 
ongoing work of the International Bar Association („IBA‟) and section 7.3 examines 
the potential of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe („CCBE‟).  
Sections 7.4 and 7.5 scrutinise the obstacles concerning the equally crucial 
issue of enforcement. Section 7.4 examines whether international courts have the 
legal power to exercise regulatory jurisdiction towards counsel. Section 7.5 considers 
whether international courts have the practical competence to enforce ethical 
standards, with particular reference to the expertise of judges and registrars as well as 
the challenge of harmonising the disciplinary jurisdiction of international courts with 
that of national bar authorities. Through this analysis, it is suggested that there are 
considerable challenges for professionalisation that may be overcome with care, 
flexibility and ingenuity. 
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8.1  Regulatory Jurisdiction of International Courts 
In this section, the first question considered is whether international courts have the 
legal power to regulate counsel by prescribing and enforcing common ethical 
standards to protect the integrity of their proceedings. Interview responses from nine 
judges
910
 from non-criminal
911
 international courts suggest that this question is 
contentious in relation to the regulation of State representatives. Judges at inter-State 
courts are clearly sensitive to „State sovereignty‟ concerns and judges at mixed courts 
are also alive to the potential jealousy of States over their control over agents. The 
majority of the four judges interviewed from the criminal courts
912
 likewise expressed 
divergent views about the regulation of prosecutors. Overall, nearly every interviewee 
acknowledged that the power to regulate counsel is an unresolved issue.  
Regulatory powers towards counsel, comprising prescriptive and enforcement 
elements, exist in three forms: 1) admission requirements; 2) ethical rules; and 3) 
disciplinary sanctions. Although the unfairness of ex post facto law generally calls for 
courts to prescribe, those courts that have not done so (or that otherwise encounter a 
lacuna in their procedural rules) may be compelled to nevertheless invoke an 
enforcement power where the seriousness of the professional misconduct outweighs 
that of retrospection. Given that Part II has suggested that there the occurrence of 
procedural problems in practice arising from divergences in ethical standards, the 
question arises how judges should handle them when they do. 
One possibility is to discreetly admonish the advocates in question. This has 
the virtues of ease and tact by enabling the court to get on with proceedings rather 
                                                 
910
 Judge Cot (ITLOS), Judge Keith (ICJ), Judge Higgins (ICJ), Judge Koroma (ICJ), Judge Edward 
(ECJ), Judge Forwood (EU General Court) and Judge Fora (ECtHR). Two other judges agreed to be 
interviewed on condition of anonymity. 
911
 The power to regulate prosecutors is also an issue before the criminal courts due to judicial concerns 
about the appearance of undue proximity between the judiciary and the prosecution.   
912
 Judge Harhoff (ICTY), Judge Pocar (ICTY), Judge Doherty (SCSL) and Judge Fulford (ICC).  
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than become sidetracked by incidental matters. This approach may be appropriate for 
disposing of difficult and nuanced problems on which procedural texts are silent or 
for allowing a degree of leeway for junior or inexperienced counsel. Moreover, there 
is an important human dimension to trials in that there will be a practical need to calm 
tensions (which may stem from misunderstandings or personality clashes) in order to 
enable the trial to proceed smoothly. In the words of one experienced judge: 
„Ultimately, it is easy to talk tough on [enforcement], but in real-life situations the real need is 
for a nuanced approach. The authority of the Court is often enhanced by dealing with 
egregious behaviour with a firm but moderate response. The Court is likely to attract respect 
by showing restraint rather than judicial bad temper, expressed in the heat of the moment.‟913 
 
Thus, it is arguable that tactful and restrained admonishment is a useful judicial 
method of preventing rather than curing problems. 
However, it could also be argued that this method is alone inadequate to 
uphold strict ethical standards. In serious cases, judges are compelled to publicly 
reprimand counsel to preserve procedural integrity and clearly disapprove of such 
conduct. In Chapter 6, an ICC trial chamber criticised a media interview given by a 
prosecutor: 
„The point needs to be made publicly and directly whenever necessary. Imposing a stay on the 
proceedings was, in a way, an indirect and substantial sanction because of the public nature of 
the reprimand. Again, I repeat this was not the object of the exercise, given the Chamber was 
focussing on the alleged abuse of process. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber‟s criticisms of Ms 
le Fraper du Hellen were so clearly expressed that the Chamber‟s authority would not have 
been enhanced by the addition of a fine. It could have been seen as rather petty to have gone 
further. I agree that there is a need to be firm and to control behaviour but more often than not 
these situations can be disposed of without resort to formal sanctions. It should also be 
emphasised that some judges believe that resorting to penalties involves, in some degree, 
admitting failure because a judge should be able to exercise control over the proceedings by 
detecting and dealing with problems early – “nipping them in the bud”. Although judges are 
not in control of everything that counsel does, they are in a position to give early and firm 
warnings to counsel, to avert problems at the outset.‟914 
 
Hence, a public reprimand can be an effective judicial tool to deal with inappropriate 
conduct without resorting to formal disciplinary procedures.  
                                                 
913
 Interview with Judge Sir Adrian Fulford, ICC (8 July 2011), cited with permission. 
914
 Ibidem. 
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However, there is a drawback to this approach, namely, that since a public 
reprimand is itself a sanction there is a clear need not only for natural justice to be 
observed in handling the conduct (e.g. – allowing the impugned counsel the 
opportunity to defend himself prior to public criticism) but also for prescribed 
standards to preclude ex post facto law. Without prescribed standards, an court may 
feel compelled to merely issue a warning without reprimanding the counsel in 
question. However, this is clearly unsatisfactory because some counsel may draw the 
conclusion that they can exploit the lack of common standards and counsel in general 
will be left without clear direction on a host of difficult ethical issues.  
Consequently, from the judicial viewpoint, a code of conduct is a useful tool 
to provide a normative framework within which to handle ethical issues. 
Paradoxically, prescribed standards may result in fewer cases of professional 
misconduct: 
„There is a definite need for a code of conduct for all counsel so that there is something in 
black and white that applies across the board. This provides certainty and a fair level playing 
field, and it avoids the impression that individual judges are making up the rules as they go 
along. That said, most experienced judges ensure that situations of difficulty do not arise, and 
they rarely need to refer to a written code. Nevertheless, a definitive document is necessary in 
order to deal with extreme cases.‟915 
 
Thus, it is arguable that the lack of prescribed standards causes ethical issues to 
assume greater importance in practice whereas articulated rules diminishes their 
importance by better enabling courts to deal with professional conduct. 
However, there may be grave cases in which formal disciplinary procedures 
prove necessary. In this respect, the question arises whether international courts can 
exercise disciplinary jurisdiction. An attractive recourse for judges is to refer the 
matter to a national bar by writing formally to inform it of the alleged misconduct. As 
seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the ECJ and ICC have prescribed rules specifically 
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 Ibidem. 
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empowering judges to do so. Alternatively, a more subtle approach could entail public 
judicial criticism or the relevant bar authority being discreetly informed by a judge 
from its jurisdiction. The attractiveness of this solution is that it enables the trial 
judges to proceed with the proceedings whilst also ensuring that they have raised the 
issue with an authority specifically created to investigate such matters. 
However, there are also disadvantages to this approach. First, the alleged 
misconduct may be so grave that it will prove impossible to sidestep it without 
injustice. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the bar authority in question will 
investigate the alleged misconduct – particularly where the alleged misconduct is 
permitted by its own standards. Thirdly, this solution does not solve the problem of 
divergent ethical standards: as has been seen, many counsel do not belong to a 
national bar. It is unfair to hold professional counsel to one standard and amateur 
counsel to another simply by virtue of the fact that the former happen to hold a licence 
to practice. Fourthly, even if the national bar sanctions the misconduct the deterrent 
effect is likely to be negligible. Consequently, for the immediate future it appears 
inevitable that international courts will continue – in the absence of a unified 
international bar authority, examined in Chapter 7 – to be confronted with problems 
arising from divergent ethical standards in their practice. Thus, assuming that the 
prescription and enforcement of common ethical standards by international courts is 
desirable, two discrete issues arise: 1) whether international courts have the legal 
power to regulate counsel; and 2) whether they have the requisite expertise and 
resources to do so fairly.  
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8.1.1 Power to Regulate Counsel 
No international court is vested with express powers to regulate all representatives 
appearing before it. Practice hitherto suggests that the legal basis for a particular 
power varies from court to court. Some powers are expressly conferred upon the court 
through its statute,
916
 other powers are implicitly conferred through a broad statutory 
power to frame rules of procedure
917
 and still other powers have been prescribed by 
courts invoking an inherent jurisdiction in procedural rules or ad hoc decisions.
918
 
Several international courts
919
 have yet to engage with the regulation of counsel in 
either their procedural rules or cases whereas others
920
 have done so to varying 
degrees. The overall picture is further complicated by the political relationship of each 
court with its constituency, particularly the autonomy of the court to control its own 
procedures. Thus, there is a live question of whether international courts have the 
legal power to regulate counsel.  
Hitherto, the practice of international courts has been mixed and inconsistent. 
In 1992, a Chamber of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal held that the Tribunal „does not 
have the power to impose sanctions or disciplinary measures for the presentation of 
false evidence‟ by counsel.921 However, this should not be treated as authoritative 
since it was the unreasoned comment of one Chamber and the possibility cannot be 
excluded that the Tribunal, invoking its broad power to Article 15(1) of its Rules of 
Procedure,
922
 would exclude a representative from proceedings for fraudulent or 
otherwise abusive misconduct. It is also inconsistent with other jurisprudence by the 
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 E.g. – Rome Statute, Arts 15, 42, 46-47; ECJ Rules of Procedure, Art. 35. 
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 E.g. – Rome Statute, Art. 51; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 8, 22.  
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Tribunal in invoked an inherent jurisdiction to revise awards that were based upon 
„forged documents or perjury‟,923 to order a party to stay parallel domestic litigation924 
and in the areas of jurisdiction and provisional measures orders.
925
 
In two ICTY cases,
926
 Trial Chambers held that they did not have inherent 
jurisdiction to prescribe a code of conduct or exercise disciplinary jurisdiction for 
prosecutors. However, as explained in Chapter 7, those unreasoned decisions are 
inconsistent with the broader power of contempt of court that the Tribunal expressly 
based upon inherent jurisdiction.
927
 It is illogical to invoke an inherent jurisdiction to 
prescribe a crime for gross procedural abuses whilst denying the jurisdiction to 
prescribe professional standards and sanctions for similar, if less severe, misconduct. 
Consequently, these decisions are also unpersuasive. 
Three recent decisions concerning the application of inherent jurisdiction to 
the regulation of counsel have been rendered by ICSID tribunals.
928
 In the Libananco 
arbitration, allegations of espionage by Turkey prompted an application to exclude it 
from proceedings. The tribunal declared: 
„These allegations and counter-allegations strike at principles which lie at the very heart of the 
ICSID arbitral process, and the Tribunal is bound to approach them accordingly. Among the 
principles affected are: basic procedural fairness, respect for confidentiality and legal privilege 
… the right of parties to seek advice and to advance their respective cases freely and without 
interference; and no doubt others as well. For its own part, the Tribunal would add to the list 
respect for the Tribunal itself, as the organ freely chosen by the Parties for the binding 
settlement of their dispute in accordance with the ICSID Convention. It requires no further 
recital by the Tribunal to establish either that these are indeed fundamental principles, or why 
they are. Nor does the Tribunal doubt for a moment that, like any other international tribunal, 
it must be regarded as endowed with the inherent powers required to preserve the integrity of 
its own process – even if the remedies open to it are necessarily different from those that 
might be available to a domestic court of law in an ICSID Member State. The Tribunal would 
express the principle as being that parties have an obligation to arbitrate fairly and in good 
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 E-Systems, 51-64, 59. 
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 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2008, Rule 77(A); Buteau and Oosthuizen, „When the 
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 Sarvarian, supra note 918, 128-129. 
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faith and that an arbitral tribunal has the inherent jurisdiction to ensure that this obligation is 
complied with; this principle applies in all arbitrations, including investment arbitration, and 
to all parties, including States (even in the exercise of their sovereign powers).
929
 
 
Whilst the case only indirectly concerned counsel
930
 in that the orders sought were 
directed at controlling parties‟ conduct, it is analogous because of the nature of the 
misconduct, the similar remedy of exclusion and the rationale of procedural integrity.  
In the Hrvatska decision of 6 May 2008, an ICSID tribunal (Mr David 
Williams QC, Mr Jan Paulsson and the Honourable Charles Brower) relied upon 
Article 44 of the ICSID Convention
931
 as providing a partial „textual foothold‟ for the 
inherent powers doctrine.
932
 However, this is a conflation of discrete grounds for the 
existence of a regulatory power. Whereas an implied power would require a „textual 
foothold‟, an inherent jurisdiction does not because it exists to fill textual lacunae. 
Significantly, the tribunal cited ICTY jurisprudence on contempt in support of its 
assertion that „[m]ore broadly, there is an “inherent power of an international court to 
deal with any issues necessary for the conduct of matters falling within its 
jurisdiction”; that power “exists independently of any statutory reference.”‟933 Thus, 
this precedent may be construed either as the application of an implied power under 
the ICSID Convention or of a freestanding inherent jurisdiction.  
In the Fraport decision of 18 September 2008, an ICSID ad hoc committee 
(Judge Tomka of the ICJ, Judge Dominique Hascher of the Cour d‟Appel de Paris 
and Professor Campbell McLachlan QC) denied the Respondent‟s request in the 
Fraport arbitration to exclude Mr Eric Schwartz of Dewey & LeBoeuf from 
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 Libananco, para. 78. 
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 Ibidem, para. 79. 
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 Hrvatska, paras. 33–34. 
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 Ibidem, para. 33 (note 17). 
 247 
proceedings for a conflict of interest arising from the contested prior representation of 
the Respondent in a related proceeding. Mr Schwartz was a dually admitted as a 
California attorney and Paris avocet and the committee heard submissions on the 
ethical rules of both bars as well as the CCBE Code of Conduct. Whilst no 
submissions were heard on ICSID or international jurisprudence,
934
 the committee 
relied upon Article 44 of the ICSID Convention (with the agreement of the impugned 
counsel and the Respondent) to decide the application.  
The Committee relied upon the „functional justification‟ of protecting fairness 
and equality, which included the „power and obligation to make sure that generally 
recognized principles relating to conflict of interest and the protection of the 
confidentiality of information imparted by clients to their lawyers are complied 
with‟.935 The Committee observed that questions concerning representation affects the 
rights of both parties but emphasised that, since it lacked „deontological 
responsibilities‟, it „has no power to rule on an allegation of misconduct under any 
such professional rules as may apply‟ so that „its concern is therefore limited to the 
fair conduct of the proceedings before it.‟936 Whilst the Committee specifically 
asserted that it was not relying upon any particular set of ethical standards, it 
ultimately rejected the application on the factual ground of lack of evidence of a real 
risk of the disclosure of confidential information.
937
  
Thus, the legal basis for the Fraport decision was an implied power to regulate 
counsel within the Article 44 express power to decide procedural questions. Despite 
the lack of argumentation concerning prior international jurisprudence on the doctrine 
of inherent jurisdiction, this is a convincing basis upon which to decide the 
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 Ibidem, para. 37. 
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 Ibidem, paras 38-39. 
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 Ibidem, paras 41, 54-55. 
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application that was clearly connected to the functional justification. Whilst the 
consent of the parties and the impugned counsel is practically useful, it is not 
determinative. However, the committee‟s assertion that its decision had no 
deontological implications is unpersuasive because an exclusion of counsel from 
proceedings for conflict of interest, or even factual findings, has potential reputational 
consequences for that counsel in the real world.   
In the Rompetrol decision of 14 January 2010, an ICSID tribunal (Sir Franklin 
Berman QC, Mr Donald Donovan and the Honourable Marc Lalonde QC) reserved its 
position on inherent jurisdiction but rejected an application to exclude counsel for 
conflict of interest due to professional links with an arbitrator on factual grounds.
938
 
The Tribunal grounded the doctrine in the right to a fair trial and acknowledged that 
these would be opposed to the statutory framework based upon the right of parties to 
choose their own legal representation.
939
 Whilst the Tribunal cast doubt on the 
doctrine, it did not disapprove of the Hrvatska decision but distinguished it with 
respect to the degree of potential prejudice caused by the alleged conflicts of 
interest.
940
 Thus, the view of the Tribunal appeared to be that the inherent jurisdiction 
doctrine may apply to the regulation of counsel but that it was not yet settled and 
should in any case be exercised sparingly. There was no consideration of Article 44 or 
of the Libananco and Fraport decisions.  
This survey of the jurisprudence suggests that there is as yet no general 
consensus amongst international courts concerning the applicability of inherent 
jurisdiction to the regulation of counsel. Since the legal source of the doctrine has yet 
to be authoritatively determined, international courts have often cited a broad 
statutory power to decide procedural questions as their legal basis for the regulation of 
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counsel. Whilst this is a logical and persuasive foundation, the language of implied 
power should be clearly distinguished from that of inherent jurisdiction. This should 
clearly be the basis for those courts have them since the purpose of inherent 
jurisdiction is to fill procedural gaps. Its applicability to the regulation of counsel is 
supported by the much broader contempt powers and the connexion between the 
functional rationale and the role of counsel.  
 In considering the nature of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction, a 
comprehensive treatment is found in the recent works of Dr Chester Brown.
941
 In 
examining the jurisprudence, he concludes that its origin principally lies in common 
law jurisdictions and that its rationale for international courts is „the need to ensure 
the carrying out of the functions that have been expressly conferred upon them.‟942 He 
argues that this functional justification stems from the jurisprudence concerning the 
administration of justice, particularly the prevention of procedural abuses by 
parties.
943
 He asserts that the doctrine is circumscribed by courts‟ statutes and „the 
relationship between each particular international court and the parties.‟944 Whilst this 
thesis generally endorses these conclusions, they may be further developed by 
connecting the doctrine to the duty of procedural integrity set out in Chapter 1.  
Although international courts have generally not grounded their invocations of 
inherent jurisdiction in a source of law, scholarship has offered four potential sources: 
1) the functional justification mentioned above; 2) the doctrine of implied powers; 3) 
general principle of law recognised by common law jurisdictions; and 4) the identity 
of international courts as judicial bodies. In examining these four bases, it is 
                                                 
941
 Brown, „The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals‟, 66 BYIL (2005), 195-244; 
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 Brown (2007), ibidem, 71. 
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suggested that the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction is based either upon a general 
principle of law deriving from national jurisdictions or from natural law to enable 
international courts to discharge their duty to protect procedural integrity. Neither the 
functional justification, doctrine of implied powers nor the identity of international 
courts as judicial bodies provides a satisfactory legal basis for inherent jurisdiction.     
  The functional justification provides a convincing rationale for the doctrine 
because its original purpose in common law jurisdictions and subsequent adoption by 
international courts has consistently been to safeguard the integrity of the judicial 
process.
945
 This purpose is consistent with the identity of international courts as 
judicial bodies bound by duties of impartiality, integrity and independence. However, 
a compelling justification must still be based upon a source of law. Whilst the 
functional justification provides the rationale for the doctrine, it does not provide its 
legal basis.  
As mentioned above, the doctrine of inherent jurisdictions must be clearly 
distinguished from that of implied powers. An implied power is rooted in a statutory 
provision as a logical assumption or outcome of it. An inherent jurisdiction need only 
be invoked in cases where an international court is faced with a procedural problem 
for which no express or implied power exists. Consequently, it is a subsidiary basis 
for an international court to solve procedural dilemma and may only be invoked to fill 
lacunae.
946
 It is displaced by an express or implied power and may not be invoked to 
justify a wider discretion than prescribed under that power. Thus, the necessity to 
invoke an inherent power derives from the absence of that power in statute.  
                                                 
945
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946
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The first plausible source for inherent jurisdiction is its commonality to 
national jurisdictions, particularly in the common law world.
947
 On this approach, the 
doctrine derives from the judicial process which accords with its historical origin and 
expressly recognises its functional rationale to protect the integrity of that process, 
whether national or international. The applicability of the doctrine to international 
advocacy is particularly persuasive because of the analogy between party-led 
adversarial procedure and the practical dependence of international courts upon 
parties. The need for safeguards to protect procedural integrity makes inherent 
jurisdiction a practical necessity. 
However, it is arguable that there are two key differences between national 
and international jurisdictions. First, national courts have asserted their powers within 
constitutional frameworks that operate upon different theoretical foundations to those 
of international courts. The lack of a similar constitutional mandate to exercise such 
judicial powers, it could be argued, renders the claim of international courts to 
exercise the same regulatory powers tenuous. However, this objection may ultimately 
be discounted as a distinction without difference because, functionally, national and 
international courts are both tasked with adjudication. 
Secondly, at least one party in any international litigation must be a State, 
which is not the case before national courts. On this argument, States may vest their 
own courts with inherent jurisdiction whilst denying it to international courts in order 
to amplify their own influence as parties. Since the current system historically 
developed out of a laissez-faire, party-centred procedure, therefore, international 
courts may only regulate advocacy to the extent that they are statutorily empowered to 
do so. This argument may also be disregarded because it not only fails to account for 
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international courts‟ accepted invocation of inherent jurisdiction in other procedural 
contexts but it also ignores the possibility of procedural lacunae. As this thesis has 
shown, States from the PCA and PCIJ onwards generally scrutinised the issue of 
representation scantly in negotiations for international court statutes and, on the 
contrary, drafted provisions that left the matter for international courts to decide.   
In this context, the following propositions may be advanced: 1) that 
international courts with broad powers to prescribe procedural rules possess an 
implied power to regulate counsel; 2) that the legal source of inherent jurisdiction is a 
general principles of law deriving from national jurisdictions; and 3) that the doctrine 
is applicable to the regulation of counsel due to the clear connection between the role 
of counsel and the procedural integrity. Thus, it is suggested that international courts 
may invoke either an implied power or, in its absence, the doctrine of inherent 
jurisdiction to enable themselves to regulate counsel in order to discharge their duties 
of fairness, equality and procedural integrity.  
 
8.1.2  Practical Competence to Regulate Counsel 
Assuming that international courts have jurisdiction to regulate counsel in their 
proceedings to protect procedural integrity, the next question is whether they are 
practically capable of effectively exercising that jurisdiction. This raises two issues: 1) 
the qualifications of international judges and registrars; and 2) the regulatory 
architecture of international courts. In examining these two points, it is suggested that 
the competence of international courts to regulate counsel is linked to the ongoing 
debate concerning the qualification standards applicable to judicial candidates as well 
as the ability of the courts to construct a transparent disciplinary system that 
safeguards natural justice rights of hearing and defence for impugned counsel. In 
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order to enlist the cooperation and support of practitioners in the professionalisation 
process, it is imperative that adequate assurances of fairness be offered to preclude the 
arbitrary exercise of the jurisdiction.  
 The qualifications of candidates for international judges and the systems of 
election have been criticised as inadequate and deleterious to judicial 
independence.
948
 Clearly, this issue concerning the general integrity and competence 
is connected to that of professionalisation of counsel because practitioners are 
unlikely to support their regulation by judges elected under a questionable system 
with questionable results. The consequences of the exercise of disciplinary 
jurisdiction by international judges can be potentially devastating to the professional 
livelihoods of counsel, which accordingly demands that it be exercised by persons of 
integrity and competence observing natural justice standards. Even the public 
criticism of counsel is arguably a form of sanction.
949
   
 In addition to the question of the general integrity and competence of 
successful candidates for judicial office and the transparency of the electoral systems, 
there is an issue concerning their expertise to regulate counsel. International judges 
come from a variety of professional backgrounds; those who have primarily been 
diplomats, academics, government officials or career judges have often never been 
professional advocates. It is questionable whether such persons are in a position to 
competently regulate counsel without firsthand experience of the realities of 
advocacy. In the course of fourteen interviews with current or former international 
judges,
950
 a difference could be identified between the views on whether international 
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courts should regulate counsel of those judges who had a background as practitioners 
and those who did not. The former group was generally in favour of regulation 
whereas the latter group was against.  
 This pattern cut across geographical and jurisdictional lines. Although the 
majority of those in favour of regulation were from common law jurisdictions and the 
majority against were from civil law jurisdictions, virtually all of those interviewees 
asserted that their views were not based upon systemic difference. Moreover, there is 
a logical explanation for this pattern, namely, that in the common law world the great 
majority of judges are recruited from senior counsel whereas in the civil law world 
counsel and judges are recruited separately. Interviewees also cited the institutional 
culture of each court as a major factor with the inter-state courts even more wary of 
„State sovereignty‟ than the mixed courts. The criminal court judges, by contrast, 
were readier to regulate counsel.   
Thus, it is suggested that this pattern amongst common law and civil law 
judges is predominately attributable to professional rather than jurisdictional 
background. As one interviewee expressed it: 
„There is undoubtedly a real advantage for this court in having a certain number of judges who 
have previously been advocates or judges, thereby having gained a real understanding of the 
problems that will occur once they come to the ICC, and how to solve them. In the field of 
ethical problems as regards court proceedings, you only really learn the rights and wrongs of 
how to react from practice and experience rather than by reading a book. The balance between 
those judges who have experience of judging or criminal trials versus ex-diplomats, academics 
etc, is a real question in our institution. 
 
To some degree, at the ICC the judges have engaged with the regulation of counsel through 
Chapter IV of the Regulations of Court. Personally, I have no difficulty in dealing with these 
issues given my background and experience. I believe that national origins have no real 
bearing on this. Those who have been judges or criminal advocates, wherever they come from, 
are familiar with the issues that come up in practice. I believe that the shyness of certain 
judges concerning these difficulties, in the main, comes from their inexperience.‟951  
 
The link between professional background and willingness to regulate counsel was 
also noted by another interviewee from a civil law country and former practitioner: 
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„Absolutely correct [that it will be difficult for judges who have not served themselves as 
practising counsel to detect or fully understand the sorts of problems that arise for counsel], 
and this seems to me to be self-evident. For example, I have an advantage in this area over 
those of my colleagues who have principally been academics, for example, in that I have 
sometimes had to explain how counsel is fairly charging a certain amount of money in fees for 
documents which they say is only X number of pages in length. However, I can explain that, 
as a counsel, it is actually quicker to produce a document that is many times longer than that 
short document but to produce a concise document that is well-drafted for the judges to read 
takes many more hours. For these types of matters, it is important that judges called upon to 
deal with disciplinary matters concerning counsel have the background necessary to see all of 
the issues.‟952 
 
Whilst those judges who expressed sceptical views concerning regulation are not 
uniformly non-practitioners and raised cogent arguments concerning jurisdiction, 
necessity and enforceability, the divide between practitioners and non-practitioners 
remained striking. It is likely that lack of experience is a factor for scepticism. 
 Since there is no express qualification requirement for international judges to 
be competent to regulate counsel, there is a practical question concerning their 
practical ability to do so. One way to address this is to ensure that judges with 
practical experience as counsel are appointed as the presiding judges of trials to 
ensure that an experienced hand manages the advocates and deals with ethical issues 
that may arise. Another technique utilised at the SCSL is to appoint former 
practitioners with expertise in counsel ethics as disciplinary judges of the court.  
 These basic techniques necessitate a minimal number of judges on the bench 
who are able to assume these roles. Whilst it is clearly pragmatic for at least a 
percentage of judges serving at international courts at any one time to be experienced 
practitioners, there are no requirements in the system of judicial election to that effect. 
In the absence of statutory reform to admission requirements, one pragmatic method 
may be for the serving judges to publicly request (e.g. – through an annual address by 
the President of the Court) that States nominate candidates with, inter alia, experience 
as practitioners. Whilst it is possible that informal lobbying already occurs in judicial 
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elections, a more transparent and formalised procedure would lead to a more 
legitimate and meritocratic process. These considerations also apply to registrars who 
often have more frequent and closer contact with counsel than the judges and have a 
regulatory role. However, the efficacy of these tools will clearly vary from court to 
court. Whereas permanent infrastructure of international courts proper (e.g. – the ICJ, 
ITLOS, ECJ and ECtHR) provide greater continuity, arbitral institutions like ICSID, 
the PCA and NAFTA may struggle to regulate parties‟ choice of arbitrator.  
 Architectural reform raises not only the question of judicial qualifications but 
also that of the disciplinary process. There is a need to avoid the arbitrary exercise of 
discipline due to the potentially drastic consequences for the professional livelihoods 
of impugned counsel. Natural justice rights of hearing, appeal and neutrality are 
crucial to instil confidence in the justice of the disciplinary jurisdiction. Whilst trial 
judges have a duty to maintain the discipline of the courtroom, which in turn requires 
that they have sanctions at their disposal, the construction of an external disciplinary 
board to consider referrals from the court would clearly be advantageous. A 
particularly useful technique is the creation of a formal link between the disciplinary 
board and the home bar of the impugned counsel.  
 As suggested in Chapter 9, the true solution to the double deontology problem 
is the relinquishment by national bars of extraterritorial disciplinary jurisdiction for 
conduct before international courts. This, however, will only be possible upon the 
harmonisation of international courts‟ and national bars‟ disciplinary jurisdictions. 
The supremacy of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the international court over that of 
national bars is vital to ensure that counsel are not subjected to double jeopardy, 
divergent national ethical standards are not applied to judge identical conduct and that 
the disciplinary body is able to hear the complaint promptly with access to evidence.  
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8.2  Articulation of Common Ethical Standards 
The second core issue that this chapter examines is the feasibility of articulating 
common ethical standards for counsel before international courts. As set out in Part I, 
there are a number of challenges facing this task. First, there is the problem of 
harmonising divergent national standards that conflict with each other. Clearly, there 
are times when harmonisation through compromise is impossible because the degree 
of divergence is too great. In addition, it is impossible to „agree to disagree‟ before 
shared proceedings – ruling out the transnational conflict-of-laws approach.  
Second, there is the problem of prescribing standards based upon shared 
ideology and values like justice and the rule of law that, even if universally accepted, 
are neither uniformly understood nor universally applied to the same standard. For 
example, positing an „overriding duty to justice‟ over the client or the State as a 
fundamental ethical principle for counsel is more readily harmonious to jurisdictions 
with traditions of professional independence and a relatively weak market ideology. 
Amidst pressures for a more client or State-oriented philosophy, the identification of 
common ground for the basic identity of the international bar is both challenging and 
vital.   
 Third, there is the problem of striking the appropriate balance between the 
incisiveness necessary to ensure that common standards are practically effective and 
the consensus needed to instil confidence in them. Standards that please everyone are 
necessarily so banal and anodyne as to be practically useless. Standards that offend 
everyone will not be applied because for want of a mandate. Careful and pragmatic 
drafting that identifies this delicate balance is required to ground common standards 
in the realities and needs of international litigation rather than a dogmatic national 
approach.   
 258 
8.2.1  ILA Hague Principles  
As seen in Part II, during the twentieth century there were no common ethical 
standards for counsel before international courts which (with the partial exception of 
the ICC and the ad hoc criminal tribunals) lack them to the present day. One reason 
for this has been the perceived difficulty of identifying universal principles common 
to the various national traditions discussed in Chapter 2. Today, some argue that the 
regulation of representatives by international courts and tribunals according to 
prescribed ethical principles is futile owing to irreconcilable differences of national 
culture.    
 As explored in Chapter 3, even in the days of the PCIJ and increasingly in the 
late twentieth century individual commentators (notably international judges) were 
identifying ethical standards for counsel as a practical problem and calling for the 
establishment of an „international bar‟ to address them. To address this gap, the ILA 
Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals 
(„Study Group‟) decided on 12 June 2009 to take up the matter.953 On 18 August 
2010, the Study Group proposed the „Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for 
Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals‟954 („the Hague 
Principles‟) at the 74th ILA Conference in the Hague. 
The ILA is an academic organisation whose mission is „the study, clarification 
and development of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of 
international understanding and respect for international law‟.955 The Study Group 
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was created in 2001 with the mandate of inquiring into contemporary, procedural 
problems within international courts and tribunals. This is significant for two reasons: 
1) its authoritativeness in the area of international advocacy is enhanced by the 
expertise of its membership and its focus upon the international judicial procedure; 
and 2) its mandate is limited by the fact that ILA does not have a direct relationship 
with national bars.  
Significantly, the Study Group‟s first topic of inquiry was the ethical standards 
of judges in international courts and tribunals which culminated in the proposition of 
the „ILA Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International 
Judiciary‟.956 One factor behind the Study Group‟s decision to select counsel ethics as 
its second topic was the desire expressed by judges who assisted it in the formulation 
of the Burgh House Principles that ethical standards for counsel also be addressed.
957
 
Thus, there is an important connection between ethical standards for judges and for 
counsel which affects the prospect of international judges acting regulating counsel.  
The Study Group held three working meetings over the course of one year 
with the aim of drafting a text of common ethical principles for counsel before 
international courts. Its meetings, conducted under the „Chatham House Rule‟ of 
confidentiality, included a range of individual views. Besides a core group of 
members participating in the working meetings, the Study Group had the benefit of 
input from several overseas members and former and current members of the 
international judiciary as advisers. The composition of the Study Group – including 
practitioners and academics from a variety of jurisdictions and professional 
backgrounds
958
 – was intended to bring together a diverse range of views concerning 
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these issues in order to produce a balanced and informed text. At the formal 
presentation of the Hague Principles at the ILA Conference in August 2010, the Study 
Group benefited from the criticism offered by a mixed panel by regional and 
professional background comprising Professor John Dugard of South Africa and 
Judge Kamal Hossein of Bangladesh.
959
  
The Study Group, conscious of its limited mandate, intended the Hague 
Principles to be a first step in sparking debate and future development by addressing 
´gaps´ and recurring issues in practice on a general level rather than draft a 
comprehensive ´code of conduct´.
960
 This cautious approach emphasising consensus 
can be detected throughout the text. As Professor Dugard observed, they „clearly 
reflect the “lowest common denominator” of a large committee with many 
compromises and few risks taken on the serious issues.‟ Additional criticisms 
included the omission of issues arising in criminal practice, the assumption of a self-
regulated rather than externally-regulated „international bar‟, a naïve assumption of 
counsel „independence‟ towards clients, the omission of the „cab rank rule‟ and the 
tolerance of „witness proofing‟.961 Anonymous comments from interviewees also 
suggested that certain judges felt that they had had insufficient input into the 
Principles. Finally, the drafting process was relatively short (one year) with uneven 
participation from the Study Group members and no consultation with national bars. 
The aims of the Study Group were accordingly modest. 
The Principles adopt a conservative or vague position on several sensitive 
issues upon which there exist clear national and philosophical divisions.
962
 For 
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example, Principle 2.1 declares that „counsel has a duty of loyalty to his or her client 
consistent with a duty to the international court or tribunal to contribute to the fair 
administration of justice and the promotion of the rule of law.‟ This statement, 
virtually identical to Article 3(iv) of the ICTY Code of Conduct, adopts a neutral 
position between conflicting duties to justice, court and client and suggests 
differences between the „“realists” principally including those who regularly appear as 
counsel and the “ethical” school who emphasised due process and duties to justice.‟963  
This sort of compromise matters because it is indicative of the difficulty that 
will be encountered during the articulation of common ethical standards, namely, the 
resistance from a client-oriented culture to its displacement by justice-oriented values. 
In the words of a former judge who spoke on condition of anonymity:  
„I would say that it is difficult to write it all down given the very wide diversity of national 
approach. Almost certainly this entails trying to prescribe rules preventing lawyers from 
obeying client instructions, which is quite a big step to take. This lies at the heart of this entire 
discussion and the real source of difficulty is the diversity of views concerning the 
fundamental duties of lawyers.‟ 
 
The creation of an „international judicial culture‟ is not something that can happen 
through a code of conduct or even in a few years of practice. However, prescribed 
standards provide a platform upon which advocates and judges can build until the 
accumulation of practice gradually establishes a justice-oriented professional culture. 
Thus, the articulation of an overriding duty to justice is vital as a declaration of intent 
and of the fundamental values of the new culture being created.  
 Moreover, there are also matters upon which the Principles are largely or 
wholly silent.
964
 The Principles largely serve to illuminate existing problems rather 
than to solve them. Whilst they represent the agreement of individual counsel, judges 
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and academics from diverse national and professional backgrounds, their conservative 
and consensual nature largely does not offer the politically sensitive solutions to those 
identified problems. Without further work, this largely dilutes from the utility of the 
Principles to solve the practical problems they avoid. To create ethical standards that 
will solve those problems, the dynamic of consensus must be abandoned in favour of 
the imposition of justice-based values.  
Clearly, this is an exercise that can only be undertaken by the international 
judiciary vested with the authority to do so. Whilst several judges interviewed for this 
thesis expressed a preference for counsel to prescribe their own standards rather than 
judges to impose them, the Principles illustrate that the „lowest common denominator‟ 
is the inescapable outcome from this consensual dynamic. Although the Principles 
represent an attempt to spark debate on this important practical topic, they also 
demonstrate the limitations of its own approach. Moreover, the Study Group‟s express 
recognition
965
 of an inherent jurisdiction for international courts is a clear call by 
counsel for greater activity by the judiciary to regulate the bar. Thus, the Hague 
Principles both expressly and implicitly demonstrate the necessity for a compulsory 
dynamic to gradually create an international judicial culture that prioritises justice and 
the rule of law over the interests of clients to win their case at all costs.  
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8.2.2  IBA Task Force 
The IBA is an organisation of national bars with the aim of „supporting the 
establishment of law and the administration of justice worldwide.‟966 Its membership 
now comprises more than 40,000 individual lawyers and 197 bar associations and law 
societies spanning all of the continents,
967
 providing its activities with a uniquely 
global scope. In 2008, the IBA Arbitration Committee formed a Task Force on 
Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration
968
 („Task Force‟) for the purpose of 
studying the different ethical and cultural norms, standards and disciplinary rules that 
may apply to counsel in international arbitration.
969
 The mandate of the Task Force is 
„to investigate whether the lack of international guidelines and conflicting norms in 
counsel ethics undermines the fundamental protections of fairness and equality of 
treatment and the integrity of international arbitration proceedings.‟970 Although this 
thesis has examined the practice of three international courts rather than that of 
international investment tribunals in the ICSID and NAFTA organisations in order to 
more accurately compare their experiences with one another, the field of international 
arbitration is an area in which the problem of divergent ethical standards has become 
increasingly prominent.
971
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 The ethical standards that the IBA has already produced
972
 are formally 
exhortatory but be applied in practice due to their acceptance by the international 
arbitration community. This suggests that ethical guidelines that are formally not 
binding can nevertheless be practically effective. Thus, should the Task Force 
undertake the task of articulating ethical standards for adoption by national bars and 
the ICSID, the endorsement of the IBA would enhance the authority of those 
standards. 
 However, there are considerable obstacles in the path of professionalisation 
over and above the problems that apply to international courts generally. Chief among 
these is the problem of enforcement, which is particularly acute in the arbitral context. 
This is due to its party-controlled procedure, the flexibility of which is one of its 
hallmark features. This militates against that of individual tribunals to control 
procedure and, by extension, advocacy. It is arguable that, unless a way can be found 
to ground the enforcement of common ethical standards in party consent, the 
imposition of such standards by arbitral tribunals would potentially damage, or even 
destroy, the arbitration market by removing one of its most attractive features.  
 On the other hand, it is arguable that the death of international arbitration 
would be an exaggerated outcome of professionalisation. First, by rectifying existing 
practical problems and thereby strengthening procedural integrity, parties may react 
favourably to a regulatory framework requiring all representatives to observe strict 
ethical standards based upon principles of fairness, integrity and equality. Secondly, 
the authority of arbitral tribunals to regulate counsel can be based upon party consent. 
For example, this could be achieved for institutional arbitration by amending standard 
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arbitral rules on representation.
973
 Another way to engage party consent (particularly 
important for ad hoc arbitral tribunals
974
) is to require counsel to agree upon a code of 
conduct at the outset of proceedings whilst permitting them to amend optional 
provisions by common consent. Whilst another alternative is for national bars to 
prescribe a common code for international arbitration, this would necessarily be 
inapplicable to those representatives who are not members of national bars and so 
must be rejected as inadequate.  
 Alternatively, it is possible that the momentum for professionalisation in 
international arbitration can be provided by the adoption of common ethical standards 
by international courts with a clearer mandate to do so. The courts examined in Part II 
of this thesis, mutatis mutandis, are in this respect better-placed to take the lead in 
doing so. Although the problems arising from divergent ethical standards have not yet 
attracted the same degree of attention before these courts as in the arbitral context, 
Part II has shown that they nevertheless exist. Since the mandate provided by the 
participation of national bars in the legislative process is vital to the success of the 
professionalisation project, another organisation with the potential to undertake the 
task is the CCBE.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
973
 E.g. – ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 18; PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between 
Two States, Art. 4. 
974
 E.g. – UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Annex VII, Art. 5. 
 266 
8.2.3  CCBE 
The CCBE is an organisation comprising national bars and law societies from forty-
one European States with the principal aim of representing the interests of its 
members in dealings with EU and other international institutions.
975
 The founding of 
the CCBE in 1960 was sparked by the creation of the EEC through the Treaty of 
Rome 1957, which raised fears of a threat to the independence of European lawyers 
amongst the presidents of national bars.
976
 The CCBE‟s membership includes the bar 
associations of all twenty-seven EU members alongside those of fourteen States that 
are members of the Council of Europe. Only six bar associations of Council of Europe 
members are not members.
977
 
In 1988, the CCBE created the „Code of Conduct for European Lawyers‟, 
which has been integrated into the national rules of all forty-one members.
978
 Its 
provisions, backed by disciplinary sanctions at the national level, are binding upon 
some seven hundred thousand European lawyers.
979
 Whilst the CCBE Code applies to 
transnational legal services throughout the Common Market – which does not apply to 
the ECJ or ECtHR – it has nevertheless indirectly been influential as a source of 
inspiration for ethical standards for international courts (e.g. – the ILA Hague 
Principles). Its authoritativeness stems not from its textual provisions, which are 
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highly anodyne,
980
 but rather from its bindingness based upon the consent of a wide 
range of national bars. 
 In considering this precedent, the possibility arises whether the CCBE can 
play a role in the development of codes of conduct for the ECJ and ECtHR. It is 
conceivable that such a code, based upon the consent of the national bars in 
consultation with the Courts, would be a relatively straightforward first step in the 
professionalisation of the international judicial system. One of the functions of the 
CCBE is the articulation and development of professionalism and its mandate is 
particularly powerful. Moreover, the CCBE maintains a permanent delegation to the 
ECJ as well as a committee on its relationship with the ECtHR. Crucially, a code 
adopted by the organisation in plenary would be binding upon its members.
981
 Such a 
code could be adopted ex proprio motu by the ECtHR and would be likely to be 
adopted by the EU Council for the ECJ. 
 However, there are also obstacles that should be taken into account. One is the 
divide between the bars of States that are members of both the EU and the CoE and 
those that are members of the CoE only. The former group of States are full CCBE 
members with voting rights whereas the latter are associate members without voting 
rights.
982
 In this respect, a code of conduct for the Strasbourg Court would be 
problematic if it did not also have the approval of the associate members. It may in 
any case prove controversial since six CoE members do not have membership in the 
CCBE – most notably Russia. Thus, it may be politically wise to begin with a 
relatively straightforward code of conduct for the ECJ and subsequently articulate one 
for the ECtHR. 
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 A second problem involves reconciling the need for consensus that for textual 
integrity. Whilst this is a key issue for the professionalisation process in general, it 
may particularly apply to the CCBE context because of the failure of a recent 
initiative to prescribe a code of conduct for international arbitration. The story of this 
project is not generally known in the public domain,
983
 though it appears to be 
common knowledge amongst European lawyers working in the arbitration field. On 
22 May 2010, the CCBE Plenary decided to appoint a working group „to prepare 
some recommendations/guidelines with regard to the function, training, ethics, 
liability and other aspects of lawyers acting in [international arbitration].‟984 The 
terms of reference included „monitor[ing] developments in the field of arbitration at 
EU and international level‟, „reply[ing] to EU and international consultations 
affecting the role of European lawyers in the field of arbitration as arbitrators, counsel 
or experts‟ and „draw[ing] up ethical recommendations/guidelines for the use of 
European lawyers in arbitration‟.985 
 This was, by any standard, an ambitious undertaking. It was also based upon a 
questionable premise, namely, that the standards produced by the Working Group for 
use by European lawyers in international arbitration would assist in the harmonisation 
of ethical standards worldwide. Since European lawyers represent only one regional 
group amongst arbitration practitioners, a binding code of conduct would arguably 
have at best had a marginal effect in harmonising standards or even have exacerbated 
the problem by holding European lawyers collectively to a higher standard than other 
counsel. Moreover, voluntary guidelines would likely have been ignored in practice 
unless they were exceptionally well-drafted and intrinsically authoritative.  In addition 
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to these obstacles, it appears that the Working Group was plagued by lack of expertise 
and interest with very few members actively participating in the research and drafting 
process and the bulk of the work being done by a few individuals.   
 Despite these difficulties, a „final draft‟ of exhortative guidelines was 
produced by the Working Group after less than a year of work. However, certain 
arbitral institutions have registered strong objections to the draft, the German CCBE 
delegation has called for a motion to be passed by the CCBE Standing Committee 
requiring the project to be stopped and the Standing Committee appears to be in 
favour of stopping it.
986
 In reading the draft guidelines,
987
 it is easy to see why this 
occurred. It shows the marks of hasty drafting with verbose and imprecise 
language,
988
 a hopelessly broad remit
989
 and a weak grasp of the subject-matter. Since 
it is likely to be not only practically useless but even, due to the bindingness of CCBE 
rules, highly detrimental to European practitioners the termination of the project 
would be sensible. 
 Although this experience concerns a discrete subject, it nevertheless illustrates 
the danger of careless and over-ambitious drafting. Since the professionalisation 
project is particularly dependant upon the authoritativeness of ethical standards for 
success and that authoritativeness depends in large part upon the strength of its 
drafting, a putative code of conduct for the European Courts would require 
exceptionally well-considered draftsmanship not only to gain the support of the 
European bars and the Courts but also to be of practical utility. Clarity, succinctness, 
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logic and pragmatism are imperative to transcend the national differences towards 
uniformity based upon practical demands and an overarching ideal of professionalism. 
To achieve this result, the drafting committee have eminent and expert membership, 
adequate time and sufficient outside consultation. 
 Given these conditions, it is likely that a code of conduct could be achieved 
that would mark a major milestone in the professionalisation project. By showing that 
the articulation of common ethical standards is feasible, the European Courts could 
take the lead in inspiring other international courts. The relatively greater 
homogeneity of the European bars (compared with that of all bars worldwide) and, in 
particular, the existence of the CCBE Code is an important advantage in this respect. 
Although there is considerable variation amongst European bars on ethical issues, 
there are also important commonalities that provide a philosophical and cultural 
foundation for harmonisation. Through a spirit of pragmatism, flexibility and 
creativity it is probable that a drafting committee could produce a useful set of 
common ethical standards for the European Courts.   
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8.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused upon the question of the feasibility of the professionalisation 
project. In that respect, it has addressed two critical issues, namely, the articulation of 
common ethical standards and their enforcement by international courts as the 
common disciplinary jurisdiction. Obstacles have been identified that would hinder 
professionalisation, such as the difficulty of balancing consensus with textual integrity 
in the prescriptive process and the need for safeguards to ensure that the judges and 
registrars who would enforce ethical standards are qualified to do so and observe 
natural justice rights for impugned counsel. However, this chapter has also suggested 
that the obstacles are surmountable through a pragmatic, flexible and creative 
approach that is sensitive to national differences and competing interests and 
priorities.  
 The ILA Hague Principles have proved that common ethical standards are 
achievable for general application and the international criminal courts have provided 
templates for architectural reforms that can meet these demands. This chapter has 
offered two bases for international courts to assert regulatory jurisdiction over 
counsel, namely, an implied statutory power within a broad express power to frame 
procedural rules and, alternatively, the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction. Through its 
analysis, it has offered an answer to the legal objection to professionalisation that 
international courts lack the power to regulate counsel. However, the policy 
consideration of whether international courts should exercise that jurisdiction depends 
upon the ability of the court to do so with competence and basic fairness. In that 
respect, the adoption by international courts of codes of conduct should be 
accompanied by architectural reforms to instil confidence in the integrity of the 
system and thereby propel the professionalisation process forward.     
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Chapter IX: Towards an International Bar 
 
This chapter examines two questions: 1) the feasibility of self-regulation by the 
international bar; and 2) the potential consequences of the professionalisation of 
advocacy in the international judicial system. In Chapter 7, the regulation of advocacy 
by international courts was explored as one avenue to professionalisation whereby the 
onus would principally be upon the various courts to individually prescribe and 
enforce admission requirements, ethical standards and disciplinary powers. Assuming 
that the individual court has the jurisdiction and expertise to do so, this creates the 
basic conditions of professionalism. As previously discussed, this appears to be the 
most feasible regulatory option in the near-term.  
As explained in Chapter 1, professionalisation does not require self-regulation 
as an architectural model. However, beyond the minimal conditions for a profession 
there are practical and political factors to be considered in the selection of a 
permanent regulatory structure. One such factor is the ability and willingness of the 
judiciary to regulate counsel – even if the desirability of regulation is accepted. There 
are legitimate doubts about this with splits of opinion amongst the judges. Interviews 
conducted for this thesis with the international judiciary suggests that the majority of 
the interviewed judges would prefer advocates to regulate themselves rather than to 
assert regulatory jurisdiction over them. The chief reason for this appears to be a 
desire to increase the distance between bench and bar by promoting the independence 
of the latter from the former.  
Thus, there is a body of judicial opinion that would prefer self-regulation over 
the regulation of counsel by the courts. There are advantages to be offered by self-
regulation, including the creation of a tangible forum for collective discussion and 
representation of the bar‟s common interests and the promotion of collective 
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responsibility for the conduct of its members. The legitimacy of the regulatory 
process would also be arguably enhanced by counsel applying agreed standards to 
themselves rather than having imposed standards by the judges who may or may not 
have personal experience as counsel. On this reasoning, this is best achieved through 
advocates regulating themselves. Thus, there are potential advantages to self-
regulation not only to raise standards but also to provide a permanent forum within 
which to address other matters of common concern to advocates.  
As indicated in Chapter 1, the consequences of professionalisation for the 
practice of advocacy in the international judicial system stem from the degree of 
incisiveness that is generated by the process. For example, centralisation into an 
international bar would presumably have a profound effect upon the independence, 
transparency and professional accountability of advocacy. By contrast, the less radical 
step of international courts setting up their own regulatory infrastructure may be less 
impactful. Although professionalisation would change the realities of litigation, its 
success in creating an independent bar depends upon the incisiveness and utility of its 
standards.    
In this chapter, section 7.1 addresses the various degrees of centralisation that 
are possible within the international judicial system. Section 7.2 examines the 
possibility of national enforcement of international standards. Section 7.3 considers 
the creation of an international bar authority, which would be mandated to create 
admission standards, ethical standards and/or a standing disciplinary organ. Section 
7.4 sets out the possible consequences of professionalisation for the practice of 
advocacy in the international judicial system. Finally, section 7.5 concludes the 
chapter by reflecting upon the competing themes and dynamics involved in the 
professionalisation of advocacy.  
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9.1 Centralisation of Regulatory Authority 
The creation of an international organ to regulate counsel before international courts 
engages two dynamics, namely, the centralisation of regulatory authority over 
licensed practitioners and the expansion of that authority to cover non-practitioners. 
Centralisation entails the transfer of national bars‟ powers to regulate licensed 
practitioners before international courts to the international authority. Expansion 
entails the extension of regulation to counsel who are not licensed to practise law by a 
national bar (e.g. – academics and diplomats). The aim of centralisation would be to 
ensure the uniform application of common standards for the practice of international 
advocacy. 
 However, it is questionable whether centralisation is necessary to achieve the 
professionalisation of advocacy. It may also be argued that uniformity is a chimera in 
that the diversity of national standards is too great. The practical obstacles to the 
creation of a supranational bar authority to regulate counsel are considerable, 
particularly conflicts of jurisdiction. Considering the disparate and centrifugal nature 
of the international judicial system, the success of centralisation depends upon the 
degree of centralisation. Commonality necessarily entails an element of centralisation 
by reconciling differences. If one accepts the need for commonality one necessarily 
accepts the need for a degree of centralisation. However, there is a considerable 
difference between „harmonisation‟ and „uniformity‟. Harmonisation suggests the 
acceptability of a degree of divergent standards within a common framework whereas 
uniformity requires identical standards. Thus, an important dynamic in considering 
the professionalisation of international advocacy through architectural centralisation is 
this tension between divergence and centralisation. 
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  Thus, centralisation entails numerous possibilities. First, it could entail the 
divergent enforcement of common ethical standards by national bars. This would be 
the weakest solution in that it would preserve the centrifugal structure of the existing 
system, leaving the greatest scope for divergence. Second, it could entail regulation 
by international courts. As explored in Chapter 7, this is a pragmatic solution for the 
near-term that would not create an „international bar‟ in a unitary sense but rather 
several „international bars‟ attached to each court. Third, it could involve the creation 
of a supranational authority mandated by international courts and national bars. This 
could take the form of a standing disciplinary committee at a professional 
organisation such as the International Law Association. Fourth, it could involve the 
federalisation of national bars into a single supranational authority like a strengthened 
International Bar Association. This would be the most radical and far-reaching 
solution in scale and consequently the most practically difficult to achieve.  
 Paradoxically, a peculiar strength of the complex and diffuse nature of the 
international judicial system is that it provides considerable scope for creativity and 
imagination. Whereas in national jurisdictions the presence of an overarching State 
superstructure limits the ability of the bar to unilaterally change itself, no such 
centralised public authority exists at the international level. For example, the creation 
of a supranational bar authority does not require a State mandate to function. The 
centralisation of regulatory authority engages three key actors: 1) the senior members 
of the de facto international bars; 2) the international judiciary; and 3) the national 
bars. The test for the success of professionalisation lies in the ability to mobilise these 
three actors and to reconcile competing priorities and jurisdictions within a common 
framework. 
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9.2 National Enforcement of Common Standards 
As explored in Chapter 7 in relation to the CCBE, one method for the 
professionalisation of advocacy entails the enforcement of common ethical standards 
by national bars. The attractiveness of this solution is twofold. First, it is relatively 
cheap in terms of effort in that no major architectural reform would be required to 
achieve it. Second, it seemingly precludes the double deontology problem by vesting 
disciplinary jurisdiction firmly with the national bars. Hence, on this approach the 
principal challenge to professionalisation is the articulation of common standards 
acceptable to the various national bars. 
 This solution is also practicable for certain organisations and jurisdictions that 
provide a framework for the compulsory integration of common standards into 
national codes of conduct. The CCBE Code of Conduct is the principal example of 
this method whereby common standards were articulated at the supranational level 
and, following adoption in plenary, were required to be integrated at the national 
level. In principle, the same procedure could be utilised to articulate codes of conduct 
for the ECJ and ECtHR with the addition of judicial consultation to ensure the 
subsequent adoption of the codes by those Courts. All four judges from those two 
courts interviewed for this thesis supported that idea.
990
 On this approach, the 
principal actors driving the process would be national bars with the support of judges 
and senior counsel. 
 However, it is more doubtful whether the same process would work for the 
articulation of common standards for other international courts that are not 
jurisdictionally defined by the European region. For other regional courts (e.g. – the 
IACtHR) there is no equivalent organisation to the CCBE to provide a mechanism for 
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this bar-driven process. For international courts with a wider territorial jurisdiction 
(e.g. – the ICJ or ICC), the only organisation with a similar forum for this technique is 
the IBA. However, unlike the CCBE the IBA has no history of articulating codes of 
conduct for adoption by national bars.
991
  
 Even if the articulation and adoption of common standards by national bars 
through the IBA is feasible, there remain significant weaknesses inherent in this 
technique. First, there would remain divergent enforcement of the common standards. 
National bars are highly diverse with different standards, cultures and resources. 
Since the law is a process that does not stop at its articulation and enactment but 
continues into its interpretation and application, it is probable that on divisive issues 
requiring normativity there would be divergent application of the common standards 
in line with national cultures. This would defeat the principal objective of 
professionalisation to harmonise divergent standards within common standards.  
Secondly, the common standards would not apply to non-practitioners because 
international courts lack the power to subject them to the discipline of national bars. 
The „common‟ standards would consequently apply only to counsel who are already 
subject to national standards through their practicing licences. This would defeat 
another important objective of the exercise to ensure the application of common 
ethical standards to all counsel. For reasons explored below, the adoption of an 
admission requirement by all international courts that advocates be practitioners 
would be insufficient to ensure that all counsel are subject to common standards.  
Thirdly, a process driven principally by national bars does not require 
practitioners to assume principal responsibility for their collective conduct in their 
advocacy before international courts. This runs counter to the spirit of the 
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professionalisation project to create an „international judicial culture‟ based upon the 
unique requirements and procedures of international courts and drawing upon national 
traditions for inspiration. The history of national bars explored in Chapter 2 suggests 
that, as a sociological phenomenon, an important facet of professionalisation is an 
awakening of corporate identity. The organisation of the international bar can only 
really be done by the practising advocates themselves to ensure its independence and 
begin to construct its collective identity rooted in common philosophical principles 
like truth, justice and the rule of law. Thus, it is vital for the creation of a common 
culture that the organisation of the international bar be undertaken principally by the 
international bar.  
 This is not to say that the national adoption of common ethical standards 
before international courts is not an important part of the project. The engagement of 
national bars, as collectively one of the key actors in the process, is crucial to preclude 
double deontology and provide the international bar with an important mandate for its 
work. For example, the adoption of common standards by the CCBE (for the ECJ and 
ECtHR) and by the IBA (for the ICSID) would provide a strong mandate for the 
adoption and application of those standards by those international courts. However, an 
equally important facet is the assumption by international advocates of responsibility 
for their own regulation. Whilst self-regulation is not a required condition for 
professionalism, it is arguably the most effective way of ensuring the inculcation of 
common standards by centralising regulation in a supranational authority.  
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9.3 International Bar Authority 
A second option for the professionalisation of international advocacy entails the 
creation of an international bar authority mandated to regulate counsel appearing 
before international courts. Whilst the salient feature of this option is self-regulation, 
its architecture may significantly differ from a national bar. The lack of an 
overarching State superstructure providing a constitutional framework demands 
different tools to ensure that international bar is accountable in its task of self-
regulation.  
 Today, the CCBE is the organisation that most closely resembles an 
international bar. Due to ideological differences concerning federalisation, there is no 
consensus concerning the degree of centralisation that might occur in future. As one 
ECtHR judge, who was previously active in the organisation, relates: 
„Certainly, it is very premature to speak of this. When we cannot even create a „European bar‟ 
as such, we probably would struggle to create an even more inclusive, unified bar. However, 
the ILA Hague Principles are a very useful idea in that they provide ideas and suggestions for 
the various Courts to consider and adapt to their own circumstances.‟992 
 
Consequently, if feasible at all, the creation of a self-regulating international bar with 
the full range of regulatory and representational functions of a national bar is a long-
term prospect. In the nearer term, more plausible is the creation of a more limited 
disciplinary committee. The success of its self-constitution would depend upon the 
recognition by international courts and national bars of its authority, which in turn 
would require a strong structure and leadership by the most eminent international 
lawyers. The historical emergence of the oldest national bars (e.g. – the Massachusetts 
colonial bar) explored in Chapter 1 indicates that the support of the judiciary is the 
most crucial factor in establishing the authority of a new bar through a monopoly over 
rights of advocacy.  
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9.3.1 Bar Admission 
The creation of an international bar, like any other organisation, begs the question of 
membership rules. In a historically decentralised legal services market at international 
courts, this exercise is particularly difficult due to the diffuse and centrifugal nature of 
international law education. However, closer examination of various options reveals 
that the creation of objective admission criteria is practicable even in the absence of a 
centralised system of legal education. This is due to the existence of a number of de 
facto requirements that have been asserted by the market rather than by a regulatory 
authority, which provides a degree of natural continuity. Additional requirements that 
the market has not yet imposed can be created to raise standards.  
In determining what expertise an international law advocate should have, the 
following broad elements are suggested: 1) an academic foundation with a speciality 
in public international law; 2) advocacy skills, including procedure, evidence, 
litigation strategy and rhetoric; and 3) good moral character including integrity, 
industry and temperance. In the first place, it is clear that the market demands a period 
of academic study. This takes the form of a foundation in the initial bachelor of laws 
degree programme, typically varying between three and five years, to obtain a 
grounding in a national legal system with the possibility of an introduction into the 
study of public international law (typically in the final year of study). Moreover, a 
period of academic specialisation has become increasingly expected through a master 
of laws degree (of one or two years‟ duration) and even a doctorate (three to five 
years). Thus, academic requirements of an LL.B. degree combined with at least two 
or three years of specialised study in public international law would appear to be 
straightforward.  
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 More difficult is the question of quality control, namely, a qualitative 
assessment of an applicant‟s academic qualifications. There is a clear interest in 
asserting such control in light of the multiplicity and diversity amongst higher 
educational institutions and the corporate interest of the image of the bar.  A 
published and annually updated list of academic institutions whose degree 
certifications are recognised may be one method to provide consistency. Additionally, 
the attainment of degree results of a minimal standard (e.g. – the equivalent a „B‟ 
grade of the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System
993
) would provide 
an additional control. Due to the difficulty in comparing higher educational standards, 
a sufficient geographical representation amongst the standard-setters at the bar is vital 
to ensure accuracy and fairness.  
 Another potential requirement is that candidates be members of a national bar 
in good standing. Although this appears to be the minimal requirement imposed by 
those international courts that have admission standards, it is potentially contentious 
because of its exclusion of academic lawyers.
994
 The principal advantages that this 
requirement would bring would be subjection to professional ethics and discipline at 
the national level and the implied addition of practical training in advocacy and civil 
procedure that membership of a national bar theoretically entails. However, these 
benefits are in practice unlikely to be very substantial because the entire point of 
creating an international bar is to provide common ethics and discipline and national 
training standards differ widely in quality and focus. Moreover, in light of the 
traditional predominance of academics in the discipline their exclusion would 
arguably deprive the bar of required expertise. 
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 However, it is also illogical to exclude from the membership requirements of a 
guild of advocates any training or experience of advocacy. There are two possible 
solutions to this. First, a training institute could be created to provide a course in the 
practical skills that international law advocacy requires (e.g. – civil procedure, written 
pleading, evidence, litigation strategy and oral rhetoric). This would clearly be an 
expensive, and the consequently more difficult, option. Second, candidates could be 
required to prove their expertise in these skills through proof of practical experience 
(e.g. – three years) and/or other forms of advocacy training.  
Clearly, either option would exclude academics with no advocacy expertise 
from admission.
995
 This, on balance, would be a healthy development in forcing the 
market to raise standards by requiring all advocates to have at least a basic foundation 
(however subjectively defined) in advocacy. Despite the traditionally academic 
character of public international law, it is indefensible that persons with no training or 
experience in these skills should be admitted to an international bar. Whilst this would 
clearly run counter to the interests of a substantial number of international lawyers, 
transitional provisions or delayed entry into force can ensure that the bar is gradually 
raised and provide academics with time to obtain training and experience prior to 
application. Another potential method to test the qualifications (academic, practical or 
both) of candidates is by bar examination. Although this has the attraction of 
consistency, it may be difficult and onerous to design and apply. It may also be 
superfluous by overlapping with examinations already given for academic degrees 
and admission to national bars. It would also be logistically more complicated, 
requiring an examinations board to manage the process, than setting degree and 
vocational requirements.   
                                                 
995
 See discussion in Chapter 5. 
 283 
 The final admission requirement would be that candidates be of good moral 
character,
996
 which is commonly demanded by national bars. This is potentially more 
complicated than may appear at first sight, particularly in light of cultural differences 
concerning the relevance of a candidate‟s private life to their professional character. 
Whilst it seems plain that personal adherence to principles of justice, integrity and the 
rule of law are vital to the professional character of an advocate, it is difficult to draw 
the line clearly in all cases. One basic requirement may be that a candidate has no 
unspent criminal convictions, though this may be more difficult in cases of 
convictions unrelated to honesty, the administration of justice or violence. For 
example, a conviction for a „political offence‟ (e.g. – participating in a violent public 
protest or a violation of demonstration laws) or private character (e.g. – adultery or 
tax evasion) arguably impact upon professional character to the extent that an 
advocate‟s respect for the rule of law or honesty. However, the national laws, fair trial 
standards and cultural perspectives on such offences makes criminality problematic as 
the professional standard for moral character.  
 Furthermore, moral standards are difficult to determine in more subtle 
qualities like sobriety or good judgement. For example, a candidate may have a 
history of making intemperate statements against opposing counsel, improper media 
statements or has a history of professional negligence lawsuits. One the one hand, 
such behaviour could be disruptive to the fair conduct of proceedings or otherwise 
bring the profession into disrepute. On the other hand, it is arguable that pugnacious 
advocates can be effective. Thus, it may ultimately be a subjective exercise to assess 
moral character in light of the candidate‟s circumstances. A final requirement may be 
knowledge of either English or French, as required by the ECJ, ECthR and ICC.    
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9.3.2 Code of Conduct 
The second regulatory aspect of an international bar entails the prescription of a code 
of conduct. Whilst it is conceivable that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the bar 
authority could be exercised by applying multiple codes of conduct enacted by the 
various courts, simplicity and consistency demand that a single code be used for all 
members of the bar. Despite the fact that different provisions of the code will apply to 
different courts according to their procedures,
997
 such provisions would naturally not 
apply to those courts that do not require them. Thus, the uniformity of ethical 
standards for all courts has no practical detriment. 
 However, this is clearly predicated upon the recognition of the international 
bar authority and its prescribed standards by international courts. Assuming that the 
judiciary is regularly consulted in the drafting process and able to directly address the 
bar on matters of common concerns (e.g. – at bar colloquia), a code of conduct agreed 
amongst advocates would presumably be a welcome development to the judiciary: 
 „It is up to counsel to set up an international bar and the Court should not interfere in this 
endeavour. Formally, the establishment of a bar could be achieved through the creation of a 
disciplinary committee comprising experienced people at the bar to engage with ethical issues. 
The International Bar Association or the International Law Association may be the 
organisations that are able to address this project. The problem with the ICJ setting up a bar is 
that there is a question concerning the relationship with national bars. The English Bar, for 
example, has extraterritorial jurisdiction – though this is not perhaps the case with other 
bars.‟998 
 
Thus, though Chapter 7 sets out the professionalisation of advocacy by international 
courts as the more practicable near-term variant it is arguable that self-regulation is 
the more politic solution for the independence of the bar from the bench. However, 
the degree to which judges should be distant from the bar depends also upon the 
development of the international judiciary (e.g. – recruitment of judges from senior 
advocates).  
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9.3.3 Standing Disciplinary Panel 
In creating a supranational regulatory authority, a standing committee of a 
professional organisation could be designed to assume disciplinary jurisdiction over 
alleged misconduct before international courts. Whilst this organ could be created as 
part of an entirely new organisation dedicated to the regulation of the international 
bar, there is no practical advantage to this approach. Rather, the pragmatic variant 
would be to create this disciplinary organ within an existing organisation with an 
established reputation and the ability to create the essential links with the judiciary 
and national bars. Its composition and procedures must be harmonised with those key 
actors to establish its authority.  
 The two principal candidates for this role are the IBA and the ILA.
999
 These 
organisations have quite different missions, memberships and activities. The former, 
based in North America, more closely resembles the CCBE as an organisation with 
direct links to national bars and extensive activity in the study of professional ethics 
worldwide. The latter, based in the Hague, is devoted to the study of international law 
and does not have links to national bars – though it counts many judges at 
international courts as members. Whereas the IBA does not have direct links to 
international courts, the ILA lacks direct links to national bars.  
As explored above, the ideal disciplinary mechanism would entail 
international law advocates assuming primary responsibility with links to both 
national bars and the international judiciary. Of the two organisations, it is suggested 
that the ILA would be the better choice within which to create a permanent 
disciplinary mechanism. First, the ILA is specifically devoted to the study and 
development of international law with international lawyers in its membership. If 
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international lawyers are to constitute an international bar to self-regulate, the ILA 
would be the logical forum. Secondly, there are practical benefits to the location of 
the disciplinary mechanism in the Hague. Thirdly, it would be politically easier to 
achieve agreement to constitute and operate the organ amongst international law 
advocates and judges than between national bars. Finally, the participation of national 
bars in the disciplinary mechanism can be achieved through the creation of a link with 
the bars directly or through the IBA.  
  The membership and procedures of the disciplinary committee would need to 
conform to the demands of natural justice. The ICC disciplinary mechanism for 
defence counsel provides a useful template.
1000
 Initial investigation should be 
conducted by a standing ombudsman elected by the committee for that purpose. 
Members of the disciplinary board should be required to have expertise in 
comparative professional ethics and international procedural law. There should be 
rights to be heard, to representation by counsel and to appeal. One member of the 
panel should be of the impugned advocate‟s nationality. To preclude double 
deontology and provide a national perspective, the national bar or university should 
be invited to provide one member of a three-person disciplinary panel. One member 
should come from the referring international court in the form of a judge or registrar 
not of the advocate‟s nationality and not the complainant. The third member should 
come from a list of senior international law practitioners.  
 The efficacy of a disciplinary organ of this kind most depends upon the strong 
support of international courts. Those courts without an existing disciplinary 
mechanism of their own would need to recognise the authority of the ILA committee 
to adjudicate alleged misconduct before them, subject to their inherent jurisdiction to 
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do so themselves where the interests of justice require it (e.g. – to exclude an advocate 
from ongoing proceedings to prevent prejudice). This category of courts includes the 
ICJ, ITLOS, WTO DSB, ECJ, ECtHR, IACtHR and ACJ. Although it would be ideal 
to centralise disciplinary jurisdiction for these courts into a single entity, pragmatism 
may demand an exception for the ECJ and ECtHR by vesting their jurisdiction into 
the CCBE. 
 However, this centralisation may be more difficult for institutional and ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals to do owing to their impermanence and generally greater weakness 
in relation to the parties.
1001
 Courts in this category include the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, ICSID, NAFTA, UNCLOS Annex VII tribunals and PCA. Whilst individual 
tribunals could invoke their inherent jurisdiction to refer alleged misconduct to the 
disciplinary committee, it would be preferable for the institution to provide them with 
an express power to do so. Were a referral to be made pursuant to an inherent 
jurisdiction and the impugned advocate decline to participate in the proceedings, the 
authority of an in absentia decision would depend upon the tribunal. For example, a 
decision to impose a fine would depend upon the tribunal declining admission until 
the advocate paid it. However, the tribunal would still have discretion to back the 
decision or not. A tribunal that disagreed with the finding, the international bar‟s 
jurisdiction or its own inherent jurisdiction may decline to do so. Similarly, the 
ultimate sanction of „disbarment‟ would have only reputational effect unless backed 
by the authority of all the tribunals. 
 A third category of courts comprises the criminal courts, which already have 
their own disciplinary structures. Whilst Chapter 6 reveals that those structures have 
scope for further improvement, particularly in extending them to prosecutors, there is 
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a strong argument for the exclusion of the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL from the 
international bar authority. This argument is on the grounds of unnecessary 
duplication and the procedural and cultural differences between civil and criminal 
proceedings. According to one judge:  
„[It is necessary] to treat each international court separately, as what is true for the ICC for 
example may not be true for the ICJ. Each Court naturally has a separate and different culture. 
For example, the ICTY can sanction counsel for contempt but the ICJ does not have such a 
provision.‟1002 
 
The most important difference is in the higher fair trial standards that apply in the 
latter, which in turn require counsel to observe stricter ethical standards.  
 However, this may be countered by the need for consistency in the application 
of ethical standards before all international courts. This argument is predicated upon 
the commonality of those standards in criminal as well as civil proceedings. Whilst it 
is arguable that there are procedural differences between the two that can give rise to 
ethical issues peculiar to themselves,
1003
 these issues derive from universal ethical 
standards.  After all, national bars apply their standards to civil and criminal 
proceedings alike while acknowledging their differences by prescribing specific rules 
to address particular issues.
1004
  Moreover, Part II has revealed there are a variety of 
ethical standards
1005
 which apply identically to both civil and criminal proceedings. 
From this viewpoint, the creation of an international judicial culture amongst counsel 
depends upon the uniformity of application of these universal standards throughout 
the international judicial system.  
On balance, the arguments for the complete centralisation of jurisdiction in a 
single international bar for all international courts are compelling in the interests of 
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embedded within a distinctive international criminal procedure.  
1004
 E.g. – paras 9-16 of the English Bar „Written Standards for The Conduct of Professional Work‟ 
contain „Standards Applicable in Criminal Cases‟.     
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 E.g. – conflicts of interest, misleading the Court, the submission of false documentary evidence, 
witness contacts, witness examination, contacts with judges or professional courtesy.  
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creating common culture through consistent application of uniform ethical standards. 
However, the complexity of the architectural issues involved and the delicacy of 
centralisation argue for an incremental approach. In the near-term, the most practical 
option is the creation of an international bar to regulate counsel before those 
international courts that currently lack such regulation. Once the bar authority is 
functional and has settled after overcoming the early challenges that inevitably 
accompany a new and transformative institution, its jurisdiction may thereafter be 
gradually extended to those the arbitral tribunals and ultimately the ICC.  
In this way, the obstacles confronting the creation of an international bar 
authority may be confronted gradually from the easier towards the more difficult. A 
catalyst for the success of the project may thereby be created by picking the low-
hanging fruit, namely, the construction of a regulatory jurisdiction to address 
problems of ethical standards for those courts that currently lack it. The resulting 
momentum can be sustained so that the architectural problems attendant to each 
particular court may be solved with due deliberation. Concerning the practicality of 
(eventually) integrating the criminal courts into the international bar, realistically this 
only applies to the ICC in light of the advanced stage of the ad hoc tribunals‟ work. 
This would entail amendment to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence by the ASP in 
order to abolish the current disciplinary system and tie its jurisdiction to the 
international bar authority. Thus, the ultimate integration of the ICC into the unified 
international bar may not prove as difficult as it may first appear.   
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9.4 Consequences of Professionalisation 
As explained in Chapter 2, the principal rationale for the professionalisation of 
advocacy is to protect the integrity of the international judicial process. This 
phenomenon is best understood as a reaction to divergent standards amongst 
professional advocates bound by conflicting national rules as well as non-
professionals bound by no comparable standards. Consequently, the most important 
potential consequence of professionalisation is increased protection for the procedural 
integrity of the international judicial system. Potential secondary consequences 
include: increased independence for counsel, reduced party control over case 
presentation, exclusion of non-professionals and enhanced image of international 
adjudication.  
 
9.4.1 Procedural Integrity 
The effect upon procedural integrity is likely to be beneficial. The harmonisation of 
national standards through the prescription of uniform standards applied at the 
supranational level would eliminate dangers to procedural integrity arising from those 
conflicts. Where national standards are so far apart as to render impossible their 
hybridisation, harmonisation may nevertheless be achieved through selectivity.
1006
 A 
case in point is the standards of France, the USA and England and Wales on witness 
proofing. Despite the impossibility of hybridising these standards, a single rule on 
witness proofing for international litigation could nevertheless be achieved through a 
selective approach that prioritises the standard that is the most suitable to protect 
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procedural integrity.
1007
 Thus, harmonisation of national standards for international 
litigation is achievable through a selective approach on their respective merits.  
Although the effect upon procedural integrity is likely to be beneficial, a more 
contestable point is the impact upon procedural efficiency. A useful example is the 
recent propensity for challenges to the participation of counsel in ICSID arbitrations 
on grounds of conflicts of interest.
1008
 On the one hand, it is arguable that uniform 
standards on conflicts would reduce challenges in ICSID proceedings by providing a 
clear normative framework. On the other hand, it is plausible that prescribed standards 
would encourage more challenges by providing a platform. It is suggested that well-
articulated standards are likelier to promote rather than detract from procedural 
efficiency for three reasons. First, challenges already happen in the absence of a clear 
normative framework. Second, the current absence of any standards to guide 
arbitrators and counsel complicates the handling of conflicts. Third, challenges that 
are made in the future can be addressed more simply and quickly under a single and 
relatively clear framework rather than through argumentation on the current myriad 
array of national and international standards.
1009
     
An important factor for realising the potential benefits of professionalisation 
for procedural integrity is the authoritativeness of the common standards. This 
depends upon several factors, including sufficient consensus amongst the legal 
community, the incisiveness of the standards in deftly addressing recurrent problems 
on which national standards differ, their sensitivity and understanding of those 
national differences and their succinctness and clarity. For example, the omission of 
witness proofing from the ICC procedural framework prompted two procedural 
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decisions with extensive argumentation in Lubanga. Where hybridisation of national 
standards is impossible due to the degree of divergence, harmonisation requires 
selection. Whereas parties may favour proofing because it increases their control over 
the testimony to support their cases, the truth-seeking process of justice is objective. 
In such cases, lax ethical standards are unlikely to be effective in discharging their 
rationale of protecting procedural integrity. 
As explored in Chapter 7, the early efforts by study groups to articulate 
common standards have provided some important lessons. First, lack of incisiveness 
to make choices between conflicting standards that produce in a text that is too 
cautious and anodyne will not be effective. Second, excessive ambition in attempting 
to articulate a wide-ranging text without the requisite time, effort or expertise to do so 
can be more dangerous than beneficial by resulting in a draft that lacks a sufficient 
consensus or produces incoherent or weak standards. Third, an incremental and 
progressive approach that anticipates the accumulation of practice to address and 
rectify ethical dilemma is better than a comprehensive approach that can fail at the 
committee stage. The Lubanga decisions are now ICC precedents that have provoked 
subsequent criticism by the ICTY and in academia which would likely feature in a 
review of ICC rules. Thus, the optimal method of professionalisation entails the initial 
construction of a professional framework within which these matters can be 
addressed. Whilst a degree of incisiveness is essential for articulated standards to be 
practically effective, resolution of particularly difficult problems can occur gradually 
through the accretion of practice.  
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9.4.2 Counsel Independence 
The increased practical independence for counsel from their clients is an important 
potential consequence of professionalisation, which is also connected to party control 
over case presentation. It extends to party control over the composition of their legal 
teams in that admission requirements would limit the pool of counsel. There would be 
less incentive for parties to retain, as they can now, incompetent or dishonest counsel 
who know how to follow orders when a framework exists within which the other side 
can challenge their misconduct and the judiciary can sanction them. Hence, even 
without admission requirements that impose legal training upon potential counsel this 
added deterrence can be expected to naturally exclude the unprofessional 
„pettifoggers‟.    
 The independence of counsel vis-à-vis clients may also cause another 
beneficial effect, namely, increased protection for inexperienced parties from 
dishonest practitioners. For example, counsel acting in pursuit of their own private 
interests in their representation of their clients
1010
 could face disciplinary proceedings. 
Similarly, counsel failing to respect opposing counsel during the course of 
proceedings
1011
 could be fined. Before the civil courts, it is only through costs orders 
(paid by the client, not counsel personally) through which the cost to the court 
resulting from such misconduct can currently be recovered. Professionalisation could 
result in independent counsel who engage in inefficient advocacy being subject to 
fines.
1012
  Furthermore, since admission requirements would compel parties to engage 
professional counsel it is conceivable that fees and legal aid
1013
 would become subject 
to regulatory oversight. 
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9.4.3 Party Control over Case Presentation 
The prescription of common ethical standards designed to promote the independence 
of counsel in order to protect procedural integrity would necessarily reduce party 
control over the presentation of their cases. Professionalism often entails empowering 
and obliging counsel to say the word „no‟ to their clients. Those counsel who are 
bound by no professional standards at the national level forbidding them from making 
use of information that their clients provide to them through covert surveillance
1014
 of 
the bench or the other side will be able to do so with relatively low risk. Since 
professional standards would oblige them to refrain from using such information, the 
risk to counsel agreeing to participate in such practices would rise considerably. 
Parties would have less incentive to engage in such misconduct without the 
cooperation of their counsel. 
 For government officials, this is a potentially sensitive area. As seen in 
Chapters 5 through 7, the bifurcation between privileged and non-privileged litigants 
concerning the appointment of their counsel entails greater control for the former over 
their cases. Agency is an important manifestation of this imbalance whereby only 
States may appoint agents and agents are outside of the court‟s regulatory jurisdiction. 
This clearly provides an important tactical advantage for government officials who 
are willing to exert pressure upon their agents to compel them to engage in nefarious 
practices in order to win cases. Officials who wish to submit false documentary 
evidence
1015
 or to refuse to disclose adverse evidence on false grounds
1016
 or without 
explanation
1017
 will find it considerably easier to do so if they are not bound to 
convince their independent counsel to participate.  
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9.4.4 Exclusion of Non-Professionals 
Another potential consequence of professionalisation is the removal of certain 
categories of non-professionals from advocacy or limiting their role in litigation. As 
indicated above, to some degree this would inevitably happen as the incentives shift in 
the market to adapt to the new regulation. However, even minimalistic admission 
requirements would be likely to be prescribed by the courts as part of the process. 
Whilst this would restrict the choice of parties to appoint whomever they wish as 
counsel, that restriction would be more beneficial than detrimental by ensuring that 
only persons with at least some legal training appear as advocates before the 
courts.
1018
    
 Categories of persons who may currently appear as counsel but would likely 
be excluded are: experts,
1019
 diplomats and politicians
1020
 and other laymen with no 
legal training or qualifications. This would be accomplished through the requirement 
that counsel be members of national bars, which is standard before the ECJ, ECtHR 
and ICC. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, academic lawyers who are specialists in 
international law are unlikely to be excluded before the inter-state courts and, in any 
case, exceptions are prescribed for them within the rules of the aforementioned courts. 
Whilst this requirement is insufficient in itself to ensure the competence of counsel, it 
would at least eliminate some of the problems that have arisen in practice such as 
experts making statements as counsel rather than witnesses or government officials 
making references to personal knowledge in the course of statements as agents. 
Whilst the price for professionalisation is consequently to restrict the pool of potential 
counsel, this can hardly be considered detrimental.  
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9.4.5 Formation of a Collective Bar 
A final secondary consequence of professionalisation is the formal constitution of the 
existing de facto bars.
1021
 Currently, there is no normative nexus that binds counsel 
from different national traditions into a collective. The de facto bars are founded more 
upon personal and collegial relationships built through shared educational and 
occupational experience rather than a common ideal. The articulation of common 
ethical standards necessitates a common purpose, which creates in its turn a common 
culture. In the current „golden age‟ of international adjudication, the need for an 
„international judicial culture‟ to fill that normative void has become increasingly 
evident. The ideals of justice and the rule of law have important practical 
consequences for the integrity and legitimacy of international courts and thus for the 
willingness of parties to use them. 
It is no longer sufficient to simply regard international courts as cloistered 
institutions that deal with abstruse and largely trivial matters. Where the ICJ once 
dealt with one or two cases a year, now it has a full docket. Where the ECJ and 
ECtHR were once obscure, now they have become increasingly prominent in the 
public eye of Europe. Where international criminal law was a completely theoretical 
area with no prospect for practical implementation, now there are the ad hoc and 
mixed tribunals and a permanent court. Where international investment arbitration 
was once relatively peripheral, the explosion of bilateral investment treaties has 
rendered it one of the most important and dynamic areas of the law. In short, the 
explosion in the scale and prominence of international litigation has necessitated a re-
assessment of the collective identity of its practitioners. The articulation of common 
values through professionalisation would be an important step in that process. 
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9.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored possibilities for centralisation into a self-regulating 
international bar authority. As this has never before been attempted and is not on the 
current agenda of the international legal community, only tentative observations can 
be offered. Certain dynamics can be identified as important to the success of such a 
bar authority should one day the idea garner significant support. The creation of a 
supranational regulatory authority has hitherto been discussed by international 
lawyers at an informal level and there are practical difficulties to its manifestation.  
 Firstly, centralisation is a variable concept. This particularly applies to the 
fragmented international judicial system, which lacks a formal superstructure to 
ensure consistency and certainty. Centralisation requires support from a significant 
majority of senior international law practitioners, the major national bars and 
international courts. It is suggested that these interests can be made mutually 
compatible through a disciplinary framework that integrates national bars into a 
supreme international jurisdiction. 
Secondly, the option of delegation of regulatory authority to the national bars 
offers more disadvantages than advantages. Although it is architecturally the easiest 
option, it does not solve the essential problem of divergent ethical standards that 
currently complicates the practice of international advocacy. Since the law entails 
both its articulation and application, the prescription of a common text is alone 
inadequate to create an international judicial culture. Standards are defined and raised 
not only through words but also through inculcation, requiring a common forum and a 
common discipline.  
Thirdly, the rationale for self-regulation is the independence of advocates from 
other authorities and the collective responsibility of the bar over its members, which 
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raise ethical standards in practice. Although the judiciary would likely welcome a 
self-regulating international bar, natural justice rights and the participation of national 
bars in the disciplinary process would be necessary. Double deontology would need to 
be solved through national bars‟ recognition of the international bar‟s jurisdiction.  
Fourthly, the support of the international judiciary is crucial because the 
establishment of the new bar‟s authority practically depends upon the recognition and 
application of its jurisdiction by the courts. As an initiative by the bar itself to 
independently tackle these issues, it is politically likely to attract the support of those 
judges who are reluctant to regulate. This requires the consensus of the senior 
members of the de facto bar but also the support of the courts.  
 Fifthly, it is suggested that the more pragmatic approach towards the creation 
of an international bar authority would be incremental rather than comprehensive. The 
bar would initially exercise its jurisdiction over advocacy before those international 
courts that currently do not have regulatory structures of their own. Once the authority 
is smoothly functioning, the desirable unification of the bar could gradually be 
achieved through the extension of the authority‟s jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunals 
and the ICC.  
 Finally, the consequences of professionalisation depend upon its incisiveness. 
An incremental approach would likely see minimal and anodyne standards created 
initially that would accumulate through practice. The aim of protecting procedural 
integrity would be achieved through increased independence of counsel and reduced 
control of parties. A useful step would be taken towards the creation of an 
international judicial culture founded upon the fundamental ideals of justice and the 
rule of law.   
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Chapter X: Conclusions 
In summary, the central conclusion of this thesis is that the professionalisation of 
advocacy before international courts and tribunals is both desirable and feasible. In 
reaching this conclusion, this chapter proceeds according to the structure of the thesis. 
First, it explains the rationale for professionalisation as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Secondly, it gives reasons for its desirability as explored in Chapters 3 to 7. Thirdly, it 
defends its feasibility as analysed in Chapters 8 and 9. Fourthly, it sets out its 
potential consequences as examined in Chapter 9. Finally, it offers recommendations 
for action to successfully implement professionalisation on the basis of the principal 
themes identified in the thesis. 
 
10.1  Rationale 
As set out in Chapter 2, the rationale identified in this thesis for the 
professionalisation of advocacy is to ensure the greatest possible protection of the 
integrity of the judicial process, including the fundamental elements of fair trial. This 
rationale is consistent with the historical emergence of professional advocacy in 
Europe as a reaction to the perceived need for competent counsel who meet the 
highest standards of integrity and professionalism. Similarly, the inherent jurisdiction 
of national courts to regulate counsel existed to prevent procedural abuses.  
 Consequently, it is necessary to address the question whether 
professionalisation is desirable as a matter of practice and policy. Since the price paid 
for professional advocacy may be the entrenchment of elites with exclusive rights of 
hearing before international courts, in a manner that constrains accessibility to the 
general public, the price must be justified by the advantages that may be obtained as a 
consequence of changing and raising standards that professionalism is designed to 
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create. It must be shown not only that inclusive, non-professional advocacy leads to 
lower standards that may raise difficulties, but also that professional advocacy 
produces higher standards. In addressing the former, this implies that misconduct 
(intentional or otherwise) need to be identified in addition to problems arising from 
honest but conflicting national standards of professional advocacy.  
The professionalisation of advocacy would reduce the power of parties 
(particularly States) over their counsel. Restricted rights of hearing to professionals 
coupled with ethical standards requiring counsel to comply with rules (backed by 
disciplinary sanctions) designed to protect procedural integrity clearly has the 
potential to shift the balance of power between parties and courts. By creating 
autonomous intermediaries with duties not only to the client but also to the court, 
parties lose a degree of control. In exchange, all concerned are intended to benefit 
from the raised standards of integrity, competence and fairness in the judicial process.  
 
10.2  Desirability 
As set out in Chapter 2, the desirability of professionalisation is based both upon its 
necessity with reference to existing practice and to its benefit with regard to the image 
of the international judicial system. Necessity is prompted by two phenomena, 
namely, divergent ethical standards and low standards caused by a lack of regulation 
that threaten the integrity of the judicial process. Image benefit derives from the 
public legitimacy and confidence that professionalism aims to provide courts as an 
ideology intended to safeguard fundamental principles of fairness and integrity.  
 As explored in Chapter 3, national standards of advocacy do diverge 
depending upon the procedural and judicial systems of the jurisdiction. In common 
law jurisdictions, the role of the advocate has been historically larger than in civil law 
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jurisdictions. Since common law counsel have a larger role in the judicial process, the 
impact of professional misconduct upon the process is greater. Consequently, the 
ethical standards imposed have been stricter in line with that role. The various 
jurisdictions also have their own histories, philosophies and contemporary challenges. 
Younger bars that operate within authoritarian political systems and/or in cultures 
historically sceptical of professional advocacy clearly struggle to inculcate high 
standards. The older bars also face modern pressure to instil a competitive ethos 
potentially detrimental to the traditional value of independence.  
As set out in Chapter 4, the role of legal adviser is particularly important due 
to the formative „diplomatic tradition‟ of nineteenth-century advocacy that relies upon 
government lawyers as agents rather than external counsel. Although the British and 
American legal advisers are generally qualified practitioners, the efficacy of the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the national bars over their conduct is doubtful. For those 
governments that utilise career diplomats (who may not have a legal background) or 
academic lawyers, there is clearly no external regulator. Thus, the independence of 
legal advisers relative to external counsel is questionable.   
 Chapter 4 also explained the origins of the laissez-faire system of 
representation that continues before the PCA, ICJ, ITLOS and the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal. Ironically, although the PCIJ declined to regulate counsel on the ground that 
States could not act dishonourably, the historical record shows that arbitral tribunals 
and the Court itself were periodically compelled to regulate counsel. Indeed, problems 
that have arisen before the modern Court (e.g. – experts acting as counsel, false 
evidence and incompetence) appeared in PCIJ practice. Whilst this historical record 
disproves the argument that international courts lack jurisdiction to regulate counsel, 
the PCIJ narrative shows that they may decline to exercise it as a policy matter.  
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Chapters 5 to 7 principally addressed whether professionalisation is desirable. 
Although the broad conclusion is that it is desirable, the conclusion varies according 
to the particular circumstances of different courts. For the ICJ, practice suggests that 
common ethical standards are necessary in light of divergent and inadequate 
standards. Although there are clearly eminent and respectable counsel who are 
members of the de facto bar, this bar does not have a complete monopoly over rights 
of hearing. Consequently, the laissez-faire policy of the Court in leaving 
representational matters generally to the parties allows parties greater control over 
case presentation and their counsel. Practice suggests that this has provided scope for 
some counsel to be appointed who have arguably not acted in accordance with 
professional standards of independence, integrity and competence.
1022
 Interviews with 
judges have shown that there is a conservative camp that believes that the Court 
cannot or should not regulate counsel and a progressive view that advocates such 
regulation to protect the Court‟s procedural integrity.  
 By contrast, Chapter 6 has shown that there has been remarkably little practice 
concerning counsel conduct before the ECJ. This is attributable to the more limited, 
review-based jurisdiction of the Court as well as the relative homogeneity of the six 
founding members. However, the chapter further illustrates that even before the ECJ 
there have been periodic issues concerning the conduct of counsel. For example, sharp 
differences regarding the independence of employed lawyers amongst national 
jurisdictions have been topical and in rare cases there has been questionable handling 
of documentary evidence. Notably, all of the latter cases have concerned the conduct 
of agents representing governments and the EU Commission. This suggests that, 
contrary to the Victorian argument that States could not act dishonourably, 
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government lawyers and diplomats are equally prone to misbehaviour. Consequently, 
this renders the bifurcation between privileged and non-privileged litigants dubious 
from the perspective of fairness, integrity and equality.    
 Chapter 7 focused upon the practice of the ICC concerning prosecutors who, 
unlike defence counsel, are self-regulating before all of the international criminal 
tribunals apart from the SCSL. Its examination revealed that multiple problems of a 
serious nature (e.g. – obeying court orders, handling of testimonial and documentary 
evidence and prejudicial media statements) have arisen concerning the professional 
conduct of prosecutors. Although the concern of the judiciary to maintain an 
appropriate distance between itself and the prosecutors is sustainable, the dichotomy 
between self-regulating prosecutors and defence counsel regulated by the Court is not. 
Indeed, the fact that hitherto most of the controversy has emanated from prosecutors 
rather than defence counsel suggests that there is a pressing need for both sides of the 
courtroom to be subject to common ethical standards. The unreasoned ICTY decisions 
finding that it lacked jurisdiction to regulate prosecutors are unconvincing. They is 
not only inconsistent with that Tribunal‟s invocation of inherent jurisdiction to 
prescribe the broader contempt powers for itself but also with the lack of an express 
statutory basis for the regulation of defence counsel.  
 
10.3  Feasibility 
Chapters 4 to 7 examined the feasibility of professionalisation as a subsidiary issue, 
principally concerning the legal power of the respective courts to regulate. However, 
feasibility was the principal focus of Chapters 8 and 9. Although the conclusion of 
these analyses is that professionalisation is feasible, important problems have been 
identified. Although the creation of a unified international bar authority to regulate 
 304 
counsel is not impossible, it is suggested that regulation by international courts is 
more practicable in the medium-term.  
In Chapter 8, the possibility of regulation by international courts was 
considered through analysis of two issues. First, the legal authority of the courts to 
regulate counsel was considered. It was suggested that the power to do so derives 
from the doctrine of implied powers, whereby those courts with a broad express 
power to frame rules of procedure can by implication lay down rules concerning 
representation by counsel. Alternatively, it was argued that those courts lacking such a 
broad statutory power could invoke the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction. It was 
suggested that this doctrine derives from national judicial systems, particularly 
common law systems, for the prevention of procedural abuses. It was argued that the 
jurisprudence of international courts is inconsistent on the doctrine‟s applicability to 
the regulation of counsel but that the decisions against are not persuasive. 
Second, the practical ability of the courts to regulate counsel was examined. A 
link was made between the system of judicial election and the courts‟ regulation in 
that there is currently no method of ensuring that judges are themselves sufficiently 
expert in counsel ethics. Interviews with judges confirmed that there is a clear 
difference between those judges who have experience as practising counsel and those 
who have been primarily diplomats or academics. It was argued that there is a need 
for architectural mechanisms that ensure the observance of natural justice standards in 
the disciplinary systems of the courts in order to instil confidence amongst 
practitioners in their fairness. These standards are also necessary to resolve the 
problem of double deontology by establishing the prescriptive and disciplinary 
supremacy of international courts. National bars that claim jurisdiction over their 
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members‟ conduct before international courts must be persuaded to relinquish it in the 
interests of providing certainty for their members and upholding the courts‟ authority. 
Chapter 9 examined two questions, namely the possibility of self-regulation by 
counsel through the creation of an international bar authority and the potential 
consequences of professionalisation. Whilst the centralisation of regulatory authority 
required for self-regulation by counsel is possible, it is suggested that the 
decentralised nature of the international judicial system allows for it to be manifested 
to varying degrees. The option of delegating the enforcement of common ethical 
standards to national bars is suggested to be undesirable because it allows for variable 
application according to national standards, thus unravelling the uniformity of the 
common standard.  
Although the creation of a common regulatory authority (e.g. – an ILA 
disciplinary panel or an association of national bars such as the CCBE) is theoretically 
possible and is favoured by some judges, the experience of the CCBE suggests that it 
may not yet be politically feasible. Its principal advantages are that it creates distance 
between the bench and the bar as well as a forum for the inculcation of common 
standards and the collective representation of the bar. However, the principal 
obstacles are the lack of consensus and momentum for the creation of such an 
authority and the potential unwillingness of national bars to relinquish their own 
regulatory jurisdiction concerning their members‟ conduct before international courts.  
In addition, were the creation of an international bar authority to be pursued in 
the future, it is suggested that the support of the international courts for its jurisdiction 
would be indispensible for its success. This would likely be a gradual process rather 
than comprehensive, whereby the bar authority could be constructed to serve one 
international courts (e.g. – the ICJ) and subsequently expand to cover other courts. 
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Although the centralisation of regulatory authority across the international judicial 
system has the potential advantages of strengthening the applicability of common 
standards and fostering a common identity and ideology, there are strong arguments 
for the segregation of those courts with their own infrastructure. This would 
principally comprise the ICC and other criminal tribunals and the ECJ and ECtHR, 
which already have the CCBE as a potential forum. 
 
10.4  Consequences 
Chapter 9 also considered the potential consequences of professionalisation for the 
international judicial system. It was suggested that the articulation of common ethical 
standards, if done effectively, would have a beneficial impact upon the integrity of the 
judicial process by ameliorating differences amongst divergent national standards and 
imposing ethical duties upon non-professionals. This would have a number of 
potential secondary effects: 1) the promotion of the independence of counsel from the 
client; 2) reduction of party control over case presentation, leading to a re-balancing 
of authority between parties and courts; 3) the exclusion of non-professionals through 
admission requirements, thus creating a formal bar; and 4) the formation of a 
collective bar that would undertake regulatory and/or representational functions. 
These potential consequences depend upon the degree and effectiveness of the 
professionalisation measures undertaken. 
 
10.5  Recommendations 
Based upon the research and analysis described above, this thesis makes the following 
recommendations for the achievement of professionalisation. First, it is proposed that 
common ethical standards be prescribed by international courts as codes of conduct 
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for counsel. Although these standards must be enacted by the courts to achieve 
practical effectiveness, they should be articulated by international law practitioners 
through professional organisations with links to the respective courts as well as 
national bars. Courts like the ICJ and ITLOS could enact codes of conduct. The IBA 
Task Force is seized with the topic and could produce standards for adoption by both 
national bars and the ICSID. The CCBE could articulate standards for adoption by the 
ECJ and ECtHR in consultation with the judiciaries of those Courts. The ICC could 
extend its Code of Conduct, currently only applicable to defence counsel, to 
prosecutors and update it to tighten standards in light of the problems that have arisen 
in its early jurisprudence.  
 Secondly, it is suggested that the articulation of those common standards be 
done in a careful, deliberate and pragmatic fashion. Notwithstanding divergences 
amongst national jurisdictions, the fundamental values of the profession should be 
recognised as justice and the rule of law. There should be informed acknowledgement 
of conflicting national standards and a willingness to harmonise them through 
hybridisation and selectivity in accordance with the practical demands of international 
litigation. Selecting national standards should not be done dogmatically but rather 
pragmatically according to their function in promoting procedural justice.    
Thirdly, it is recommended that international courts assert the supremacy of 
their regulatory jurisdictions over counsel in order to eliminate the double deontology 
problem. This entails both the textual supremacy of their codes of conduct over 
national standards (an invariable provision of the criminal courts‟ codes) but also the 
supremacy of their disciplinary jurisdictions over those of national bars. The 
effectiveness of an international jurisdiction and the need for counsel to have 
regulatory certainty demand that national courts relinquish their jurisdictions in 
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support of international courts. National bars should be integrated into the 
international courts‟ jurisdictions by inviting them to participate in the prescription of 
codes of conduct and in the courts‟  disciplinary procedures.  
 Fourthly, it is proposed that admission requirements be imposed by 
international courts for both agents and counsel in order to exclude non-lawyers from 
rights of hearing. As seen in this thesis, this principally applies to the inter-state 
tribunals and arbitral tribunals. The basic admission requirement applicable before the 
international criminal courts alongside the ECJ and ECtHR is membership of a 
national bar and familiarity with one of the official languages of the court. Whilst 
academic lawyers of proven expertise should be exempted from the requirement of 
membership of a national bar, they should be required to comply with the same 
standards as practitioners. This would beneficially exclude diplomats, politicians and 
other non-lawyers from acting as advocates. Whilst the exclusion of government 
lawyers may be sensitive, it is argued on the basis of Akzo Nobel reasoning as 
discussed in Chapter 6 as well as cases involving alleged agent misconduct in 
Chapters 4 through 6 that government lawyers are insufficiently independent from 
their employers.  
 Fifthly, it is suggested that the possibility of creating an authority that could 
assume regulatory and representational functions for the international bar should be 
examined. Whilst the current circumstances indicate that this is a long-term project 
and is not necessary to achieve professionalisation, it is nevertheless of potential 
benefit in inculcating a common identity amongst international law practitioners. This 
would promote the creation of an international judicial culture grounded in solidarity, 
mutual understanding and respect for universal values of justice and the rule of law. 
 
 309 
Bibliography 
 
Books and Articles 
 
1. 1908. Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court. 
(Suppl.) AJIL (2), 174-202. 
2. 1908. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice. 
(Suppl.) AJIL (2), 231-243. 
3. 1914. Regulations of the Central American Court of Justice. (Suppl.) AJIL (8), 
179-194.  
4. 1914. Ordinance of Procedure of the Central American Court of Justice. (Suppl.) 
AJIL (8), 194-213. 
5. Abel, R. 1989. American Lawyers. New York: Oxford University Press. 
6. Abel, R. 1999. The Politics of Professionalism: the Transformation of English 
Lawyers at the End of the Twentieth Century. Legal Ethics (2), 131-147. 
7. Abel, R. and Lewis, P. 1995. Lawyers in Society: An Overview. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
8. Al-Arayed, J. 2003. A Line in the Sea: The Qatar v. Bahrain Border Dispute in 
the World Court. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books. 
9. Ambos, K. 2008. „Witness proofing‟ before the International Criminal Court: a 
reply to Karemaker, Taylor and Pittman. LJIL (21), 911-916. 
10. Ambos, K. 2009. Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(E) ICC Statute) vs. 
Disclosure Obligations: The Lubanga Case and National Law. NCLR (12), 543-
568. 
11. Anderson, D. and Demetriou, M. 2002. References to the European Court. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
12. Ando, N., McWhinney, E. and Wolfrum, R. 2002. Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru 
Oda. The Hague: BRILL.  
13. Anoushirvani, S. 2010. The Future of the International Criminal Court: The Long 
Road to Legitimacy Begins with the Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. PILR (22), 
213-240. 
14. Antoine, A. 1953. La Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour internationale de 
Justice. RGDIP (57), 210-261. 
15. Arbour, L. 2000. The Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court. 
Berlin: Freiburg im Breisgau. 
16. Arbour, L. 2006. Legal Professionalism and International Criminal Proceedings. 
JICJ (4), 674-685. 
17. Aristotle, 2005. Politics. Translated by: Rackham, H. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
18. Arnull, A., Tridimas, T. and Eeckhout, P. 2008. Continuity and Change in EU 
Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
19. Austin, J. 1968. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson. 
20. Bablitz, E. 2007. Actors and Audience in the Roman Courtroom. London: 
Routledge. 
21. Baig, L. 2009. International Criminal Law and Legal Ethics: The Need for Shared 
Expectations. ASILP (103), 255-267. 
22. Baker, J. 1969. Counsellors and Barristers: an Historical Study. CLJ (27), 205-
229. 
 310 
23. Bayer, A. 2003. Litigators at Community patent proceedings - whose 
representation is it? IRIPCL (34), 361-373. 
24. Beignier, B., Blanchard, B. and Villacèque, J. 2002. Droit et déontologie de la 
profession d‟avocat. Paris: Presses Universitaires France. 
25. Bentham, J. 1982. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1982), London: Methuen. 
26. Benvenuti, P. 2001. The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing 
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. EJIL (12), 503-529. 
27. Bilder, R. 1962. The Office of the Legal Adviser. AJIL (56), 633-685. 
28. Bingham, T. 2010. The Rule of Law. London: Penguin Group. 
29. Bishop, C. 1931. International Arbitral Procedure. Washington, D.C.: J. Byrne & 
Co. 
30. Bishop, R. and Kehoe, E. 2010. The Art of Advocacy in International Arbitration. 
New York: Juris Net. 
31. Bodde, D. and Morris, C. 1967. Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 
Ch‟ing Dynasty Codes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
32. Bodin, J. 1962. The Six Bookes of a Commonweale. Translated by: McRae, K. 
New York: Arno Press. 
33. Bonner, R. 1927. Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens: The Genesis of the 
Legal Profession. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
34. Boon, A. and Levin, J. 2008. The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and 
Wales. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
35. Boudant, J. 2005. La Cour de justice des Communautés Européennes. Paris: 
Dalloz. 
36. Brady, J. 1982. Justice and Politics in People‟s China: Legal Order or Continuing 
Revolution? New York: Academic Press. 
37. Brown, C. 2005. The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals. BYIL 
(66), 195-244. 
38. Brown, C. 2007. A Common Law of International Adjudication. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
39. Brown, L. and Kennedy, T. 2000. The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
40. Brundage, J. 2008. The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
41. Burrage, M. Revolution and the Making of the Contemporary Legal Profession: 
England, France and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
42. Bustamente, A. 1925. The World Court. London: Macmillan. 
43. Byers, M. 1997. Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga 
Omnes Rules. NJIL (66), 211-239. 
44. Calhoun, S. 2008. Globalization's Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and 
What U.S. Courts Can Do to Prevent It. TxLR (87), 235-265. 
45. Caloyanni, M. 1931. The Judicial Policy for the Settlement of International 
Disputes. TGS (17), 85-111. 
46. Caloyanni, M. 1931. L‟organisation de la Cour permanente de justice. RdC 
(1931), 651-786.   
47. Calvocoressi, P. 1947. Nuremberg: The Facts, the Law and the Consequences. 
London: Chatto and Windus. 
48. Carty, A. 2004. The Corfu Channel case – and the Missing Admiralty Orders. 
LPICT (3) 1-35. 
 311 
49. Cassese, A., Gaeta, P. and Jones, J. 2002. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
50. Chavrier, 2003. L‟avocat devant les jurisdictions européennes. L‟observateur de 
Bruxelles (52), 21-31. 
51. Ch‟en, P. 1979. Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols: the Code of 1291 as 
Reconstructed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
52. Ch‟en, P. 1981. The Formation of the Early Meiji Legal Order: The Japanese 
Code of 1871 and its Chinese Foundation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
53. Chen, J., Li, Y. and Otto, J. 2002. Implementation of Law in the People's Republic 
of China. New York: Kluwer Law International. 
54. Chinkin, C., Nouwen, S. and Ward, C. 2010. Report of the Seventy-Fourth 
Conference. London: International Law Association. 
55. Clark, G. 2008. An Introduction to the Legal Profession in China in the Year 
2008. SULR (51), 833-850. 
56. Cocks, R. 1983. Foundations of the Modern Bar. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
57. Cohen, H. 1929. A history of the English Bar and attornatus to 1450. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell. 
58. Charney, J. 1997. Book Review: International Law Decisions in National Courts. 
AJIL (91), 394-396, 
59. Cicero. 1942. De Oratore: Books 1-II. Translated by: Sutton, E. Edited by: 
Rackham, H. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
60. Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H. 2009. The Law of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
61. Conot, R. 1983. Justice at Nuremberg. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  
62. Cot, J. 2011. The Hague vs. Burgh House. LPICT (10), 25-29. 
63. Cot, J. The Corfu Channel Case: The Bar in Due Diligence, Self-Help and the Rise 
of International Law: The Continued Relevance of the Corfu Channel Judgment 
60 Years On. Unpublished paper on file with author. 
64. Cranston, R. 1995. Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
65. Crawford, J. 2006. The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
66. Crook, J. 1967. Law and Life of Rome. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
67. Delvaux, L. 1956. La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon 
et de l‟Acier. Paris: J. Duculot.  
68. De Richemont, J. 1954. Communauté européenne du charbon et de l‟acier: La 
cour de justice, code annoté guide pratique. Paris: Libraire du journal des notaires 
et des avocats. 
69. Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. 1996. Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
70. Dicks, A. 1989. The Chinese Legal System: Reforms in the Balance. CQ (119), 
540-576.  
71. Diez, E., Monnier, J. Müller, J. et al. Festschrift fu  r Rudolf Bindschedler. Bern: 
Stämpfli.  
72. Doria, J., Gasser, H. and Bassiouni, C. 2009. The Legal Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko. 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
73. Edward, D. 1990. Different Assumptions – Different Methods. S.S.C. Biennial 
Lecture 1990. Edinburgh: Society of Solicitors in the Supreme Court of Scotland. 
 312 
74. Evans, M. 2003. International Law (2003). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
75. Evetts, J. 1999. Professionalisation and professionalism: issues for 
interprofessional care. JIC (13), 119-128. 
76. Feldbrugge, F. 1992. The Emancipation of Soviet Law. New York: St. Martin‟s 
Press. 
77. Forsyth, W. 1849. Hortensius: or, The advocate: an historical essay. London: J. 
Murray. 
78. Fujikura, K. 1996. Japanese Law and Legal Theory. Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing.   
79. Gawalt, G. 1979. The Promise of Power: The Emergence of the Legal Profession 
in Massachusetts. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
80. Gellhorn, W. 1987. China‟s Quest for Legal Modernity. JCL (1), 1-22. 
81. Glendon, M. 1994. A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal 
Profession is Transforming American Society. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux. 
82. Goh, B. 2002. Law without Lawyers, Justice without Courts: On traditional 
Chinese mediation. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
83. Goldschmidt, L. 1874. Projet de Règlement pour Tribunaux Arbitraux 
Internationaux. RdDI (6), 421. 
84. Goldschmidt, L. 1875. Procédure arbitrale internationale. RdDI (7), 418-426.  
85. Goldston, J. 2010. More candour about criteria: the exercise of discretion by the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. JICJ (8), 383-406. 
86. Goodman, C. 2008. The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis. Leiden: 
Kluwer Law International. 
87. Guyomar, G. 1973. Commentaire du règlement de la Cour internationale de 
justice : interprétation et pratique. Paris: A. Pendone.  
88. Haley, J. 1991. Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.   
89. Harding, A. 2002. Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
90. Hardinge, S. and Mackay, J. 2008. Halsbury‟s Laws of England. London: 
LexisNexis. 
91. Harhoff, F. 2010. It is all in the Process: Reflections on the Relation between 
International Criminal Trials and International Humanitarian Law. NJIL (78), 469-
480. 
92. Harris, W. 1954. Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg. Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press.  
93. Hazard, G. and Dondi, A. 2004. Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press. 
94. Henkin, L. 1993. The Mythology of Sovereignty. ASIL Newsletter, 1. 
95. Hicks, F. 1908. The Equality of States and the Hague Conferences. AJIL (2), 530-
561. 
96. Higgins, A. 1908. The Papacy and International Law. JSCL (9), 252-264. 
97. Higgins, R. 2001. Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom. 
ICLQ (50), 121-132.  
98. Higgins, R. 2010. Ethics and International Law LJIL (23), 277-289. 
99. Hilderbrand, R. 1990. Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and 
the Search for Postwar Security. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 
Books.  
100. Hobbes, T. 1947. Leviathan. London: J.M. Dent. 
 313 
101. Honoré, T. 1998. Law in the Crisis of Empire 379-455 AD: the Theodosian 
Dynasty and its Quaestors. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
102. Hu, J. 2000. The development of the Chinese legal profession since 1978. 
Durham: University of Durham.  
103. Hudson, M. 1932. The Central American Court of Justice. AJIL (26), 759-786.  
104. Hudson, M. 1943. The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942. 
New York: The Macmillan Company. 
105. Hudson, M. 1946. The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World Court. AJIL (40), 1-
52.  
106. Hull, W. 1908. Obligatory Arbitration and the Hague Conferences. AJIL (2), 
731-742. 
107. Ipp, D. 1998. Lawyers in Court. LQR (114), 63-107. 
108. Jackson, R. 1949. Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative 
to the International Conference on Military Trials. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office. 
109. Jeantet, F. 1954. Les intérêts privés devant la Cour de Justice de la 
Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l‟Acier. RDP (70), 684-713. 
110. Jiménez de Aréchaga, E. 1973. The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of 
the International Court of Justice. AJIL (67), 1-22.  
111. Johnson, T. 1972. Professions and Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
112. Joint Committee on the Role of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. 
1991. The Role of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. AJIL (85), 358-
371. 
113. Jordash, W.  2009. The practice of „witness proofing‟ in international criminal 
tribunals. LJIL (22), 501-523. 
114. Kalshoven, F., Kuyper, P., van Panhuys, H. and Lammers, J. 1980. Essays on 
the Development of the International Legal Order. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
115. Kaplan, W. and McRae, D. 1993. Law, Policy, and International Justice 
(1993). Quebéc City: McGill-Queen‟s University Press. 
116. Karpik, L. 1999. French Lawyers: a study in collective action 1274 to 1994. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
117. Katzman, R. 2009. The Non-Disclosure of Confidential Exculpatory Evidence 
and the Lubanga Proceedings: How the ICC Defense System Affects the 
Accused‟s Right to a Fair Trial. NUJIHR (8), 77-101. 
118. Karemaker, R., Taylor, B. and Pittman, T. 2008. Witness proofing in 
international criminal tribunals: a critical analysis of widening procedural 
divergence. LJIL (21), 683-698. 
119. Karemaker, R., Taylor, B. and Pittman, T. 2008. Witness proofing in 
international criminal tribunals: a response to Ambos. LJIL (21), 917-923. 
120. Kawashima, Y. 1986. Puritan Justice and the Indian: White Man‟s Law in 
Massachusetts. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press. 
121. Kazazi, M. 2011. Commentary on the Hague Principles on Ethical Standards 
for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals. LPICT (10), 17-
23. 
122. Keith, K. „Naval secrets‟, public interest immunity and open justice in Due 
Diligence, Self-Help and the Rise of International Law: The Continued Relevance 
of the Corfu Channel Judgment 60 Years On. Unpublished paper on file with 
author. 
123. Keith, R. 1994. China‟s Struggle for the Rule of Law. London: Macmillan. 
124. Kelsen, H. 1946. General Theory of Law and State. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 314 
125. Kirby, J. 2011. Witness Preparation: Memory and Storytelling. JIntA (28) 401-
406.   
126. Koh, H. and Zelinsky, A. 2009. Practising International Law in the Obama 
Administration. YJIL (35), 1-13. 
127. Kranzbühler, O. 1964-1965. Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards.DLR (14), 
333-347. 
128. Lagrange, M. 1954. La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du 
Charbon et de l‟Acier. RDP (70), 417-435. 
129. Lagrange, M. 1978. La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes: du 
Plan Schuman à l‟union Européenne. RTDE, 2-17. 
130. Lasok, K. 1984. European Court of Justice: Practice and Procedure. London: 
Butterworths. 
131. League of Nations Advisory Committee of Jurists. 1920. Draft Scheme of the 
Committee with Reports to the Council of the League of Nations and Resolutions 
by the Council Relating to It. Geneva: League of Nations. 
132. League of Nations Advisory Committee of Jurists. 1920. Procès-verbaux of 
the Proceedings of the Committee. League of Nations: the Hague. 
133. Leng, S. 1967. Justice in Communist China: A Survey of the Judicial System of 
the Chinese People‟s Republic. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications. 
134. Leubsdorf, J. 2001. Man in His Original Destiny: legal ethics in France. 
London: Ashgate. 
135. Lewis, J. 1982. The Victorian Bar. London: Hale. 
136. Lubman, S. 1995. Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law. CQ (141), 1-21. 
137. Mackenzie, R., Malleson, K., Martin, P. and Sands, P. 2010.Selecting 
International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
138. Mahoney, P. 2008. The International Judiciary – Independence and 
Accountability. LPICT (7), 313-349. 
139. Malintoppi, L. 2008. Remarks on Arbitrators‟ Independence, Impartiality and 
Duty to Disclose in Investment Arbitration. LPICT (7), 351-356. 
140. Malleson, K. 2000. Judicial Bias and Disqualification after Pinochet (No 2). 
MoLR (63), 119-127.   
141. Marston, G. 2000. Falsification of Documentary Evidence before International 
Tribunals: An Aspect of the Behring Sea Arbitration, 1892-3. BYIL (71), 357-373. 
142. Massa, A. 2006. NATO‟s Intervention in Kosovo and the Decision of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Not 
to Investiate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion? BJIL (24), 610-
649. 
143. Matheson, M. 2002. Practical Aspects of the Agent‟s Role in Cases before the 
International Court. LPICT (1), 467-479. 
144. May, A. 2003. The Bar and the Old Bailey. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 
145. May, R., Tolbert, D. Hocking, J. et al. 2000. Essays on ICTY Procedure and 
Evidence in honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
146. McDowell, D. 1986. Spartan Law. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. 
147. Mégrét, F. 2008. International Prosecutors: Accountability and Ethics. Leuven 
Center for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 18. 
148. Mendelson, M. 2001. The Curious Case of Qatar v. Bahrain in the 
International Court of Justice. BYIL (72) 183-212. 
 315 
149. Mérignhac, A. 1895. Théorique et pratique de l‟arbitrage international: le 
rôle du droit dans le fonctionnement actuel de l‟institution et dans ses destinées 
futures. Paris: L. Larose. 
150. Mettraux, G. 2008. Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
151. Monnet, J. 1976. Mémoires. Paris: Fayard. 
152. Moore, J. 1898. History and digest of the international arbitrations to which 
the United States has been a party. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office. 
153. Moore, J. 1929. International Adjudications, Ancient and Modern. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
154. Morcom, C. 2009. „Representation of parties before the European Court of 
Justice - is there a need for reform?‟ EIPR (2009), 223-226. 
155. Mouton, J. and Soulard, C. 2004. La Cour de justice des Communautés 
Européennes. Paris: Presses Universitaires France. 
156. Müller, D. 2005. Procedural Developments at the International Court of 
Justice. LPICT (4), 141-163. 
157. Neave, A. 1978. Nuremberg. London: Hodder and Stoughton.  
158. Nicholson, D. and Webb, J. 2004. Lawyers‟ Duties, Adversarialism and 
Partnership in UK Legal Ethics. Legal Ethics (7), 133-140. 
159. Nys, E. 1912. Droit international. Paris: Libraire des sciences politiques 
sociales. 
160. Oppenheim, L. 1912. International Law. London: Longmans. 
161. Orakhelashvili, A. 2006. Peremptory Norms in International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
162. Owada, H. 1971. What Future for the International Court of Justice? AJIL (65) 
268-274. 
163. Papakonstantinou, Z. 2008. Lawmaking and Adjudication in Archaic Greece. 
London: Duckworth. 
164. Peck, C. and Lee, R. 1997. Increasing the Effectiveness of the International 
Court of Justice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.  
165. Peerenboom, R. 1998. Lawyers in China: Obstacles to Independence and the 
Defense of Rights. USA: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 
166. Pellet, A. 2006. Remarks on Proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice. LPICT (5), 163-182. 
167. Pellet, A. 2008. The Anatomy of Courts and Tribunals. LPICT (7), 275-287. 
168. Philip, C. 1983. La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France.  
169. Phillips, O. and McCoy, P. 1952. Conduct of Judges and Lawyers: A Study of 
Professional Ethics Discipline and Disbarment. Los Angeles: Parker and Co. 
170. Phillipson, C. 1911. The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and 
Rome. London: Macmillan & Company.  
171. Prest, W. 1981. Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America. New York: 
Holmes and Meier. 
172. Prest, W. 1986. The Rise of the Barristers: A Social History of the English Bar 
1590-1640. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
173. Pue, W. and Sugarman, D. 2003. Lawyers and Vampires: Cultural Histories of 
the Legal Professions. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
174. Rabinowitz, R. 1956-1957. The Historical Development of the Japanese Bar. 
HLR (70), 61-81. 
 316 
175. Raeder, A. 1912. L‟Arbitrage international chez les Hellenes. Oslo: Kristiania.  
176. Ralston, J. 1910. International arbitral law and procedure. Boston: Ginn & 
Co. 
177. Ralston, J. 1929. International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press. 
178. Reuter, P. 1947-1948. Nurnberg 1946: The Trial. NDL (23), 76-97. 
179. Reuter, P. 1952. Le Plan Schuman. RdC (81) 523-628. 
180. Reuter, P. 1953. La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l‟Acier. Paris: 
Institut des hautes études internationales.  
181. Revon, M. 1892. L‟Arbitrage international. Paris: Lévy. 
182. Reydams, L. 2005. The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg 
Paradigm? JICJ (3) 977-988. 
183. Rhode, D. 2000. In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
184. Rhode, D. 2004. Access to Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
185. Riese, O. 1953. Die Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (6), 521-525. 
186. Robertson, A. 1957. Legal Problems of European Integration. RdC (91), 105-
211. 
187. Rodman, K. 2009. Is peace in the interests of justice? The case for broad 
prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court. LJIL (22), 99-126. 
188. Romano, C. 1998-1999. The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: 
The Pieces of the Puzzle, NYUJILP (31), 709-752.  
189. Rogers, C. 2009. Lawyers without Borders. UPILR (30), 1035-1086. 
190. Rosenne, S. 1985. The Law and Practice of the International Court. Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
191. Rosenne, S. 2002. International Court of Justice: Practice Directions on Judges 
ad hoc; Agents, Counsel and Advocates; and Submission of New Documents. 
LPICT (1), 223-245. 
192. Rosenne, S. 2005. The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-
2004. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 
193. Roxburgh, R. 1968. The Black Books: Vol. V A.D. 1845-A.D. 1914. London: 
The Honourable Society of Lincoln‟s Inn. 
194. Sandifer, D. 1975. Evidence before International Tribunals. Charlottesville. 
University Press of Virginia. 
195. Sands, P. 2005. Lawless World. London: Penguin Books. 
196. Sands, P. 2011. The ILA Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel 
before International Courts and Tribunals. LPICT (10), 1-5. 
197. Sarvarian, A. 2011. Problems of Ethical Standards for Representatives before 
ICSID Tribunals. LPICT (10), 67-134. 
198. Schabas, W. 2010. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the 
Rome Statute. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
199. Schaffer, M. 1988. L‟avocat et l‟Europe des 12 et des 21. Strasbourg : Centre 
de formation professionnelle des avocats d'Alsace. 
200. Schulz, F. 1946. History of Roman Legal Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
201. Schulze, R. and Hoeren, T. 2000. Dokumente zum Europaischen Recht Bandz 
Justiz (bis 1957). Berlin: Springer. 
202. Schuman, R. 1963. Pour l‟Europe. Paris: Nagel. 
203. Scott, J. 1908. The Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice. AJIL (2), 772-810 
 317 
204. Scott, J. 1920. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
205. SFDI. 2004. La Pratique et le droit international. Paris: Pedone.  
206. Smith, B. 1977. Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg. London: Andre Deutsch. 
207. Spiermann, O. 2003. Who Attempts to Do Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 
1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. BYIL (73), 187-260. 
208. Stahn, C. and Sluiter, G. 2009. The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 
209. Stuart, H. 2008. The ICC in trouble. JICJ (6), 409-417. 
210. Tams, C. 2005. Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
211. Taylor, T. 1993. The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials. London: Bloomsbury. 
212. Teitelbaum, R. 2007. Recent Fact-Finding Developments at the International 
Court of Justice. LPICT (6), 119-158. 
213. Terry, L. 1993-1994. An Introduction to the European Community's Legal 
Ethics Code Part I: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct. GJLE (7), 1-87.  
214. Thorne, S. 1985. Essays in English Legal History. London: Hambledon Press. 
215. Toth, A. 1978. Legal Protection of Individuals in the European Communities. 
Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company. 
216. Tusa, A. and Tusa, J. 1983. The Nuremberg Trial. London: Macmillan. 
217. Tyrrell, A. and Yaqub, Z. 1996. The Legal Professions in the New Europe. 
London: Cavendish. 
218. Usher, J. 1983. European Court Practice. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
219. Valentine, D. 1955. The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel 
Community. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
220. Valentine, D. 1965. The Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
London: Stevens and Sons. 
221. Van der Sprenkel, S. 1962. Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A 
Sociological Analysis. London: The Athlone Press. 
222. Van Houtte, A. 1956. La Cour de Justice de la Communauté Européenne du 
Charbon et de l‟Acier. Annuaire Européen (II) 183-222. 
223. Van Reepinghen, C. and Orianne, P. 1961. La procedure devant la Cour de 
justice des communautés européennes. Bruxelles: F. Larcier. 
224. Vasiliev, S. 2009. Proofing the ban on „witness proofing‟: did the ICC get it 
right. CLF (20) 193-261. 
225. Vohrah, L. et al. 2003. Man‟s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International 
Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.  
226. Von Mehren, A. 1963. Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
227. Wall, E. 1966. The Court of Justice of the European Communities: 
Jurisdiction and Procedure. London: Butterworths. 
228. Watts, A. 2002. New Practice Directions of the International Court of Justice. 
LPICT (1), 247-256.  
229. Weiss, F. 2001. Improving WTO dispute settlement procedures: issues and 
lessons from the practice of other international courts and tribunals. London: 
Cameron May. 
230. Whewell, W. 1853. Hugonis Grotii de jure belli et pacis libri tres. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 318 
231. Wickremasinghe, C. and Gardner, J. 1997. The International Court of Justice: 
Process, Practice and Procedure. London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law. 
232. Wickremasinghe, C. 2000. The International Lawyer as Practitioner. London: 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
233. Witt, J. 2007. Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American 
Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
234. Wolfrum, R. 2001. MPYUNL. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 
235. Yarrow, S. and Abrams, P. 1999. Conditional Fees: The Challenge to Ethics. 
Legal Ethics (2), 193-213. 
236. Zappala, S. 2003. Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
237. Zimmerman, A., Tomuschat, C. and Oellers-Frahm, K. 2006. The Statute of 
the International Court of Justice: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Government and International Records 
 
238. 1945. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization. London: United Nations Information Office. 
239. United Nations General Assembly Official Records. New York: United 
Nations. 
240. Chernichenko, S. and Treat, W. 1991. The right to a fair trial: Current 
recognition and measures necessary for its strengthening. UN Commission on 
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.1/Sub.2/1991/21. 
241. International Court of Justice, Acts and Documents. The Hague: International 
Court of Justice. 
242. International Court of Justice, Yearbook. The Hague: International Court of 
Justice.   
 
Interviews
1023
 
 
243. Coulon, Emmanuel. 14 October 2010. Luxembourg. 
244. Cot, Jean-Pierre. 13 September 2010. Brussels. 
245. Doherty, Teresa. 20 August 2010. The Hague. 
246. Edward, David. 27 August 2010. Edinburgh. 
247. Forwood, Nicholas. 14 October 2010. Luxembourg. 
248. Fulford, Adrian. 8 July 2011. London. 
249. Fura, Elisabet. 15 October 2010. Strasbourg.    
250. Harhoff, Frederik. 17 August 2010. The Hague. 
251. Higgins, Rosalyn. 30 September 2010. London. 
252. Jaeger, Eric. 14 October 2010. Luxembourg. 
253. Keith, Kenneth. 10 November 2010. London. 
254. Koroma, Abdul. 4 August 2011. Telephone. 
255. Meisenberg, Simon. 20 August 2010. The Hague. 
256. Ovey, Clare. 15 October 2010. Strasbourg. 
257. Pocar, Fausto. 17 August 2010. The Hague. 
258. Sachithanandan, Pubudu. 20 August 2010. The Hague. 
                                                 
1023
 Four additional interview subjects spoke on condition of complete anonymity. 
 319 
259. Valencia-Ospina, Eduardo. 19 August 2010. The Hague.  
260. Vaughan, David. 22 July 2010. Telephone. 
261. Wisskirchen, C. 7 July 2010. Telephone. 
 
 
Newspapers 
 
262. Isikoff, M. 19 February 2010. Report: Bush Lawyer said President could order 
civilians to be “massacred”. Newsweek. 
263. Norton-Taylor, R. 26 January 2010. Chilcot inquiry: Lawyers expose pressure 
to give green light for war. The Guardian. 
264. Rodríguez Iglesias, G. 28 April 2000. Réformer la Cour de justice européenne. 
Le Monde.  
265. Rozenberg, J. 3 July 2008. Why the World‟s Most Powerful Prosecutor 
Should Resign: Part I. The Daily Telegraph. 
266. Rozenberg, J. 14 September 2008. Why the world‟s most powerful prosecutor 
should resign: Part 2. The Daily Telegraph. 
267. Rozenberg, J. 18 August 2010. ICC prosecutors should not be grandstanding 
on their own cases. The Guardian. 
 
 
Electronic Sources 
 
268. American Bar Association. Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Online: 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/mode
l_rules_of_professional_conduct.html [Accessed: 26 November 2011]. 
269. Bar Standards Board. Code Guidance:  
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/standardsandguidance/codeguidance/ 
[Accessed: 11 November 2011]. 
270. Biografiá del Dr. José Gustavo Guerrero: 
http://www.elsalvadorhistorico.org/biografias/138-dr-gustavo-guerrero.html and 
http://www.rree.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&It
emid=202 [Accessed: 10 March 2011]. 
271. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2004. Jacques Verges: “The Devil‟s 
Advocate”: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3578421.stm [Accessed: 10 
March 2011]. 
272. CAHDI, 2006. Item 7: Organisation and Functions of the Office of the Legal 
Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Document submitted by the 
Delegation of the UK: www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi [Accessed: 10 December 2011]. 
273. Centre d‟histoire Sciences Po: Pierre Cot. http://centre-histoire.sciences-
po.fr/archives/fonds/pierre_cot.html [Accessed: 10 March 2011]. 
274. Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe: http://www.ccbe.org [Accessed: 
20 December 2011]. 
275. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2011: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/557065/sovereignty [Accessed: 10 
May 2011]. 
276. Hoffman, L. 2009. The Universality of Human Rights. Judicial Studies Board 
Annual Lecture: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/Hoffmann_200
 320 
9_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Human_Rights.pdf [Accessed: 6 
November 2011] 
277. Institut de Droit International, Code of Arbitral Procedure: http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiF/navig_chron1873.html [Accessed: 10 December 2011]. 
278. International Bar Association: http://www.ibanet.org [Accessed: 5 July 2011]. 
279. International Court of Justice, President Hisashi Owada: http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/ [Accessed: 30 November 2011]. 
280. International Law Association: http://www.ila-hq.org [Accessed: 4 May 
2011]. 
281. Mayson, S. 2006. After Clementi: The Impending Legal Landscape, Legal 
Services Policy Institute: http://www.legalservicesinstitute.co.uk [Accessed: 4 
December 2011]. 
282. Oxford Dictionary of Law. 2009: http://www.oxfordreference.com [Accessed: 
9 February 2011]. 
283. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 2004: 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31703 [Accessed: 10 March 2011]. 
284. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 2008: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.
e2230 [Accessed: 28 October 2011]. 
285. Oxford English Dictionary.1989: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/196665?redirectedFrom=system#eid [Accessed: 
6 June 2011]. 
286. Owada, H. 2011. Sir Ian Brownlie, KT, CBE, QC (1932-2010): The Professor 
as Counsel. BYIL: www.bybil.oxfordjournals.org [28 October 2011], 
287. Neuberger, D. Working Party on Entry to the Bar: Final Report: 
http://www.barstandardsboard.co.uk [Accessed: 10 December 2011]. 
288. Office of Professional Responsibility, 2009. Report: Investigation into the 
Office of Legal Counsel‟s Memoranda: http://www.judiciary.house.gov 
[Accessed: 10 December 2011]. 
289. Sydney Chinese Consulate. Curriculum vitae of Consul-General Duan Jielong: 
http://sydney.chineseconsulate.org/eng/zlszl/t518871.htm [Accessed: 28 
November 2011]. 
290. Weismann, J. 2010. Freshfields Sued in International Racketeering Case. The 
National Law Journal: 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202446897911&slreturn=1&
hbxlogin=1 [Accessed: 3 July 2011]. 
291. Wolfrum, R. 2010. Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law: 
http://www.mpepil.com [Accessed: 10 December 2011]. 
292. Wood, D. 2008. Bar Standards Board Review of the Bar Vocational Course 
Report of the Working Group: 
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/news/latest/220.html [Accessed: 10 
December 2011]. 
293. Wood, „Legal Adviser‟, MPEPIL: http://www.mpepil.com [Accessed: 25 
November 2011]. 
 
 
 
